Compatibilism is impossible

[Harbal]

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Maybe it isn't completely deterministic. Anyway, there is too much that we don't know to be able to say if, and to what extent, free will is possible.

Free will isn't deterministic. Free will is necessary. There are situations when only a free decision can resolve the conflict of interest in options.

So what constitutes free will? Would it be a conscious decision that isn't influenced by any unconscious factor? I think there have been studies that show, or certainly suggest, that our decision making occurs prior to our conscious awareness of it. And if decisions are made at some subconscious level, how can we know if they are the result of a deterministic, or probabilistic process, or even something else?

What I am saying is that it is pointless to say we have, or we have not, got free will, because we simply don't know, but it does seem reasonable to say that total conscious free will is not possible. The only people who are entitled to say we do have completely free will are some religious folks, whose religion demands that they believe we have it, which, ironically, means they have even less free will than the rest of us.

[Iwannaplato]

Even as a definition for librarian free will... I mean, can one actually terminate a chain of causality? Do libertarians believe that?

I don't know, but I think one could argue it is entailed. This stuff comes at you: someone screaming, this stuff arises inside you and you experience it: fear, angry, confusion, whatever arises. And yet these causes stop at you. The screaming continues and may be heard by others, but it enters the self and does not affect you in the causal sense of leading to your actions - and that gets gnarly right there as it must cause the experience, it's just that this isn't causal. But anyway I think it's a fair opening move to say this is entailed. As is the idea that they are starting causal chains. I'm not saying libertarians think of it this way, but I don't think this is a bad description of what must be the case.

Like, let's say a row of dominoes are toppling over. Before the entire set of dominoes falls, you put your hand between two and stop the rest from falling. Have you really terminated a chain of causality?

I would say that unlike the next dominoes the cause enters your experience but does not necessarily lead to one further chain, in you. The domino will still be affecting, I would guess, the molecules in your hand and the air, but the causal chain entering your body (so to speak) ends at some point. You are free to go in a number of directions. No amount of information about the locations energy etc. of atoms and molecules could lead to a prediction of your response. Even with a supercomputer the size of a galaxy. Of course as part of their ontology the LFW person might not believe in atoms, etc. in the physicalist sense or at all.

(just to be clear I don't believe in free will. I am not defending my position, but rather trying to match his description with what I think is fair in relation to libertarian free will and what it entails)

Well... no. Physics says every force produces an equal and opposite force, and all energy is preserved in the universe. If you stop a domino toppling, the chain of causality doesn't just STOP - the momentum from that last domino is transferred to your hand, distributed through your body, perhaps converted to heat or something - things keep happening in the chain of causality.

Well, that's more or less what he's saying. It can't work with what we know about causes in determinism, including what we know from science.

I don't think one CAN terminate a chain of causality.

Hence you are not a libertarian free willist.

This isn't meant to be an argument against libertarian free will, just that particular definition. Maybe I'm taking it too literally, idk.

Yes, I think you are agreeing with Bahman here in relation to LFW.
You may think, though, that a LFW is not saying what he said and it is not entailed by their beliefs. Me, I think it's fair, but I'm no expert in LFW. When I have interacted with LFW people I never get a clear understanding of what's going on in their model.

[phyllo]

Even as a definition for librarian free will... I mean, can one actually terminate a chain of causality? Do libertarians believe that?

Instead of just stating some abstract definition, people ought to be listing the characteristics of free-will ... a list of the things that someone can actually do with free-will.

So if the libertarian free-willist has a list with "I can start causal chains without being caused to do it", it's not surprising that a compatibilist doesn't have it on his list. The compatibilist doesn't think it's a necessary, or even a possible characteristic of free-will.

I think that is behind IC's "Compatibilists think free-will is an illusion" statements. He expects compatibilists to accept all the characteristic of free-will that he has on his list. And if they don't, then they think free-will is an illusion.

"Terminate a chain of causality"? It sounded weird to me. I think Bahman put that in to bookend everything ... begin - end ...nice symmetry.

[bahman]

Maybe it isn't completely deterministic. Anyway, there is too much that we don't know to be able to say if, and to what extent, free will is possible.

Free will isn't deterministic. Free will is necessary. There are situations when only a free decision can resolve the conflict of interest in options.

