Philosophy Now Forum

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 12:51 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jul 26, 2017 2:13 pm A woman sees a group of people and mistakes one of them, a stranger, for her friend. So she believes her friend is there. And as it happens, her friend really is there, but hidden. So what she believes is the case. But does she know her friend is there?

We find out later that she didn't know. The J, in this case, trust in her observation, was off than she realized or considered at that moment.

I think justification is a-whole-nother can of worms - such as the argument between externalists and internalists - closely related to arguments about what constitutes knowledge in the first place. And this endless search for (metaphorical) foundations is the real problem.

The point is, what happens in the story has nothing to do with propositions. The woman’s mistake does not come from a false premise. She just believes the stranger is her friend, which is not the case.

I agree that it wasn't a premise, but it seems like it could be represented as one.

Of course. And my point is the need for a sharp methodological separation and distinction between the feature of reality and what we say about it.

And her belief that her friend is there is not propositional. Propositional belief is as muddled an idea as propositional knowledge. There are just beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions.

I think I agree.

Okay - and I think this goes a long way to seeing the problem with the JTB account of knowledge.

, b

We want to say that what she believes is true, because her friend really is there.

What she believes is a couple of things. She saw her friend is in there also. She did not see her friend. or 'that is my friend'. Her friend was near to where she thought her friend was, but not 'there' where she thought she saw him. He was in the group. But that's not exactly what she believed.

This is interesting. It could be that you're pointing out a muddle that arises when we talk about what we believe to be the case. The description is necessarily not the belief - going by my tripartite starting point. Mmm.

But that is the myth of propositions at work. What she mistakenly believes to be the case is a feature of reality, which is not a proposition. When we believe or know a feature of reality is the case, we do not believe or know a proposition. So we do not believe or know something that is true or false.

What would you call it then? I do think animals know things and also mistakenly believe things (can on occasion). So, yes, I don't they need have formed propositions to know and humans can be without them.

As I think you suggest later, what we believe or know is that something is (or isn't) the case - because, outside language, features of reality have no truth-value.

The woman does not know her friend is there because she lacks objective knowledge of that feature of reality. And afterwards, apprised of the situation and her mistake, she would not say she knew her friend was there. That is not how we use the word 'know'. She would say she believed the stranger was her friend, but was mistaken.

We wouldn't use know that way. But we, generally, do think that some of our knowledge may be incorrect.

Agreed.

I am not necessarily disagreeing, in fact I don't know if I am.

We say we know a feature of reality is the case only if it is, or we think it is, the case. And if it turns out not to be the case, we don’t say we have stopped knowing it. We just say we were mistaken. For example, we don’t say we stopped knowing the earth is flat.

So, in that future time, we realize that it wasn't knowledge, it was mere belief.

Agreed.

Gettier-cases recycle the JTB definition's concentration on: subjective knowledge - what an individual knows - effectively ignoring objective knowledge and its justification; propositional knowledge - S knows that p - as though what we know is propositions rather than features of reality; and the truth condition - S knows that p only if p is true - which gets things back to front. Our knowing that p doesn't come from the truth of p. It comes from our knowing the feature of reality that p asserts.

So, if we go back to the original scene with the two friends and the others. What is an example of objective knowledge?

Good question. Given that 'objective' is 'factual' or 'based on facts', I'm proposing that the JTB definition, while isolating 'what S knows', in fact appeals to 'what is a fact' independent from what S knows. In other words, we talk about knowing things when they are indeed the case (facts). The fact that we can be mistaken about what actually is the case doesn't alter that use of the word 'know'.

There are features of reality; there is what we believe or know about them, such as that they are the case.
; and there is what we say about them, which may be true or false. To muddle these things up is a mistake.

so, the first sentence before the semicolon. We could add 'or such that they are not the case'.

Interesting. I left that out for a reason, but I can't remember what it was, or if it was a good reason. Mmm.

Or? Is believing something is not the case different from having a false belief about something. I assume the idea is that only propositions can be true or false, but I think false (and true) are more flexible than that. But is the big difference between your proposal and JTB that we consider beliefs, like hers, to not be the case or mistaken, rather than false?

Yes. My point is that 'true/false belief', while unproblematical everyday expressions, is part of what led to the JTB muddle. Correct and incorrect clarify the actual situation - I think!

