South Africa: difficulty getting good information

[accelafine]

Determinism means no one could have acted differently in the moment. That’s not a philosophical garnish—it’s the core. No freedom to choose means no moral justification for blame-based punishment. Period. You can’t logically hold someone “accountable” in the traditional sense if their actions were the inevitable result of prior causes.

Anyone, everyone can act differently in any given moment. That is more true than saying no one in a given moment could act differently.

But it is certainly true that men can be trained to control their impulses and to think about consequences in the moment.

That people who engage in crimes make the choice to do something illegal and punishable is a complicated issue. But it is plainly false to say “they had no choice”.

The question of how criminals should be effectively punished is separate from the pseudo-philosophical assertion that no one can choose, in a given moment, what they do. It stands to reason that it is more efficient and less expensive in the long run to attempt rehabilitation of a criminal rather than to be punish with vengeance tactics.

But the apparent fact that Norway, with one of the lowest crime rates in the world, even before they reformed the prison system, has low recidivism rates does not prove Mike’s assertion that men cannot choose their behaviors.

Alexis, if you think the Norwegian Vikings were peace-loving models of impulse control, ask the Brits. Or the French. Or anyone who lived through Lindisfarne, Paris, or the thousand other raids. The Norwegians weren’t exactly known for rehabilitation in the 9th century. They were known for burning monasteries and enslaving entire villages. So if you’re under the impression that Norway's low recidivism today is just the echo of some ancient cultural restraint, you’ve skipped about 1,000 years of history and reform.

And if you think the Lindisfarne raid is fantasy, I’d say your skepticism is misfiring. But forget Vikings for a second. Let’s talk Portugal.

They decriminalized drugs over two decades ago. Treated addiction as a medical issue, not a moral failing. Their rates of drug-related deaths, HIV infection, and incarceration all dropped dramatically. Not because people suddenly “chose better,” but because the conditions that drive behavior were intelligently reshaped.

That’s determinism in action: you change the outcomes by changing the inputs. You don’t scream at the addict to "make better choices." You change the environment that produces addiction. Just like Norway changed the environment that fuels recidivism.

Your insistence that “anyone can act differently in a given moment” is not an argument—it’s a faith statement. It feels true because you’re used to thinking that way. But feelings aren’t logic, and intuition isn’t evidence. The deterministic view doesn’t deny that people change—it explains how and why they change, without resorting to metaphysical free will.

So if you want to argue against determinism, you’ll need more than vague appeals to what “stands to reason.” You’ll need to explain how anything—any thought, decision, or action—escapes cause and effect. Until then, all you’re doing is declaring your belief louder, not defending it better.

Drugs should be decriminalised everywhere. It's a non crime and a non issue and has nothing to do with whatever your 'argument' is.
You are getting really annoying. By saying that 'accepting determinisim' means we can then 'choose to be kinder and more just' is a contradiction. You don't appear to have the brain capacity to see that. Don't bother replying. If I wanted an 'answer' I could just refer back to any one of your tediously repetitive (but typo-free) AI word salad posts.

[BigMike]

So, by the same token, no one "deserves" Nobel Prizes (or any achievement for that matter). Perhaps we could start the ball of deterministic acceptance rolling by doing away with trophies and prizes, doing away with competitions that reward achievement or merit. Instead of giving a CEO millions of dollars to sit around and make decisions, maybe we ought to just pay them a basic wage like everyone else? What do you think? Essentially, we're all not unlike molecules bumping around into each other in accidental ways that produce different results for each of us. We have no more agency than to be in the right place at the right time for something, either good or bad, to happen. If everything is determined, then what difference do incentives make any more than disincentives do?

Gary, yes—exactly. That’s the point. No one "deserves" a Nobel Prize any more than they “deserve” a prison cell. Not if by "deserve" you mean they freely chose their intelligence, drive, health, upbringing, education, or opportunities. They didn’t. No one did. That's what determinism makes clear: outcomes—good or bad—emerge from causes, not from some magical internal chooser floating above causality.

So when you say, “maybe we ought to just pay CEOs a basic wage like everyone else”—I don’t hear sarcasm. I hear you touching the core of what a just, deterministic society would look like: one that stops confusing luck for virtue and misfortune for guilt. One that stops rewarding people for “winning” a race they didn’t choose to enter, with conditions they didn’t control.