So what constitutes free will? Would it be a conscious decision that isn't influenced by any unconscious factor?

No. Free will comes into play when there is a conflict of interest in options. For example, you might like two options equally or the future outcomes of options are not known. On top of these, one can decide unconditionally even if there is no conflict of interest in options, and pick up the option that he doesn't like for no specific reason.

I think there have been studies that show, or certainly suggest, that our decision making occurs prior to our conscious awareness of it. And if decisions are made at some subconscious level, how can we know if they are the result of a deterministic, or probabilistic process, or even something else?

I am aware of those studies but I think that one cannot generalize this problem to all sorts of decision-making. I found it ironic to assign decisions to the subconscious mind while the conscious awareness of decisions always coincides with what you choose. I mean what if you consciously decide to do one thing and your subconscious mind decides to do otherwise?

What I am saying is that it is pointless to say we have, or we have not, got free will, because we simply don't know, but it does seem reasonable to say that total conscious free will is not possible. The only people who are entitled to say we do have completely free will are some religious folks, whose religion demands that they believe we have it, which, ironically, means they have even less free will than the rest of us.

Well, I think that free will is necessary as I argue in favor of it in the first comment.

[Flannel Jesus]

I am aware of those studies but I think that one cannot generalize this problem to all sorts of decision-making. I found it ironic to assign decisions to the subconscious mind while the conscious awareness of decisions always coincides with what you choose. I mean what if you consciously decide to do one thing and your subconscious mind decides to do otherwise?

Conscious minds are very good at justifying whatever happens.

Have you heard of this split brain experiment?

https://physics.weber.edu/carroll/honor ... _brain.htm

One side of his brain was quite happy to just make up explanations for decisions it didn't make.

[Consul]

Libertarian free will (as described by Chisholm) surely is [impossible in a deterministic world].

"[E]ach of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen."
(Chisholm, Roderick M. On Metaphysics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. p. 12)

What is the other sort of free will?

"I’m going to be discussing some of the common attitudes held by people writing about free will. These come in four basic flavors:

The world is deterministic and there’s no free will. In this view, if the former is the case, the latter has to be as well; determinism and free will are not compatible. I am coming from this perspective of “hard incompatibilism.”

The world is deterministic and there is free will. These folks are emphatic that the world is made of stuff like atoms, and life, in the elegant words of psychologist Roy Baumeister (currently at the University of Queensland in Australia), “is based on the immutability and relentlessness of the laws of nature.” No magic or fairy dust involved, no substance dualism, the view where brain and mind are separate entities. Instead, this deterministic world is viewed as compatible with free will. This is roughly 90 percent of philosophers and legal scholars, and the book will most often be taking on these “compatibilists.”

The world is not deterministic; there’s no free will. This is an oddball view that everything important in the world runs on randomness, a supposed basis of free will.…

The world is not deterministic; there is free will. These are folks who believe, like I do, that a deterministic world is not compatible with free will—however, no problem, the world isn’t deterministic in their view, opening a door for free-will belief. These “libertarian incompatibilists” are a rarity…."

(Sapolsky, Robert M. Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will. New York: Penguin, 2023. pp. 10-1)

[bahman]

I am aware of those studies but I think that one cannot generalize this problem to all sorts of decision-making. I found it ironic to assign decisions to the subconscious mind while the conscious awareness of decisions always coincides with what you choose. I mean what if you consciously decide to do one thing and your subconscious mind decides to do otherwise?

Conscious minds are very good at justifying whatever happens.

Have you heard of this split brain experiment?

https://physics.weber.edu/carroll/honor ... _brain.htm

One side of his brain was quite happy to just make up explanations for decisions it didn't make.

Interesting study. What it has to do with what I was arguing?

[Harbal]

Free will isn't deterministic. Free will is necessary. There are situations when only a free decision can resolve the conflict of interest in options.

So what constitutes free will? Would it be a conscious decision that isn't influenced by any unconscious factor?

No. Free will comes into play when there is a conflict of interest in options. For example, you might like two options equally or the future outcomes of options are not known. On top of these, one can decide unconditionally even if there is no conflict of interest in options, and pick up the option that he doesn't like for no specific reason.

I asked if a completely free decision would be one not influenced by any unconscious factors, and you answered, "no", but what you then went on to say sounds like, "yes". Either you misunderstood the question, or I the answer.

