Philosophy Now Forum

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 10:41 am

BigMike wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 10:38 am What is your objection to what I've said?

Well, I'm not sure you've shown objections to what I've said in other posts. But let me put my objection in a different form.
You are claiming that it must have these qualities because of the name we have given it, despite the fact that we cannot observe it directly and do not know what it is made of. (not using observe in the vision sense but in the scientific observation sense)

You are making claims about the substance of something that scientists do not know what it is made of.

Do you disagree with my assertion that all forms of energy, even hypothetical ones like dark energy, if they exist, must comply with the energy conservation law?

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 10:21 amWell, I think it has often been dualism first, based on experience, then monism coming in and trying to say that really it's one substance. I hope you see what I am saying. You are presenting it as if the dualist reacts to the monism and says, nah, there something weird going on (mystery) let me add a substance. But generally I don't think that's been the process. I wouldn't go so far as to say monism bears the onus, but I do think it's a toss up, and monism has some work to do.

I get what you're saying, and it makes sense, but I can't say I agree with it.

When it comes to the question of "where does the mind come from?", it's not that monism has the onus, it's that we, human beings, ALL have the onus, because we don't know. We aren't even close to answering the hard question of consciousness.

We have a bunch of things we reasonably know exist, which we call "the material world". Obviously you can debate if they really exist, or what it means to "really exist", but let's put that aside for a moment if you will.

And then we have this other thing that we know exists, our own consciousness. We don't know how it operates, but we know it does, and to a reasonable degree we know its operations are incredibly synchronised with the part of the material world called "the brain".

When the brain gets damaged, the mind is affected, as far as we can tell.

But we still have the hard problem of consciousness, it's for all intents and purposes a mystery.

Now you say it's dualism first, and maybe historically, philosophically, that's correct - but does it matter? Does it matter that dualism was here first, based on ancient peoples ideas? We know there's matter, but we don't know anything about this dualistic substance. We don't have a single experiment to demonstrate its existence.

If it's just based on the intuition of ancient people, well, they're wrong, a lot. I don't think we have to respect that intuition at all. Ancient people took way too long to develop even prototypical versions of scientific processes of knowledge. Ancient people intuited all sorts of nonsense. So what if they intuitively thought about dualism? Their intuition doesn't get us closer to solving the hard problem.

So even if you're chronologically correct that dualism came first (and I'm not even sure ancient intuitions even made that distinction, but I'm of course open to being shown that), that still isn't epistemically a good basis for the assumption of a mystery realm to solve our mystery problem.

We know matter exists. We know there is a mind. We don't know how to solve the hard problem. And to me, that's where it stops. It stops at our ignorance. We admit our ignorance, look for a solution if we can, sit in awe and wonder at how bizarre our world is, and do that all without positing a magic world to house all the concepts we have trouble explaining merely in terms of this world.

Maybe there is some alternate "non physical" mind substance. But I'm not going to buy it as a literal truth as long as our only reason for believing it is "because I can't explain the hard problem in purely physical terms." Because a mind substance isn't an explanation itself either.

Say we scientifically found a way to prove the existence of, and do experiments on, the mind substance. And say we figured out the rules of how it operates, similar to our own laws of physics and chemistry. Say we came to understand the mind substance in exactly the same depth that we understand our own physics.

The hard problem would still be there. We would be asking ourselves, "okay, so the machinery of our mind operates according to these rules, but... how can that stuff operating by those rules produce the subjective experience of consciousness?"

You know what I mean?

Like, the more we learn about the mind realm and the mind substance, the more the hard problem reappears. It only apparently disappears as long as the mind substance is a mystery - and that's the problem with it. It's only a solution as long as it's a mystery, which makes it no solution at all.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 11:27 am Say we scientifically found a way to prove the existence of, and do experiments on, the mind substance. And say we figured out the rules of how it operates, similar to our own laws of physics and chemistry. Say we came to understand the mind substance in exactly the same depth that we understand our own physics.

Do you agree that in order to prove the existence of the mind substance and conduct experiments on it, we would need a way to "observe" it; a way in which our measuring devices or senses could detect something "emanating" from it, and conversely "poke" it in some way in order to interact with it?

If so, wouldn't the substance of the mind have to have physical properties and thus respond to its surroundings in accordance with the laws of physics?

BigMike wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 1:12 pm

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 11:27 am Say we scientifically found a way to prove the existence of, and do experiments on, the mind substance. And say we figured out the rules of how it operates, similar to our own laws of physics and chemistry. Say we came to understand the mind substance in exactly the same depth that we understand our own physics.

