Philosophy Now Forum

Immanuel Can wrote:

Noax wrote:The argument seems to be one from emotion. Pick my view, else I'll tell you you're a pawn.

It's not intended that way, so I trust you won't take it that way. Rather, a "pawn," by definition, is a chess piece. Chess pieces have no volition or personhood. They don't even have an emotional view of what happens to them. Rather, forces outside of them determine everything that happens to them. And in at least that respect, that's actually a pretty good analogy of the implications of Determinism.

Well in that case your analogy is nonsense. A monist determinist has volition and personhood, and has no need to initiate cause to have that. Why do you call him a pawn then?

But you can of course exercise your will and move to the same show in the next room where the guy aborts his entrance into the house.

Not under Determinism, you can't.

We talking determinism with the dualistic mind? Not under single-path hard determinism (there is but one movie playing). Its why I don't call myself a hard determinist. The view has pretty much been shot to hell by physicists, and implies the ability to cause effects in the past. Can't prove that's not what's going on, but its a nasty pill to swallow. Soft determinism says there are a bunch of movies playing, none of which can be touched by the viewer, but he still can choose which one to watch, effectively initiating (only for the free-willed viewer) any effect that is uncaused, and there are plenty of them in physics, even if no biological entity seems sensitive to them.

You claim you can initiate changes in the movie, yet you demonstrate (to the other characters in the movie) no such ability.

Why? Because I find your argument implausible? Funny idea, that. And ironic. [/quote]I gave an argument? What am I attempting to demonstrate? I just thought I was disassembling your nonsense.

However, ad hominem...not legit, in this case. A straightforward fallacy. My attitude, even if wholly "programmed by my biases," might still be correct. You need to show the truth or falsehood of the statement, not your like or dislike of the person who offers it.

Confused by this. Did I express an ad-hom? I actually like you since you're substantially above the median civility on this forum. You'd score even higher without all the condescending tone, but you still have me beat I think even with that improvement.
Your claim that you can initiate causes stands against all physics, and trust me, they've searched for it since there's a lot of money and power behind such a find. So while your view might be correct, inductive reasoning puts it well down the probability scale. You seem to be aware of this since you avoid taking a stance on even simple issues like where memory, will, and cognition reside. Do they reside in the brain, the soul, or mixed or what? Or do you decline to take a stance since that would destabilize your position that looking at the man behind the curtain is a bad thing to do?

To a physical monist determinist, the will is completely free in that one is intimately part of causal physics and can do what one wants.

Incorrect. Again you seem to mix Determinism ("causal physics") and Voluntarism ("can do what one wants") without realizing you're being inconsistent there. According to strict Determinism, your will is also predetermined, and so doesn't authentically "cause" anything at all.

"Authentically" huh? So the determinist's will causes stuff, but its not authentic because it's not uncaused? Sounds like you're making rules up on the fly.

"You" don't "want" anything -- the material forces "want" it (so to speak) on your behalf.

Try finding words that don't need the quotes. Using them shows you know that you're using the terms incorrectly, and the sentence reads really funny without them. No, forces and materials don't want anything, but the combination of them that makes up a person does want things. Under monism, 'want' is a product of a functioning system that is a person with volition and personhood, I know you need to drop into this fundamental particle mode to avoid discussion of a functioning whole. I can similarly claim a tornado doesn't suck since there is nothing but individual electrons and protons and such interacting with each other, none of which is an actual tornado or sucks.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Noax wrote:

But the pawn can do anything he wants within reason.

Not strictly literally true. Pawns can't "want." Their "volition," i.e. their motion, is caused by prior material factors outside of themselves. Pawns have no emotions or awareness at all...and certainly, no choices. But on this point the analogy isn't apt: that a pawn has an advantage of sorts over every Determinist. For at least in the case of a pawn, an intelligent agent is manipulating it. That's got to be much better than simply being the pawn of material forces, which can have no purpose in what they impose on one. Material forces, if they control what you do, don't "care" about you, and don't have any "goal" or "purpose" in mind when they do. They just move you around without reason.

No, the pawn does whatever the player wants it to do, whether that is a sacrifice, or an advance to the 8th rank to become a queen. The pawn is a Vehicle for the advancement of the game, nothing more, nothing less. There is a purpose to each move or the game is lost.

Noax wrote:

Can't pass through the jail bars, etc, but he's quite free to reject the inconsistent Jesus story.

