Philosophy Now Forum

Immanuel Can wrote:

Dontaskme wrote:Great, for not being what you meant, but nothing you or I says is truth. Words are only pointers pointing to the fact that there is a truth, but it's not known by I or you.

Oh? Is that TRUE?

Yep - not sure why anyone bothers conversing with this self-contradicting fool.

Londoner wrote:Why do we privilege the state of affairs that does exits, such that only this one represents 'order', therefore must have been 'designed'?

Simply because we know what "design" looks like. It has qualities like specificity, designation, repetition, function, interrelationship and so on within it. We actually have no trouble at all differentiating this from chaos. The human mind seems eminently well-equipped for doing so...another evidence of design, it itself.

You cannot observe 'everything'

Good thing you don't have to, then.

...because you, as observer, are part of the thing you are observing. You cannot do inductive reasoning about the universe because there are never any negative examples; the universe never contradicts the rules of the universe.

Actually, there are "negative examples," if you like to put it that way. Our universe contains both things which show the features of design, and things which show decay, decomposition, randomness, and so forth. And every day, we instinctively are able to detect the differences, and that based on identifiable criteria like those I suggested above. I see no difficulty there at all.

I would suggest that the problem is that we are using the 'universe' to mean 'everything'.

That's not a "problem." It's actually the correct definition of "universe." If we mean something smaller, we say "solar system," or "galaxy," or something that refers to something more limited.

But we are also using it as if it was a location, meaning 'where we happen to live', such that their might be other universes.

Well, for my part, I wasn't. If I ever did, it was an accident, and I retract that usage happily.

I don't believe in "other universes," and I think we can rationally show that there are no "everythings" out there other than this "everything." The Multiverse Hypothesis is 100% speculation, without a scrap of actual evidence. We have no reason to think the term even makes sense. For if a different "universe" ever became empirically known, then it would, by definition, simply be a previously-unknown part of THIS "universe," THIS "everything."

The only reason it ever appeared is that secular cosmologists seek an alternative to THIS universe, because without it we get into the entropy and regression problems, and they know darn well that pretty much ends the debate in favour of a First Cause. So they're running like mad to find a way out, and are prepared even to launch non-empirical, speculative models in an effort to show "it doesn't have to be like that."

So when we talk about 'this universe' have been chosen from a range of possible universes we can only do so by contradicting the first meaning of 'universe' ('everything').

Precisely right. So we need to throw away all nonsense about "Multiverses." The idea is nonsensical.

So, to say stuff about one universe ('everything') we have to imagine an observer who is outside the universe (who doesn't happen to live there). And we have done; 'God'. We do this by suggesting a parallel spiritual realm, so that although our own universe is still 'everything', there is also a separate universe of spirit. And from the point of view of that universe of spirit, our own universe is a separate object, one that can be observed.

Non-sequitur. If as I have said above, the "universe" itself (meaning, "everything in material existence), then we have a First Cause to that "universe," because of the regression problem. But then we have to deny what Sagan says in Cosmos, namely, that "the universe is all there is, all there was, and all there will ever be." However, we still have no reason to think that whatever "else" exists, it is another "universe" like our own.

It would have to be a "something" in a completely different category from the material universe.

Unless we take that step, which assumes what we are trying to prove, we cannot get started.

I think not so. We can deduce it from design and the regression problem, if nothing else. But I think we can also know it by other means.

Re: universal theories (everything is by God's will, life is all a dream etc.)

Me: There is no piece of evidence that can disprove them, because everything can be accounted for within the theory.

Non-sequitur. Just because an "explanation" is possible and comprehensive does not make it the exclusive explanation, the correct explanation or the necessary explanation. It just makes it a very elaborate mistake.

Absolutely it does not make it the exclusive explanation. My point was that there can be any number of universal theories; none of them can be proved or disproved, so that none of them can claim exclusivity.

"Exclusivity" of what? "Exclusivity" of apparent explanatory ability, or "exclusivity" of rightness? The two are very different.

Yes, we cannot show beyond any possibility of doubt that the brain-in-a-vat explanation cannot be right, but we have reasons to regard it as so unlikely as to be dismissed. For one thing, nobody lives as if it were true. There are far more plausible explanations that go along much better with the observable regularities of human activity and the kinds of cognitive experiences we all have. For example, unless ALL other people are fictional constructs of "the vat," we have reason to seek to communicate -- as you and I are doing right now -- but if they are mere fictional constructs, we have no reason to do so. Other people are not, in fact, "real," so things like communication, morality, knowledge and reason itself (so necessary as it is even to considering the "brain-in-a-vat" thought experiment) are inauthentic. But if other people are in any sense "real" or "brains," we ought to puzzle about why they have such similar "delusions" -- if that's what consciousness really is... But again, I think we have every reason to doubt it.