Do you agree that in order to prove the existence of the mind substance and conduct experiments on it, we would need a way to "observe" it; a way in which our measuring devices or senses could detect something "emanating" from it, and conversely "poke" it in some way in order to interact with it?

If so, wouldn't the substance of the mind have to have physical properties and thus respond to its surroundings in accordance with the laws of physics?

I'm not disagreeing with you. I think your position here makes sense. I'm entertaining the train of thought and seeing the implications of it.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 11:23 am I get what you're saying, and it makes sense, but I can't say I agree with it.

That made me laugh out loud, and in a happy way.

When it comes to the question of "where does the mind come from?", it's not that monism has the onus, it's that we, human beings, ALL have the onus, because we don't know. We aren't even close to answering the hard question of consciousness.

Oh, I agree. I wasn't saying that dualism, for example, has no onus. I mainly meant that the process isn't quite as you laid it out.

We have a bunch of things we reasonably know exist, which we call "the material world". Obviously you can debate if they really exist, or what it means to "really exist", but let's put that aside for a moment if you will.

OK

And then we have this other thing that we know exists, our own consciousness. We don't know how it operates, but we know it does, and to a reasonable degree we know its operations are incredibly synchronised with the part of the material world called "the brain".

Sure. Though the word 'brain' is a reification of all sorts of (yes, repeatable) experiencess - for example to an idealist.

When the brain gets damaged, the mind is affected, as far as we can tell.

Sure,

But we still have the hard problem of consciousness, it's for all intents and purposes a mystery.

I think there are other problems
or perhaps anomolies is a better word.

Now you say it's dualism first, and maybe historically, philosophically, that's correct - but does it matter? Does it matter that dualism was here first, based on ancient peoples ideas?

As a pragmatist, I do think it does. It doesn't in the sense of onus here, say. If you come here and write there are two substances, one mind (or spirit) or whatever, and one matter, then I think it's just plain useful and sensible to, when asked, justify this. Likewise the monist.

But in life, given that many of us (I think actually all of us) are at least partly dualist (I don't see people as managing pure ontologies in life, however much they can, potentially in philosophy forums) I think the onus of the disagreer with what seems to be workign for me gets the onus. And this holds true for other positions. IOW if it works for me to have a dualism (my own assessment of works) and you think I shouldn't be a dualist (or if the base is, idealist, pantheist, monist), then you've got the onus to get me off my momentum.

So, let's just be 100% clear. I am not saying that monism has more of an onus than my position or other postions. But if anyone wants to convince someone, they got the onus. Given that many of us have dualistic tendencies, any monist wanting to get them off that position, have work to do. But sure, any monist, trucking along and finding monism working for them can well require being convinced.

I think that's all practical.

What I objected to in your version was as if we as individuals decided to solve a mystery and said hey we'll make up another substance.

We know there's matter, but we don't know anything about this dualistic substance.

We keep expanding matter to include new things with new qualities or new lacks of qualities.

If you notice Big Mike's response to me mentioning dark energy, he says that it will be matter when we find out what it's made of. I agree in social terms. I think that is exactly what it will be classed as by scientists. I just don't think 1) you can talk about what we will find in science, that's mere speculation 2) given that dark matter and energy are supposed to make up the majority of the universe AND we can't observe them, yet, but infer them, yet we talk about them as real, it's a leap to assume it will be like matter we have called matter before and that the category actually means more than something like 'real'. 3) There are physicists who are idealists. There are physicists who are 'informationists' (the fundmental substance is information). There are physicists who believe that what we call the universe is something like a hologram and only at the periphery in two dimensions is reality. These are not merely marginal opinions. some methodologies) My point is that even the term physical (as the root) may well be arbritrary. Science is a methodology (or following Feyarabend and others, not a ontological stand (at least as far as substance.

Sure, if anything that has an effect on what we are calling matter is called physical, well, fine, yeah monism is demonstrated. But I think that word no longer has any specific meaning beyond verified or real.

We don't have a single experiment to demonstrate its existence.

I think we have evidence. Is it sufficient? There's a whole discussion. Or at least we have evidence of things that both sides tend to class as dualist, and one side rules it out because of this and the other defends a dualism that they perhaps need not.

