What evidence would you accept for human evolution?

[Immanuel Can]

Well, just as an unmarried man = a bachelor, equally supported by exactly same evidence and equally data-supported are the same thing.

But that never happens. "Equal," in reality, is simply not available.

Nor is perfection, which torpedos any ontological argument for God,

It would, if God were merely a piece of furniture within the universe, rather than the Transcendent Creator.

...but I think you misunderstand. It is not two data sets that are compared, it is hypotheses that are attempts to account for one set of data that are compared.

Equality is not possible in either one. A hypothesis that is not equally supported by the facts is not in any sense "equal" to one that is. I think you must mean only that an observer, looking at both hypotheses, might be confused as to both, as to which one corresponds better to the facts: that's not the same thing, though, as saying that the hypotheses themselves are equal.

How are you going to convince anyone that being in Detroit is equivalent to knowing God?

Both can be experiential.

Why do you think saying that will convince anyone?

I'm saying that the case is much simpler than you think: those who have experienced Detroit believe in Detroit. Those who have not may find they have reason to be skeptical. And that skepticism will be warranted by their lack of experience, but it will not be warranted by the reality.

So I don't think my experience will convince you. How could I? But just as you could go to Detroit, you could have your own experience of God, and that might convince you after all.

What can one hold in their hands after a visit to God?

Two stone tablets, apparently.

Great. Show me the tablets.

You'll find them in Exodus. And you'll see their concatenations thoughout Western history, as well...even to this present moment.

The thing about being deluded is you don't know that you are deluded.

That doesn't change the answer. A delusion has no corresponding reality, whereas a perception of reality does.

What difference would an external reality make to a perception?

The difference between a delusion and a perception of the truth, of course.

You seem too impressed with Kant, if I may say, or rather, with the doubt induced in some interpreters of Kant. The fact that we have access only to perceptions does not imply our perceptions are automatically false. It only means that they are partial, incomplete and probabilistic. But even Kant thought there was the "noumenal" (real things-existing-independently) as well as the "phenomenal" (perception).

The fact that I perceive Detroit only from beside the river does not mean Detroit is less real, or my perception less reliable. There is a Detroit "out there," (so-to-speak) forcing me to perceive buildings, a walkway and a river, even if I'm only perceiving one side. My perception is not free-form and delusory. It's constrained by the reality imposed on it by Detroit itself.

That's what I mean when I say that reality is that which "pushes back against our wishes." I may wish to perceive Detroit as Disneyworld: but I cannot, because Detroit isn't Disneyworld. The only way I could perceive it the way I wish to is by choosing instead to enter a hallucination or delusion: reality will not help me do what I wish to do, in that regard. If I perceive the real Detroit, it will be as a dirty, run-down and crime-infested a city full of skyscrapers, abandoned neighbourhoods and freeways, not as Disneyworld. And while other people may characterize it somewhat differently, they will all likewise be constrained by their own experience of Detroit to perceive the real Detroit in some way it actually is, not as they might wish it to be.

[Will Bouwman]

I think you must mean only that an observer, looking at both hypotheses, might be confused as to both, as to which one corresponds better to the facts: that's not the same thing, though, as saying that the hypotheses themselves are equal.

Why do you think I must mean something other that what I said? I am not saying any two hypotheses are equal; I am saying that two or more hypotheses can account for the same phenomenon. For instance, we have the phenomenon of you failing to address what I have actually said. I can think of several reasons, one or more of which might be true, but all of them explain your behaviour equally well.

[Immanuel Can]

I think you must mean only that an observer, looking at both hypotheses, might be confused as to both, as to which one corresponds better to the facts: that's not the same thing, though, as saying that the hypotheses themselves are equal.

Why do you think I must mean something other that what I said?

Well, because I think you're a rational person, and what you said didn't make sense to me.

I am not saying any two hypotheses are equal; I am saying that two or more hypotheses can account for the same phenomenon.

And I'm saying that both good and ridiculuous hypotheses can "account" for the same phenomenon; but not much light can be shed by that fact. I can "account for" the phenomenon of cancer by way of malignant cells or malicious pixies: but I don't think you'll regard those hypotheses as even equivalent, let alone equal. And I think you won't have a problem figuring out which might qualify as knowledge and which as speculation, either.

