I didn't mean to precipitate you into a side-discussion about that. Sorry. I was just making a joke; hence the smiley. "Is" is, of course, both a copula and a predicate. It can either mean, "exists" or can be used to link a noun with an adjective. But I think we need only concern ourselves with the "is"-as-predication situation when we are discussing God here.Londoner wrote:Suppose I say 'snow is white'....Immanuel Can wrote: Actually, I'm pretty sure "to exist" IS a predicate, at least in grammar.![]()
I don't think it would, actually. Philosophy doesn't assume, for example, that Metaphysics is "meaningless," even though by definition it's not "scientific." After all, logic itself (upon which science depends, of course) is not "scientific" if by that we understand "strictly empirical."The inability to sort out the mix frustrates a project that rules what it is, and isn't, possible to say. To put it another way, to make philosophy like science, a system which does not attempt to address certain areas of experience, except unlike science it would say that those areas are meaningless.
I think that's guaranteed to be wrong, actually.The idea is that all meaningful statements must be ultimately reduce-able to very simple sense-experiences.
Take a concept like "pi". Pi is a real thing, in the sense that there IS (exists) a real ratio between the radius and circumference of a circle, and circles are real things.
But pi isn't amenable to "simple sense-experience." In fact, it's not amenable to sensory experience at all...for nobody has every seen pi, and nobody has ever even written pi out as a number, since it's infinite. Nevertheless, it's a very powerful tool for calculating real-world results, and I don't think there's a single engineer or architect in the world that doubts the "meaningfulness" of the pi concept.
Why then are you speaking of them?The same goes for ethics and metaphysics; they are literally nonsense. or, more kindly, 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'.
Well, for reasons above, I think this isn't quite so.I do not think that constitutes a truth-claim in the sense of being certain that it would be impossible to distinguish concepts from experience, but we do know that we can't (and don't) do it. If you like, we know it empirically.
Oh, I would agree with that last statement, but not with the claim that "knowledge" must be "empirical" to be "meaningful." Much of our knowledge is not empirical. Empiricism is but one episteme, and a presuppositional one at that. As such it's neither inevitably nor exclusive. It's not a bad one; but it's not the only one. It's one paradigm among the several to which human knowers ordinarily have resort.So I would not take this failure as ruling out the idea you can have 'knowledge ' of God, rather it implies that your knowledge is not of a different (or inferior) kind to knowledge generally.
Oh, I didn't say it had to be "perfect." Indeed, if science were already "perfect," what need would we have for further science? We'd just convert our "perfected" knowledge into a tradition, and move on from there: why try to improve on "perfection"?It doesn't meet our needs because it is perfect, it meets our needs/remains consistent because we constantly adjust it. We want a consistent framework because that enables us to predict future experience; when it fails we readjust it to take it into account.Me: This is why I tend to be more sympathetic to religious claims than many on these boards. Atheist or theist, I do not think we can ever draw a sharp line between 'facts' and our conceptual frameworks. And, with conceptual frameworks, all that matters is that they work for us; that they meet our needs.
Yeah, this is where our agreement hits a roadblock. I would respond that one can have a completely consistent "framework" that one has devised, and that framework not be good or true at all. More than that, the claim, "The purpose of frameworks is to 'meet our needs,' " as you put it, is itself an unsupported claim. I would tend to deny it.
But by the same token, we need to know what our legitimate "needs" are. And we need to know that when something "works" that it "works" for a purpose we ought to be having. After all, nuclear warheads "work" very well for some purposes some people have had. And we need a means by which to judge whether our "need" for a new Rolls Royce is a real and legitimate "need," or just something we perceive ourselves to want.
What does a human being "need" in order to be a fully-actualized human being? That is a matter of much controversy, once we get beyond the level of oxygen, food and basic clothing. And it's clear that many of the things we dream we "need" are not, after all, such absolute "needs."
What "works" for a Quaker or a Zoroastrian is nothing like what "works" for a Wiccan or a Nazi. So to leave our inquiry at the point of saying that something "works," and that it's "good" if such a thing "works," is both gratuitous and uninformative.![]()
That's why it's an excellent thing that sensory experience is not all we have, as I have said earlier.Quite a lot of what such people believe will be common; 'fire burns' etc. But the important point is that a theory is simply an attempt to provide a consistent description of experience and there isn't just one single, correct, theory. For example, I can have the theory that the whole world is just my dream, or that every event that happens is willed by God, or that we all live in The Matrix. Since all these theories can be made consistent with our experiences, there is no way that we can use experience to show which one (if any) is correct.
But what do you do with the disparate conceptions of what "works" as I pointed them out above?
No, not "straw men," but imaginary cases. They're two different things.As far as 'good' comes in, we can speculate our choice of theory might reflect our emotions. A brutalised person might prefer a theory that is modeled around conflict...but then they might do the opposite and have a theory that denies this world is real. But now we are doing psychology on straw men, a sign that we are no longer doing proper philosophy.
"Straw men" are reductional misrepresentations of real-world arguments; imaginary cases are fictive heuristic devices, realistic representations of cases that we use so that we do not have to perform experiments on actual human beings. The former are bad, and the latter are very good for philosophical (and moral) purposes.
You seem to leave us above at Emotivism. The problems with Emotivism are well-documented. They include things like that just because one emotionally "likes" something cannot tell us whether or not it's "good," and that emotions are not stable as a source of information for how different human beings can reach consensus about the world...and do things like build societies, systems of justice, fair distribution, and so on.
In sum, the fact that someone "likes" or "wants" something does not ever turn out to be morally informative. It may be interesting, but it does not give us reason to associate rightness with any such emotion.