Compatibilism
Michael Lacewin
A second form of compatibilism argues that it is a confusion to oppose free will and causation. The opposite of caused is uncaused; the opposite of free is constrained. Events are caused or uncaused, actions are free or constrained. So the opposite of a free action is not a caused event but a constrained action. Actions that are not constrained are free. The issue of causation is irrelevant.
Again, Mary and Jane.
What caused Mary to abort Jane? She got pregnant as a result of a defective contraceptive device. Then going back to why she chose to have sex and why sex is a part of the human condition and why the human species came about as a result of the evolution of biological life on Earth going back to the Big Bang going back to...what exactly?
Causes seem to be everywhere here. But we don't know what caused the existence of existence itself. Or, if it has always existed, how to encompass this either ontologically or teleologically. God, perhaps?
As for the distinction between caused and constrained, in a wholly determined universe where the human brain itself is just along for the "only possible reality" ride, making that distinction in and of itself is just another domino toppling over on cue re...nature?
Including this domino...
Here are four cases of constraint that bring out the contrast with free action:
1. You trip and fall into someone, knocking them over. Your knocking them over is physically constrained, not something that you had any choice or control over.
2. Someone puts a gun to your head, and tells you to push someone over. You have a kind of choice here – you can push them or die. But your action is very constrained, by coercion, a psychological constraint.
3. You are addicted to heroin, and acting on the intense desire for it, you steal from a store to get the money to buy more. You hate your addiction and would chose to be without it if you could. Your action is driven by an addiction, so it is physically (and psychologically) constrained, and not free.
4. Kleptomania is the compulsion to steal, without needing to or profiting from it. If you were a kleptomaniac, you would want to steal things, even things that aren’t much use to you. You may even want to not want to steal and try to resist stealing; but you don’t (always) succeed. We could argue that being a kleptomaniac is a case of psychological compulsion.
These four cases all stand in contrast to what it is to act freely, to act without physical or psychological constraint. This, say compatibilists, is the contrast that matters to whether we are free.
Again, and again, and again: what the compatibilists say about all of this is no less fated/destined to be as an inherent component of the only possible reality in the only possible world.
Though only if the hard determinism argument prevails. But: As though, for each of us, it does or does not prevail in turn in the only possible reality in the only possible world.