Me as a spectrumist sees this all as rather silly. I mean, given the diversity of qualities and lacks we have even in what science has confirmed (so far) to itself, I don't know what a monist is really hanging on to. Why can't we just say 'here's all the real stuff we've found'. We do modify the possibilities of what is real and what it is like (qualities and lacks) over time and it seems likely we will not stop doing that any time soon. So, hey, it doesn't really matter how we view ontology as far as substance, mon, dual, plural. If any model at the level of substance stops research or makes us deny something real, well we can look at that. We can treat them as vague maps and go from there.

If it's just based on the intuition of ancient people, well, they're wrong, a lot. I don't think we have to respect that intuition at all. Ancient people took way too long to develop even prototypical versions of scientific processes of knowledge. Ancient people intuited all sorts of nonsense. So what if they intuitively thought about dualism? Their intuition doesn't get us closer to solving the hard problem

.

Again, I am not saying their or even my beliefs can be appealed to as authority.

But let's talk paradigmatic blindess for a second. UP into the 70s if you treated animals in professional contexts as experiencers with emotions, thought processes, intentions - so, as subjective experiencers first, then as having many of the things humans do and experience in their minds, you were in professional danger. There was a bias you couldn't drive a truck through. Primitive peoples as you call them - and animal trainers and pet owners, knew this was blind bias. But from within the scientific community on official levels, they were considered, yes, primitive.

Science still has biases and dominant models.

So even if you're chronologically correct that dualism came first (and I'm not even sure ancient intuitions even made that distinction, but I'm of course open to being shown that), that still isn't epistemically a good basis for the assumption of a mystery realm to solve our mystery problem.

Right. I know that. But if you already assume it and someone else wants to convince me otherwise they get the onus.

And you don't get to tell me that I made up a mysterious substance to explain a mystery. That just didn't happen. And some of what I tend to think of as not physical I experience all the time and everywhere, let alone the anomolies I experience with regularity. I am told by the monist that the mundane 'thing' is physical somehow. And note, this isn't me talking about ghosts, say. This is me talking about everywhere and all the time. And is the basis for every experimental observation. And, I don't, and most others have not experienced it as a mystery. The anomolies, sure, though not always even those. Hey, let me solve the mystery of my consciousness. I'll make up a substance for it.

I don't think that's what happened. So anyone telling me almost anything to believe gets an onus. And as someone who black boxes A LOT, in some ways I don't see what all the fuss is about. It seems to be about winning, often, and ruling out phenomena and old gripes. I can't see the harm, actually, in being open. Seriously, I see not the slightest bit of harm in being open and being comfortable with a diverse set of ontologies and models. AS far as I can tell, from my everyay life, most individuals exhibit different ontologies and epistemologies at different times during the day. That we can have diverse ontologies in different people seems to even have a bonus side. It doesn't close off looking in a certain direction. Maybe in the end we find that oh, it really is also matter. But perhaps it seemed like it would have to be non-material so we ruled it out first.

We know matter exists.

I would say science has current consensus on a wide range of things and they call it all matter.

We know there is a mind. We don't know how to solve the hard problem. And to me, that's where it stops. It stops at our ignorance. We admit our ignorance, look for a solution if we can, sit in awe and wonder at how bizarre our world is, and do that all without positing a magic world to house all the concepts we have trouble explaining merely in terms of this world.

It ain't magic to me.

Maybe there is some alternate "non physical" mind substance. But I'm not going to buy it as a literal truth as long as our only reason for believing it is "because I can't explain the hard problem in purely physical terms." Because a mind substance isn't an explanation itself either.

I'm not expecting you to.

See, that's the thing. My beliefs are not a demand for you to have different beliefs. If I think Big Mike bears an onus, that doesn't mean Flannel Jesus needs to believe what I believe.

That I disagree with the scenario you described doesn't mean you need to accept what you call primitive beliefs. 1) I don't think it's the scenario and it's not mine. 2) I am trying to place this discussion in situ in individuals. Individuals are already beleivers. Given that, they need reasons to stop. If it is workign for them, they need reasons to stop. Whatever that belief is, if they are expected to drop a belief. Yes, this even includes people who have beliefs we both would find problematic.