I think there have been studies that show, or certainly suggest, that our decision making occurs prior to our conscious awareness of it. And if decisions are made at some subconscious level, how can we know if they are the result of a deterministic, or probabilistic process, or even something else?

I am aware of those studies but I think that one cannot generalize this problem to all sorts of decision-making. I found it ironic to assign decisions to the subconscious mind while the conscious awareness of decisions always coincides with what you choose. I mean what if you consciously decide to do one thing and your subconscious mind decides to do otherwise?

I don't think it works like that. I think the decision would be made on an unconscious level, and then your consciousness simply informed of it afterwards, but being under the mistaken impression that it was responsible for it.

Well, I think that free will is necessary as I argue in favor of it in the first comment.

I suspect that your preference (rather than logic) for thinking you have completely free will pretty much determined what the conclusion of your argument would be.

[bahman]

Libertarian free will (as described by Chisholm) surely is [impossible in a deterministic world].

What is the other sort of free will?

"I’m going to be discussing some of the common attitudes held by people writing about free will. These come in four basic flavors:

The world is deterministic and there’s no free will. In this view, if the former is the case, the latter has to be as well; determinism and free will are not compatible. I am coming from this perspective of “hard incompatibilism.”

The world is deterministic and there is free will. These folks are emphatic that the world is made of stuff like atoms, and life, in the elegant words of psychologist Roy Baumeister (currently at the University of Queensland in Australia), “is based on the immutability and relentlessness of the laws of nature.” No magic or fairy dust involved, no substance dualism, the view where brain and mind are separate entities. Instead, this deterministic world is viewed as compatible with free will. This is roughly 90 percent of philosophers and legal scholars, and the book will most often be taking on these “compatibilists.”

The world is not deterministic; there’s no free will. This is an oddball view that everything important in the world runs on randomness, a supposed basis of free will.…

The world is not deterministic; there is free will. These are folks who believe, like I do, that a deterministic world is not compatible with free will—however, no problem, the world isn’t deterministic in their view, opening a door for free-will belief. These “libertarian incompatibilists” are a rarity…."

(Sapolsky, Robert M. Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will. New York: Penguin, 2023. pp. 10-1)

I asked whether there is another definition of free will.

[Flannel Jesus]

I am aware of those studies but I think that one cannot generalize this problem to all sorts of decision-making. I found it ironic to assign decisions to the subconscious mind while the conscious awareness of decisions always coincides with what you choose. I mean what if you consciously decide to do one thing and your subconscious mind decides to do otherwise?

Conscious minds are very good at justifying whatever happens.

Have you heard of this split brain experiment?

https://physics.weber.edu/carroll/honor ... _brain.htm

One side of his brain was quite happy to just make up explanations for decisions it didn't make.

Interesting study. What it has to do with what I was arguing?

Literally just about everything

[bahman]

So what constitutes free will? Would it be a conscious decision that isn't influenced by any unconscious factor?

No. Free will comes into play when there is a conflict of interest in options. For example, you might like two options equally or the future outcomes of options are not known. On top of these, one can decide unconditionally even if there is no conflict of interest in options, and pick up the option that he doesn't like for no specific reason.

I asked if a completely free decision would be one not influenced by any unconscious factors, and you answered, "no", but what you then went on to say sounds like, "yes". Either you misunderstood the question, or I the answer.

I answered your concern in the next comment: "I am aware of those studies but I think that one cannot generalize this problem to all sorts of decision-making. I found it ironic to assign decisions to the subconscious mind while the conscious awareness of decisions always coincides with what you choose. I mean what if you consciously decide to do one thing and your subconscious mind decides to do otherwise?"

I think there have been studies that show, or certainly suggest, that our decision making occurs prior to our conscious awareness of it. And if decisions are made at some subconscious level, how can we know if they are the result of a deterministic, or probabilistic process, or even something else?

I am aware of those studies but I think that one cannot generalize this problem to all sorts of decision-making. I found it ironic to assign decisions to the subconscious mind while the conscious awareness of decisions always coincides with what you choose. I mean what if you consciously decide to do one thing and your subconscious mind decides to do otherwise?

I don't think it works like that. I think the decision would be made on an unconscious level, and then your consciousness simply informed of it afterwards, but being under the mistaken impression that it was responsible for it.

