Philosophy Now Forum

Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Mar 29, 2021 4:31 pmYou are equating the experience of this color with the word "red".

More associating. Been doing it all my life and, so far, it has worked pretty well.

tillingborn wrote: ↑Mon Mar 29, 2021 4:36 pm More associating. Been doing it all my life and, so far, it has worked pretty well.

Mapping. Asserting. Equating. Associating. Relating. Potato/potatoh. It's a mapping function.

The point is that the association between the experience and the linguistic term is done by you. You are the mapping function.

You could associate the experience of this color with the word ""red".
You could associate the experience of this color with the word ""red".

And since you are the associator, why have you chosen this association and not this association?
There is no logical or empirical problem of any sort calling this red.

The only thing that makes this red is normative semantics.

Asserting "red" when you experience this color is a judgment. It's an ought, not an is.

Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Mar 29, 2021 4:43 pmAsserting "red" when you experience this color is a judgment. It's an ought, not an is.

It is also my judgement that 'ought' doesn't apply to the use of colour.

tillingborn wrote: ↑Mon Mar 29, 2021 5:25 pm It is also my judgement that 'ought' doesn't apply to the use of colour.

It applies to all normatives.

You are free to reach for the special pleading.

Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Mar 29, 2021 5:27 pmIt applies to all normatives.

You are free to reach for the special pleading.

Thank you, I will.

The use of language is a rule-governed game or activity. In that sense, language can be called 'normative'. But no one is obliged to follow the rules. No one has to use the word red to refer to the colour that English speakers call red - or the word dog to talk about the things we call call dogs. There's no sense in which people 'ought to' follow the rules, or that it's 'right' to follow them and 'wrong' not to.

And the same goes for playing chess. Having and following rules makes playing the game possible. It's why I can write and you can read and understand these words - we know and are following rules we learned - maybe from the cradle. That there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices - that there's no reason for calling the thing we call a red circle a red circle other than that that's what English speakers do - doesn't mean there's no reason for doing it. The things we call red circles - and dogs, and so on - exist.

So, as always, the debate about moral facts is ontological: is there a moral reality, and therefore are there moral facts? Do moral rightness and wrongness exist in reality in the way that red circles and dogs do? And just as our calling red circle 'red circles' and dogs 'dogs' has absolutely no bearing on whether or not those things exist - our saying an action is morally right or wrong has absolutely no bearing on whether the properties 'moral rightness' and 'moral wrongness' actually exist. They either do or don't.

Our calling something a red circle doesn't 'make' it a red circle. Something else - something demonstrable - is needed.
Our calling abortion morally wrong doesn't 'make' it morally wrong. Something else - something demonstrable - is needed.

And the 'something demonstrable' has nothing to do with language. So instead of deflecting attention by whining about the normative nature of language games - as though that's an exciting, gotcha discovery - moral objectivists just need to produce the goods: just one example of a moral fact.

We await with unbated breath - because the very expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. Aint no such thing.

Peter Holmes wrote:

-----the very expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. Aint no such thing.

In accordance with social reality there is such as a moral fact. if a society becomes fractured its culture of beliefs will also fracture and sometimes cause social reality to change not always immediately but quite drastically.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 9:01 am So, as always, the debate about moral facts is ontological: is there a moral reality, and therefore are there moral facts?

Do moral rightness and wrongness exist in reality in the way that red circles and dogs do?

And just as our calling red circle 'red circles' and dogs 'dogs' has absolutely no bearing on whether or not those things exist - our saying an action is morally right or wrong has absolutely no bearing on whether the properties 'moral rightness' and 'moral wrongness' actually exist. They either do or don't.

Our calling something a red circle doesn't 'make' it a red circle. Something else - something demonstrable - is needed.
Our calling abortion morally wrong doesn't 'make' it morally wrong. Something else - something demonstrable - is needed.

And the 'something demonstrable' has nothing to do with language. So instead of deflecting attention by whining about the normative nature of language games - as though that's an exciting, gotcha discovery - moral objectivists just need to produce the goods: just one example of a moral fact.

We await with unbated breath - because the very expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. Aint no such thing.

I have already explained a "1000" times, you are presenting the issue here wrongly or is deliberately deceptive.