And when I say need, I mean this in two ways: 1) in practical terms. You can tell them over and over that they bear the onus, but if they experience their beliefs as working, that is not going to work, I think. 2) I think also in epistemological terms. We all bear onuses and I think it makes sense to look at this socially and chronolocially. If I come to you and say, hey there's two substances (whatever that actually means, but that's another topic). I am coming to you and say this, even in virtual space. So, I have seen your belief system and found it wanting and I come to you working to get a change. I bear an onus. I have a desire and it involves you. Likewise the other way around. Regardless of position and regardless of how obvious I think it is that you are wrong. (in this specific case, it's more like I black box it and shift around a lot, but I don't have some desire to stop monism, or dualism or non-idealisms and so on). I don't think it works to come and say Oh, you're a Christian, say. You bear the onus to convince me (whatever it is you think they are wrong about). If the Chritian comes to you - and in a society this could include indirectly through legislation - now they get the onus.

And it needs to be kept in mind all the time that asking for justification is not well rebutted by saying 'hey, you don't have any justification.' Hell, we could both be wrong.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 2:33 pm

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 11:23 am I get what you're saying, and it makes sense, but I can't say I agree with it.

That made me laugh out loud, and in a happy way.

That's gotta be at least half of what philosophy is all about- not getting someone to agree with you, but to see why you think it and say, "okay, I can see why your mind took you there. I'm not following you there, but I see how you got there."

Anyway, I don't need you to change your mind. Just chatting ideas. You do you brother

Sam Ruhmkorff
Hard Determinism

...hard determinism is consistent with blame, praise, and the criminal justice system. Even though people who do good or bad things couldn't have done something differently, what they do is determined in part by what they perceive as incentives. If we want people to act in a certain way, we have a reason to create an incentive structure that will determine them to act in the ways that we want. We should reinforce behavior that we like and punish behavior that we don't.

Hard determinism? Or, rather, free will determinism?

Or, okay, sure, it's actually my own inability to wrap my head around compatibilism.

As though what people perceive as incentives they were free to opt not to perceive as incentives. After all, if "people who do good or bad things couldn't have done something differently" than how do they manage to perceive things...other than as they must in turn? Aren't our perceptions also compelled by brains wholly in sync with the laws of matter? We do what we do because of what we first perceive and then think about. But how are the reasons we come up with "to create an incentive structure that will determine [us] to act in the ways that we want" not embedded in Schopenhauer's conjectures about wanting things being wholly in sync with wanting what we want. The brain sets up all of the dominoes such that everything that we think and feel and say and do topple over on cue. What we sense, what we perceive, what we reason, what we do.

A general theme behind these two observations is that even if we aren't free, we still want things to be a certain way. So we have a reason to work towards things happening the way we want them, both by making decisions ourselves that will lead to what we want, and by praising and blaming others so that they are more likely to do what we want.

And around and around the free will determinists go. We're not free but "somehow" when we want things we are. We're not free but "somehow" we "work towards things happening the way we want them". We're not free but "somehow" when we make decisions and praise and blame others we are.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Feb 02, 2023 8:38 pm You're going too fast for my brother, you're asking questions about an idea that you haven't even had fully explained to you yet. You gotta understand the full idea before it's worth while even trying to approach the questions.

Click.

What I'm waiting for is your own "full explanation" of all this to Mary. And to Jane if, in a free will world, Mary chooses not to abort her.

In that respect you are still "absolutely shameless". Well, whatever that means in a wholly determined universe.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Feb 02, 2023 8:38 pmThe first idea you've apparently just acknowledged above is that, no matter what, whether determinism or indeterminism or even mind dualism is true, no matter what, we can always trace any choice we made back to a state of mind or a thought that happened to us, that we didn't choose.

I want to just verify with you first that you understand and agree with that.

In a determined universe as I understand it, anything that I do understand, I understand in the only possible way that I ever could have understood it. And anything I seek to verify, I was never able not to seek to verify. Then [you guessed it] this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

The profound mystery that we are all "somehow" entangled in.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Feb 02, 2023 8:38 pmAnd then I want you to answer this: do you think we have moral responsibility and/or free will in an indeterministic universe?

Indeterminism: a theory that the will is free and that deliberate choice and actions are not determined by or predictable from antecedent causes.

As always, I make a distinction between the either/or world where human interactions are rooted in the laws of matter, and the is/ought world where sans God mere mortals derive their moral and political value judgments based on the assumptions I make in this thread: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

a theory that holds that not every event has a cause.

What events do not have causes?

the quality or state of being indeterminate. especially unpredictability.

Unpredictability is everywhere: https://youtu.be/mTDs0lvFuMc

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 10:21 am

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 10:11 am Looks like big mike's point there is that, if it interacts with the physical world at all, it's physical by definition.I suppose there's something to that, it's not without merit.