That doesn't make them mistakes, as I wrote it makes them 'inconsequential', since whichever is true (if any) it makes no difference.

Oh, I think that's evidently untrue. Even delusions can be "consequential": how much more is the truth "of consequence"? What we think makes a very big difference, even when it's untrue.

There was a time when people believed that matter was solid. That is a comprehensive explanation, covering all things: there was no "further down" to drill, it was thought, and nobody yet had the means to show it wrong. So it was just like the brain-in-a-vat. And yet, it was wrong.

'Matter is solid' is not a theory; it is a description. In due course we came up with a more complex description of the nature of matter.

A "theory" and a "description" are not opposite terms. Some theories "describe," and some "attribute." Some "explain" and some "evaluate." Theories come in different kinds, and refer to different cognitive challenges.

This is what Newton meant when he wrote 'Hypotheses non fingo'; he described gravity, but he could not give a reason for it.

[/quote]
That would be a limitation of Newton and his theory about gravity. He was just honestly admitting the limitations of his personal knowledge, and saying that he would prefer to leave the matter hanging, since he had nothing further to go on, pending a better explanation.

In other words, he would not advance a "feigned" or gratuitous theory. Not that no theory could ever apply to gravity. Nobody could say such a thing, because unless there were a "definitional" or "analytical" reason to prove that no further theory would ever apply, Newton would have been rash to say so much; nobody knows the future. How could he then say what theories might be possible for others in the future?

He wasn't saying there would BE no more theories...just that HE didn't have one, and wouldn't fake one. (This was the point that poor old wtf didn't get on the other strand, and got all bunched up about.)

More on...
Re: Language and 'truth'.
...later.

Must run.

attofishpi wrote:Yep - not sure why anyone bothers conversing with this self-contradicting fool.

Sometimes it's good to remind people of the contradiction. But yeah, at some point you do just have to quit bothering to say it. Maybe that's now.

bobevenson wrote:Name me a single religion since the beginning of time that has not oppressed the hoi polloi.[/size][/b]

Explain what you mean by "oppressed." From which ideology's definition of "oppression" do you speak here? For instance,

Is the hijab "oppression"?
Is circumcision "oppression"?
Is congregation-attendance "oppression"?
Is building cathedrals "oppression"?
Is theology "oppression"?
Is morality "oppression"?

We need to know, or we cannot evaluate the success of your claim.

Londoner wrote:
Re: Language and 'truth'.

Me: I'm sure you are aware of the many problems with this idea, for example how then can we talk about 'cats' unless we are having an identical sense experience?

Too easy. There's such a thing as comparable experience. Our minds have things called "categories," ironically, that let us recognize new cats. But yes, Plato puzzled about this.

That would be like finding the meaning of words by looking them up in an imaginary dictionary. How do you know the new cats are the same as the old cats? You need an imaginary librarian to make sure the mental categories have been maintained, then that librarian needs an imaginary supervisor... Isn't it more likely that you know the meaning of 'cat' through your interactions with other people? That we fix the meaning of 'cat' not through introspection, or some innate template from the spirit world, but because when we misuse it other people will correct us; 'That's not a cat, it's a dog!'

How can people "correct" us, if there's no "correct" and real usage of "cat"? That's the more interesting question. If we have no basis for knowing what our words mean, how does anyone else, no matter how many of them there are, get to "correct" us?

Do they not have to look at the real world, and say, "He's talking about a cat, but that's a dog"? If they don't, then why are they correcting us? For there is no objective thing to which the word "dog" or "cat" refers.

But our society has decided that in the real presence of a particular real animal, we will appropriately be using the word cat if, and only if, there is a real cat there to be the referent of that word.

Again, we're back to reality.

Once again, there is was mass of philosophy that attempted to fix words to 'things', or sense experiences in this way, both using natural language and artificial languages, the most famous names probably being Russell and Wittgenstein. I would say that philosophy today, at least in the UK and USA, is still digesting the realisation that language is not transparent in that way.

Not "transparent," no...but much clearer than "opaque."

