Philosophy Now Forum

Immanuel Can wrote:There is no way to convince a person against his or her will. There is always a theoretical way out, no matter how improbable. Some willingness to believe has to be present in order for evidence to be regarded as evidence -- no matter how good the evidence might be.

NDEs are very interesting and mysterious things, with people going through extraordinary states of consciousness. Even if these are the effects of the brain shutting down, surely this capacity to enjoy such extraordinary states of consciousness and experiences that tend to be life changing is worth exploring? If they are only a state of the brain, wouldn't it make sense to have brain probe services (or whatever) and bring this capacity for extraordinary spiritual experiences to the public?

Immanuel Can wrote:There is no way to convince a person against his or her will.

Mr Can, how determined must one be not to believe in something they cannot see, hear, touch, taste or smell?

Immanuel Can wrote:There is always a theoretical way out, no matter how improbable.

There is absolutely no need for a theoretical way out, no matter how improbable, of an unsubstantiated claim.

Immanuel Can wrote:Some willingness to believe has to be present in order for evidence to be regarded as evidence -- no matter how good the evidence might be.

This is projection. You assume that a lack of belief is an act of will, as that is precisely what your own belief is. The evidence you have presented to support your claim is woeful; it is much less an act of will not to believe bad evidence, than it is to believe the same bad evidence.

Immanuel Can wrote:
Me: With God, you say that evidence for God depends on the 'frame of mind' or 'condition of the heart' of the believer.
No, no...I said that seeing the evidence AS EVIDENCE depends on the willingness of the observer. An Atheist who does not want to accept life after death will not even be impressed if a Man does rise from the dead. He'll just find an alternate "material" explanation, and carry right on.

I do not see the difference. If calling something 'evidence' depends on the willingness of the observer, then whatever they think the evidence goes on to prove will also depend on that willingness. If I am willing to accept 'owning a black cat' is 'evidence' that somebody is a witch, then my conclusion 'She is a witch' still hangs on my initial inclination as to what counts as evidence.

But if something is real, and is actually "evidence," then it won't matter whether or not the skeptic believes in it: it will be really true either way. And likewise, nothing will become true simply because somebody believes in it. That door swings both ways.

But the skeptic accepts that reality. The skeptic accepts that we cannot know 'the truth' unconditionally. But the person who makes the claim they do know something unconditionally denies it; they believe there is an exception. The onus is surely on that person to explain why they believe that.

Not quite what I said. I said that I can't force other people to believe (remember the dirty microscope?). I didn't say that there were no material evidences of God -- I think there are -- but only that those evidences are not sufficiently strong to force an adamant Atheist to concede them, since nobody can convince a hard-hearted person.

Me: In the same way' 'I know there will be a Day of Judgement' just tells us about the mental state of the believer. If it was meant to be understood as more than that we can ask them 'How do you know?' and see if they reply.
Not so. Either there will be one, or there will not -- that we know for sure. But if there is, you and I will know it; and if there is not, neither you nor I will know it. Either way, the objective facts don't change.

It isn't that we are getting incomplete information, nor inconclusive information, it is that no information is possible. There is no microscope, dirty or otherwise. If I have no information about X, then the situation is - that I have no information. Regarding 'The Day of Judgement' I cannot say; 'It may or not be, therefore there is a 50% chance it will happen'. The situation is that if we have no reason to think it will - then we have no reason to think it will.

If you believe there are material evidences for God, then I would be interested to hear them, but the material can only be evidence of the material. God must be beyond the material. All the ways we talk about 'information', or 'evidence', refer to systems that do not include God. e.g. God is not an object in science, so we cannot use science to provide 'evidence' about him.

As you know, I do not see any harm in having an interpretation of the world that involves God. For example, one could add to an entirely materialistic description of an event '...also it is by God's will'. That would not contradict the materialistic explanation, but nor would it be a part of it.

Me: Relativism says that we have no truth that cannot be questioned at some level.

No. It says, "All truth claims are relative to the situation of the observer." That itself is advanced by Relativists as a truth claim not relative to the situation of any observer.

That is surely the same thing. If I make a truth claim from within science, that my claim would be in the context of what counts as true in science. But somebody else could stand outside science and question its assumptions. 'How do you know you are not a brain in a vat?' etc.

And that is the situation for all of us. You do not seem to claim yourself that you have absolute certainty; you do not argue that it impossible for anyone to question whether Jesus really arose from the dead.

But it is more than just the Cartesian 'demon' of doubt in our own senses:

If you mean, "People are confused about truth" then that is indeed an observation. But if you mean "because people are confused about truth therefore there can be no truth," then it's a non-sequitur....

All truths can be questioned. That does not mean truths are relative. I can question the existence of planet Earth. That does not mean there is no planet Earth. It just means I'm very skeptical.

It is not just about the possibility that earth might be a group hallucination. When you talk about 'the existence of planet earth', you are referring to an idea in your head, a concept. That concept was created by lumping together lots of different things (all the things planet earth is made of) and by separation from other things (the rest of the solar system). You did that; you could equally have lumped and separated those elements of the experienced world in a different way, and said 'carbon exists' or 'life exists' or 'thoughts exist'.

There is no 'truth' out there, a truth that exists independently of people using language, a truth without any context.

Me:...not unless you had a meta-knowledge of a universe that might or might not contain God, such that you could count the possibilities.
No, this doesn't follow. You would only have to be able to imagine it as being the case. And even the erroneousness of that assumption would not prevent you from making a calculation of probability. You might be wrong, but you could do it.

That would be like inviting me to 'imagine a horse', now calculate the odds of it winning the 2.30 race. If we have already imagined God as existing, then in that imagined universe the odds of God existing would be 100%.

Probability can always be calculated exactly. The problem is with the figures we use for the calculations; do they accurately describe the situation we are interested in? I can exactly calculate the odds for my winning money at roulette...provided the wheel has no unknown bias...provided nobody robs the casino...provided I don't have a heart attack... In order to make the calculation there has got to be some limit to the situation, such that I can list all the factors.

But with God, there is no limit. If I searched the entire universe, listed every object, understood every scientific law, God would still be outside the situation I have described. I can make no calculation at all about probabilities.

It is. (That atheists and Muslims are worse than Christians (or just Catholics?)) Want the body count?

Yes and no; see below. To begin with, if we are doing numbers, I would be interested in the definition of 'comparatively minuscule' and how we quantify 'cruelties'

Me: But to make any argument of this type stick depends on heavy use of the 'no true Scotsman' argument, whereby we can disown Christians who do discreditable things.
No, it's not. The "No True Scotsman" fallacy is only half-understood by most people. Like many fallacies (the ad hominem, for example). It's only a fallacy in some of the cases.

If you say, "No true Scotsman drinks ale," then it's a fallacy. If you say, "No true Scotsman has no relevant connection to Scotland," then it's no longer a fallacy: it's true. And it's true if you say, "No true Scotsman is a woman," for by definition, to be a "woman" is not to be a "man."

In other words, there are relevant criteria for being a Scotsman, and irrelevant ones. Likewise, there are relevant criteria for being a Christian, and irrelevant ones. We can discuss what the relevant criteria are, if you like; but we both can see there ought to be some criteria applied.

