Toxic Gender Philosophy

[Immanuel Can]

You accused him of a fraud which he definitely didn't commit.

Firstly, it's a her. And there was a definite fraud: she deliberately omitted the very first definition listed in Cambridge, and then went with one that doesn't even make sense, presenting that as the authoritative Cambridge pronouncement on the subject. And unless you believe she was incapable of reading the primary definition Cambridge supplies, that's got to be a deception. I call that lying. You don't, apparently.

But actually, I think you do. You recognize it as a deliberate deception, which is a great synonym for (drumroll, please ) lying.

But let's say you actually don't recognize that. Let's play pretend. Let's say that for you, lying cannot be performed by omission, by misrepresentation, or by deliberate obfuscation of any kind.

All I can say is, "I'm not surprised."

[Consul]

All of this seems reasonable. What, then, is the problem? Of course these new, shifting categories of gender assignment are problematic.

The whole psychological theory of gender identity is "problematic" (both conceptually and empirically), especially its hypothesis that "a mismatch between one’s “gender identity” and one’s physiology (in particular one’s “assigned sex” or “natal sex”)" (Briggs/George) is the cause of gender dysphoria.

"Conceptualising GD [Gender Dysphoria]

There are currently two distinct conceptual models for GD—a developmental, biopsychosocial model and an innate gender identity model. These models differ in their views about the causes for (etiologies of) GD, whether underlying psychological conditions can lead to gender dysphoria, whether GD can desist, and the role of a thorough evaluation before considering medical and surgical transition.

In a developmental, biopsychosocial model (a model that considers biological, psychological, and social contributors), GD can emerge in the context of a variety of psychological, social, and cognitive situations (such as being bullied for having gender-non-conforming interests, in the aftermath of rape, or due to difficulty accepting oneself as lesbian, gay, or bisexual); can be temporary; and can be the result of underlying psychological conditions (…). Treatment approaches are specific to the type of GD and the context in which it arose. In other words, there are multiple causes for GD and multiple treatments. Medical and surgical transition are not appropriate treatments for all types of gender dysphoria (…). Because there can be multiple causes for GD, the approaches associated with a developmental model employ thorough evaluations to identify the causes of distress and a judicious use of medical and surgical transition so that each patient receives the correct treatment for their situation (…). The approaches consistent with a developmental perspective include the developmentally informed, biopsychosocial approach, and exploratory approaches (…).

In contrast, the innate gender identity model is based on gender identity theory and may be referred to as a gender-affirmative model. From an innate gender identity perspective, every person has an innate soul-like gender identity that represents their ‘true self ’, and this entity can either match or not match one’s biological sex (…). In this model, GD has one cause (a mismatch between a person’s gender identity and their physical body) and one treatment: changing the physical body to align with the innate gender identity (…). Proponents of this model support an approach where once a person expresses a gender identity that differs from their biological sex, the stated gender identity is reinforced without question or delay, and transition interventions are made available to them according to any of several protocols (…). The assumptions supporting this approach are that when transition interventions are provided to gender-dysphoric individuals, the benefts will usually exceed the risks and that delaying these interventions will usually cause harm. The clinical approaches that are related to an innate gender identity model include the gender-(identity-)affirming approach and the informed consent model of care which employ minimised or eliminated evaluations and a liberal use of medical and surgical transition (…).

From the perspective of the innate gender-identity model, the desistence evidence is rejected, and if a person has GD and psychological issues, it is believed that the psychological issues cannot be underlying conditions for the GD (…). However, the existence of people who desist after experiencing GD, people who have been harmed by transition, detransitioners who regret transitioning, and people who have had underlying psychological conditions for their GD contradict the assumptions and beliefs associated with the innate gender-identity model. While the developmental model prioritises making the correct diagnosis and providing the correct treatment to the gender-dysphoric patient, the innate gender-identity model prioritises quick access to transition. These differences in priorities contribute to the current contentious public debate surrounding the topics of GD, transition, and detransition."