And no, that doesn’t mean incentives have no effect. Of course they do. Incentives, like every other environmental input, influence behavior. But we shouldn’t kid ourselves into thinking those who respond well to incentives are “better people.” They’re just the products of causes that made them responsive to that input. That insight doesn’t make incentives useless—it just removes the self-congratulatory mythology around them.

What you’re resisting is actually the next logical step in your own thinking. If we accept that no one “deserves” to be tortured, then we also have to accept that no one “deserves” to be idolized. It’s the same mistake in both directions: assigning moral weight to outcomes that were causally inevitable.

So yes, let’s start rethinking incentives and disincentives. Let’s stop propping up myths of merit and blame. And let’s start designing systems that are based not on fantasy—but on facts. Because that’s the only way to stop punishing the unlucky and worshiping the fortunate.

OK. Wait, you said incentives have an effect. But disincentives don't? Do incentives make people happy and want to pursue the tasks that would reward them? But disincentives don't cause people to think twice about murdering someone who really, really pissed them off by cutting them off in traffic or something (for example)? A disincentive doesn't cause people to check their anger?

Gary, now you’re twisting the argument.

No one said disincentives don’t have effects. Of course they do. Just like incentives, they’re part of the causal chain. What I said is that neither incentives nor disincentives are about what someone “deserves.” They’re about influencing behavior through cause and effect—not handing out moral gold stars or lashes.

The issue isn’t whether disincentives “work.” The issue is why we use them—and whether we’re using them intelligently or just lashing out in moral panic. If your goal is to prevent someone from committing a violent act in traffic, then sure, legal consequences (a form of disincentive) can shape behavior. That’s not in dispute. But if your goal is justice in the moral sense—punishing someone because they "deserve it"—then under determinism, you’re off the rails.

So let’s be clear: incentives and disincentives are both tools. Determinism just strips away the mythology that turns those tools into moral theater. It tells us to use them strategically, not punitively.

Your example of someone checking their anger because they fear punishment? That’s exactly how disincentives function within a deterministic framework. Fear itself is caused—by upbringing, by culture, by the memory of consequences. None of it comes from a magical chooser overriding causality in the heat of the moment.

So yes, both incentives and disincentives work. But the story we tell about why we use them—and who "deserves" what—that’s what determinism forces us to rethink.

[accelafine]

Come to think of it he only likes responding to the idiots anyway

[BigMike]

Anyone, everyone can act differently in any given moment. That is more true than saying no one in a given moment could act differently.

But it is certainly true that men can be trained to control their impulses and to think about consequences in the moment.

That people who engage in crimes make the choice to do something illegal and punishable is a complicated issue. But it is plainly false to say “they had no choice”.

The question of how criminals should be effectively punished is separate from the pseudo-philosophical assertion that no one can choose, in a given moment, what they do. It stands to reason that it is more efficient and less expensive in the long run to attempt rehabilitation of a criminal rather than to be punish with vengeance tactics.

But the apparent fact that Norway, with one of the lowest crime rates in the world, even before they reformed the prison system, has low recidivism rates does not prove Mike’s assertion that men cannot choose their behaviors.

Alexis, if you think the Norwegian Vikings were peace-loving models of impulse control, ask the Brits. Or the French. Or anyone who lived through Lindisfarne, Paris, or the thousand other raids. The Norwegians weren’t exactly known for rehabilitation in the 9th century. They were known for burning monasteries and enslaving entire villages. So if you’re under the impression that Norway's low recidivism today is just the echo of some ancient cultural restraint, you’ve skipped about 1,000 years of history and reform.

And if you think the Lindisfarne raid is fantasy, I’d say your skepticism is misfiring. But forget Vikings for a second. Let’s talk Portugal.

They decriminalized drugs over two decades ago. Treated addiction as a medical issue, not a moral failing. Their rates of drug-related deaths, HIV infection, and incarceration all dropped dramatically. Not because people suddenly “chose better,” but because the conditions that drive behavior were intelligently reshaped.

That’s determinism in action: you change the outcomes by changing the inputs. You don’t scream at the addict to "make better choices." You change the environment that produces addiction. Just like Norway changed the environment that fuels recidivism.

Your insistence that “anyone can act differently in a given moment” is not an argument—it’s a faith statement. It feels true because you’re used to thinking that way. But feelings aren’t logic, and intuition isn’t evidence. The deterministic view doesn’t deny that people change—it explains how and why they change, without resorting to metaphysical free will.