In fact, even if you only say, "A Christian is someone who says he/she is," then you've set a criterion. I would dispute it, but you have still set one. So you can hardly accuse me of the "No True Scotsman" fallacy; for I only do precisely what you yourself are doing also.

I think your body count is going to depend on the criteria you set. And I would be free to set a different criteria, and thus come to a different count. What this shows is the defect of the 'no true Scotsman' as an argument.

But even if we agreed the regimes of Stalin and Hitler were entirely atheist,
We do. So did they.

Certainly not. Hitler did not say Christianity was incompatible with being a Nazi; Christians had no problem joining the Party and supporting the regime. Stalin eased off on the atheism during WW2, since then the church continued, as a supporter of the state. You agree that both Stalin and Hitler were raised as Christians.

And of course, what Hitler did to the Jews wasn't unknown in Christian Europe, nor were other forms of genocide, war etc. If a Christian is prepared to burn ten people alive, whereas using 20th century technology an atheist guard gasses a hundred people, are we really going to argue that the Christian is ten times 'less cruel' than the guard?

We note that Christians shipped over 10 million slaves to the Americas. If these millions - and their children, and their children's children - were kept alive, it was only because they could be worked until they dropped dead. Was that Christian slavery more or less cruel than the atheist Gulags, say? Are we really going to try to do that calculation?

As Doctor Johnson said: 'Sir, there is no settling the point of precedency between a louse and a flea'.

Well, we have to establish what a "Christian" is and does, before that holds any water. I would argue that you are corrupting your data with a multitude of manifestly refutable cases. But until you decide what qualifies a person to be a "Christian" -- or a "Scotsman" -- you're not going to find it easy to sort that out, I fear.

Not a problem for me. If somebody calls themselves a Christian, I would accept they are a Christian. If others cannot say that you are not really a Christian, just because you differ from them in some ways, then equally you cannot say it about them.

The argument was whether being a Christian makes any difference to anything, or whether Christianity simply adopts the attitude of whatever society it finds itself in; in a communist society it supports communism, in conservative USA it supports conservative American values, in an Antisemitic society it supports Antisemitism. Christianity supports slavery, up until slavery is no longer supported, after that it is against slavery. So we are just left with the name, and a set of beliefs that have no practical consequences.

Londoner wrote:I do not see the difference. If calling something 'evidence' depends on the willingness of the observer, then whatever they think the evidence goes on to prove will also depend on that willingness.

Not everything depends on the will of the observer. It takes a lot more energy to deny the facts than to go with them, does it not? But even when it does depend on that, the truth itself does not. And truth wins, every time -- if you just wait long enough.

If I am willing to accept 'owning a black cat' is 'evidence' that somebody is a witch, then my conclusion 'She is a witch' still hangs on my initial inclination as to what counts as evidence.

Yes, but I think we can both see it's very poor evidence. However, if you were a 15th Century witch burner, you might refuse to see past it. That certainly happened, did it not?

But if something is real, and is actually "evidence," then it won't matter whether or not the skeptic believes in it: it will be really true either way. And likewise, nothing will become true simply because somebody believes in it. That door swings both ways.

But the skeptic accepts that reality. The skeptic accepts that we cannot know 'the truth' unconditionally. But the person who makes the claim they do know something unconditionally denies it; they believe there is an exception. The onus is surely on that person to explain why they believe that.

Neither you nor I believe in "unconditional" knowledge. I believe in inductive -- hence probabilistic -- knowledge, and I suspect you do too. But "unconditional" -- well, that only happens in closed symbol systems like maths and symbolic logic. Nothing in real life is so absolutely knowable.

Christians accept that. All knowledge is a combination of both evidence and belief: ideally, with as much of the former in place as possible. And that's routine: after all, even the most hardened skeptic "believes" things all the time. He "believes" his wife is faithful, though he cannot conclusively show she is. He "believes" an elevator will not kill him, and steps into it, even though elevators do occasionally fail and kill people.

This is all very ordinary, and need trouble us not at all. Induction is just how any person knows anything at all.

It isn't that we are getting incomplete information, nor inconclusive information, it is that no information is possible.

About what? The Day of Judgment?

I admit: we only have one real testimony on that. And that would be rather shaky if our Witness didn't also happen to the Supreme Being...and the Judge Himself.

If you believe there are material evidences for God, then I would be interested to hear them,...

Well, they're well-known. The Cosmological Argument is very good. The Design Argument is inductively excellent. The Moral Argument is to me completely devastating to Atheism. And there are many others. But how many can we treat here?

...but the material can only be evidence of the material.

No, not so. The evidence that someone has been by may be a piece of paper with writing on it. Paper and writing are not a human being, though. Rather, it is a material effect of the activity of a human being in that area. And it's good evidence.

The existence of a design in nature would be superb evidence of a Designer. And it would take considerable mental gymnastics to avoid such evidence. But people can do it; they do it all the time. The existence of an origin point for the universe (as in the Cosmological Infinite Regression Argument) would make a powerful case for the existence of an Uncaused Cause; but you can find quite a bunch of people desperately trying to avoid it.

All the ways we talk about 'information', or 'evidence', refer to systems that do not include God. e.g. God is not an object in science, so we cannot use science to provide 'evidence' about him.

An author is not writing-on-paper. But some writing, found on paper, is evidence for the existence of an author.

As you know, I do not see any harm in having an interpretation of the world that involves God. For example, one could add to an entirely materialistic description of an event '...also it is by God's will'. That would not contradict the materialistic explanation, but nor would it be a part of it.

Does this not mix up categories of explanation, though? Different categories of explanation do not necessarily contradict: sometimes, they coexist. For example, is the reason for, say, your degree in Engineering (if you had one, say) University of Manchester (i.e. the source), or is it your will to learn, or is it the expectations of your ambitious parents? Or is the reason for that degree that it was a prerequisite to building bridges? Which is the true "explanation" for why you have it?

The answer might well be "all of those." They're just differing categories of explanation.

In a similar way, we might ask, did Nazism fail because it was a delusion, or because the Americans entered the war, or because of the Battle of Britain, or because of winter in Stalingrad, or because of Hitler's insanity, or because of the will of God? Maybe all.

Why are you alive? What does your life mean? How do you know if you're a good person? Where do you go when you die? Which of these can you avoid asking, and for which one is "because of materials" a good enough explanation?

Me: Relativism says that we have no truth that cannot be questioned at some level.

No. It says, "All truth claims are relative to the situation of the observer." That itself is advanced by Relativists as a truth claim not relative to the situation of any observer.

That is surely the same thing.

Oh, no. That must be clear, surely. To say anything CAN be questioned...sure, anything can be, thought it's not always sensible to do so. But relativism says more. It says there IS no objective truth.

But if that is TRUE, then Relativism is false...because IT is true...which makes IT false.

You see? Relativism is just epistemological nonsense. It can't even possibly be true, because if it's true it's false. It's false both ways, then.

You do not seem to claim yourself that you have absolute certainty; you do not argue that it impossible for anyone to question whether Jesus really arose from the dead.

No, I don't contest that. It's a matter about which each one of us must make up his own mind.