(Littman, Lisa. "Psychosocial Factors and Gender Dysphoria: Emerging Theories." In Sex and Gender: A Contemporary Reader, edited by Alice Sullivan and Selina Todd, 156-174. Abingdon: Routledge, 2024. pp. 160-1)

[Alexiev]

Clearly, math is not a science, despite being rigorous. This is not my idea. I'm borrowing it from Timothy Williamson, Cambridge Philosophy professor. Not only is math not a science, but neither are history, philosophy, literary theory, and many other fields of knowledge. Only when we broaden the definition of "science" to all investigations leading to knowledge can we call math or history (or cultural anthropology, in general) a science. That does not suggest that they cannot add to our understanding. Indeed, without math, scientific understanding would be significantly reduced.

You seem to have misread Williamson (Emeritus Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford):

"In my view, the supposed opposition between philosophy and science assumes an overly narrow, one-size-fits-all conception of science. After all, mathematics is just as scientific as natural sciences like physics, chemistry, and biology, all of which constantly rely on it, yet mathematicians don’t do experiments. Like philosophers, they can work by thinking in an armchair. This book explains how the methods philosophers use are the appropriate scientific methods for answering their questions, which are questions of the traditional ambitious kind. Like mathematics, philosophy is a non-natural science. Unlike mathematics, it is not yet a fully mature science.“

(Williamson, Timothy. Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. p. 4)

Yes, (pure) mathematics is a non-natural science, but a science all the same. It's a non-empirical, rational science, but a science all the same.

I should have looked it up. I have a "Stone Reader in Modern Philosophy" in which Williamson debates a Duke U. philosopher about the virtues of "Naturalism", best described (by Williamson) as the belief that, "There is only the natural world, and the best way to find out about it is the scientific method."

Williamson continues:

The scientific method... involves formulating theoretical hypotheses and testing their predictions against systematic observation and controlled experiment..... ONe challenge to naturalism is to find a place for mathematics. Natural sciences rely on it, but should we count it as a science in its own right? If we do, then the description of the scientific method just given is wrong, for it does not fit mathematics, which proves its results by pure reasoning, rather than the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method.

Clearly, if we define science as "naturalism", math does not fit in. If we use a more general definition of science, then math can be considered a science. However, if we eliminate the scientific method from our definition of science, and call anything that creates "knowledge" science, we are circular in our attempts to figure out the best way to attain knowledge. We all know that Mr. Darcy is the protagonist in Pride and Prejudice. Is that knowledge "scientific"? Same with the definitions of words. The definitions (as we've been arguing) of "man" and "woman" are culturally constituted. Awareness of these definitions is a form of knowledge, but I would not call it scientific knowledge, because the scientific method is not employed in attaining it.

[Immanuel Can]

The definitions (as we've been arguing) of "man" and "woman" are culturally constituted.

Words are "constituted" culturally. The realities they signify are not culturally constituted. They're biological realities. They exist, regardless of what words we choose to use to describe them...or fail to describe them.

A woman is a woman, even if we call her an xxdorgl. And a man is a man, even if we call him a xybydl. Nothing we change in our nomenclature will alter the biological facts. Reality is reality.

[Consul]

You seem to have misread Williamson (Emeritus Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford):

"In my view, the supposed opposition between philosophy and science assumes an overly narrow, one-size-fits-all conception of science. After all, mathematics is just as scientific as natural sciences like physics, chemistry, and biology, all of which constantly rely on it, yet mathematicians don’t do experiments. Like philosophers, they can work by thinking in an armchair. This book explains how the methods philosophers use are the appropriate scientific methods for answering their questions, which are questions of the traditional ambitious kind. Like mathematics, philosophy is a non-natural science. Unlike mathematics, it is not yet a fully mature science.“

(Williamson, Timothy. Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. p. 4)

Yes, (pure) mathematics is a non-natural science, but a science all the same. It's a non-empirical, rational science, but a science all the same.

I should have looked it up. I have a "Stone Reader in Modern Philosophy" in which Williamson debates a Duke U. philosopher about the virtues of "Naturalism", best described (by Williamson) as the belief that, "There is only the natural world, and the best way to find out about it is the scientific method."