But Gettier-cases also contain the solution to the Gettier problem. The protagonists believe things for reasons that don't objectively justify their beliefs, which is why their beliefs don't amount to knowledge. Objective knowledge of features of reality, which may be expressed by means of true factual assertions, frees us from subjective, epistemic isolation. It's the objective knowledge that we Gettier-spectators have.

We do because it is a story and one with a presumed omniscient narrator. It's a hidden assumption in the story. In actual fact an observer in that situation could also turn out to be mistaken later. They mixed up the stranger and the friend also.

Okay. But that such objective knowledge is possible is a deeper assumption behind both the JTB and Gettier's criticism.

I feel like I am missing something and even that it is obvious, but I am not quite sure what it is. Yes, our knowledge can be revised so some things that we were justified in saying we knew we now realize were false. I don't see any way to avoid this unless we never say we know something. Perhaps it'll all turn out to be a simulation or our brain is in a vat.

I'm not sure what it is you feel you may be missing. And sorry if I've misconstrued your points above, so that my responses miss the mark. I think you're asking all the right questions! More anon, I hope. Thanks.

I think justification is a-whole-nother can of worms - such as the argument between externalists and internalists - closely related to arguments about what constitutes knowledge in the first place. And this endless search for (metaphorical) foundations is the real problem.

Iwanna:
Yes, I sometimes look at justification and think, oh this is just sour grapes. You worked hard and had some rigorous methodology and mulled over epistemology and then some guy comes in off the street with the right answer and wants to think he knows something. And as much as I sympathize I think there is a degree of sour grapes and at least one faulty assumption: that we can know how we ourselves arrived at a conclusion and other people know their processes of justification and will report them correctly. It also creates problems with intuition in experts. Often people can consistantly draw correct conclusions or make great observations or sex-determine chicks or whatever, without even knowing how they drew the conclusion. The fear of course is that if we allow some intuition to be considered knowledge we have to throw the gates open. I don't think that's true and then that's not an argument against whatever their black-boxed process is. We can learn to make near instantaneous evaluations and be reliable without really being experts in our own methodologies and children of course do this regarding all sorts of things while growing up and sucking the world in.

All that could make me a kind of externalist, perhaps a reliablist. But I actually think my epistemology is eclectic. And I think everyone else's is also.

Of course. And my point is the need for a sharp methodological separation and distinction between the feature of reality and what we say about it.
The point is, what happens in the story has nothing to do with propositions. The woman’s mistake does not come from a false premise. She just believes the stranger is her friend, which is not the case.

I agree that it wasn't a premise, but it seems like it could be represented as one.

Of course. And my point is the need for a sharp methodological separation and distinction between the feature of reality and what we say about it.

Just nail this home for me. Why? I wonder about the term feature of reality. The term seems to presume 'it is real' and the person 'knows what part of reality'. One nice thing about 'what we say about it' is it obviously can be wrong. Feature of reality seems less neutral as a term. And in the specific story with the 'seeing the friend' I am not quite sure what it is referring to.

Peter Holmes wrote

As I think you suggest later, what we believe or know is that something is (or isn't) the case - because, outside language, features of reality have no truth-value.

Ah, ok. I think I have another problem with 'feature of reality' (though I think you are going in a good direction and i agree there is a problem). Features of reality have no truth value. Agreed. But a person does not have 'a feature of reality'. The propositional format gives us a statement describing reality (hopefully). This is ours, so to speak. I know where the proposition is. You said it. It's on paper or a screen. you thought it. When you replace it with 'feature of reality' I don't know where it is unless it is, seemingly obviously, outside of me. But a feature of reality cannot be mistaken or incorrect, either. And I think the term, whatever it is, has to have some part of my cognitive make-up in it or it is misleading. (I could be missing something you said here or meant) All the knowledge as mirror or representation models have their problems, but they do include the person in their noun for belief. LIke we know where the belief is, or part of it is constituted in a mind. Feature of reality is external.

Perhaps a verb or process might be better.

Despite or perhaps surrounding my eclecticism is pragmatism. Not anybody's pragmatism, but my not well thought out, hey look this is what I find in me pragrmatism.