That's the real meaning of "faith." Not "believing what you know ain't so," but deciding what you are going to invest your life in, based on the best evidence you can find. 100% certainty is not available to human beings, except, as I said earlier, in closed systems of symbols like maths. We are all creatures of faith. We just have to decide what it is worth placing our faith in.

There is no 'truth' out there, a truth that exists independently of people using language, a truth without any context.

Do you want me to agree that that is true? If you do, you've just denied that creed. "There is no truth out there" is a statement of "truth." You expect it to stand categorically, objectively true, unless I mistake your meaning. And if I am unpersuaded, will you now tell me I am objectively wrong? But how could I be, since you say there is no objective truth I ought to believe?

Me:...not unless you had a meta-knowledge of a universe that might or might not contain God, such that you could count the possibilities.
No, this doesn't follow. You would only have to be able to imagine it as being the case. And even the erroneousness of that assumption would not prevent you from making a calculation of probability. You might be wrong, but you could do it.

That would be like inviting me to 'imagine a horse', now calculate the odds of it winning the 2.30 race. If we have already imagined God as existing, then in that imagined universe the odds of God existing would be 100%.

Your analogy is backwards. You were saying I had to have knowledge of a universe in which God does NOT exist. I simply say that if God does exist, I don't need such a universe in order to know it.

Probability can always be calculated exactly.

Can I go gambling with you?

The problem is with the figures we use for the calculations; do they accurately describe the situation we are interested in? I can exactly calculate the odds for my winning money at roulette...provided the wheel has no unknown bias...provided nobody robs the casino...provided I don't have a heart attack... In order to make the calculation there has got to be some limit to the situation, such that I can list all the factors.

But with God, there is no limit. If I searched the entire universe, listed every object, understood every scientific law, God would still be outside the situation I have described. I can make no calculation at all about probabilities.

Fair enough: we can't guess at the probabilities of an unknown and unknowable God existing. But what if God told you He existed? That is, what if the Supreme Being chose to reveal His existence to you? Is there any reasonable doubt that IF a Supreme Being wanted to do that, He could? For that is precisely the Christian postulate. God speaks.

It is. (That atheists and Muslims are worse than Christians (or just Catholics?)) Want the body count?

Yes and no; see below. To begin with, if we are doing numbers, I would be interested in the definition of 'comparatively minuscule' and how we quantify 'cruelties'

Oh, don't worry. It won't be close, and you won't be in doubt.

Firstly, let me ask what you think: what would you guess is the percentage of dead brought about by religious wars? And what would you guess was the bodycount of Atheism? Just give me the former as a percent and the latter as some kind of number, if you would. I just want to know how close or far from the truth your assumptions might be.

Indulge me, if you will. I won't trick you on it.

I think your body count is going to depend on the criteria you set. And I would be free to set a different criteria, and thus come to a different count.

I think you'll see you have no worry on this account.

You agree that both Stalin and Hitler were raised as Christians.

I don't agree that a person can be "raised as" a Christian at all, as a matter of fact. And as for their later years, I only quote the founder of Christianity who said, "Not everyone who says to me 'Lord, Lord' will enter the kingdom of heaven," and "by their fruits you shall know them."

We note that Christians...

No, "we" don't. I do not agree that the "born in a 'Christian' country" or even "self-identifying as 'Christian'" criteria are in any way sufficient for a person being a Christian. Those are fallacies. As I said before, there is no national "Christianity," and if a person calls herself a ham sandwich, that does not make her one.

Well, we have to establish what a "Christian" is and does, before that holds any water. I would argue that you are corrupting your data with a multitude of manifestly refutable cases. But until you decide what qualifies a person to be a "Christian" -- or a "Scotsman" -- you're not going to find it easy to sort that out, I fear.

Not a problem for me. If somebody calls themselves a Christian, I would accept they are a Christian.

I would not. And the Founder of our faith has declared Himself already what He thinks of that, as you see above. I'll stay with His definition of what it means for a Christian to be genuine. Nobody would know better.

If others cannot say that you are not really a Christian, just because you differ from them in some ways, then equally you cannot say it about them.

I defer to the Founder. If I am what He told me to be, then I am a Christian. Anyone who is not, is not. It's that simple. He's right, and everybody else is wrong.

Immanuel Can wrote: Neither you nor I believe in "unconditional" knowledge. I believe in inductive -- hence probabilistic -- knowledge, and I suspect you do too. But "unconditional" -- well, that only happens in closed symbol systems like maths and symbolic logic. Nothing in real life is so absolutely knowable.

Christians accept that. All knowledge is a combination of both evidence and belief: ideally, with as much of the former in place as possible. And that's routine: after all, even the most hardened skeptic "believes" things all the time. He "believes" his wife is faithful, though he cannot conclusively show she is. He "believes" an elevator will not kill him, and steps into it, even though elevators do occasionally fail and kill people.

This is all very ordinary, and need trouble us not at all. Induction is just how any person knows anything at all.

I usually trust elevators because I know something about elevators in general; that they are made of durable materials, they are inspected, they rarely fail. I hope and expect that the particular elevator I am using conforms to that pattern. In the material world, like things behave in a like way; steel is always strong etc.

But there is nothing like God. I cannot say that God conforms to the pattern of other gods. Unlike the physical world he is not constrained by rules, such that God must always behave in a regular way. We cannot use inductive reasoning about something that is immaterial and unique.

Me: If you believe there are material evidences for God, then I would be interested to hear them,...
Well, they're well-known. The Cosmological Argument is very good. The Design Argument is inductively excellent. The Moral Argument is to me completely devastating to Atheism. And there are many others. But how many can we treat here?

The issue there would be with the word 'evidences'. If those arguments worked, then they would work entirely. For example, if we could show the universe must have been designed, then it must have been designed. The existence of a designer would be undeniable. God must be a fact. End of thread.

But if we cannot do that, if we cannot show the universe must have been designed, then the argument fails. We are not left with a bit of an incomplete argument, that we can aggregate with bits of other incomplete arguments, to make one stronger argument.

Remember, that we cannot completely disprove any theory-of-everything is not a sign that it must therefore be 'a bit true'. We can come up with no end of un-disprovable theories-of-everything; life is a dream, we are brains in a vat, Jesus was really an alien, the world is created anew from moment to moment...

Me:...but the material can only be evidence of the material.
No, not so. The evidence that someone has been by may be a piece of paper with writing on it. Paper and writing are not a human being, though. Rather, it is a material effect of the activity of a human being in that area. And it's good evidence.

The reason we think a human must have done it is because there are also some pieces of paper without writing on them, and places where there are no paper. But we do not think God is like a human, who just lives in the world and does particular things, like sometimes write on paper, like a human.

If we think the material is evidence of God, then that must apply to all material things; random marks on rocks, the rocks themselves, the absence of rocks...the hand of God must be on everything. But I can only deduce evidence of a designer having been at work if I could contrast it with things that haven't been designed.

So certainly, it is still the case that the universe might have been designed, I cannot disprove it, but (as I write above) there are no end of other 'brain in a vat' type theories that also might be the case.

Oh, no. That must be clear, surely. To say anything CAN be questioned...sure, anything can be, thought it's not always sensible to do so. But relativism says more. It says there IS no objective truth.