They've gone overboard, as people tend to do, leaping from "meaning is difficult" to "meaning is impossible," without due warrant. And they swallow the "camel" of the fact that we DO communicate, in order to choke on the "gnat" that miscommunication is also possible.

Me: But I don't think that. I do not think there is only one metaphysical 'Truth', so there is no paradox in my saying 'X is true in one sense of that word, but not in another'.

But there's no way to say it's "true" without reference to reality of some kind yet to be specified. "True" is anchored there.

For example, you say

I might reply; 'No, for example there is an 'x' in 'Exmouth', but no 'x' in 'England'.

Yes, you might: and the truth would be established on whether or not there was any "x" on the page when you spelled it.

Or if we were doing maths, and somebody said "It's true that Exmouth is in England" I would reply 'I don't think you understand what maths is about'. Or, a West Country nationalist might dispute the 'true', they might say 'Exmouth is in the West Country; the English claim it is in England is a lie!'.

Not relevant cases. The first is a simple misunderstanding of the game in hand, and the second is a geographic conflict...but the second, in particular, depends on the question of where the "real" boundaries of England lie. And the dispute between the parties is over where that boundary "really" should be drawn.

Truth again. We never said everybody had to agree about a particular matter; only that both sides were contesting for a "truth" about where lines ought to lie. And they would not fight if they thought it were otherwise.

Nobody fights for things they know they can have in their fullness by being purely fictively anyway. But they DO fight over how things are going to be mutually actualized in the real world. So both sides are assuming an objective truth can be had; they may disagree about what it will turn out to be, but both are adamant that it will turn out to be something...something real.

Immanuel Can wrote:

bobevenson wrote:Name me a single religion since the beginning of time that has not oppressed the hoi polloi.[/size][/b]

Explain what you mean by "oppressed." From which ideology's definition of "oppression" do you speak here? For instance,

Is the hijab "oppression"?
Is circumcision "oppression"?
Is congregation-attendance "oppression"?
Is building cathedrals "oppression"?
Is theology "oppression"?
Is morality "oppression"?

We need to know, or we cannot evaluate the success of your claim.

Let me put it this way, any religion that is directly or indirectly responsible for me not being able to buy a glass of whiskey 24 hours a day, 7 days a week is an oppressive religion that should be destroyed forthwith by the hoi polloi. And you can substitute any other activity of your choice. By the way, I'm talking about the oppression of people who don't subscribe to the religion, but the pathetic subjugation of its own members is equally appalling.

bobevenson wrote:... any religion that is directly or indirectly responsible for me not being able to buy a glass of whiskey 24 hours a day, 7 days a week is an oppressive religion that should be destroyed forthwith by the hoi polloi.

Much as the barley beverage is a fine thing, I'm going to suggest that perhaps this is too trivial an impediment to warrant a term like "oppression"; and unless you're an alcoholic, it would be difficult to imagine your affliction being on the level with floggings, public beheadings, censorship of freedom of speech, and revenge rape. But okay.

Do you have a serious answer as to which ideology and conception of "oppression" you are launching your critique from, or are you actually launching it from nothing more than the bottom of a glass?

Immanuel Can wrote:

How can people "correct" us, if there's no "correct" and real usage of "cat"? That's the more interesting question. If we have no basis for knowing what our words mean, how does anyone else, no matter how many of them there are, get to "correct" us?

Young children learn language from others in social situations. Mothers talk to their little ones in actual social situations. The learning about e.g. cats will include whether or not the cat is allowed indoors, is kept for hunting mice, or is the companion of the old lady next door. The infinite number of possible utterances about cats make it impossible for a mother or other teacher to define all possible utterances that include the word and concept 'cat'.

Later on at school formal learning happens. The most effective way to teach a child the social usage of 'cat' or any other concept is through stories, and conversations with adults or other children who possess good vocabularies.
The teaching of science is more formal and in science one finds exact definitions for concepts.
Later on in life the individual learns professional jargons which define words and concepts for professional purposes.

There is no mystery, Immanuel. Linguists actually know facts such as I have written, based upon thorough research.

Plato thought that there are Forms such that there is an ideal Form of cat .Each person's concept of cat was, for a Platonist , a pale and distorted notion which was akin to a vague memory of the ideal Form. If Plato was right, the small child learning language would be sort of remembering what he had always known. Nevertheless the learning of the concept could not happen unless the social interaction also happened ideally when the small child was at the stage of maturation when learning is most rapid.