And this is a terrible term, but just to get the idea slightly more concrete, might it not make sense to say that someone with an incorrect belief actually has a problematic tendency related to a specific event, thing or other sustained phenomenon. In practical terms (ironically) that's a terrible suggestion. But I hope you can see what I am contrasting with both propositional beliefs and feature of reality.

I had more but I think that's enough for now.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 3:49 pm

I think justification is a-whole-nother can of worms - such as the argument between externalists and internalists - closely related to arguments about what constitutes knowledge in the first place. And this endless search for (metaphorical) foundations is the real problem.

Iwanna:
Yes, I sometimes look at justification and think, oh this is just sour grapes. You worked hard and had some rigorous methodology and mulled over epistemology and then some guy comes in off the street with the right answer and wants to think he knows something. And as much as I sympathize I think there is a degree of sour grapes and at least one faulty assumption: that we can know how we ourselves arrived at a conclusion and other people know their processes of justification and will report them correctly. It also creates problems with intuition in experts. Often people can consistantly draw correct conclusions or make great observations or sex-determine chicks or whatever, without even knowing how they drew the conclusion. The fear of course is that if we allow some intuition to be considered knowledge we have to throw the gates open. I don't think that's true and then that's not an argument against whatever their black-boxed process is. We can learn to make near instantaneous evaluations and be reliable without really being experts in our own methodologies and children of course do this regarding all sorts of things while growing up and sucking the world in.

All that could make me a kind of externalist, perhaps a reliablist. But I actually think my epistemology is eclectic. And I think everyone else's is also.

I agree with a lot of what you say here - and it may be that we've come to the same conclusion by slightly different routes. Could be that Moynihan's relevant here: 'You are entitled to your opinion. But you are not entitled to your own facts.' I know this seems to beg the question, by assuming there are what I call features of reality (facts), which are independent from opinion. (More on that later.) And - given my standing objection to theorising about what we call knowledge, justification, and so on - I prefer the externalist approach - one reason why I think the JTB's focus on what S knows misses something important: what we mean when we say we know something. (In philosophy, we're always really talking about the use of words, not the existence of things. Other people do that, such as natural scientists.)

Your thoughts on intuition are interesting. I usually argue that an appeal to intuition on a matter of fact (more question-begging?) is unconvincing - and usually dependent on background objective knowledge anyway. But perhaps how we come to know something is a separate issue from whether we know it. Not sure. More work needed on that.

Of course. And my point is the need for a sharp methodological separation and distinction between the feature of reality and what we say about it.
The point is, what happens in the story has nothing to do with propositions. The woman’s mistake does not come from a false premise. She just believes the stranger is her friend, which is not the case.

I agree that it wasn't a premise, but it seems like it could be represented as one.

Of course. And my point is the need for a sharp methodological separation and distinction between the feature of reality and what we say about it.

Just nail this home for me. Why? I wonder about the term feature of reality. The term seems to presume 'it is real' and the person 'knows what part of reality'. One nice thing about 'what we say about it' is it obviously can be wrong. Feature of reality seems less neutral as a term. And in the specific story with the 'seeing the friend' I am not quite sure what it is referring to.

Okay. I prefer 'feature of reality that is or was the case' to 'state-of-affairs' - but the category's the same. These are things that exist or existed. And, pending evidence for the existence of anything non-physical, 'exists or existed' means 'exists or existed physically': the poet's rocks and stones and trees, humans, brains, electrochemical processes that we call thoughts, and so on. Of course, it's a realist assumption that such things do exist - but I see no reason to doubt it. It's the background for everything we know and say - the thing we never more than speculatively (philosophically!) doubt.

Peter Holmes wrote

As I think you suggest later, what we believe or know is that something is (or isn't) the case - because, outside language, features of reality have no truth-value.

Ah, ok. I think I have another problem with 'feature of reality' (though I think you are going in a good direction and i agree there is a problem). Features of reality have no truth value. Agreed. But a person does not have 'a feature of reality'. The propositional format gives us a statement describing reality (hopefully). This is ours, so to speak. I know where the proposition is. You said it. It's on paper or a screen. you thought it. When you replace it with 'feature of reality' I don't know where it is unless it is, seemingly obviously, outside of me. But a feature of reality cannot be mistaken or incorrect, either. And I think the term, whatever it is, has to have some part of my cognitive make-up in it or it is misleading. (I could be missing something you said here or meant) All the knowledge as mirror or representation models have their problems, but they do include the person in their noun for belief. LIke we know where the belief is, or part of it is constituted in a mind. Feature of reality is external.