But if that is TRUE, then Relativism is false...because IT is true...which makes IT false.

You see? Relativism is just epistemological nonsense. It can't even possibly be true, because if it's true it's false. It's false both ways, then.

'True' is a word; it only has a meaning in use. The relativist says that all the ways we use the word 'true' are contextual.

The meaning of 'true' in logic is different from the meaning of 'true' in science, say. There is no paradox there; one meaning does not exclude the other; they are both equally valid. Saying 'truth' in this area means something different to 'truth' in that area is not to say 'truth is false'.

That's the real meaning of "faith." Not "believing what you know ain't so," but deciding what you are going to invest your life in, based on the best evidence you can find. 100% certainty is not available to human beings, except, as I said earlier, in closed systems of symbols like maths. We are all creatures of faith. We just have to decide what it is worth placing our faith in.

As I say, I don't think we can claim levels of probability in this area, but otherwise I do not see anything wrong with that. After all, we have to invest our life in something. We can't opt out of living while we wait for 100% certainty.

Fair enough: we can't guess at the probabilities of an unknown and unknowable God existing. But what if God told you He existed? That is, what if the Supreme Being chose to reveal His existence to you? Is there any reasonable doubt that IF a Supreme Being wanted to do that, He could? For that is precisely the Christian postulate. God speaks.

Again, I have no problem with that. Obviously we cannot justify the terms you have chosen like 'Supreme Being' within systems like science, but then we cannot justify any of our subjective internal experiences in that way. Yet, we plainly do have such experiences. Pointing out they are 'imaginary' is not a criticism; we humans are creatures that do imagine.

Firstly, let me ask what you think: what would you guess is the percentage of dead brought about by religious wars? And what would you guess was the bodycount of Atheism? Just give me the former as a percent and the latter as some kind of number, if you would. I just want to know how close or far from the truth your assumptions might be.

Indulge me, if you will. I won't trick you on it.

Accepting your terminology would be falling for the trick. I do not believe that there have ever been any religious wars. To call them such would be to single out just one particular feature of those involved and posit it as 'the cause'.

This seems absurd on so many levels. For example, even if it was true one would then have to ask 'what was the cause of them adopting that religion?' and religion would become an effect rather than a cause. One might equally talk about 'economic wars' or 'race wars' or 'political wars' or 'testosterone wars' or 'human nature wars'.

If it was the case that only Hindus went to war, then we would have some reason to see it as cause-and-effect (although we would be begging the question' why are some people Hindus?') But that isn't the case; we know that people of all religions and none go to war. So, religion cannot be 'the cause'.

I don't agree that a person can be "raised as" a Christian at all, as a matter of fact. And as for their later years, I only quote the founder of Christianity who said, "Not everyone who says to me 'Lord, Lord' will enter the kingdom of heaven," and "by their fruits you shall know them."...

No, "we" don't. I do not agree that the "born in a 'Christian' country" or even "self-identifying as 'Christian'" criteria are in any way sufficient for a person being a Christian. Those are fallacies. As I said before, there is no national "Christianity," and if a person calls herself a ham sandwich, that does not make her one....

I defer to the Founder. If I am what He told me to be, then I am a Christian. Anyone who is not, is not. It's that simple. He's right, and everybody else is wrong.

But that makes the meaning of Christian 'whoever I decide is a Christian'. I know what the founder wanted and anyone who disagrees with me is wrong. Therefore the idea that Christians can do bad things is an oxymoron, because Christians are necessarily good. So no need for the historical body-count after all, since we have defined our way to the result in advance!

I do not think that is persuasive for others. The history of Christianity is full of people, not always very nice, who made exactly the same claim about themselves. So, since here we are discussing religion, rather than your own personal beliefs, we have to take a broader definition of 'Christian'.

Londoner wrote:We cannot use inductive reasoning about something that is immaterial and unique.

I would see that as reasonable, if that were all. But if, as Christians believe, God also self-reveals through revelation and even more, through incarnation, then we actually have some premises upon which to build a deduction. Assuming God's word to be reliable, we would be able to make rational steps forward to what was good or desirable for mankind.

But yes, absent that, we'd all be in the dark.

If those arguments worked, then they would work entirely.

No, I wouldn't say that. Why should we suppose that if an argument is good it is going to convince everyone, regardless of their disposition? After all, Galileo's "argument" didn't "work entirely" in that way, because both the Aristotelian scientists and the Catholic clergy of his day were not in frames of mind to accept that argument. But I still think that you and I know he was right, and eventually, his argument would indeed "work entirely," in that it would show itself substantially true.

There is always a difference between a good argument and the disposition of the hearer. You have to have a reasonable hearer in order for a good argument to take hold. But it remains a good argument, even if some listeners are not good hearers.

But if we cannot do that, if we cannot show the universe must have been designed, then the argument fails.

But you cannot "show" yourself that the elevator will not fail. They do fail 0.00000015% of the time, statistically. But I think you and I will still ride in elevators, will we not?

High probability is the only "certainty" a human ever gets. But it's good enough for us.

Remember, that we cannot completely disprove any theory-of-everything is not a sign that it must therefore be 'a bit true'. We can come up with no end of un-disprovable theories-of-everything; life is a dream, we are brains in a vat, Jesus was really an alien, the world is created anew from moment to moment...

Yes; but given what I say above, I think this ought not to disturb us much. After all, we cannot avoid all elevators, or are not rational to do so if the chances are so small.

The reason we think a human must have done it is because there are also some pieces of paper without writing on them, and places where there are no paper. But we do not think God is like a human, who just lives in the world and does particular things, like sometimes write on paper, like a human.

I think I'm missing the gist of your thought here. All I was saying that one way we know a thing exists is because of the manifestation of what it does on material reality. We know a tiger has been by because we see its footprint. We know an architect existed because we have a skyscraper...and so on.

If we think the material is evidence of God, then that must apply to all material things; random marks on rocks, the rocks themselves, the absence of rocks...the hand of God must be on everything. But I can only deduce evidence of a designer having been at work if I could contrast it with things that haven't been designed.

Absolutely. Things altered by chance produce randomness, a chaotic and unpredictable form. Things designed have specification, interdependent complexity and specification. Quite so.

So certainly, it is still the case that the universe might have been designed, I cannot disprove it, but (as I write above) there are no end of other 'brain in a vat' type theories that also might be the case.

Of course. But estimate the relative probabilities. We should put our faith in what we believe, on the basis of the evidence, is most likely to be true.

'True' is a word; it only has a meaning in use. The relativist says that all the ways we use the word 'true' are contextual.

That's not particularly clear. Yes, words have context. But context itself can frame that word in a way in which it is being used with truth or falsehood. For one "word" alone does not often mean something specific: rather, it's propositions (i.e. a group of words importing a statement of truth) that have truth value.

The word "toothpaste" all by itself cannot be true or false. But "The toothpaste is on the sink" is true or false.

Saying 'truth' in this area means something different to 'truth' in that area is not to say 'truth is false'.

But that's not Relativism. Relativism says, "All truth claims are relative," meaning "not objectively true."

As I say, I don't think we can claim levels of probability in this area, but otherwise I do not see anything wrong with that. After all, we have to invest our life in something. We can't opt out of living while we wait for 100% certainty.

