What is at stake is whether or not Materialism is a sufficient and rational explanation for that phenomenon. A view (like Dualism of some kind) that allows for non-material realities is not faced with the same problem. But because Materialism claims that "materials" is an absolutely comprehensive summary of all things in the universe, it owes us a "materials"-type explanation for all phenomena.Noax wrote:I said that. But I also said materialism doesn't need to specify when this happens. It is an arbitrary designation it seems. It seems to hinge on identity, when a single life splits into two lives. That point is the arbitrary designation, and materialism doesn't hinge on where that designation is made.
This it cannot provide, so it has to deny the problem. "Consciousness", it says, is an illusion.
Ironically, it takes consciousness even to decide "Consciousness is an illusion." What a paradox!
Other views need to solve this problem as well.
That is true. But at least potentially, they can; because they accept the existence of something beyond "matter." Materialism, by definition, can't.
If so, its claim to be a sufficient and rational explanation is gone. It's supposed to make taking these things on any kind of faith unnecessary.The evolution model just says something like 'step by step' without declaration that we know what each of those steps were.
I think it is. If you think it's not, consider this: I can show you things that are definitely non-sentient, and I can show you things that are. Can you show me even one thing that is non-binary on that? That is, a thing that is neither sentient nor non-sentient?Consciousness/sentience is not a binary thing.
I know of none.
Agreed.Yes, those steps need accounting for.
But this is merely semantic. At some point, the chemicals that would eventually make you up existed -- in fact, if matter can neither be created nor destroyed, as the axiom goes, you would have to say they always existed.No, I was never random chemicals. There is no "I" to be those random chemicals in a view that doesn't posit identity separate from the thing to which the identity was associated. So I did not become a conscious sentient being in my view. That implies a time when I wasn't one.
Nowadays, they form a "you." So when did those chemicals start being "you'? And how did they do it?
Ah, but I've never seen a toaster appear by gradualism or by spontaneous self-generation, have you? So if you want to say we were created -- like every toaster is -- then I'm fine with that. But Materialism is not fine with that.No more remarkable than a toaster arising from not-toaster.Quite simply, how does sentience arise from non-sentient matter?
Let's clear that up. We may not be able to define the quality precisely, but we can give clear and excellent examples. Firstly, for sentience, you and I qualify. Secondly, for non-sentience, rocks and chemical compounds are clearly in that category. The dualism of sentient-non-sentient is extremely easy to establish.You say consciousness exists, but you don't say what has it, so I have little idea what you mean by the word.
Now, where do the rest of the items in your list fit? We don't know. As Thomas Nagel has put it, none of us knows what it's like to be a bat...or a tulip, or a whale, or whatever. But we do know that sentience is real, and we can't explain it by Materialism.
It does. Ironically, Materialists must deny the real existence of a "person" behind the scientist who states his belief in Materialism. But what would it mean for mere "materials" (i.e. the scientist) to "state" anything at all? Why should we believe "materials" when it speaks? And what sense does it make to speak of "materials speaking" at all?They might define the word differently of course, so it probably doesn't undermine their case.And we all know it, and we all act like these things exist -- even professed Materialists do, at the cost of undermining their own case.
Maybe. But what sense does it make for us to say, "The empirical, material realm is all we can investigate fully, so it's all that we're going to accept as real"? That's deciding our ontology by restricting it to our epistemology, isn't it? And that is bass-ackwards.Understood. How is the existence of these immaterial causes explained? Are they things with identity, or is it 'stuff' without it? The latter is sort of a panpsychic view. My problem with this view is it seems to just shove the problems under the rug where it is immune from scrutiny. Yes, this magic stuff under there solves your problems, and we don't have to explain it since it is declared beyond the empirical realm.
Only if it does not exist. But it does. And we can tell because not only do we think it does, but so does the most ardent Materialist. He believes his "material" pronouncements. He thinks "he" is a "he," a real person. But personhood and the entity that is capable of pronouncements are not things that are materially explicable.The materialist doesn't attempt to describe 'soul'. Why would he? It is not reductionism to deny a thing.
So he's become a hypocrite. He talks about everything being just materials, but he doesn't act like they are. In fact, he cannot.