He is " quite free to reject the inconsistent Jesus story" only if he engages reason . Modern civilisations are founded upon reason, although only liberal democracies encourage all citizens to be empowered by reason, by way of their universal school and tertiary education regimes.

Hobbes' Choice wrote: Switch on a light. Are you causing the light to appear, or are there ever more deeper levels of causality? The conditions and material of the bulb, the electricity right back to the generator and the nuclear reaction or coal burning that causes the heat - maybe you'd like to include the rays of the sun which nourished the trees that made the coal?

I would say yes; I have caused the light to appear because unless I switched it on, then it would not have come on.

I agree my switching it on is not enough in itself; it would not have come on if the house hadn't been wired for electricity, or electricity been generated, or the laws of physics...but nor could those things have caused the light to come on if I hadn't pressed the switch. They are the causes for lots of things, but here we are not looking for a cause of lots of things, only of one single event, of this particular light coming on, at this particular moment.

I would say that when we are trying to describe a cause, we might mean 'all the causes', but in that case we would have to include everything in the universe that contained me and the light. But usually we are trying to pick the cause most immediately linked to the particular effect; the last and crucial cause in the chain, or web, of causes.

That our ideas about causality are derived from habitual observation does not seem to me to matter. That we have such ideas, that we try to understand the world in that way is a characteristic of humans; it derives from our non-identity of ourselves and our experiences. That we think about our own experiences. Unlike all the other causes we might identify about why the light comes on, we alone have that dual character; we are self-conscious. We can therefore imagine things being other than how they are; the light might be on, or off. Nothing else in the chain of cause and effect is ever in that state. I think it is our ability to imagine alternative futures that is 'free will'.

Londoner wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote: Switch on a light. Are you causing the light to appear, or are there ever more deeper levels of causality? The conditions and material of the bulb, the electricity right back to the generator and the nuclear reaction or coal burning that causes the heat - maybe you'd like to include the rays of the sun which nourished the trees that made the coal?

I would say yes; I have caused the light to appear because unless I switched it on, then it would not have come on.
'.

This is the very definition of naive causality. And the point about Hume is that he's pointing out that as a fallacy.
If the sun had not shone on the tress in the carboniferous era making the coal that the generator burned to make the electricity -, the light would not have come on too.

What happens when you throw throw the switch and nothing happens?
And if the light blows and sets the lamp shade on fire buring down the house - did you cause the house to burn down. Did you kill the baby asleep in the bed?

Hobbes' Choice wrote:
Me: I would say yes; I have caused the light to appear because unless I switched it on, then it would not have come on.

This is the very definition of naive causality. And the point about Hume is that he's pointing out that as a fallacy.
If the sun had not shone on the tress in the carboniferous era making the coal that the generator burned to make the electricity -, the light would not have come on too.

What happens when you throw throw the switch and nothing happens?
And if the light blows and sets the lamp shade on fire buring down the house - did you cause the house to burn down. Did you kill the baby asleep in the bed?

That is a criticism of all causality.

As I wrote, if one wanted to list all the causes of an event, then one would have to list everything in the world, and everything in the world could also be described as an effect. So, all statements about causality are naive causality when seen like that.

So describing things in terms of causality isn't an exercise in metaphysics, when I say 'A caused B' I am only pointing out a particular relationship, not attempting to describe all relationships. If when I turned on the lights the house burnt down, in one sense I was the cause and in another I wasn't. Which sense is determined by the context; which question we are trying to answer.

But my point is that we only ask such questions because we are aware that something else might have happened. If the house did burn down, then the reason it burnt down was - that it burnt down. If we are not content with that, if we ask; Why? it is because we can imagine a world in which that did not happen, where the house remained un-burnt, where things are otherwise than what they are.

The house as it is, can only be the house as it is. It is not indeterminate, it does not contain 'all houses' (possible and impossible). But our idea of the house is not fixed in that way. Our ideas are not limited to 'what is'. That is the sense in which I would say we have free will.

thedoc wrote:The debate on free will vs. determinism is all dependent on where you draw the line. A hard determinist will claim that all influences mean that life is deterministic. However there may be some influences that are not deterministic, certainly all choices are determined by influences both external and internal, but some internal influences may allow free will, and it only takes a few choices, freely made, to demonstrate free will. Most of our actions are indeed determined and we are left with no choice in the matter, but there are a few actions that could go either way, and there is where the question is.