Quite so. Well said.

Obviously we cannot justify the terms you have chosen like 'Supreme Being' within systems like science, but then we cannot justify any of our subjective internal experiences in that way.

Sure we can. Like objective experiences, our subjective experiences have to be judged by their relative probability. If I take LSD, it is improbable that my subjective experiences are real; but if my subjective experience conforms very closely to reality as it normally is, if other people also experience it or similar things, and if it is repeated, consistent and rational, I have better reason to trust my subjectivity.

Yet, we plainly do have such experiences. Pointing out they are 'imaginary' is not a criticism; we humans are creatures that do imagine.

Well, sure. The only problem with imagination is when it is treated as reality, in defiance of the facts. Then it can become dangerous.

Accepting your terminology would be falling for the trick.

I promise you, there isn't one.

I do not believe that there have ever been any religious wars.

Oh? Zero percent, then? You wouldn't even accept the entire Islamic Crusades period as genuinely Islamic? What about the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre...not religious?

I'm surprised. But if you are content at zero, then any Atheist killers at all would be sufficient to exceed the religious ones, and I'd win my argument...but too easily, I would think.

To call them such would be to single out just one particular feature of those involved and posit it as 'the cause'.

Yes, I see. But let's accept "primary cause" as good enough, even if it hurts my case. I'm still very confident, you see, so I don't need a trick here, and I don't need to suppose there is nothing bad to say about "religion" in this regard. I can give you a big "head start."

So, religion cannot be 'the cause'.

Well, technically true; but I think we're okay with "primary incentive" or "main reason for." If I can accept a little admixture in the cases, I'm sure it's more a problem for me than for you.

You are astute to observe that wars are usually a mixed bag of stuff...cavils over language, geography, resources, governance, ideology, utopias, riches, reputation...all of these are mixed into every war, and really, most are far bigger causes of war than "religion" has ever been, it is true. But I'm trying to give you credit here for every bit of doubt you can possibly have, so as to weaken my own case as much as it can be weakened.

However, maybe that tips you off to just how totally imbalanced the scales really are in my favour. I can give away so much and still be confident of a win.

I don't agree that a person can be "raised as" a Christian at all, as a matter of fact. And as for their later years, I only quote the founder of Christianity who said, "Not everyone who says to me 'Lord, Lord' will enter the kingdom of heaven," and "by their fruits you shall know them."...

No, "we" don't. I do not agree that the "born in a 'Christian' country" or even "self-identifying as 'Christian'" criteria are in any way sufficient for a person being a Christian. Those are fallacies. As I said before, there is no national "Christianity," and if a person calls herself a ham sandwich, that does not make her one....

I defer to the Founder. If I am what He told me to be, then I am a Christian. Anyone who is not, is not. It's that simple. He's right, and everybody else is wrong.

But that makes the meaning of Christian 'whoever I decide is a Christian'. I know what the founder wanted and anyone who disagrees with me is wrong.

No, it doesn't. All it means is that we are capable of understanding the most obvious and straightforward things Christ Himself said. That's a very modest epistemological claim...and indeed, is even more modest than the supposition you and I can understand each other at this very moment so as to converse. But we're assuming that, clearly; so this is much more reasonable.

And to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there can be no criteria for "being a Christian." In which case, you couldn't even talk about what a "Christian" is or has done, since there would be no criterial way for you to know whom you were taking about. But you are supposing you can, and I agree. So we're not any distance apart on this issue at all, really. We both think there are criteria for what makes a Christian "real": we're just supposing different criteria. But as to the use of criteria...well, we're both doing that.

Therefore the idea that Christians can do bad things is an oxymoron, because Christians are necessarily good. So no need for the historical body-count after all, since we have defined our way to the result in advance!

No, no...don't give me any cheap wins like that. I don't need to be handed anything on that point. I can take the heat.

After all, it was you who said "Christians" did certain things...like owning slaves, you said. So you must know to whom you were trying to refer, I assume.

The history of Christianity is full of people, not always very nice, who made exactly the same claim about themselves.

Ah, there it is again! If it's "the history of Christianity," how do you know that it is, since you have also said there are no criteria for what a "Christian" really is?

So, since here we are discussing religion, rather than your own personal beliefs, we have to take a broader definition of 'Christian'.

"Christian" is not synonymous with "religion." Ask any Muslim or Hindu about that, if you doubt me. If we're only talking about "religion," without any further nuance, there are very few generalizations we can make at all. It's as incoherent as trying to have an argument over whether "people" are nice or nasty. The next question always has to be, "Which people?"

Just so, if we specify no "religion," and have no criteria for what makes a "religion" what it is, we can make no statements about any of this subject at all. But you and I both think we can, I suspect.

Immanuel Can wrote: No, I wouldn't say that. Why should we suppose that if an argument is good it is going to convince everyone, regardless of their disposition? After all, Galileo's "argument" didn't "work entirely" in that way, because both the Aristotelian scientists and the Catholic clergy of his day were not in frames of mind to accept that argument. But I still think that you and I know he was right, and eventually, his argument would indeed "work entirely," in that it would show itself substantially true.

There is always a difference between a good argument and the disposition of the hearer. You have to have a reasonable hearer in order for a good argument to take hold. But it remains a good argument, even if some listeners are not good hearers.

I would have said that we should have accepted an argument like Galileo's as a hypothesis; it fitted the facts reasonably well, but so did other hypotheses too. We wouldn't have to decide that it was true or false, indeed the rational judge would say we shouldn't have decided, since we were not in any position to know. In that situation,I think to say 'we cannot know' is the truth; making a guess (either way) is irrational.

Me: But if we cannot do that, if we cannot show the universe must have been designed, then the argument fails.
But you cannot "show" yourself that the elevator will not fail. They do fail 0.00000015% of the time, statistically. But I think you and I will still ride in elevators, will we not?

High probability is the only "certainty" a human ever gets. But it's good enough for us.

The uncertainty over the elevator arises because there is some variation between elevators. I do not think elevators are reliable because I have some general theory about all elevators; rather I have theories about mechanics. Although I usually trust elevators, I am under no illusion that they will not fail if they are subject to overloading etc. I can test elevators and discover why some fail and others don't.

But we cannot do this with the universe, because we cannot compare it to the non-universe. We cannot say; this bit of the universe works because it was designed by God, compared to that bit doesn't work because it wasn't designed by God.

To put it another way, Galileo's theory could be disproved. We might have found a planet that did not move in the way he expected. But what observation could disprove the Design theory?

The reason we think a human must have done it is because there are also some pieces of paper without writing on them, and places where there are no paper. But we do not think God is like a human, who just lives in the world and does particular things, like sometimes write on paper, like a human.
I think I'm missing the gist of your thought here. All I was saying that one way we know a thing exists is because of the manifestation of what it does on material reality. We know a tiger has been by because we see its footprint. We know an architect existed because we have a skyscraper...and so on.

It is the same argument I give above. We guess the architect existed because only some places have skyscrapers. Because in other places, where there are no architects, there are no skyscrapers. Thus we assume cause-and-effect.