So if you want to argue against determinism, you’ll need more than vague appeals to what “stands to reason.” You’ll need to explain how anything—any thought, decision, or action—escapes cause and effect. Until then, all you’re doing is declaring your belief louder, not defending it better.

Drugs should be decriminalised everywhere. It's a non crime and a non issue and has nothing to do with whatever your 'argument' is.
You are getting really annoying. By saying that 'accepting determinisim' means we can then 'choose to be kinder and more just' is a contradiction. You don't appear to have the brain capacity to see that. Don't bother replying. If I wanted an 'answer' I could just refer back to any one of your tediously repetitive (but typo-free) AI word salad posts.

If my posts annoy you that much, accelafine, there's a simple fix: put me on your foe-list. That way you won’t have to read anything I write, and you can stop misrepresenting what I’m saying based on partial readings or frustration. Win-win. You stay unbothered, and I don’t have to correct misinterpretations you didn’t want to understand in the first place.

[Gary Childress]

Gary, yes—exactly. That’s the point. No one "deserves" a Nobel Prize any more than they “deserve” a prison cell. Not if by "deserve" you mean they freely chose their intelligence, drive, health, upbringing, education, or opportunities. They didn’t. No one did. That's what determinism makes clear: outcomes—good or bad—emerge from causes, not from some magical internal chooser floating above causality.

So when you say, “maybe we ought to just pay CEOs a basic wage like everyone else”—I don’t hear sarcasm. I hear you touching the core of what a just, deterministic society would look like: one that stops confusing luck for virtue and misfortune for guilt. One that stops rewarding people for “winning” a race they didn’t choose to enter, with conditions they didn’t control.

And no, that doesn’t mean incentives have no effect. Of course they do. Incentives, like every other environmental input, influence behavior. But we shouldn’t kid ourselves into thinking those who respond well to incentives are “better people.” They’re just the products of causes that made them responsive to that input. That insight doesn’t make incentives useless—it just removes the self-congratulatory mythology around them.

What you’re resisting is actually the next logical step in your own thinking. If we accept that no one “deserves” to be tortured, then we also have to accept that no one “deserves” to be idolized. It’s the same mistake in both directions: assigning moral weight to outcomes that were causally inevitable.

So yes, let’s start rethinking incentives and disincentives. Let’s stop propping up myths of merit and blame. And let’s start designing systems that are based not on fantasy—but on facts. Because that’s the only way to stop punishing the unlucky and worshiping the fortunate.

OK. Wait, you said incentives have an effect. But disincentives don't? Do incentives make people happy and want to pursue the tasks that would reward them? But disincentives don't cause people to think twice about murdering someone who really, really pissed them off by cutting them off in traffic or something (for example)? A disincentive doesn't cause people to check their anger?

Gary, now you’re twisting the argument.

No one said disincentives don’t have effects. Of course they do. Just like incentives, they’re part of the causal chain. What I said is that neither incentives nor disincentives are about what someone “deserves.” They’re about influencing behavior through cause and effect—not handing out moral gold stars or lashes.

Color me confused. You say no one "deserves" incentives or disincentives, But you say that they influence behavior through cause and effect "not through handing out moral gold stars or lashes"? But isn't that what causes the effect of people doing things, the gold stars or lashes? Aren't the gold stars and lashes the very influencers that you are trying to promote?

[accelafine]

Alexis, if you think the Norwegian Vikings were peace-loving models of impulse control, ask the Brits. Or the French. Or anyone who lived through Lindisfarne, Paris, or the thousand other raids. The Norwegians weren’t exactly known for rehabilitation in the 9th century. They were known for burning monasteries and enslaving entire villages. So if you’re under the impression that Norway's low recidivism today is just the echo of some ancient cultural restraint, you’ve skipped about 1,000 years of history and reform.

And if you think the Lindisfarne raid is fantasy, I’d say your skepticism is misfiring. But forget Vikings for a second. Let’s talk Portugal.

They decriminalized drugs over two decades ago. Treated addiction as a medical issue, not a moral failing. Their rates of drug-related deaths, HIV infection, and incarceration all dropped dramatically. Not because people suddenly “chose better,” but because the conditions that drive behavior were intelligently reshaped.

That’s determinism in action: you change the outcomes by changing the inputs. You don’t scream at the addict to "make better choices." You change the environment that produces addiction. Just like Norway changed the environment that fuels recidivism.