So I guess I'm asking, "What's your point in saying that there can be multiple hypotheses for one phenomenon?" It seems both obvious and trite...as well as not particularly illuminating of anything.

[Will Bouwman]

...I'm saying that both good and ridiculuous hypotheses can "account" for the same phenomenon...

That goes without saying.

...but not much light can be shed by that fact.

More illuminating would be that two or more good hypotheses can account for the same phenomenon.

I can "account for" the phenomenon of cancer by way of malignant cells or malicious pixies: but I don't think you'll regard those hypotheses as even equivalent, let alone equal. And I think you won't have a problem figuring out which might qualify as knowledge and which as speculation, either.

Well, for example, there are several hypotheses competing to explain gravity. To take just two; general relativity and loop quantum gravity are both consistent with all the phenomena we are currently aware of that are attributed to gravity. Hence they explain gravity equally well, but no one knows if the model of reality either is based on is true. Do you think that one or other, quite possibly both, must be ridiculous? Are true and ridiculuous the only options you recognise?

[Alexiev]

Show me a duck evolve into a worm evolve into a man.

Right. There's no evidence of macro-evolution, even among lower species: dogs don't change into birds, or paramecia into cats. There is some evidence of intra-species modifications, such as red cats, black cats, orange cats, taller cats, etc. But none of cats-to-whales, or whatever.

Moreover, since the earlier frauds like the archaeopteryx have long been debunked, we're missing a whole ton of "links" in the evolutionary narrative. Moreover, what's needed is not just one sample -- like the archaeopteryx -- but all the billions of proposed "evolutionary fails" that the theory would require.

And we just don't have them. Why would that be?

Nonsense. The Gallapagos showed Darwin that animals could evolve sufficiently in isolation to become new species. That's how he figured it out.

By the way, since you want evolutionists to create life in the lab, why can't we demand that God create some new species out of a rib? Both demands are equally ludicrous.

Also, didn't Dr. Frankenstein sufficiently fulfill your silly demands?

[Immanuel Can]

...I'm saying that both good and ridiculuous hypotheses can "account" for the same phenomenon...

That goes without saying.

...but not much light can be shed by that fact.

More illuminating would be that two or more good hypotheses can account for the same phenomenon.

But what makes a hypothesis "good"? Can we say a hypothesis is "good" if it's true? Or do we regard one as "good" if it's merely deceptive enough to confuse the observers at the present moment? How is a deceptive hypothesis ultimately "good"?

In my view, a "good" hypothesis has to have the higher probability of being true, by way of accounting for all the data better. Since no two such are actually equal, there's always one like that. And it is the job of we who are disputing the evidence to decide which one that is...even in cases in which two hypotheses compete. For there is only ever one reality, and one truth about what genuinely accounts for the data.

Well, for example, there are several hypotheses competing to explain gravity. To take just two; general relativity and loop quantum gravity are both consistent with all the phenomena we are currently aware of that are attributed to gravity. Hence they explain gravity equally well, but no one knows if the model of reality either is based on is true. Do you think that one or other, quite possibly both, must be ridiculous? Are true and ridiculuous the only options you recognise?

No. But true and erroneous are. Were it not so, hypotheses could not "compete," as you put it, nor can "all the phenomena of which we are currently aware" be guaranteed to be sufficient to arbitrate that. Nevertheless, one will be right and the other erroneous, or else both erroneous. But both will not be true, so long as they contradict.

And that's just logic.

[Immanuel Can]

The Gallapagos showed Darwin that animals could evolve sufficiently in isolation to become new species.

That never happened. His finches remained finches, despite the differences in beaks. No finch became an iguana or a porpoise.

By the way, since you want evolutionists to create life in the lab,

Well, only if they want to claim it's "scientific" or "demonstrable." If they give up those silly claims, then I don't ask them to do anything.

why can't we demand that God create some new species out of a rib?

How about a new sex?

Also, didn't Dr. Frankenstein sufficiently fulfill your silly demands?

Do you think Dr. Frankenstein was real? Or are you having trouble discerning truth from fiction again?

[Alexiev]

Do you think Dr. Frankenstein was real? Or are you having trouble discerning truth from fiction again?

The Frankenstein story is as believable as the creation of Eve from one of Adam's ribs. Who is it who has trouble discerning truth from fiction?