What is the use of the conscious mind then? How subconscious mind decide when there is a conflict of interest in choosing one option in a situation?

Well, I think that free will is necessary as I argue in favor of it in the first comment.

I suspect that your preference (rather than logic) for thinking you have completely free will pretty much determined what the conclusion of your argument would be.

Do you have the ability to decide to gamble?

[bahman]

Conscious minds are very good at justifying whatever happens.

Have you heard of this split brain experiment?

https://physics.weber.edu/carroll/honor ... _brain.htm

One side of his brain was quite happy to just make up explanations for decisions it didn't make.

Interesting study. What it has to do with what I was arguing?

Literally just about everything

I am afraid that I cannot see that. Would you mind to elaborate?

[Trajk Logik]

The word "illusion" appears 6 times in the Stanford article. Here's the 3rd appearance:

The worry is that determinism entails that what we do is, always, the only thing we can do, and that because of this we never really have a choice about anything, as opposed to being under the (perhaps inescapable) illusion that we have a choice. Someone who argues for incompatibilism in this way may concede that the truth of determinism is consistent with our making choices, at least in the sense in which a dog or young child makes choices, and consistent also with our choices being causally effective. But, she insists, this is not enough for free will; we have free will only if we have a genuine choice about what actions we perform, and we have a genuine choice only if there is more than one action we are able to perform.

Explicitly it links the idea that choices are an illusion with incompatibilism, not compatibilism. You have it backwards IC.

If someone says they believe the world is deterministic and free will is an illusion, then it's almost certain that you're talking to an incompatiblist, not a compatibilist

Then maybe we need to come up with a proper definition of "choice". We are aware that we have choices, alternatives or options. Choices exist in both a deterministic and non-deterministic framework. The question is are those choices we are aware of in any given moment of decision actually viable given the existing circumstances. The illusion isn't in whether we have choices or options. We obviously do. The illusion is in that we could have chosen one of the other options or alternatives given the existing circumstances. But when you think about it you didn't choose one of the alternatives for a reason so to then assert post-decision that you could have chosen an alternative when you had reasons not to choose that alternative at the moment of decision isn't really an illusion. It's just being inconsistent.

When someone says that they could have chosen otherwise, then the proper response is "Why didn't you?" Their answer should tell you whether they are under the spell of some illusion or just being inconsistent.

[Flannel Jesus]

Interesting study. What it has to do with what I was arguing?

Literally just about everything

I am afraid that I cannot see that. Would you mind to elaborate?

You were talking about how it seems remarkably coincidental that our consciousness seems to match what our subconscious chose, according to some model. You even asked, what if it didn't match, what would happen then?

What I posted is a direct response to both of those things. It proves that our conscious mind can see a decision, and INVENT a reason why it made that decision. It's a natural thing our conscious minds do. So it's not a coincidence that our actions seem to match our conscious choices - our consciousness will bend itself to make it match what our bodies do. Even when it wasn't actually the source of that act.

[Harbal]

No. Free will comes into play when there is a conflict of interest in options. For example, you might like two options equally or the future outcomes of options are not known. On top of these, one can decide unconditionally even if there is no conflict of interest in options, and pick up the option that he doesn't like for no specific reason.

I asked if a completely free decision would be one not influenced by any unconscious factors, and you answered, "no", but what you then went on to say sounds like, "yes". Either you misunderstood the question, or I the answer.

I answered your concern in the next comment: "I am aware of those studies but I think that one cannot generalize this problem to all sorts of decision-making. I found it ironic to assign decisions to the subconscious mind while the conscious awareness of decisions always coincides with what you choose. I mean what if you consciously decide to do one thing and your subconscious mind decides to do otherwise?"

Although I am curious about just how much more of a muddle this could become, I'm not going to pursue it any further.

I don't think it works like that. I think the decision would be made on an unconscious level, and then your consciousness simply informed of it afterwards, but being under the mistaken impression that it was responsible for it.

What is the use of the conscious mind then? How subconscious mind decide when there is a conflict of interest in choosing one option in a situation?

If I could answer those questions, I would probably consider such a forum as this beneath me, and so would not be here to answer them, anyway.

Do you have the ability to decide to gamble?

I'm sure I could arrive at such a decision, but I wouldn't be able to identify all the factors that led to it.