Your insistence that “anyone can act differently in a given moment” is not an argument—it’s a faith statement. It feels true because you’re used to thinking that way. But feelings aren’t logic, and intuition isn’t evidence. The deterministic view doesn’t deny that people change—it explains how and why they change, without resorting to metaphysical free will.

So if you want to argue against determinism, you’ll need more than vague appeals to what “stands to reason.” You’ll need to explain how anything—any thought, decision, or action—escapes cause and effect. Until then, all you’re doing is declaring your belief louder, not defending it better.

Drugs should be decriminalised everywhere. It's a non crime and a non issue and has nothing to do with whatever your 'argument' is.
You are getting really annoying. By saying that 'accepting determinisim' means we can then 'choose to be kinder and more just' is a contradiction. You don't appear to have the brain capacity to see that. Don't bother replying. If I wanted an 'answer' I could just refer back to any one of your tediously repetitive (but typo-free) AI word salad posts.

If my posts annoy you that much, accelafine, there's a simple fix: put me on your foe-list. That way you won’t have to read anything I write, and you can stop misrepresenting what I’m saying based on partial readings or frustration. Win-win. You stay unbothered, and I don’t have to correct misinterpretations you didn’t want to understand in the first place.

I haven't misinterpreted anything. You've written the same thing often enough for crying out loud. You just know I'm right. Simple.

[BigMike]

OK. Wait, you said incentives have an effect. But disincentives don't? Do incentives make people happy and want to pursue the tasks that would reward them? But disincentives don't cause people to think twice about murdering someone who really, really pissed them off by cutting them off in traffic or something (for example)? A disincentive doesn't cause people to check their anger?

Gary, now you’re twisting the argument.

No one said disincentives don’t have effects. Of course they do. Just like incentives, they’re part of the causal chain. What I said is that neither incentives nor disincentives are about what someone “deserves.” They’re about influencing behavior through cause and effect—not handing out moral gold stars or lashes.

Color me confused. You say no one "deserves" incentives or disincentives, But you say that they influence behavior through cause and effect "not through handing out moral gold stars or lashes"? But isn't that what causes the effect of people doing things, the gold stars or lashes? Aren't the gold stars and lashes the very influencers that you are trying to promote?

Gary, you’re conflating effectiveness with moral justification—and that’s exactly the distinction determinism demands we make.

Yes, rewards and punishments influence behavior. That’s precisely the point: they’re tools in the causal chain. But calling them "deserved" adds a layer of moral fiction that determinism exposes as false. The gold stars and lashes may produce effects—but that doesn’t mean the person earned them in any metaphysical or moral sense.

Let’s make it simple: imagine pressing a lever that releases food for a rat in a lab. The rat learns, changes its behavior. But do you say the rat deserved the pellet? No—you say the environment was conditioned to produce an outcome. Same principle applies to humans, just with more complexity.

So yes, use incentives and disincentives—but stop pretending they're moral judgments. They're levers. They're cause-and-effect mechanisms. They work, but they don’t carry moral weight unless you insert it. And under determinism, inserting moral weight where there’s just causality is exactly the error we’re trying to leave behind.

[BigMike]

By saying that 'accepting determinisim' means we can then 'choose to be kinder and more just' is a contradiction.

If my posts annoy you that much, accelafine, there's a simple fix: put me on your foe-list. That way you won’t have to read anything I write, and you can stop misrepresenting what I’m saying based on partial readings or frustration. Win-win. You stay unbothered, and I don’t have to correct misinterpretations you didn’t want to understand in the first place.

I haven't misinterpreted anything. You've written the same thing often enough for crying out loud. You just know I'm right. Simple.

Perfect then. Since you haven’t misinterpreted anything, you should be able to clearly explain how I’ve said that memory, learning, and prior experiences can influence future behavior—without implying free will.

Because yes, people change over time. The brain encodes experience, and future responses are shaped by those changes. But in the moment, given every variable—genes, environment, mood, history—a person can do only one thing. And they do. That’s determinism. No contradictions—just cause and effect.

So if you’re “right,” go ahead and lay out how that’s wrong. Not with snark—with logic.

[Gary Childress]

Gary, now you’re twisting the argument.

No one said disincentives don’t have effects. Of course they do. Just like incentives, they’re part of the causal chain. What I said is that neither incentives nor disincentives are about what someone “deserves.” They’re about influencing behavior through cause and effect—not handing out moral gold stars or lashes.

