Hobbes' Choice wrote:"Predestined" is a Theological Fallacy. It's as ridiculous to use in this context as "fatalism"
Aside from that...
I should have specified: I didn't mean
theologically predestined...just predestined
by material forces. I would have preferred just to use the word "determined," but that was the contested term, so it would have been too easy to misunderstand my intent if I had. However, perhaps this clears that bit up.
Let me just ask you this.
What happens for you to make a decision. Talk me through it in your own words. I'm puzzled to understand how and when your "Free" will kicks in.
That's a complex question.
Let's start with what everybody knows. We all know that human volition is at least largely a product of a group of factors which include seemingly-determinist things like culture, background, experiences, mood, what a person had for lunch that day...and so on. Now, both the Free will view and Determinism hold the same on those issues: except Determinism adds that all these things are prior material or natural stimuli which produce the inevitable response of a choice (which is not really a choice at all, but looks to the "chooser" as if it is). In other words, authentic choice doesn't happen...only the
appearance of choice, and that that "choice" is actually nothing but the collocation of prior causes or stimuli. Nothing is "free" there.
In contrast, though the advocate of free will has no problem with the idea that prior causes and stimuli are present and often importantly involved in human decision-making, he or she regards the Determinist account as incomplete. He or she would add that with all that stuff there exists the ability of the individual to choose among them, and to respond or not respond to one or more of those factors. That would be to say that "freedom" consists in not being the slave of prior causes and stimuli exclusively, but with them also having the ability to decide not to respond to some or all of them.
Determinism says that can't happen.
So a "free will" advocate would point to many cases that exist in which a person refuses urgent stimuli and even basic needs, in order to do something he or she has decided to do...like the weight-lifter who ignores the pain in his arms because he believes he will be strong if he works out, or the athlete who refuses to drink liquids even though she is running hard, because she wants to win and doesn't want to cramp, or the soldier who knows he is going to die but stays to fight for some cause in which he believes, and so on. In those cases, pain, thirst and self-preservation are all urgent and basic motives; but something stronger enables us to relativize their claim upon us, and choose to do other than those stimuli incline us to do.
I wouldn't even bother with such complex cases. I think it's much more straightforward than that. I have never met a person who actually lives like his or her life is
determined by forces. Everybody gets up in the morning and *assumes* they make their own decision to brush their teeth, tie their shoes, go to work or phone in sick...and so on. The natural living state of all people (including Determinists) is to act as if free will exists. The natural assumption is always on the side of free will. So I think it's really a burden of proof issue: the Determinist needs to make his case that that strong intuition that all of us mysteriously seem to share, the belief that our choices matter, is not authentic. And that's a really hard case to make. Absent such a case, we all just go on living as if free will exists.
Take our present conversation: you are arguing, and I am arguing. Both of us are assuming the other one is capable of choosing to change his mind. Neither one of us thinks that what we believe at the end will be a matter of determinism (not pre-set, already decided, guaranteed to happen only one way, and so on). We are both acting as though free will is possible, for that is entailed in any attempt to argue. On the other hand, if I believed you were already pre-set to be only and ever an Atheist, why would I reason with you? And you, if you believed you could not possibly influence my Theism, why would you argue? There would be nothing more futile than a communicative exchange that cannot change anything. So long are we're arguing, then, we're not Determinists...except one of us perhaps in theory...but not in action.
And actually, I can't even imagine how a Determinist could live Deterministically. He would have to literally believe no decision of his was authentic. So if he were perfectly rational, then he would make none. And such a one would surely not fare well under any circumstances.
For that reason, I regard Determinism as essentially
self-defeating. Even its most ardent advocates cannot live as if it is true. If they do, they don't live long, I suspect. And if they are consistent Determinists, they certainly do not bother to argue.