Perhaps a verb or process might be better.

Not sure I understand you here. What do you mean by 'have' in 'a person does not have 'a feature of reality'? People - we - are features of reality - physical existents. (I've called this Wittgenstein's prophylactic for philosophical delusion; we're objects surrounded by objects, not cut off from them.) So I don't understand why you say you don't know where features of reality are. You're one of them, as is your brain. (As you say of my point, I may well be missing yours.) Sure, beliefs and knowledge are things we - and arguably other creatures - have. But why does that mean features of reality have to 'have some part of [our] cognitive make-up' in them? That smacks of VA's supposed anti-realism. Again, sorry if I'm missing the point. (Oh - talk of reality as external and mind as internal may be the clue. I completely reject that quasi-religious delusion.)

Despite or perhaps surrounding my eclecticism is pragmatism. Not anybody's pragmatism, but my not well thought out, hey look this is what I find in me pragrmatism.

And this is a terrible term, but just to get the idea slightly more concrete, might it not make sense to say that someone with an incorrect belief actually has a problematic tendency related to a specific event, thing or other sustained phenomenon. In practical terms (ironically) that's a terrible suggestion. But I hope you can see what I am contrasting with both propositional beliefs and feature of reality.

I can't see what problem you're pointing at. Beliefs aren't propositional - that's my starting point. There are dogs, which are features of reality; there are things we believe and know about dogs - and we can be wrong; and there are things we say about dogs, which (classically) may be true or not true/false, in context. And, while I think the pragmatism theory of truth is well dodgy (like all the others), this three-part distinction seems to me pretty pragmatic in tenor - which is why I call it methodological.

I had more but I think that's enough for now.

Many thanks. And, once again, apologies for my misunderstandings. Please do straighten me out. All very interesting.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 5:32 pm In philosophy, we're always really talking about the use of words, not the existence of things. Other people do that, such as natural scientists.

That's not true.

If you believe you are talking about the use of words, then your domain of discourse necessitates the existence of an a priori use-case for using words.
Nobody uses words for the sake of using words - there's a reason for using words beyond lip service. And that puts you right back to questioning the goals&motivations of those who use words.

What are you using words for? To correctly describe reality.
Why do you want to correctly describe reality?

Because we use words with the expectation of some particular future outcome Backwards induction is inevitable.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 5:32 pm Your thoughts on intuition are interesting. I usually argue that an appeal to intuition on a matter of fact (more question-begging?) is unconvincing - and usually dependent on background objective knowledge anyway. But perhaps how we come to know something is a separate issue from whether we know it. Not sure. More work needed on that.

Sure, I don't think an appeal to intuition works unless you have demonstrated expertise. It doesn't make your opinion fact, but I would act on it in many instances, so it can be a fact for me. But in the original scenario where we are talking about does she know her friend is there or even does an observer with a better perspective know the person is there, these are forms of intuition. Generally recognizing a friend is very effective and it is more or less a form of intuition. A skill we have built up and don't really mull over a methodology. So, these individuals on the ground navigating their lives type of knowing situations or just believing, I think intuition is a fine route to deciding if you know or are pretty sure and so on.

But then there's the whole view of knowledge as public. Which is where I keep thinking you will go. That I know that is Jimmy is a different kind of knowing from jellyfish X is a hermaphrodite. There's really no reason for a public sense of X being considered knowledge because some scientist feels in her gut X is true. Might as well go the whole 9 yards and do some testing. But many would treat a scientist's intuition as knowledge or near knowledge. For example, give them lots of money to study X, because they've done so damn well in the past. But yeah, I am not focusing on this kind of people in Japan should believe your intuition even though they never met you public facts type of knowledge.

People vote and have all sorts of life strategies based on less, even scientists. Assessments of the opposite sex, in general. Strategies for avoiding conflict. I raise these kinds examples because whatever people's official epistemologies, they often make incredibly important decisions using other epistemologies and think they know certain things. And of course some of theme are actually good at assessments like this.