Color me confused. You say no one "deserves" incentives or disincentives, But you say that they influence behavior through cause and effect "not through handing out moral gold stars or lashes"? But isn't that what causes the effect of people doing things, the gold stars or lashes? Aren't the gold stars and lashes the very influencers that you are trying to promote?

Gary, you’re conflating effectiveness with moral justification—and that’s exactly the distinction determinism demands we make.

Yes, rewards and punishments influence behavior. That’s precisely the point: they’re tools in the causal chain. But calling them "deserved" adds a layer of moral fiction that determinism exposes as false. The gold stars and lashes may produce effects—but that doesn’t mean the person earned them in any metaphysical or moral sense.

Let’s make it simple: imagine pressing a lever that releases food for a rat in a lab. The rat learns, changes its behavior. But do you say the rat deserved the pellet? No—you say the environment was conditioned to produce an outcome. Same principle applies to humans, just with more complexity.

So yes, use incentives and disincentives—but stop pretending they're moral judgments. They're levers. They're cause-and-effect mechanisms. They work, but they don’t carry moral weight unless you insert it. And under determinism, inserting moral weight where there’s just causality is exactly the error we’re trying to leave behind.

I'm still confused. You say a person who does something doesn't "deserve" what they receive for it. But then you say outcomes influence behavior. Isn't that the same as saying "gold stars and lashes" are "deserved", meaning that is what must be applied in order to assure the right outcome? Otherwise, I'm not sure how you are using the word "deserve" here. Isn't "deserve" another way of saying that some particular influencer is appropriate for that person because they are doing something that either requires reward in order to keep them doing it or else punishment in order to prevent them from doing it again?

[BigMike]

Color me confused. You say no one "deserves" incentives or disincentives, But you say that they influence behavior through cause and effect "not through handing out moral gold stars or lashes"? But isn't that what causes the effect of people doing things, the gold stars or lashes? Aren't the gold stars and lashes the very influencers that you are trying to promote?

Gary, you’re conflating effectiveness with moral justification—and that’s exactly the distinction determinism demands we make.

Yes, rewards and punishments influence behavior. That’s precisely the point: they’re tools in the causal chain. But calling them "deserved" adds a layer of moral fiction that determinism exposes as false. The gold stars and lashes may produce effects—but that doesn’t mean the person earned them in any metaphysical or moral sense.

Let’s make it simple: imagine pressing a lever that releases food for a rat in a lab. The rat learns, changes its behavior. But do you say the rat deserved the pellet? No—you say the environment was conditioned to produce an outcome. Same principle applies to humans, just with more complexity.

So yes, use incentives and disincentives—but stop pretending they're moral judgments. They're levers. They're cause-and-effect mechanisms. They work, but they don’t carry moral weight unless you insert it. And under determinism, inserting moral weight where there’s just causality is exactly the error we’re trying to leave behind.

I'm still confused. You say a person who does something doesn't "deserve" what they receive for it. But then you say outcomes influence behavior. Isn't that the same as saying "gold stars and lashes" are "deserved", meaning that is what must be applied in order to assure the right outcome? Otherwise, I'm not sure how you are using the word "deserve" here. Isn't "deserve" another way of saying that some particular influencer is appropriate for that person because they are doing something that either requires reward in order to keep them doing it or else punishment in order to prevent them from doing it anymore?

Gary, the confusion here is entirely about the meaning of the word “deserve.”

In ordinary moral language, “deserve” means someone is morally entitled to a reward or punishment—because they freely chose to act well or badly. That’s the concept determinism rejects. No one freely chooses anything in that metaphysical sense, so no one is morally entitled to praise or blame. That’s the kind of “deserve” I’m dismantling.

Now, when we talk about outcomes influencing behavior, we’re not saying, “This person deserves X because of some internal moral credit or fault.” We’re saying, “If we apply X, behavior tends to change in a useful way.” It’s a functional, not moral, use of consequences. And that is what determinism affirms.

You don’t feed a dog a treat because it deserves it—you do it to reinforce behavior. You don’t punish a child because they were a free-willed villain—you do it (hopefully) to guide future behavior. But when we start believing they earned reward or punishment through some mystical power of choice, we stop looking at causes—and start moralizing.

So yes, gold stars and lashes can work. But they don’t prove moral worth. They’re just mechanisms in the machine of causality.