Williamson continues:

The scientific method... involves formulating theoretical hypotheses and testing their predictions against systematic observation and controlled experiment..... ONe challenge to naturalism is to find a place for mathematics. Natural sciences rely on it, but should we count it as a science in its own right? If we do, then the description of the scientific method just given is wrong, for it does not fit mathematics, which proves its results by pure reasoning, rather than the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method.

Clearly, if we define science as "naturalism", math does not fit in. If we use a more general definition of science, then math can be considered a science. However, if we eliminate the scientific method from our definition of science, and call anything that creates "knowledge" science, we are circular in our attempts to figure out the best way to attain knowledge. We all know that Mr. Darcy is the protagonist in Pride and Prejudice. Is that knowledge "scientific"? Same with the definitions of words. The definitions (as we've been arguing) of "man" and "woman" are culturally constituted. Awareness of these definitions is a form of knowledge, but I would not call it scientific knowledge, because the scientific method is not employed in attaining it.

"[S]hould we count [mathematics] as a science in its own right?" – Williamson gives a clear answer to his question: "[M]athematics is just as scientific as natural sciences like physics, chemistry, and biology."
The mistake is to equate science with natural science and its empiricist methodology. There is no good reason to deny that (pure) mathematics is properly regarded as a science, albeit a non-empirical one. We have a huge amount of mathematical knowledge that was produced in a genuinely scientific way. Doing empirical science isn't the only possible way of doing science!

"It's too bad for epistemologists if mathematics in its present form baffles them, but it would be hubris to take that as any reason to reform mathematics. Neither should we take that as any reason to dismiss mathematics as mere fiction; not even if we go on to praise it as very useful fiction, as in Hartry Field's instrumentalism. Our knowledge of mathematics is ever so much more secure than our knowledge of the epistemology that seeks to cast doubt on mathematics."

(Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. p. 109)

[Alexiev]

"[S]hould we count [mathematics] as a science in its own right?" – Williamson gives a clear answer to his question: "[M]athematics is just as scientific as natural sciences like physics, chemistry, and biology."
The mistake is to equate science with natural science and its empiricist methodology. There is no good reason to deny that (pure) mathematics is properly regarded as a science, albeit a non-empirical one. We have a huge amount of mathematical knowledge that was produced in a genuinely scientific way. Doing empirical science isn't the only possible way of doing science!

"It's too bad for epistemologists if mathematics in its present form baffles them, but it would be hubris to take that as any reason to reform mathematics. Neither should we take that as any reason to dismiss mathematics as mere fiction; not even if we go on to praise it as very useful fiction, as in Hartry Field's instrumentalism. Our knowledge of mathematics is ever so much more secure than our knowledge of the epistemology that seeks to cast doubt on mathematics."

(Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. p. 109)

Williamson doubtless knows more about this than I, but if we use the definition I cut and pasted from some dictionary a couple of posts ago, I don't think math qualifies as a science.

Science: the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation, experimentation, and the testing of theories against the evidence obtained:

I see math as a language and logic as its grammar. Of course math often corresponds to the natural world, but we now know that Euclidean Geometry doesn't actually work perfectly in the Einsteinian Universe. Does that "falsify" it? No. It's a language, consistent in its own terms.

If we use a very general definition of science (as opposed to the one I quoted) both math and the study of language could be considered sciences. I like to think of them as distinct fields; we can call them distinct from "naturalism" or "natural science" if anyone prefers.

[Alexiev]

Words are "constituted" culturally. The realities they signify are not culturally constituted. They're biological realities. They exist, regardless of what words we choose to use to describe them...or fail to describe them.

A woman is a woman, even if we call her an xxdorgl. And a man is a man, even if we call him a xybydl. Nothing we change in our nomenclature will alter the biological facts. Reality is reality.

If you had studied anthropology more carefully, you would have heard of the Sapir/Whorf hypothesis: "Language has a tyranny on thought." It's one of the many anthropological generalizations that may or may not be correct. But it is certainly true that language influences how we think: for example, math (a language) allows us to measure things differently than we would if we were ignorant of math. We remember stories better than we remember events about which we have never told stories. Indeed, we may see the world in a manner influenced by how that world is divided up in our native language.