[Will Bouwman]

In my view, a "good" hypothesis has to have the higher probability of being true, by way of accounting for all the data better.

By which measure the heliocentric model of Copernicus is a good hypothesis, because it accounts for the data better than the geocentric model it replaced.

Since no two such are actually equal, there's always one like that.

Maybe a Nobel Prize winner can explain it better:
https://youtu.be/NM-zWTU7X-k?si=RpczP4TajJNzw12F

Are true and ridiculuous the only options you recognise?

No. But true and erroneous are. Were it not so, hypotheses could not "compete," as you put it, nor can "all the phenomena of which we are currently aware" be guaranteed to be sufficient to arbitrate that.

Precisely. How then could we ever know that there isn't some phenomenon that we are not currently aware of that our best hypothesis cannot account for?

[Age]

Do you think Dr. Frankenstein was real? Or are you having trouble discerning truth from fiction again?

The Frankenstein story is as believable as the creation of Eve from one of Adam's ribs. Who is it who has trouble discerning truth from fiction?

The story of "eve" coming, or evolving, from 'one of "adam's" ribs', and, about "adam" coming, or evolving, from earth, while obviously the earth came, or evolved, from other things is, essentially, just a story about how through 'evolution' every thing is 'created'.

What other 'evidence' would a "christian" want, or need, for 'evolution' or 'human evolution'?

[Immanuel Can]

In my view, a "good" hypothesis has to have the higher probability of being true, by way of accounting for all the data better.

By which measure the heliocentric model of Copernicus is a good hypothesis, because it accounts for the data better than the geocentric model it replaced.

It would only be a better one than the geocentric theory, not the best hypothesis. And we should always aim for the best.

How then could we ever know that there isn't some phenomenon that we are not currently aware of that our best hypothesis cannot account for?

We cannot. That is why all human creatures live by faith, whether they know it or not. We cannot avoid the expedient of putting trust in things for which we have only indicative evidence, not absolute certainty. That's why it's all the more important to us that we pay attention to relative probability...we are rather error-prone in this regard.

Still, always, something will end up being true. So some hypothesis will be the right one.

[Immanuel Can]

Do you think Dr. Frankenstein was real? Or are you having trouble discerning truth from fiction again?

The Frankenstein story is as believable as the creation of Eve from one of Adam's ribs. Who is it who has trouble discerning truth from fiction?

To you, perhaps. And that's your prerogative. But you don't know. And when you have divine revelation to authorize the Frankenstein story, you should probably believe it.

[Alexiev]

To you, perhaps. And that's your prerogative. But you don't know. And when you have divine revelation to authorize the Frankenstein story, you should probably believe it.

If it's good enough for Percy Bysshe and George Gordon, it's good enough for me.

[Immanuel Can]

To you, perhaps. And that's your prerogative. But you don't know. And when you have divine revelation to authorize the Frankenstein story, you should probably believe it.

If it's good enough for Percy Bysshe and George Gordon, it's good enough for me.

[Will Bouwman]

In my view, a "good" hypothesis has to have the higher probability of being true, by way of accounting for all the data better.

By which measure the heliocentric model of Copernicus is a good hypothesis, because it accounts for the data better than the geocentric model it replaced.

It would only be a better one than the geocentric theory, not the best hypothesis. And we should always aim for the best.

Do you not think that, in its time, Copernicus's heliocentric model was the best?

How then could we ever know that there isn't some phenomenon that we are not currently aware of that our best hypothesis cannot account for?

We cannot. That is why all human creatures live by faith, whether they know it or not. We cannot avoid the expedient of putting trust in things for which we have only indicative evidence, not absolute certainty.

The "indicative evidence" is what we know with absolute certainty. It is absolutely certain that every example of indicative evidence of heavier than air objects, with nothing to stop them, is that they fall to Earth. That is not an hypothesis, that is what happens. When Einstein developed general relativity, which accounts for the advance of Mercury's perihelion among other things in a way that Newton couldn't, heavy objects didn't stop falling. What we do not know, and can never know with absolute certainty, is why that happens. Similarly, what anyone who has indicative evidence of God knows with absolute certainty is that they have indicative evidence; what they cannot be absolutely certain of, at least as long as they live, is why.

Still, always, something will end up being true. So some hypothesis will be the right one.

Of course something is true, but it doesn't follow that any hypothesis we come up with will reflect that.