If you're still tying cause and effect to the idea of moral desert, you’re dragging in a concept that determinism explicitly discards. Outcomes influence—but they don’t morally validate. That's the line.

[Gary Childress]

Gary, you’re conflating effectiveness with moral justification—and that’s exactly the distinction determinism demands we make.

Yes, rewards and punishments influence behavior. That’s precisely the point: they’re tools in the causal chain. But calling them "deserved" adds a layer of moral fiction that determinism exposes as false. The gold stars and lashes may produce effects—but that doesn’t mean the person earned them in any metaphysical or moral sense.

Let’s make it simple: imagine pressing a lever that releases food for a rat in a lab. The rat learns, changes its behavior. But do you say the rat deserved the pellet? No—you say the environment was conditioned to produce an outcome. Same principle applies to humans, just with more complexity.

So yes, use incentives and disincentives—but stop pretending they're moral judgments. They're levers. They're cause-and-effect mechanisms. They work, but they don’t carry moral weight unless you insert it. And under determinism, inserting moral weight where there’s just causality is exactly the error we’re trying to leave behind.

I'm still confused. You say a person who does something doesn't "deserve" what they receive for it. But then you say outcomes influence behavior. Isn't that the same as saying "gold stars and lashes" are "deserved", meaning that is what must be applied in order to assure the right outcome? Otherwise, I'm not sure how you are using the word "deserve" here. Isn't "deserve" another way of saying that some particular influencer is appropriate for that person because they are doing something that either requires reward in order to keep them doing it or else punishment in order to prevent them from doing it anymore?

Gary, the confusion here is entirely about the meaning of the word “deserve.”

In ordinary moral language, “deserve” means someone is morally entitled to a reward or punishment—because they freely chose to act well or badly. That’s the concept determinism rejects. No one freely chooses anything in that metaphysical sense, so no one is morally entitled to praise or blame. That’s the kind of “deserve” I’m dismantling.

Now, when we talk about outcomes influencing behavior, we’re not saying, “This person deserves X because of some internal moral credit or fault.” We’re saying, “If we apply X, behavior tends to change in a useful way.” It’s a functional, not moral, use of consequences. And that is what determinism affirms.

You don’t feed a dog a treat because it deserves it—you do it to reinforce behavior. You don’t punish a child because they were a free-willed villain—you do it (hopefully) to guide future behavior. But when we start believing they earned reward or punishment through some mystical power of choice, we stop looking at causes—and start moralizing.

So yes, gold stars and lashes can work. But they don’t prove moral worth. They’re just mechanisms in the machine of causality.

If you're still tying cause and effect to the idea of moral desert, you’re dragging in a concept that determinism explicitly discards. Outcomes influence—but they don’t morally validate. That's the line.

I don't think it's accurate to call us "determined" if we are able to choose. Determinism generally means that one could not do anything other than what one did. I can choose not to rape or murder or I can choose to give away all my money if I want. I think you're going to have to bite the bullet and say that there are some crimes so atrocious that the punishment is deserved, and there are some good deeds so wonderful that they deserve reward. Otherwise, you're not speaking English (or you are, except the words have no content or meaning).

I think what you are confusing with "determinism" is that there are incentives that might attract people to do immoral things if they think they can. That doesn't subtract responsibility for doing those things. I wish I could subtract responsibility for lots of things I've done; however, if I did, then I'd probably do them again and again (since I did them the first time before I realized they were harmful and felt shame).

[BigMike]

I'm still confused. You say a person who does something doesn't "deserve" what they receive for it. But then you say outcomes influence behavior. Isn't that the same as saying "gold stars and lashes" are "deserved", meaning that is what must be applied in order to assure the right outcome? Otherwise, I'm not sure how you are using the word "deserve" here. Isn't "deserve" another way of saying that some particular influencer is appropriate for that person because they are doing something that either requires reward in order to keep them doing it or else punishment in order to prevent them from doing it anymore?

Gary, the confusion here is entirely about the meaning of the word “deserve.”

In ordinary moral language, “deserve” means someone is morally entitled to a reward or punishment—because they freely chose to act well or badly. That’s the concept determinism rejects. No one freely chooses anything in that metaphysical sense, so no one is morally entitled to praise or blame. That’s the kind of “deserve” I’m dismantling.

Now, when we talk about outcomes influencing behavior, we’re not saying, “This person deserves X because of some internal moral credit or fault.” We’re saying, “If we apply X, behavior tends to change in a useful way.” It’s a functional, not moral, use of consequences. And that is what determinism affirms.