Perhaps by politely agreeing that individuals can choose which gender we will see them as, and refer to them as, we can improve human happiness, while doing no damage whatsoever to intellectual integrity.

[Iwannaplato]

If we use a very general definition of science (as opposed to the one I quoted) both math and the study of language could be considered sciences. I like to think of them as distinct fields; we can call them distinct from "naturalism" or "natural science" if anyone prefers.

Math is based on logic and proof.
Science on observation and experiment.

Mathematical exploration need not conform to reality beyond math. It can seek coherence and nothing to do with models, representation and understanding of something else.
Science couples itself to things, parts of reality and seeks information about that. One seeks coherence, yes, but also correspondence.

Math is limited by logic.
Science is limited by correspondence and logic.

Math can be utterly precise. It makes it's own 'objects of investigation'.
Science is always approximating given the fuzziness of language and the limits of measurement. It may isolate the objects of its investigation, it generally does not make them.

I suppose I would say math is not a science. I think it's clearer to think of it as something else. I'm not sure how much this matters however.

[Immanuel Can]

Words are "constituted" culturally. The realities they signify are not culturally constituted. They're biological realities. They exist, regardless of what words we choose to use to describe them...or fail to describe them.

A woman is a woman, even if we call her an xxdorgl. And a man is a man, even if we call him a xybydl. Nothing we change in our nomenclature will alter the biological facts. Reality is reality.

...it is certainly true that language influences how we think...

That much is true. But it doesn't change reality. If reality is one thing, and our language turns out to be inadequate to that reality, it's the language that's at fault. "Gender" is an excellent example of the abuse of language: it fails to reflect reality, because it effectively denies the sex binary. And the problem is with the language chosen, not with the reality.

Perhaps by politely agreeing that individuals can choose which gender we will see them as,...

Why should we give them power over us to tell us we have to say things that we know aren't true?

That's the problem with political correctness. It demands we abandon our common sense, our reason, and our sense of truth, to please the desires of those who have a grasp on none of them.

[Alexiev]

Words are "constituted" culturally. The realities they signify are not culturally constituted. They're biological realities. They exist, regardless of what words we choose to use to describe them...or fail to describe them.

A woman is a woman, even if we call her an xxdorgl. And a man is a man, even if we call him a xybydl. Nothing we change in our nomenclature will alter the biological facts. Reality is reality.

...it is certainly true that language influences how we think...

That much is true. But it doesn't change reality. If reality is one thing, and our language turns out to be inadequate to that reality, it's the language that's at fault. "Gender" is an excellent example of the abuse of language: it fails to reflect reality, because it effectively denies the sex binary. And the problem is with the language chosen, not with the reality.

Perhaps by politely agreeing that individuals can choose which gender we will see them as,...

Why should we give them power over us to tell us we have to say things that we know aren't true?

That's the problem with political correctness. It demands we abandon our common sense, our reason, and our sense of truth, to please the desires of those who have a grasp on none of them.

Oh, come off it. Gender is a social reality as well as biological one, and language is a form of communication (in other words, it is social). If by "political correctness" you mean "basic decency and good manners", then you are correct that basic decency and good manners demand that we use the gender terms (and regendered names) that an individual has chosen.

[Alexiev]

...it is certainly true that language influences how we think...

That much is true. But it doesn't change reality. If reality is one thing, and our language turns out to be inadequate to that reality, it's the language that's at fault. "Gender" is an excellent example of the abuse of language: it fails to reflect reality, because it effectively denies the sex binary. And the problem is with the language chosen, not with the reality.

Perhaps by politely agreeing that individuals can choose which gender we will see them as,...

Why should we give them power over us to tell us we have to say things that we know aren't true?

That's the problem with political correctness. It demands we abandon our common sense, our reason, and our sense of truth, to please the desires of those who have a grasp on none of them.

Oh, come off it. Gender is a social reality as well as biological one (just as race is a social and cultural concept,l even if not a biological one).
Language is a form of communication (in other words, it is social). If by "political correctness" you mean "basic decency and good manners", then you are correct that basic decency and good manners demand that we use the gender terms (and regendered names) that an individual has chosen.