But yes, the word fact seems like a jump into consensus, public, common knowledge and that's a different can of worms. Though many of the issues we've been talking about apply.

I think we might want to talk about how procedural knowledge relates to our ideas (or not) also. Or tacit knowledge, also.

Of course. And my point is the need for a sharp methodological separation and distinction between the feature of reality and what we say about it.
The point is, what happens in the story has nothing to do with propositions. The woman’s mistake does not come from a false premise. She just believes the stranger is her friend, which is not the case.

I agree that it wasn't a premise, but it seems like it could be represented as one.

Of course. And my point is the need a sharp methodological separation and distinction between the feature of reality and what we say about it.

I'll try a different approach. If we focus on propositions, which you think causes problems, we talk about the truth value of propositions. Reality is not true. And you don't think, for example in the recognizing friend scenario, there is a proposition. But it seemed at times that instead of talking about propositions, we should talk about features of reality. So, do we say 'it wasn't a feature of reality that she saw her friend'? Her belief is not a feature or reality. (it is, of course, but it's not the one we are referring to. we are thinking of the sight of the friend, or the friend being there as the feature of reality (or?). Like I cant find a way to replace proposition with feature of reality when talking about knowledge/belief. I can see that phrase in a discussion, but not as a replacement.

Like she didn't have a propositional belief, she had a feature of reality.
That doesn't work for me. NOt that you said this. But it seemed like a replacement in the way we talk about what she beliefs.

[/quote] 1 Does this mean your answer to my three questions is 'no'?
2 Relativity and quantum mechanics don't demonstrate that 'there is no objective reality'. They merely explain more accurately and objectively what the thing we call reality consists of. There's no reason to say atoms are more real than the things they constitute. Are the bricks 'real', whereas the house is only 'apparent' or an 'illusion'? 3 I think your position amounts to little more than old-fashioned idealism - with a modern twist.
[/quote]

Peter,

There is no objective reality, I thought you might take Einstein's word for that but here is a link that might help.

https://amp.interestingengineering.com/ ... ve-reality

There are others posted on The Scientific American if you are a member.

Opinions are largely due to the information one is exposed to, google it there is more than enough info on it.

Essentially it states that all is energy and that ultimate reality is a place of no things. So, at that point one has to ask one's self then where do objects come from, the answer I have already stated.

There is no objective reality, I thought you might take Einstein's word for that but here is a link that might help.

Einstein can't really make up rules about the universe and then say there is no objective reality. E=MC2 for example is an extremely strong claim about an objective reality.

https://amp.interestingengineering.com/ ... ve-reality

Sure, it is being hyped as that. But look at what they did. They created very controlled testing conditions and create the effects predicted by Wigner's thought experiment. The results seem to support
local observer-independence

I do really appreciate the link to the article which i followed to the actual paper. Very interesting, thanks.

Essentially it states that all is energy and that ultimate reality is a place of no things. So, at that point one has to ask one's self then where do objects come from, the answer I have already stated.

Then get together with Peter, and create some objects. I guarantee he'll go along with you. yes, should the experiment hold, we have a reality that is quite different than we imagined before. But it is still a reality with all sorts of rules.

As far as opinions, people create different opinions while NOT disagreeing about what is present or just happened.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 11:04 pm E=MC2 for example is an extremely strong claim about an objective reality.

Eh? E=MC2 isn't about reality. It's a claim about rest frames of particles.

It's a model for interpreting your experiences.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 11:04 pm As far as opinions, people create different opinions while NOT disagreeing about what is present or just happened.

When people claim that rules are present in reality one is obliged to disagree.

Rules are mental constructs.

popeye1945 wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 10:49 pm

1 Does this mean your answer to my three questions is 'no'?
2 Relativity and quantum mechanics don't demonstrate that 'there is no objective reality'. They merely explain more accurately and objectively what the thing we call reality consists of. There's no reason to say atoms are more real than the things they constitute. Are the bricks 'real', whereas the house is only 'apparent' or an 'illusion'? 3 I think your position amounts to little more than old-fashioned idealism - with a modern twist.

Peter,

There is no objective reality, I thought you might take Einstein's word for that but here is a link that might help.

https://amp.interestingengineering.com/ ... ve-reality

There are others posted on The Scientific American if you are a member.