You don’t feed a dog a treat because it deserves it—you do it to reinforce behavior. You don’t punish a child because they were a free-willed villain—you do it (hopefully) to guide future behavior. But when we start believing they earned reward or punishment through some mystical power of choice, we stop looking at causes—and start moralizing.

So yes, gold stars and lashes can work. But they don’t prove moral worth. They’re just mechanisms in the machine of causality.

If you're still tying cause and effect to the idea of moral desert, you’re dragging in a concept that determinism explicitly discards. Outcomes influence—but they don’t morally validate. That's the line.

I don't think it's accurate to call us "determined" if we are able to choose. Determinism generally means that one could not do anything other than what one did. I can choose not to rape or murder or I can choose to give away all my money if I want. I think you're going to have to bite the bullet and say that there are some crimes so atrocious that the punishment is deserved, and there are some good deeds so wonderful that they deserve reward. Otherwise, you're not speaking English (or you are, except the words have no content or meaning).

I think what you are confusing with "determinism" is that there are incentives that might attract people to do immoral things if they think they can. That doesn't subtract responsibility for doing those things. I wish I could subtract responsibility for lots of things I've done; however, if I did, then I'd probably do them again and again (since I did them the first time before I realized they were harmful and felt shame).

Gary, I’m not the one confused here—you’re just refusing to let go of the language of free will even while trying to debate determinism. You say “I can choose not to rape or murder,” but determinism by definition says that what you “choose” is the result of prior causes—biological, psychological, environmental—not some uncaused inner chooser floating above causality.

Yes, you can imagine doing otherwise. Yes, you experience deliberation. But when the moment arrives, you do exactly one thing, and that thing is fully determined by everything that led up to it. That’s not speculation—that’s the deterministic model you keep trying to argue while clinging to its opposite.

Now, you say if we drop moral responsibility, people will do harmful things over and over again. That’s fear, not logic. It’s also empirically false. Norway, Portugal, and other nations that treat people as products of causes—rather than as morally autonomous agents—get better outcomes. Lower recidivism. Healthier societies. Safer streets. They reduce harm not by threatening eternal blame, but by addressing the conditions that lead to harm.

You say without blame or shame, you’d repeat harmful actions. No—you wouldn’t. You’d still be shaped by everything: your memories, your reflection, your capacity for empathy. Shame is a feeling caused by experience, not a moral currency that buys redemption. It’s just another input. And like any input, it can change behavior—but that doesn’t make you morally responsible in the old-school “you could’ve done otherwise” sense.

As for your last jab—“if you don’t say some punishments are deserved, you’re not speaking English”—I am speaking English. I’m just not speaking theology. Words have meaning, but sometimes the meaning is outdated and misleading. "Deserve" is one of those words. It’s built on a lie: that people author their actions independently of cause.

Determinism doesn’t erase consequences. It replaces mythology with reality. You don’t stop addressing harm—you just stop lying to yourself about why it happened.

[Gary Childress]

Gary, the confusion here is entirely about the meaning of the word “deserve.”

In ordinary moral language, “deserve” means someone is morally entitled to a reward or punishment—because they freely chose to act well or badly. That’s the concept determinism rejects. No one freely chooses anything in that metaphysical sense, so no one is morally entitled to praise or blame. That’s the kind of “deserve” I’m dismantling.

Now, when we talk about outcomes influencing behavior, we’re not saying, “This person deserves X because of some internal moral credit or fault.” We’re saying, “If we apply X, behavior tends to change in a useful way.” It’s a functional, not moral, use of consequences. And that is what determinism affirms.

You don’t feed a dog a treat because it deserves it—you do it to reinforce behavior. You don’t punish a child because they were a free-willed villain—you do it (hopefully) to guide future behavior. But when we start believing they earned reward or punishment through some mystical power of choice, we stop looking at causes—and start moralizing.

So yes, gold stars and lashes can work. But they don’t prove moral worth. They’re just mechanisms in the machine of causality.

If you're still tying cause and effect to the idea of moral desert, you’re dragging in a concept that determinism explicitly discards. Outcomes influence—but they don’t morally validate. That's the line.

I don't think it's accurate to call us "determined" if we are able to choose. Determinism generally means that one could not do anything other than what one did. I can choose not to rape or murder or I can choose to give away all my money if I want. I think you're going to have to bite the bullet and say that there are some crimes so atrocious that the punishment is deserved, and there are some good deeds so wonderful that they deserve reward. Otherwise, you're not speaking English (or you are, except the words have no content or meaning).