Asking the following;
PH: Do moral rightness and wrongness exist in reality in the way that red circles and dogs do?
is like asking,
Do square-circles or two-sided triangles exist in reality in the way that red circles and dogs do?

The right question is;
Are there physical mechanisms in the brain that represent moral oughtness which can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a biological and moral FSK.

The moral oughtness [represented by its physical mechanisms in the brain] that is verifiable and justifiable empirically and philosophically within a credible moral FSK is a moral fact.
Therefore morality is objective within moral realism.

Belinda wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 10:17 am Peter Holmes wrote:

-----the very expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. Aint no such thing.

In accordance with social reality there is such as a moral fact. if a society becomes fractured its culture of beliefs will also fracture and sometimes cause social reality to change not always immediately but quite drastically.

All this can be saying is that it's a fact that there are moral stances, whether "social" or not. But that's not what's in dispute.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 10:50 am The right question is;
Are there physical mechanisms in the brain that represent moral oughtness which can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a biological and moral FSK.

And the answer is 'no'. If there are physical mechanisms in the brain that make us behave in certain ways, that fact has no moral implication. It doesn't mean we ought to behave in those ways - as I have demonstrated a thousand times.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 9:01 am So, as always, the debate about moral facts is ontological: is there a moral reality, and therefore are there moral facts?

As usual you are trying to side-skirt the issue. Ontologically, is there such thing as "red"?

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 9:01 am Our calling something a red circle doesn't 'make' it a red circle. Something else - something demonstrable - is needed.

EXACTLY!

Go head and demonstrate what makes this "red".

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 11:59 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 10:50 am The right question is;
Are there physical mechanisms in the brain that represent moral oughtness which can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a biological and moral FSK.

And the answer is 'no'. If there are physical mechanisms in the brain that make us behave in certain ways, that fact has no moral implication. It doesn't mean we ought to behave in those ways - as I have demonstrated a thousand times.

So you ought not to breathe, eat, and drink water?

I have told you a 'million' times, what is a moral fact is specific to a moral FSK.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Mar 31, 2021 5:15 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 11:59 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 10:50 am The right question is;
Are there physical mechanisms in the brain that represent moral oughtness which can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a biological and moral FSK.

And the answer is 'no'. If there are physical mechanisms in the brain that make us behave in certain ways, that fact has no moral implication. It doesn't mean we ought to behave in those ways - as I have demonstrated a thousand times.

So you ought not to breathe, eat, and drink water?

I have told you a 'million' times, what is a moral fact is specific to a moral FSK.

Oh, ffs.

Fact: if humans don't breathe, eat and drink water, they die.

Conclusion: therefore, humans ought to breathe, eat and drink water.

But why ought humans to breathe, eat and drink water? Why should humans - or any living things - live? Why is it right for them to do so, and wrong for them not to do so? Where is the oughtness here?

Try this: things exist; therefore things ought to exist - it's right for them to exist and wrong for them not to exist.

Does that strike you as a sound argument?

Here's a moral assertion: capital punishment is wrong.

Can a moral objectivist here explain how that assertion could be false?

What would have to be different in reality (not in what people think about reality), in order for it to be false - or a false inductive conclusion - or a false polished conjecture.

If, as I maintain, that (or any) moral assertion can't be false, then the claim that it's true is incoherent. And the claim 'X is morally right/wrong' isn't a factual assertion with a truth-value at all.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Mar 31, 2021 3:01 pm Here's a moral assertion: capital punishment is wrong.

Can a moral objectivist here explain how that assertion could be false?

What would have to be different in reality (not in what people think about reality), in order for it to be false - or a false inductive conclusion - or a false polished conjecture.

If, as I maintain, that (or any) moral assertion can't be false, then the claim that it's true is incoherent. And the claim 'X is morally right/wrong' isn't a factual assertion with a truth-value at all.

Here's a factual assertion. This square is blue.

Can any objectivist here explain how that assertion could be false?

What would have to be different in reality (not in what people think about reality), in order for it to be false - or a false inductive conclusion - or a false polished conjecture.

If, as I maintain, that assertions can't be false, then the claim that it's true is incoherent. And the claim "The square is blue isn't an assertion with a truth-value at all".