Opinions are largely due to the information one is exposed to, google it there is more than enough info on it.

Essentially it states that all is energy and that ultimate reality is a place of no things. So, at that point one has to ask one's self then where do objects come from, the answer I have already stated.

New Physics Experiment Indicates There's No Objective Reality
https://amp.interestingengineering.com/ ... ve-reality

That 'there is no objective reality' [as claimed by realists] it already well accepted within the Quantum community.

Therein the article;

Someone once said: "The world is all that is the case."
But, is it?
...
So the next time your friends think something is or isn't the case, consider interjecting with an argument from quantum physics: they're both wrong, and so are you, because even the simple fact of the disagreement itself is just another illusion.

Peter always claim that 'objective facts' are "that is the case" [so no moral facts]; the conclusion in that article is mud in the face for him. This is the realists' position on objective reality tied to words or whatever which is not realistic at all.

Nevertheless there are objective facts but not 'that is the case' but rather there are objective facts which must be conditioned upon a specific Framework and System of Reality [Knowledge], i.e. FSR or FSK.

Who deny scientific facts are not objective facts?
It is well accepted scientific facts are objective but they are imperatively conditioned upon the scientific FSK is the most credible and reliable.

In the sense of scientific facts conditioned upon its FSK, so there are moral facts conditioned upon the moral FSK [claimed as of near equivalent credibility with the scientific FSK].

As such Knowledge are Justified True Beliefs imperative conditioned upon a specific FSK which are different degrees of credibility.
There are no unconditional knowledge.

Btw, Einstein believed there is objective reality in the realist sense, i.e. he believed the moon pre-existed humans.

To Einstein, the probabilistic description of the natural world couldn’t be the final word.
There had to be an objective reality out there, independent of the observer. Quantum mechanics, useful as it was, had to be an incomplete theory. He believed in a deeper layer of physical reality where the normalcy of classical physics—determinism and the separation of observer and observed—would prevail.
https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2010/ ... te-reality

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Jun 24, 2022 6:45 am

popeye1945 wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 10:49 pm

1 Does this mean your answer to my three questions is 'no'?
2 Relativity and quantum mechanics don't demonstrate that 'there is no objective reality'. They merely explain more accurately and objectively what the thing we call reality consists of. There's no reason to say atoms are more real than the things they constitute. Are the bricks 'real', whereas the house is only 'apparent' or an 'illusion'? 3 I think your position amounts to little more than old-fashioned idealism - with a modern twist.

Peter,

There is no objective reality, I thought you might take Einstein's word for that but here is a link that might help.

https://amp.interestingengineering.com/ ... ve-reality

There are others posted on The Scientific American if you are a member.

Opinions are largely due to the information one is exposed to, google it there is more than enough info on it.

Essentially it states that all is energy and that ultimate reality is a place of no things. So, at that point one has to ask one's self then where do objects come from, the answer I have already stated.

New Physics Experiment Indicates There's No Objective Reality
https://amp.interestingengineering.com/ ... ve-reality

That 'there is no objective reality' [as claimed by realists] it already well accepted within the Quantum community.

Therein the article;

Someone once said: "The world is all that is the case."
But, is it?
...
So the next time your friends think something is or isn't the case, consider interjecting with an argument from quantum physics: they're both wrong, and so are you, because even the simple fact of the disagreement itself is just another illusion.

Peter always claim that 'objective facts' are "that is the case" [so no moral facts]; the conclusion in that article is mud in the face for him. This is the realists' position on objective reality tied to words or whatever which is not realistic at all.

Nevertheless there are objective facts but not 'that is the case' but rather there are objective facts which must be conditioned upon a specific Framework and System of Reality [Knowledge], i.e. FSR or FSK.

Who deny scientific facts are not objective facts?
It is well accepted scientific facts are objective but they are imperatively conditioned upon the scientific FSK is the most credible and reliable.

In the sense of scientific facts conditioned upon its FSK, so there are moral facts conditioned upon the moral FSK [claimed as of near equivalent credibility with the scientific FSK].

As such Knowledge are Justified True Beliefs imperative conditioned upon a specific FSK which are different degrees of credibility.
There are no unconditional knowledge.