I think what you are confusing with "determinism" is that there are incentives that might attract people to do immoral things if they think they can. That doesn't subtract responsibility for doing those things. I wish I could subtract responsibility for lots of things I've done; however, if I did, then I'd probably do them again and again (since I did them the first time before I realized they were harmful and felt shame).

Gary, I’m not the one confused here—you’re just refusing to let go of the language of free will even while trying to debate determinism. You say “I can choose not to rape or murder,” but determinism by definition says that what you “choose” is the result of prior causes—biological, psychological, environmental—not some uncaused inner chooser floating above causality.

Yes, you can imagine doing otherwise. Yes, you experience deliberation. But when the moment arrives, you do exactly one thing, and that thing is fully determined by everything that led up to it. That’s not speculation—that’s the deterministic model you keep trying to argue while clinging to its opposite.

Now, you say if we drop moral responsibility, people will do harmful things over and over again. That’s fear, not logic. It’s also empirically false. Norway, Portugal, and other nations that treat people as products of causes—rather than as morally autonomous agents—get better outcomes. Lower recidivism. Healthier societies. Safer streets. They reduce harm not by threatening eternal blame, but by addressing the conditions that lead to harm.

You say without blame or shame, you’d repeat harmful actions. No—you wouldn’t. You’d still be shaped by everything: your memories, your reflection, your capacity for empathy. Shame is a feeling caused by experience, not a moral currency that buys redemption. It’s just another input. And like any input, it can change behavior—but that doesn’t make you morally responsible in the old-school “you could’ve done otherwise” sense.

As for your last jab—“if you don’t say some punishments are deserved, you’re not speaking English”—I am speaking English. I’m just not speaking theology. Words have meaning, but sometimes the meaning is outdated and misleading. "Deserve" is one of those words. It’s built on a lie: that people author their actions independently of cause.

Determinism doesn’t erase consequences. It replaces mythology with reality. You don’t stop addressing harm—you just stop lying to yourself about why it happened.

I don't think anything is happening other than you are trying to shift the goal posts from harsher punishment to more lenient. What you are trying to say is that prisons should try to prevent recidivism. We can both agree to that and still believe in free will.

I think your primary proof for determinism is "conservation laws", however, you haven't provided any proof yet that conservation laws would be violated if I chose one alternative over another.

Someone throws a beach ball at me. I can either choose to catch it or dodge it (among other things). Do you have evidence that conservation laws would be violated by one of those reactions? Is it possible that either reaction could be performed without violating conservation laws? So far all I see for an argument is "conservation laws", therefore "determinism". Where's the evidence that conservation laws would be violated if I did one thing but not the other?

[accelafine]

If my posts annoy you that much, accelafine, there's a simple fix: put me on your foe-list. That way you won’t have to read anything I write, and you can stop misrepresenting what I’m saying based on partial readings or frustration. Win-win. You stay unbothered, and I don’t have to correct misinterpretations you didn’t want to understand in the first place.

I haven't misinterpreted anything. You've written the same thing often enough for crying out loud. You just know I'm right. Simple.

Perfect then. Since you haven’t misinterpreted anything, you should be able to clearly explain how I’ve said that memory, learning, and prior experiences can influence future behavior—without implying free will.

Because yes, people change over time. The brain encodes experience, and future responses are shaped by those changes. But in the moment, given every variable—genes, environment, mood, history—a person can do only one thing. And they do. That’s determinism. No contradictions—just cause and effect.

So if you’re “right,” go ahead and lay out how that’s wrong. Not with snark—with logic.

The onus is on you to explain yourself. I've simply pointed out that your 'determinism with choice' stance is an absurd contradiction in terms. That's self explanatory.

[accelafine]

We need to listen to children more. Children are us at our genius level--before we became moronic adults. I had always had an awareness that people couldn't help what they did--long before I knew that adults had been agonising over this 'dilemma' for millennia. Long before I had ever heard the words 'free will' or 'determinism'. That awareness made no difference to anything. I never felt that I should care about people who tortured animals, or were generally nasty and cruel. Listen to children. They are much 'older and wiser' than you are.
According to SmallMike, the 'poor things' who were 'determined' to rape and burn babies alive in front of their mothers only need coddling and cuddles.