Immanuel Can wrote:

bobevenson wrote:... any religion that is directly or indirectly responsible for me not being able to buy a glass of whiskey 24 hours a day, 7 days a week is an oppressive religion that should be destroyed forthwith by the hoi polloi.

I'm going to suggest that perhaps this is too trivial an impediment to warrant a term like "oppression."

Since when does freedom come in different sizes?

Belinda wrote:There is no mystery, Immanuel. Linguists actually know facts such as I have written, based upon thorough research.

Your answer's a bit too quick, Belinda. It takes at face value that society determines meaning.

But then you have to ask, "HOW is society able to determine what meanings are relevant? Do they just "make it up" with no reference to reality, and then compel us all to believe it? If so, why should we persist in believing any of it, since it's all autocratically determined?

Sure, we can change words as we move from one society to another. And that might fool us into thinking "it's all dependent on society." But can we really change "realities" on that basis, or just words?

In other words, is there a "cat" on the mat for the English, but in the identical circumstance, no "chat" on that same mat for the French, and no "gato" for the Spaniards?

You see, the word may change: reality doesn't. There's a feline creature on that mat, or there's not...call it what we will.

Plato thought that there are Forms such that there is an ideal Form of cat .Each person's concept of cat was, for a Platonist , a pale and distorted notion which was akin to a vague memory of the ideal Form. If Plato was right, the small child learning language would be sort of remembering what he had always known. Nevertheless the learning of the concept could not happen unless the social interaction also happened ideally when the small child was at the stage of maturation when learning is most rapid.

Yes, and that makes some account of how children are indoctrinated into a particular language. But it doesn't tell us how ALL languages relate to reality. That's a better question, I would say. For we do know how to fool children; we just don't know if what we're convincing them to believe, or 'fooling' them into, is a reality or just a social delusion, according to the sociological definition of language.

It also doesn't tell us how ANY language first comes to have ANY relationship to reality...which is prior to all this, and far more important to the question of how reality compares to language, I would say.

bobevenson wrote: Since when does freedom come in different sizes?

Since all the time.

Your "freedom" to pick socks out of a drawer is of a lesser importance than your "freedom" to breathe. Everybody concedes that, I would say.

But you still didn't even try to answer my question, and I can't evaluate your claim as true until I know your terms.

Immanuel Can wrote:

----reality or just a social delusion,----

Nobody can know the answer for sure. My faith is that what we know is a socially constructed reality. However what we can know and the infinite perspectives of nature are not the same .

Belinda wrote:Immanuel Can wrote:

----reality or just a social delusion,----

Nobody can know the answer for sure. My faith is that what we know is a socially constructed reality. However what we can know and the infinite perspectives of nature are not the same .

"The infinite perspectives of nature"? That must be a metaphor for something, but I can't tell what.

Literally speaking, it must be patently obvious that "nature" has no "perspectives," to say nothing of the fact that nothing in "nature" is "infinite." The very phrase hast to be an anthropomorphism of impersonal material forces...nothing more. And as Hume pointed out, we cannot get any "perspective" ourselves from "nature," for "nature" has nothing to say about morality at all.

However, if "nobody can know," that "nobody" surely cannot include God, assuming for argument's sake that He exists. If a Supreme Being exists, there's no longer any reason to rest morality at the level of society. For the right answer will be the one that conforms best to what God knows morality is, not merely to what that society contingently and temporarily happens to want to think it is.

We could then look beyond society, and ask questions like, "Does one society (say Western liberal society) have morals closer to the true ones than another (say ISIL)?"

And that would be a very good question to be able to ask, as I'm sure you'd agree. For the alternative, social relativism, implies that there can be no objective value judgment to make against practices like throat-slitting, throwing people off buildings and raping women at will. Those are socially-approved practices in the locales in which ISIL is the regnant culture. So if social relativism is true, they must all be...."right"?

I'm sure neither you nor I would think that. But that is the implication of social relativism. We surely cannot rest there.

Immanuel Can wrote:...

I'm sure neither you nor I would think that. But that is the implication of social relativism. We surely cannot rest there.

No it's not, the implication is that there are multiple ethical and moral systems and if the people under one of them ask for our help the question for us is whether ask we decide to help them or not.

Given that in IC's example they think they are acting in accordance to 'God' I'm surprised he thinks they are wrong. Is their 'God' different from his and does this mean he thinks there is more than one 'God'?