Btw, Einstein believed there is objective reality in the realist sense, i.e. he believed the moon pre-existed humans.

To Einstein, the probabilistic description of the natural world couldn’t be the final word.
There had to be an objective reality out there, independent of the observer. Quantum mechanics, useful as it was, had to be an incomplete theory. He believed in a deeper layer of physical reality where the normalcy of classical physics—determinism and the separation of observer and observed—would prevail.
https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2010/ ... te-reality

The claim that what we call reality is an illusion depends on two assumptions: that there is a real reality - reality-in-itself - that's not an illusion; and that 'we' are being fooled by the illusion. But then, 'we' must also be an illusion, being fooled by an illusion. So these assumptions undercut themselves.

And what we actually do and say belies them anyway. For example, if all is illusion, including all facts, why bother arguing about the existence of moral facts?

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jun 24, 2022 1:08 pm The claim that what we call reality is an illusion depends on two assumptions:
1. that there is a real reality - reality-in-itself - that's not an illusion; and
2. that 'we' are being fooled by the illusion.
But then, 'we' must also be an illusion, being fooled by an illusion. So these assumptions undercut themselves.

And what we actually do and say belies them anyway. For example, if all is illusion, including all facts, why bother arguing about the existence of moral facts?

The above is based on your shallow, narrow and dogmatic thinking.
There is no reality-in-itself or your 'real reality' [1]- that is the mother of all illusions.
Your [2] is moot since 1 is already an illusion.

I had argued,
what are truths, facts, real and knowledge are conditioned to a specific FSK,
of which the scientific FSK is the most reliable and credible; such beliefs must be reinforced with critical and rational philosophical reasonings to prevent Scientism.
So what we have here is 'reality-in-FSK' that is really real and not an illusion.

'Reality-in-FSK' is the objective reality, i.e. independent of individual opinions and beliefs.

Since 'reality-in-FSK' is really real and not an illusion,
then, your 'reality-in-itself' is otherwise, thus not real and so is an illusion. [as argued by Kant, the thing-in-itself is an illusion].
Your facts are indeed 'fact-in-itself' which are ultimately illusion because they are mere words and lack grounding to reality i.e. reality-in-FSK.

The most real reality-in-FSK or 'facts-in-FSK' leads to moral_facts-in-Moral_FSK.
Note reality-in-FSK includes reality-in-Human_FSK, i.e. reality is always entangled with the human conditions.

Your whole mess started with the very unrealistic Assumption 1, [of Metaphysical Realism]
"that there is a real reality - reality-in-itself - that's not an illusion".

Hope you get it? but I believe that is unlikely.

[/quote]The claim that what we call reality is an illusion depends on two assumptions: that there is a real reality - reality-in-itself - that's not an illusion; and that 'we' are being fooled by the illusion. But then, 'we' must also be an illusion, being fooled by an illusion. So these assumptions undercut themselves.
And what we actually do and say belies them anyway. For example, if all is illusion, including all facts, why bother arguing about the existence of moral facts?
[/quote]

Peter,

When physicists talk about ultimate reality they are talking about energy but, a place of no things, it is thus the source of the stimulus that affects the body or makes changes to the body which gives perception which gives objects. If this were not the case how would one explain that with a change or impairment of the body apparent reality changes? I think you would admit that not all species enjoy the same biological structure and form thus not the same apparent reality. Perhaps it is not the proper categorical term illusion for apparent reality is a biological reaction to the energy frequencies of ultimate reality. Apparent reality is the meanings derived from perception/reaction and are relevant to biological consciousness alone. Morals are relevant to biological consciousness in the same way, the meanings that support life and justice or meanings that undermine life and justice. You were right about Einstein I'd forgotten about the battle between him and Bohr. Einstein didn't believe in entanglement either but could not disprove it or prove there was an objective reality. There are no objective moral facts, there are sentiments then made into rules and laws or societal norms.

popeye1945 wrote: ↑Sat Jun 25, 2022 6:41 am There are no objective moral facts, there are sentiments then made into rules and laws or societal norms.