Hi, Doc.
I agree with what you say about where the question lies. So the question from a hard determinist such as myself is this. When you speak of those choices, freely made, that demonstrate free will, how do you establish that they were freely made? Some physical processes were occurring in your brain when you wrote the above paragraph, causing you to write in the way you did? How could those neural events have happened otherwise? Given that you wrote what you did, how could you not have written what you did?
In your response to Hobbes’ Choice’s first comment, you say “Some conditions MAY influence a decision, but it does not determine that action. The action may be counter to the influence, that is free will. Not all influences contradict free will.” My answer to that is that free will is not established. Your action counter to the influence of which you were conscious was caused by other influences, of which you were unconscious.

Londoner wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote:
Me: I would say yes; I have caused the light to appear because unless I switched it on, then it would not have come on.

This is the very definition of naive causality. And the point about Hume is that he's pointing out that as a fallacy.
If the sun had not shone on the tress in the carboniferous era making the coal that the generator burned to make the electricity -, the light would not have come on too.

What happens when you throw throw the switch and nothing happens?
And if the light blows and sets the lamp shade on fire buring down the house - did you cause the house to burn down. Did you kill the baby asleep in the bed?

That is a criticism of all causality.

As I wrote, if one wanted to list all the causes of an event, then one would have to list everything in the world, and everything in the world could also be described as an effect. So, all statements about causality are naive causality when seen like that.

So describing things in terms of causality isn't an exercise in metaphysics, when I say 'A caused B' I am only pointing out a particular relationship, not attempting to describe all relationships. If when I turned on the lights the house burnt down, in one sense I was the cause and in another I wasn't. Which sense is determined by the context; which question we are trying to answer.

But my point is that we only ask such questions because we are aware that something else might have happened. If the house did burn down, then the reason it burnt down was - that it burnt down. If we are not content with that, if we ask; Why? it is because we can imagine a world in which that did not happen, where the house remained un-burnt, where things are otherwise than what they are.

The house as it is, can only be the house as it is. It is not indeterminate, it does not contain 'all houses' (possible and impossible). But our idea of the house is not fixed in that way. Our ideas are not limited to 'what is'. That is the sense in which I would say we have free will.

In other words we have free will in no sense at all.

RickLewis wrote:There's some interesting and nuanced discussion in this thread. I'm almost embarrassed to intrude to point out that we're currently running a basic opinion poll about free will and determinism on Twitter.

https://twitter.com/PhilosophyNow/statu ... 5464221697

The question is:

Do we freely choose our actions or are they predetermined by chains of cause & effect stretching back to the dawn of time?

So far with 552 votes cast, the results are:

22% We have free will
18% Determinism is true
47% Both are true
13% Neither are true

Hi, Rick.

I note that 47% of your voters suffer from the Compatibilist confusion between "having free will" and "feeling free", which allows them to believe in determinism (sort of) without having to worry about the consequences for moral responsibility. I hope this poll indicates an upcoming article on the topic in Philosophy Now.

Dave Mangnall wrote:

RickLewis wrote:There's some interesting and nuanced discussion in this thread. I'm almost embarrassed to intrude to point out that we're currently running a basic opinion poll about free will and determinism on Twitter.

https://twitter.com/PhilosophyNow/statu ... 5464221697

The question is:

Do we freely choose our actions or are they predetermined by chains of cause & effect stretching back to the dawn of time?

So far with 552 votes cast, the results are:

22% We have free will
18% Determinism is true
47% Both are true
13% Neither are true

Hi, Rick.

I note that 47% of your voters suffer from the Compatibilist confusion between "having free will" and "feeling free", which allows them to believe in determinism (sort of) without having to worry about the consequences for moral responsibility. I hope this poll indicates an upcoming article on the topic in Philosophy Now.

Your conclusions are nonsense. Moral responsibility is a red herring which impinges on us regardless of this debate; but it's only made sense of with determinism like everything else.

Hobbes' Choice wrote: In other words we have free will in no sense at all.

Well, I do not think I said that.

What I am saying is that I think 'free will' describes exactly that, the will. Actions are determined because they have happened, they are in the past, so they are fixed and stand in a relationship to everything else. But our will is indeterminate.

Belinda wrote:The Doc wrote:

Certainly, but which of those influences negates free will, all of them will influence my decision, but where do you draw the line of which influence is freely accepted and which determine our decision.