But suppose I claimed I knew an architect existed because there was both a skyscraper and no-skyscraper, or because there was a tiger's footprint, or because the sky was blue, and because of every other possible observation I could make? That is what we are saying about God the architect.

Absolutely. Things altered by chance produce randomness, a chaotic and unpredictable form. Things designed have specification, interdependent complexity and specification. Quite so.

But all the universe is all of a piece. If God designed it, he would also have designed the bits we might think of as chaotic. Unless we posit that God is only an object within the universe, that the whole universe (including the un-designed bits) came from somewhere other than God.

Me: So certainly, it is still the case that the universe might have been designed, I cannot disprove it, but (as I write above) there are no end of other 'brain in a vat' type theories that also might be the case.
Of course. But estimate the relative probabilities. We should put our faith in what we believe, on the basis of the evidence, is most likely to be true.

Probability does not come into it, because such theories account for anything. There is no possible event that would not fit in with such theories. It is like asking what the probability would be of a thrown dice showing a number between one and six; the probability is 100%. Theories like 'we are all brains in a vat' or 'the universe was designed' admit no examples where they are not the case, therefore we cannot talk of probabilities.

More later!

There have been quite a few arguments for how religion has been a bane to mankind, but not many for how religion has been a boon.

And that would seem to epitomise the conclusion. In the past and perhaps even in today's technologically 'challenged' societies religion may have been useful or at least not a bane.

But in todays technological societies, religion has outlived its usefulness. It is used more as a justification for warfare than as a process for peace.

And the root cause of that, I suspect, is that it is based upon a lie. Proponents of religion take fantastical possibilities and claim that they are true and try to persuade others that they are true. But to claim that they are true, or even likely to be true, is a lie.

And lies that are believed distort a person's view of the world. And that is not a good thing.

Immanuel Can wrote: Me: 'True' is a word; it only has a meaning in use. The relativist says that all the ways we use the word 'true' are contextual.
That's not particularly clear. Yes, words have context. But context itself can frame that word in a way in which it is being used with truth or falsehood. For one "word" alone does not often mean something specific: rather, it's propositions (i.e. a group of words importing a statement of truth) that have truth value.

The word "toothpaste" all by itself cannot be true or false. But "The toothpaste is on the sink" is true or false.

But not true in the same sense that '1+1=2' is true. The reasons we would give for thinking either was true are different.

Me: Saying 'truth' in this area means something different to 'truth' in that area is not to say 'truth is false'.

But that's not Relativism. Relativism says, "All truth claims are relative," meaning "not objectively true."

Yes; because no single sense of the word 'true' is objective. Claims about where the toothpaste is, and claims about maths, might be called objective in the sense that we can give reasons for saying they are true, and those reasons are accessible to others. But we cannot claim that those reasons have absolute truth or validity within themselves; in each case our claim is only relative, relative to whether the person making them is making empirical observations or doing maths.

Me: Obviously we cannot justify the terms you have chosen like 'Supreme Being' within systems like science, but then we cannot justify any of our subjective internal experiences in that way.

Sure we can. Like objective experiences, our subjective experiences have to be judged by their relative probability. If I take LSD, it is improbable that my subjective experiences are real; but if my subjective experience conforms very closely to reality as it normally is, if other people also experience it or similar things, and if it is repeated, consistent and rational, I have better reason to trust my subjectivity.

But there you are not judging the subjective experience. My subjective experience on LSD is my experience on LSD, it is what it is, the probability of it being itself is 100%.

By contrast, when we compare our experiences to those of other people we are deliberately trying to exclude the subjective. That doesn't mean the subjective experiences are not 'true'/'real'; our perceptions will never entirely match those of other people, because we are individual subjects, each with our own point of view (figuratively and literally), but when we seek consensus we are trying to identify and discount those subjective elements.

Which is all a long way of saying that the meanings of the words 'subjective' and 'objective' oppose each other. If we claim our subjective experiences are 'real', meaning objective, then we are saying they are not subjective. It is like asking 'How far are my dreams real?' There are two possible answers (a) 'They are real dreams' but also (b) 'not at all, because if they were real they would not be dreams'. We are back to relativism; both answers are true, but their truth is relative to the context of the question.

More later.

Immanuel Can wrote: Your analogy is backwards. You were saying I had to have knowledge of a universe in which God does NOT exist. I simply say that if God does exist, I don't need such a universe in order to know it.

To all those reading this thread.... IC is correct by what he says in the above quote.

Because knowing is not known by a someone, that someone is the knowing. You are that knowing. To deny God is to deny You. And you cannot deny You for You are...other wise you wouldn't be reading and writing on this thread.

Also, the You in question here, is not who you think it is, it's prior to thought, and it's also the thought manifest...aka knowledge.

Immanuel Can wrote: Me: I do not believe that there have ever been any religious wars.
Oh? Zero percent, then? You wouldn't even accept the entire Islamic Crusades period as genuinely Islamic? What about the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre...not religious?

I think each person involved had a religion, just as they belonged to a tribe, and had a desire for wealth or security, were primed with testosterone, made pragmatic calculations, wanted to get away from their wife, etc.

Suppose we pointed to Donald Trump, say. Do you explain what he does by some single factor, for example 'Trump's Muslim ban was caused by his religion'. That a concern about terrorism, or desire to please his supporters, or his psychological complexes, or racism and all the rest played no part at all. That Trump is a robot solely operated by his Presbyterianism?

I think that would be absurd when thinking about one individual, so it is equally absurd to apply it to the behaviour of groups.

Yes, I see. But let's accept "primary cause" as good enough, even if it hurts my case....

So, religion cannot be 'the cause'.

Well, technically true; but I think we're okay with "primary incentive" or "main reason for." If I can accept a little admixture in the cases, I'm sure it's more a problem for me than for you.

How do you justify calling it (religion/atheism) the 'primary' or 'main'? Why can't it be 'desire for wealth and power'?

You are astute to observe that wars are usually a mixed bag of stuff...cavils over language, geography, resources, governance, ideology, utopias, riches, reputation...all of these are mixed into every war, and really, most are far bigger causes of war than "religion" has ever been, it is true. But I'm trying to give you credit here for every bit of doubt you can possibly have, so as to weaken my own case as much as it can be weakened.

Yes, but the basic problem here is the desire to distinguish one (or many) things as 'the cause' of a single 'effect'. In this case, the 'effect' is war.

But just as those causes turn out to be a mixed bag, so are effects. In fact, when viewed objectively, they are the same thing. One could start with wars and see them as one cause of religious differences, of economic inequality, of social divisions. But equally, those things can be seen as the causes of war.

Again we can look at an individual. Savage people often have savage Gods. So did the gods they picked make them savage? Or did they pick those gods because their world is a savage place? Even when presented with this artificial binary choice, we can see a decision to pick either one as the cause and the other as the effect would be arbitrary.

Me: But that makes the meaning of Christian 'whoever I decide is a Christian'. I know what the founder wanted and anyone who disagrees with me is wrong.
No, it doesn't. All it means is that we are capable of understanding the most obvious and straightforward things Christ Himself said. That's a very modest epistemological claim...and indeed, is even more modest than the supposition you and I can understand each other at this very moment so as to converse. But we're assuming that, clearly; so this is much more reasonable.