The clue is the term "sentiments".
Where did they arise from?
I have argued these moral sentiments [not the arbitrary ones] are represented as inherent moral potentiality supported by physical neural networks as a matter of fact in the brain/mind of the individual[s].
These potentialities can be verified and justified by science and when inputted into a credible moral FSK, they are objective moral facts.

Morality is thus confined to the individual[s]' brain and mind, where these potentialities are the internal moral laws to guide the individual towards moral progress on a spontaneous and based on freedom.

When these sentiments are interpreted from an external basis and make into rules [religious with threats] and laws with penalties, these are not related to morality-per-se at all but rather they relate to religions and politics respectively enforced by fears, threat of hell and penalties for criminality.

Morality-proper's objective is confined to the individual[s] own self-development and moral progress such that the individual[s] will act in alignment with the inherent moral principles spontaneously with freedom [without external coercion].

The reality is the majority of humans at the present phase of evolution has very low moral quotient [MQ] [say average 100] and the objective to get to a critical mass where the average person has a reasonably high MQ [average 1,000, i.e. 10x].

The big question is how can be achieved the above objective which is in total contrast to the current perverted understanding of 'what is morality' like what Peter et. al. believe with ignorance and arrogance.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Jun 25, 2022 6:54 am

popeye1945 wrote: ↑Sat Jun 25, 2022 6:41 am There are no objective moral facts, there are sentiments then made into rules and laws or societal norms.

The clue is the term "sentiments".
Where did they arise from?
I have argued these moral sentiments [not the arbitrary ones] are represented as inherent moral potentiality supported by physical neural networks as a matter of fact in the brain/mind of the individual[s].
These potentialities can be verified and justified by science and when inputted into a credible moral FSK, they are objective moral facts.
Morality is thus confined to the individual[s]' brain and mind, where these potentialities are the internal moral laws to guide the individual towards moral progress on a spontaneous and based on freedom.

When these sentiments are interpreted from an external basis and make into rules [religious with threats] and laws with penalties, these are not related to morality-per-se at all but rather they relate to religions and politics respectively enforced by fears, threat of hell and penalties for criminality. Morality-proper's objective is confined to the individual[s] own self-development and moral progress such that the individual[s] will act in alignment with the inherent moral principles spontaneously with freedom [without external coercion].

The big question is how can be achieved the above objective which is in total contrast to the current perverted understanding of 'what is morality' like what Peter et. al. believe with ignorance and arrogance.

Veritas,
All is cognitive. The institutions you speak of are but humanities biological extensions, manifestation of human nature.

popeye1945 wrote: ↑Sat Jun 25, 2022 6:41 am I wrote:

The claim that what we call reality is an illusion depends on two assumptions: that there is a real reality - reality-in-itself - that's not an illusion; and that 'we' are being fooled by the illusion. But then, 'we' must also be an illusion, being fooled by an illusion. So these assumptions undercut themselves.
And what we actually do and say belies them anyway. For example, if all is illusion, including all facts, why bother arguing about the existence of moral facts?

popeye1945 wrote:

Peter,

When physicists talk about ultimate reality they are talking about energy but, a place of no things, it is thus the source of the stimulus that affects the body or makes changes to the body which gives perception which gives objects. If this were not the case how would one explain that with a change or impairment of the body apparent reality changes? I think you would admit that not all species enjoy the same biological structure and form thus not the same apparent reality. Perhaps it is not the proper categorical term illusion for apparent reality is a biological reaction to the energy frequencies of ultimate reality. Apparent reality is the meanings derived from perception/reaction and are relevant to biological consciousness alone. Morals are relevant to biological consciousness in the same way, the meanings that support life and justice or meanings that undermine life and justice. You were right about Einstein I'd forgotten about the battle between him and Bohr. Einstein didn't believe in entanglement either but could not disprove it or prove there was an objective reality. There are no objective moral facts, there are sentiments then made into rules and laws or societal norms.

My response:

But you ignore my point. The 'stimulus that affects ... or makes changes to the body which gives perception which gives objects' - these are all 'apparent reality' for any organism. You can't say all is illusion (apparent reality), which biological consciousness perceives and endows with meaning - because biological consciousness must itself be an illusion (an apparent reality). You don't seem to recognise the black hole you're in.

And, meanwhile, do you have an example of a physicist who talks confidently about 'ultimate reality' as 'a place of no things' in a scientific context?