[Alexiev]

...it is certainly true that language influences how we think...

That much is true. But it doesn't change reality. If reality is one thing, and our language turns out to be inadequate to that reality, it's the language that's at fault. "Gender" is an excellent example of the abuse of language: it fails to reflect reality, because it effectively denies the sex binary. And the problem is with the language chosen, not with the reality.

Perhaps by politely agreeing that individuals can choose which gender we will see them as,...

Why should we give them power over us to tell us we have to say things that we know aren't true?

That's the problem with political correctness. It demands we abandon our common sense, our reason, and our sense of truth, to please the desires of those who have a grasp on none of them.

Oh, come off it. Gender is a social reality as well as biological one (just as race is a social and cultural concept,l even if not a biological one).
Language is a form of communication (in other words, it is social). If by "political correctness" you mean "basic decency and good manners", then you are correct that basic decency and good manners demand that we use the gender terms (and regendered names) that an individual has chosen.

[Immanuel Can]

...it is certainly true that language influences how we think...

That much is true. But it doesn't change reality. If reality is one thing, and our language turns out to be inadequate to that reality, it's the language that's at fault. "Gender" is an excellent example of the abuse of language: it fails to reflect reality, because it effectively denies the sex binary. And the problem is with the language chosen, not with the reality.

Perhaps by politely agreeing that individuals can choose which gender we will see them as,...

Why should we give them power over us to tell us we have to say things that we know aren't true?

That's the problem with political correctness. It demands we abandon our common sense, our reason, and our sense of truth, to please the desires of those who have a grasp on none of them.

Oh, come off it. Gender is a social reality as well as biological one,

It's neither. The reality is sex. And it's binary. There is no "third option," let alone 120, or whatever absurd number they claim now.

If by "political correctness" you mean "basic decency and good manners",

I don't. I mean the attempt at moral bullying, performed by the deluded and the propagandized, on people who are neither.

[Alexiev]

If we use a very general definition of science (as opposed to the one I quoted) both math and the study of language could be considered sciences. I like to think of them as distinct fields; we can call them distinct from "naturalism" or "natural science" if anyone prefers.

Math is based on logic and proof.
Science on observation and experiment.

Mathematical exploration need not conform to reality beyond math. It can seek coherence and nothing to do with models, representation and understanding of something else.
Science couples itself to things, parts of reality and seeks information about that. One seeks coherence, yes, but also correspondence.

Math is limited by logic.
Science is limited by correspondence and logic.

Math can be utterly precise. It makes it's own 'objects of investigation'.
Science is always approximating given the fuzziness of language and the limits of measurement. It may isolate the objects of its investigation, it generally does not make them.

The dictionary chimes in:

1
a
: knowledge or a system of knowledge covering general truths or the operation of general laws especially as obtained and tested through scientific method
b
: such knowledge or such a system of knowledge concerned with the physical world and its phenomena : NATURAL SCIENCE
2
a
: a department of systematized knowledge as an object of study
the science of theology
b
: something (such as a sport or technique) that may be studied or learned like systematized knowledge
have it down to a science

Obviously, math is a department of systematized knowledge (as is theology), but many people would not label theology a science. Personally, I like theology, because (for Christians, at least) it has a starting point, the discovery of which is bothersome in other forms of philosophy. How many angels can fit on the head of a pin? I don't know. But I like the question.

For some reason, we divide the world into the "natural" and the "artificial". "Artificial" means man-made. Like art. Why we call houses "artificial", and ant hills "natural" is, perhaps, unclear. But we do. Math is connected to reality (as are other languages), but since it is man made, it is "artificial". I'm guessing this goes back to our religious heritage. God created the "natural world", but man, with his free will, creates artificial things.

I suppose the anti-regendering police in this thread think we must stick to our natural genders. But I don't see why.

[Alexiev]

Firstly, it's a her.

"It"? Shouldn't that be, "He's a she. Or maybe, "She's a he?" Also, "it's a her" is ungrammatical. The subjective case ("he" or "she") is proper, although, of course, I would not expect you to know that.