It cannot be that modest, since we are arguing that large numbers of Christians (not to mention those who have chosen to follow other religions) got it wrong!

And to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there can be no criteria for "being a Christian." In which case, you couldn't even talk about what a "Christian" is or has done, since there would be no criterial way for you to know whom you were taking about. But you are supposing you can, and I agree. So we're not any distance apart on this issue at all, really. We both think there are criteria for what makes a Christian "real": we're just supposing different criteria. But as to the use of criteria...well, we're both doing that.

Neither of us are using any single set of criteria. For example, you mention the St Bartholomew's Day as religious. If it was religious, then the religion would be Christian. But you differentiate it from what you mean by your own Christianity.

That isn't a problem in that readers have no difficulty in distinguishing between the uses of the word 'Christian' in this thread. But it is a return to the issue we discuss elsewhere, that of 'truth'. I do not think any word is tied to some sort of fact, such that it is true when linked to that fact and false when it isn't. Language does not, and cannot, work like that.

The history of Christianity is full of people, not always very nice, who made exactly the same claim about themselves.
Ah, there it is again! If it's "the history of Christianity," how do you know that it is, since you have also said there are no criteria for what a "Christian" really is?

In this case, the context of the remark is 'history', so the criteria for what would count as a Christian would be the one that we use when discussing history (for example when describing the St Bartholomew's Day massacre). That this is not the same criteria you use when describing your own beliefs is not a problem, because I do not think there must be only one.

Me: So, since here we are discussing 'religion', rather than your own personal beliefs, we have to take a broader definition of 'Christian'.
"Christian" is not synonymous with "religion."

I didn't say 'Christian' was synonymous with religion. What I mean is that 'religion' in the context of this thread is historical, it is descriptive of a group. When we ask 'Has religion been a boon or a bane to mankind?' we are not asking: 'Are Immanuel Can's personal beliefs a boon or a bane to mankind?'

As you will gather, my own answer to the question is that we cannot answer the question of the thread because we cannot untangle religion from all the other causes and effects of history.

Immanuel Can wrote:

The existence of a design in nature would be superb evidence of a Designer. And it would take considerable mental gymnastics to avoid such evidence. But people can do it; they do it all the time. The existence of an origin point for the universe (as in the Cosmological Infinite Regression Argument) would make a powerful case for the existence of an Uncaused Cause; but you can find quite a bunch of people desperately trying to avoid it.

But natural selection is design without designer. It would be mentally nutritious for me to read contributions from a reasoning believer, or from an accomplished theologian. Immanuel Can is not that contributor unfortunately.

Belinda wrote:Immanuel Can wrote:

The existence of a design in nature would be superb evidence of a Designer. And it would take considerable mental gymnastics to avoid such evidence. But people can do it; they do it all the time. The existence of an origin point for the universe (as in the Cosmological Infinite Regression Argument) would make a powerful case for the existence of an Uncaused Cause; but you can find quite a bunch of people desperately trying to avoid it.

But natural selection is design without designer. It would be mentally nutritious for me to read contributions from a reasoning believer, or from an accomplished theologian. Immanuel Can is not that contributor unfortunately.

It's a cosmological constant self designing phenomena Belinda...meaning it's a natural organic biological self perpetuating happening. IC 's body is the evidence of the designer...a representation of a designer, also with the capacity for further design.

It's a natural designer that can also manifest the opposite of it's object of desire in the form of an organic biological natural designer named the human being ..where that human being becomes the co-creator of design in the form of inanimate objects designed by the only designer there is which is itself ..the YOU...aka consciousness. It's all You. The body is the only evidence you'll need of creatorship qualities being already present in you.

Both the designer and designed are one. Just as your mind and body are one.

The idea of a creator comes from the same place as the manifest creation. They are sourced in each other. Similarly, metaphorically speaking..the egg is in the chicken and the chicken is in the egg.

Also, consider this... every snowflake has a totally unique and individual pattern that is never repeated, sure sign that creation is itself self perpetuating and totally spontaneous.

Londoner wrote:In that situation,I think to say 'we cannot know' is the truth; making a guess (either way) is irrational.

I would have called an intelligent guess a "hypothesis," and would say it was the second step in the scientific method, right after "first observation." But okay.

But we cannot do this with the universe, because we cannot compare it to the non-universe. We cannot say; this bit of the universe works because it was designed by God, compared to that bit doesn't work because it wasn't designed by God.

I would say the evidence of both designed and seemingly chaotic elements in our observable world fits very well with the theory that the world is a) originally designed, but b) now out of sync with its original design because of entropy...and perhaps prior causes of that. That seems to me to take in all the data rather nicely, actually.

But all the universe is all of a piece.

Oh, I wouldn't say so. If it were, there would be no differentiation, specification or design evident in it at all. in fact, there would be no individuality either, and we wouldn't be having this conversation, because there'd be no "you" an no "me" to have it.

If God designed it, he would also have designed the bits we might think of as chaotic. Unless we posit that God is only an object within the universe, that the whole universe (including the un-designed bits) came from somewhere other than God.

The other postulate is the one I offer above: that the universe is both originally designed, but now out of step with the Designer...for a reason we can talk about later if the conversation turns there.

Probability does not come into it, because such theories account for anything.

I confess I cannot understand the specific meaning of this sentence. How does a "theory" eliminate "probability"?

Theories like 'we are all brains in a vat' or 'the universe was designed' admit no examples where they are not the case, therefore we cannot talk of probabilities.

Problems: it's only a theory, it's not the only possible theory, it's not the most plausible theory...in fact, it's arguably THE most improbable theory. To deal with it, all we CAN talk about it probabilities...but very, very high ones.

I'll go out on a limb and say this, too: you don't believe that theory. For if you did, we again would not be having a conversation. You would only be imagining me, and I would only be imagining you, and there could be nothing more futile than the imaginary conversation of both sides.

But I think you've dismissed the "brain in a vat" theory yourself, and I take your responsiveness here as evidence of that. So why have you done that, if its gross improbability is not the reason?

Londoner wrote:

Immanuel Can wrote: Me: I do not believe that there have ever been any religious wars.
Oh? Zero percent, then? You wouldn't even accept the entire Islamic Crusades period as genuinely Islamic? What about the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre...not religious?

I think each person involved had a religion, just as they belonged to a tribe, and had a desire for wealth or security, were primed with testosterone, made pragmatic calculations, wanted to get away from their wife, etc.

Okay, plausibly true, I'll grant you. But if that's the case, we' ve just let off all "religions" from being responsible for wars. And if you're happy with that, I am, of course, likewise content.

I remain uncertain that will do for others, though. But we can leave that point there. I think perhaps we've settled it for ourselves, even if not for everyone.

Suppose we pointed to Donald Trump, say. Do you explain what he does by some single factor, for example 'Trump's Muslim ban was caused by his religion'.

Well as an aside, I would say there's no "Muslim ban." That's a misnomer. If I understand, he's put a ninety-day slow down on seven countries -- but major countries with tons of Muslims he has not put on the 90-day slowdown, so it's not "Muslim" and it's not a "ban," so far as I can tell. Not that I'm a Trumpian, but fair is fair. I don't think he's "banned Muslims."