Sure, but then is a claim about substance?

For me, I can easily see how two different "realms" can interact, and interact deterministically, despite not being made of the same stuff, and the reason I can see that is because I can program it. Believe it or not, I've actually programmed a universe before, and if I felt compelled to I could program a synchronized universe, made of "different stuff", with a small surface area of bi-directional casualty between the universes.

Cool, though over my head.

So the idea of dualism isn't pure nonsense to me, because I can conceive of how to achieve something like it myself. My problems with dualism are that it lacks evidence, and it doesn't actually solve any problem. What it does is it takes a mystery, and it boxes up that mystery and puts it into a mystery realm, made up of a mystery substance.

I'm sort of a spectumist, though I think dualistically sometimes. I think we all do.

You can't solve a mystery by just saying "it happens in a mystery realm." That's not a solution, that's just a new mystery to box up the old mystery.

Well, I think it has often been dualism first, based on experience, then monism coming in and trying to say that really it's one substance. I hope you see what I am saying. You are presenting it as if the dualist reacts to the monism and says, nah, there something weird going on (mystery) let me add a substance. But generally I don't think that's been the process. I wouldn't go so far as to say monism bears the onus, but I do think it's a toss up, and monism has some work to do.

I'm pretty pragmatist, so for me it can be useful or better put perhaps natural to be dualist or use language that is dualist in nature. I am not so concerned with what is 'really' or really going on in the ding an sich.

And I mean, if you keep allowing anything you consider real to be called physical or expanding the category to put it another way, I don't know what you are actually committing to when you say everything is physical.

Just to jump back to the theologian fussing with his dualism and you come and tell him, no there is no transcendent stuff, non-physical stuff.

Then you describe magnetic fields, dark matter and energy, massless particles, a potential multiverse, gravity fields, neutrino passing through us, virtual particles, particles moving backward in time and the theologian just might say...

Oh, ok, that basket is so broard perhaps angels and God are physical, whatever you mean by that term.

Note to Mary:

I'm sure that eventually these gentlemen will get around to explaining how all of this is pertinent in pinning down whether in a wholly determined universe...a universe where you were never able not to abort Jane...you are still morally responsible for aborting her.

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Feb 06, 2023 7:53 pm Note to Mary:

I'm sure that eventually these gentlemen will get around to explaining how all of this is pertinent in pinning down whether in a wholly determined universe...a universe where you were never able not to abort Jane...you are still morally responsible for aborting her.

Note to Magdalena...
This thread is about Compatiblilism not the morality of abortions or the how determinism might affect the abortion issue or even morals. I am sure, given who the OP writer is the thread includes such discussions, but the OP does not. And substance issues (given mind/body issues) have a lot to do with possible compatibilisms and IS relevant and on topic.

Oddly we have the OP writer here complaining (either as if or that) we are off topic, since, well, by definition, he wrote the OP. To his credit and in his defense, the topic is 147 pages long.

It must be very hard living in a world where people don't always look at topics exactly as he wants them to. Or don't want to run every thread at Philosophy Now through his funnel of abortion. It's almost as if...people have different values. I am sure this gentleman will eventually get around to realizing that.

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Feb 06, 2023 7:40 pm
What I'm waiting for is your own "full explanation" of all this to Mary.

You didn't answer either question I asked you directly. You're still taking every opportunity you have to talk and not listen, so you'll be waiting a long time. An active listener would see the explicit questions I asked and answer them directly

I don't think you want to understand, because I don't think you have the patience to listen. Shameless

(I want to note that this is the first time I've ever directly insulted you, after many times of you insulting me. You drag me down. You're toxic to these conversations. You can't listen, but you can insult. This isn't philosophy, you are not upholding your side of the bargain. I expected better from you but I know now not to.)

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Feb 06, 2023 9:32 pm

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Feb 06, 2023 7:53 pm Note to Mary:

I'm sure that eventually these gentlemen will get around to explaining how all of this is pertinent in pinning down whether in a wholly determined universe...a universe where you were never able not to abort Jane...you are still morally responsible for aborting her.

Note to Magdalena...
This thread is about Compatiblilism not the morality of abortions or the how determinism might affect the abortion issue or even morals. I am sure, given who the OP writer is the thread includes such discussions, but the OP does not. And substance issues (given mind/body issues) have a lot to do with possible compatibilisms and IS relevant and on topic.

Oddly we have the OP writer here complaining (either as if or that) we are off topic, since, well, by definition, he wrote the OP. To his credit and in his defense, the topic is 147 pages long.