I draw no line; I believe in absolute necessity which is to say that whatever did happen must have happened . Within this huge constraint there is a measure of freedom. We are saved from fatalism and despair by not knowing the future, and by reason and knowledge. The future doesn't exist. I speculate that existence itself will not stop.The details of what events will exist are up for grabs, and the more a man reasons and knows the more they are a free agent.

So freedom, therefore, is not randomly acausal but is a spectrum of power.

Reason and knowledge increase the number of future choices. Reason and knowledge increase the power of each man to influence the future.

Hi, Belinda.
I can see how The Doc might have thought you believed in some sort of free will. Apparently there are variants in models of determinism. In my version, there is no free agency. We may feel free, if we are unencumbered with external constraints and if our reason and knowledge give us some understanding of what we’re doing. Nonetheless, in my determinism, we are all actors following the dictates of our script as it unfolds. This, for me, is by neither a bad thing nor particularly significant. It’s more of a nuance in perspective. Where free will believers “decide what to do” I find out what I’m going to find myself doing.
I’d be interested to know more of your version of determinism, and how it allows for free agency.

Londoner wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote: In other words we have free will in no sense at all.

Well, I do not think I said that.

What I am saying is that I think 'free will' describes exactly that, the will. Actions are determined because they have happened, they are in the past, so they are fixed and stand in a relationship to everything else. But our will is indeterminate.

No - it makes no sense at all to say the will is indeterminate. Such a will would be utterly capricious and useless to exercise.
If the will is not based on our volition and experience then it is worthless or random. For the will to be useful it has , itself to be driven by our experience; and hence caused.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

Dave Mangnall wrote:

RickLewis wrote:There's some interesting and nuanced discussion in this thread. I'm almost embarrassed to intrude to point out that we're currently running a basic opinion poll about free will and determinism on Twitter.

https://twitter.com/PhilosophyNow/statu ... 5464221697

The question is:



So far with 552 votes cast, the results are:

22% We have free will
18% Determinism is true
47% Both are true
13% Neither are true

Hi, Rick.

I note that 47% of your voters suffer from the Compatibilist confusion between "having free will" and "feeling free", which allows them to believe in determinism (sort of) without having to worry about the consequences for moral responsibility. I hope this poll indicates an upcoming article on the topic in Philosophy Now.

Your conclusions are nonsense. Moral responsibility is a red herring which impinges on us regardless of this debate; but it's only made sense of with determinism like everything else.

Hi there, Hobbes Choice.

I'm not sure what you're referring to as nonsense. It is a fact that philosophers have worried about the consequences of determinism for moral responsibility. It is also a fact that there is a school of thought called Compatibilism which believes you can have your cake and eat it too. You'll have no problem hunting Compatibilist philosophers down if you're interested. I can't see how Compatibilism can possibly be correct, but that one's probably worth a whole other thread in itself.

Thanks for your clarification of Hume's thought, by the way. I found your comments, and Belinda's, very helpful.

Dave Mangnall wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

Dave Mangnall wrote:
Hi, Rick.

I note that 47% of your voters suffer from the Compatibilist confusion between "having free will" and "feeling free", which allows them to believe in determinism (sort of) without having to worry about the consequences for moral responsibility. I hope this poll indicates an upcoming article on the topic in Philosophy Now.

Your conclusions are nonsense. Moral responsibility is a red herring which impinges on us regardless of this debate; but it's only made sense of with determinism like everything else.

Hi there, Hobbes Choice.

I'm not sure what you're referring to as nonsense. It is a fact that philosophers have worried about the consequences of determinism for moral responsibility. It is also a fact that there is a school of thought called Compatibilism which believes you can have your cake and eat it too. You'll have no problem hunting Compatibilist philosophers down if you're interested. I can't see how Compatibilism can possibly be correct, but that one's probably worth a whole other thread in itself.

Thanks for your clarification of Hume's thought, by the way. I found your comments, and Belinda's, very helpful.

If there is no causality then there is no point in deterrence, rehabilitation or correction of offenders. If they can exercise their will free of causality then none of our penal measures are of any use.
However is a determined world, where each of us exercises their will, as determined by our experience, learning, motivation - innate and gained throughout our lives, then such penal threats of punishment can cause us to behave in ways that prevent us from criminal activity.
If you throw out determinism then people are simply free to do as they please regardless of consideration.