That a concern about terrorism, or desire to please his supporters, or his psychological complexes, or racism and all the rest played no part at all. That Trump is a robot solely operated by his Presbyterianism?

I would think that was the least of his motives, actually, since he's not a particularly Presbyterian-like person, regardless of what he may claim. I do know a few of those, and they're nothing like him. Presbyterian theology also has no perspective on Trump, so far as I know. I think he's probably what is called a "nominal" Presbyterian, i.e. a "Presbyterian" in name only. I can't see him as very sincere; but then, a lot of his detractors feel that way too.

The press is fond of suggesting he's a "hypocrite." Maybe he is, but I won't say so. I'll just go with "nominal," since he does perhaps claim that name but doesn't seem to follow through. Either way, it's the same sort of observations I think that we're responding to: his actions and words don't really seem to fit the profile of a "Presbyterian."

How do you justify calling it (religion/atheism) the 'primary' or 'main'? Why can't it be 'desire for wealth and power'?

I just do so if it's the only way I can take others seriously when they do. And you'll doubtless know that some people speak of "religion" as a "cause of war." If I want to talk with them, I have to take their postulate seriously, if I can, or they suggest I'm "dodging" the question. And I'm not actually afraid of it one bit.

I will give them this: they may be right in some cases, so far as I can tell. Islam, for example, has the jihad concept,and an indisputable history of practicing war. Even today, some of their Imams call for it daily -- and most of these clearly do not mean "inward jihad" but outward conquest, as does ISIL. However, in stark contrast, some "religions" do not even believe in any war at all, even participation in a "just war," so we'd be silly to talk as if ALL "religions" cause wars, since some have caused precisely zero.

But when people float the idea of "religious wars," I like to try to take them seriously and address their concerns. I don't see that that is what you are doing, so I'm happy to let the issue go. However, if you do happen to believe that "religion causes wars," then we're back to talking about other ideologies, like Atheism as well, as potential contributors. And that's just fair. We have every reason to compare, then.

Again we can look at an individual. Savage people often have savage Gods. So did the gods they picked make them savage? Or did they pick those gods because their world is a savage place?

It depends. If their religion is an expression of their culture, then maybe the people caused the gods. Or if their religion is superstitious, perhaps they just looked around at the savagery of the world and made their decision based on that.

But what if God Himself revealed something to them, so that the truth was that their religion was nor sourced from their own nature or their view of the world? Then neither is the case. So it would be a false dichotomy, in that case.

Me: But that makes the meaning of Christian 'whoever I decide is a Christian'. I know what the founder wanted and anyone who disagrees with me is wrong.
No, it doesn't. All it means is that we are capable of understanding the most obvious and straightforward things Christ Himself said. That's a very modest epistemological claim...and indeed, is even more modest than the supposition you and I can understand each other at this very moment so as to converse. But we're assuming that, clearly; so this is much more reasonable.

It cannot be that modest, since we are arguing that large numbers of Christians (not to mention those who have chosen to follow other religions) got it wrong!

There is, as history has abundantly shown, nothing about being "large numbers" that suggests people cannot be wrong, or that immodesty is the only reason for saying it. Whomever it was who first conceived that the world might not be flat was pitting his view against (literally) the view of every other person in the world. And yet, he or she was quite right. The whole world was wrong.

It would be immodest to say something was true "just because I say it is." But it would not be immodest to use God-given criteria to make a judgment about which God Himself says you can be perfectly certain. That would rather be a case of one deferring to the judgment of God, and suitably modest for that reason.

You and I haven't yet established which applies here. But I would say the latter.

And to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there can be no criteria for "being a Christian." In which case, you couldn't even talk about what a "Christian" is or has done, since there would be no criterial way for you to know whom you were taking about. But you are supposing you can, and I agree. So we're not any distance apart on this issue at all, really. We both think there are criteria for what makes a Christian "real": we're just supposing different criteria. But as to the use of criteria...well, we're both doing that.

Neither of us are using any single set of criteria.

Sure you are. You're saying, "a Christian is someone who says he/she is." That's a criterion. In fact, in Religious Studies it's so well-known it has a label: the "self-identification" criterion.

It's also generally doubted as adequate by Religious Studies scholars, with good reason. People lie.

For example, you mention the St Bartholomew's Day as religious. If it was religious, then the religion would be Christian. But you differentiate it from what you mean by your own Christianity.

Sure I do. But then, so did the Catholics when they slaughtered the relatives and friends of my ancestors. Now, I wasn't personally put out by all that, and it was a very long time ago now, so let bygones be bygones, I say. However, if you want to lump that in with other wars and write it off as "not religious," I'm just fine with that.

I'm a little surprised you'll allow that though, because it ruins one of your previous arguments completely. For a bit ago, you said that "Christians" were responsible for slavery. Slavery was, like war, surely a complicated phenomenon, involving such things as racism, economics, opportunism, geography, inter-tribal warfare, exporting, the race for colonies, food supply...and so on. But if, as you now insist, these things have complicated causes (a view I'm happy to accept) then you cannot any longer say "religion" had anything to do with slavery, and that whole "slavery" objection dies stillborn.

I'm okay with that, because I agree...it wasn't a good illustration, and cannot be fairly attributed to "Christianity." I agree that saying slavery was a "religious" phenomenon at all would be at best, extremely naive about causes, and at worst would be wildly implausible and unjust. Are you okay with that now?

...it is a return to the issue we discuss elsewhere, that of 'truth'. I do not think any word is tied to some sort of fact, such that it is true when linked to that fact and false when it isn't. Language does not, and cannot, work like that.

But "truth" is not just a piece of language: it's a particular kind of language, i.e. a descriptor. A descriptor is a world that has a real-world referent, and "describes" something about it. It's also a "value-term," meaning it describes a particular desirable attribute had by some things and not by others.

So "truth" is anchored inevitably to the real world. It's not "just a word."

But there's an even bigger problem: are you saying that "truth is just a word" is a true statement? If you think it's "true," then what is it exactly you're trying to say about it, except that everybody reasonable ought to believe what you say about it?

But why? "Truth" is just a word, right?

Me: So, since here we are discussing 'religion', rather than your own personal beliefs, we have to take a broader definition of 'Christian'.
"Christian" is not synonymous with "religion."

What I mean is that 'religion' in the context of this thread is historical, it is descriptive of a group. When we ask 'Has religion been a boon or a bane to mankind?' we are not asking: 'Are Immanuel Can's personal beliefs a boon or a bane to mankind?'

Okay. How is this "group" identified? Perhaps we have the "self-identification" criterion, but we've already shown that particular criterion is generally known to be far too loose to be sufficient.

What other criterion would you suggest, so we can detect the "group" you wish us to discuss?

As you will gather, my own answer to the question is that we cannot answer the question of the thread because we cannot untangle religion from all the other causes and effects of history.

Interestingly, I said the same thing at the start about how completely useless the term "religion" is if the question-asker isn't interested in defining it further. Now you point to an additional problem with his question: how do we sort out multiple-causation, so as to reveal what "religion" (whatever he means by that) actually DID (or caused, or can be credited with, or can be saddled with) any particular effect?

Good point. I don't have his answer. And he declined my question as well.