It must be very hard living in a world where people don't always look at topics exactly as he wants them to. Or don't want to run every thread at Philosophy Now through his funnel of abortion. It's almost as if...people have different values. I am sure this gentleman will eventually get around to realizing that.

Yet another "general description intellectual contraption" about...about me of course.

Click.

My interest in compatibilism revolves around the extent to which technical philosophical arguments regarding free will can be made applicable to actual human behaviors. And since some argue that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility why not go right to the top: abortion.

Though, sure, if pedantry is more your thing, and it's really important that others envy your capacity to sound like a "serious philosopher", by all means, keep it all up in the clouds.




Note to Iwannaplato:

You're up on the Rust thread.

Oh, and just out of curiosity, why "Iwannaplato"? You want a Plato? Now there was a serious philosopher!! A philosophical realist!!!

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Feb 02, 2023 8:38 pm You're going too fast for my brother, you're asking questions about an idea that you haven't even had fully explained to you yet. You gotta understand the full idea before it's worth while even trying to approach the questions.

Click.

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Feb 06, 2023 7:40 pm
What I'm waiting for is your own "full explanation" of all this to Mary.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Feb 02, 2023 8:38 pmYou didn't answer either question I asked you directly. You're still taking every opportunity you have to talk and not listen, so you'll be waiting a long time. An active listener would see the explicit questions I asked and answer them directly

And you didn't respond to any of the points I raised above here:

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Feb 02, 2023 8:38 pmThe first idea you've apparently just acknowledged above is that, no matter what, whether determinism or indeterminism or even mind dualism is true, no matter what, we can always trace any choice we made back to a state of mind or a thought that happened to us, that we didn't choose.

I want to just verify with you first that you understand and agree with that.

In a determined universe as I understand it, anything that I do understand, I understand in the only possible way that I ever could have understood it. And anything I seek to verify, I was never able not to seek to verify. Then [you guessed it] this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

The profound mystery that we are all "somehow" entangled in.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Feb 02, 2023 8:38 pmAnd then I want you to answer this: do you think we have moral responsibility and/or free will in an indeterministic universe?

Indeterminism: a theory that the will is free and that deliberate choice and actions are not determined by or predictable from antecedent causes.

As always, I make a distinction between the either/or world where human interactions are rooted in the laws of matter, and the is/ought world where sans God mere mortals derive their moral and political value judgments based on the assumptions I make in this thread: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

a theory that holds that not every event has a cause.

What events do not have causes?

the quality or state of being indeterminate. especially unpredictability.

Unpredictability is everywhere: https://youtu.be/mTDs0lvFuMc

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Feb 02, 2023 8:38 pmI don't think you want to understand, because I don't think you have the patience to listen. Shameless

And I don't think you will ever be willing to take what you understand about compatibilism philosophically to Mary because she'll be more interested in things other than dueling definitions and deductions.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Feb 02, 2023 8:38 pm(I want to note that this is the first time I've ever directly insulted you, after many times of you insulting me. You drag me down. You're toxic to these conversations. You can't listen, but you can insult. This isn't philosophy, you are not upholding your side of the bargain. I expected better from you but I know now not to.)

Just say the word and we can both dispense with polemics and/or making it personal. But I'm not interested in dueling definitions and deductions. I'm interested in those who have thought compatibilism through philosophically bringing their conclusions down to Earth. As I noted to Alexander_Reiswich on another thread, abortion pertaining to women confronting unwanted pregnancies or to legislatures and courts passing laws or ruling on them. Only this thread explores the reality of human morality in what may or may not be a determined universe wholly in sync with the laws of matter.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Feb 07, 2023 6:40 pm

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Tue Feb 07, 2023 6:31 pm But it's a non sequitur that determinists literally don't agree with. "The physics of our universe are deterministic" is not incompatible with "that person can change their mind".

Actually it is. Don't excuse the Determinists, just because in addition to their other "charms" they're illogical. If we use logic, we can see that's exactly where Determinism directs us.

Let's be clear about something here. IC believes in free will because he believes that the Christian God stuffed free will into our very soul at the moment of conception.

Or...some other time?

In any event, free will is linked to the Christian God. And he argues that the Christian God exists because it says so in the Christian Bible.

So, sure, argue with him over, under, sideways and down about determinism...philosophically. Actually take him seriously if you must.

But make no mistake about it...no Christian God, no soul. No soul, no free will.