Philosophy Now Forum

HAHAHAHAHA!

Londoner wrote:

Immanuel Can wrote:To put it another way, existence is not a predicate,

Actually, I'm pretty sure "to exist" IS a predicate, at least in grammar.

...and the word 'is' can mean more than one thing. If we treat it as a predicate, or as if it always means one thing, then we create philosophical problems.

That is true. But I don't think it's a big problem to the present discussion. I think I've been pretty detailed on what I wish to predicate of God. If not, feel free to ask.

... I would argue that everything we believe consists of that same mix. That even 'fire burns' does not sit entirely on the side of the empirical, that every description must also involve the conceptual, if only in the form of logical relationships.

A lot of philosophy has attempted to split the two. Over here is raw experience, cold fact. Over there are concepts, logic etc. And this is how we stick the two together. But we can never quite manage it, because we can never separate out the 'raw experience'. It always comes with a bit of the other stuff already mixed in. (See the gap between early and later Wittgenstein).

Yes, I think we agree on the fact that the mix always exists; I wonder, though, if we're on quite the same page on the question of whether or not the "mix" is so polluted as not to allow for definite understanding. I would say that the "mixing" is not terminal. Perhaps you would say it obscures all possible truth claims. But then, that statement would be a truth claim.

This is why I tend to be more sympathetic to religious claims than many on these boards. Atheist or theist, I do not think we can ever draw a sharp line between 'facts' and our conceptual frameworks. And, with conceptual frameworks, all that matters is that they work for us; that they meet our needs.

Yeah, this is where our agreement hits a roadblock. I would respond that one can have a completely consistent "framework" that one has devised, and that framework not be good or true at all. More than that, the claim, "The purpose of frameworks is to 'meet our needs,' " as you put it, is itself an unsupported claim. I would tend to deny it.

I would ask, how do we know that to "work" (presumably for some purpose we have individually conceived) is the point? Maybe the purpose of a good "framework" is to reflect the truth, or to uncover the real, material facts of the world (as in science), or to lead us to understand the Transcendent, or to show us how to be morally good... Different ideological groups have thought all these things: so to say that it "works" would really be to beg the whole question. What "works" for a Quaker or a Zoroastrian is nothing like what "works" for a Wiccan or a Nazi. So to leave our inquiry at the point of saying that something "works," and that it's "good" if such a thing "works," is both gratuitous and uninformative.

Why should establishment of belief in God be confined to but one channel (such as the "scientific"), when it's only one of the many relevant sources of data? We don't do that in any other area of life: so why would we think we should to it in regard to God?

As I hope I've been able to convey, that last sentence reflects my own opinion.

Yes, I definitely get that. That's where we agree. Different ways of acquiring data are now celebrated in research as "mixed methods" studies, and they are generally regarded as more informative than the sorts of "single-method" studies that were so strongly preferred back in the days in which the university was dominated by Verificationism and Logical Positivism.

To take multiple readings from different angles allows researchers to acquire both a greater quantity of data and different qualities of data. And it is generally recognized that "mixed methods" is the best option for most kinds of research -- when it can be done. So we're on solid ground when we agree that a sort of "mixed methods" approach to the God question would be likely to be more informative. In any case, it's certainly not any sort of sensible objection for someone to realize that we are seeking more than one kind of data at a time.

henry quirk wrote:As it stands: not a single person participating in this thread has been restrained, and, since it's obvious not a jot of progress has been, or will be, had, I suggest those in favor of cake, and those who pass on cake, agree to disagree, and leave one another be.

It's Christmas time...let it go, for a little while, anyway.

Hey, I LIKE Christmas cake! So I'll stay around for a bit.

When was the last time a cake got you in or out of Heaven, Henry?

That would have to be one tasty cake.

Immanuel Can wrote: Hey, I LIKE Christmas cake! So I'll stay around for a bit.

When was the last time a cake got you in or out of Heaven, Henry?

That would have to be one tasty cake.

I suppose that with enough wine you could stretch a communion wafer to be a cake, Of course with enough wine it could be anything you want.

BTW, did you hear about the new gluten free communion wafer?

It's called "I can't believe it's not Jesus."

(Sorry but if I didn't tell that joke to someone, it would be stuck in my head for the rest of the day.)

thedoc wrote:Of course with enough wine it could be anything you want.

Hey, with wine, even long visits with in-laws can be grand.

henry quirk wrote:...it's obvious not a jot of progress has been, or will be, had...

I dunno. I think this:
Fri Dec 23, 2016 1:56 pm

Immanuel Can wrote:If Atheism means only "I disbelieve..." and does not involve evidence, then nobody needs to care.

is big advance on this:
Thu Dec 01, 2016 11:54 pm

Immanuel Can wrote:But here's what it can and inevitably does do: by denying the existence of any basis for morality, it induces people to ignore morality or practice morality only in a convenient or strategic way, since it deprives the world of any ultimate grounds for it. Being good or evil become simply arbitrary matters of taste, or strategic options, not values to which anyone owes any ultimate duty. Then whatever ideology a person may have can be unimpeded by conscience or moral qualm, and can go forward ruthlessly and with reference to power not morality.

That is Atheism's gift to the world: amorality.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:I would imagine it is the same type of evidence that presupposes there is a divine law giver.

Immanuel Can wrote: No, I wouldn't think so. So to what "evidence" do you refer here?

I would assume that human reason is required to understand God's law. In a similar way human reason is the basis of Kantian ethics. In other words, duties and obligations are self-evident

No, not "in the same way." Kantianism isn't divinely revealed. But two things bear mention: first, Kantianism isn't really grounded the same way as what we now call Neo-Kantianism (like Rawls or Habermas). Kant was a teleologist, and they tend to be formalists. Secondly, "reason," all by itself, doesn't tell us a thing about moral duties and obligations. It needs premises, and these we have to acquire from somewhere first. Reason itself is just a formal method, not a substantive position on any particular content.

Additionally, you'll find that the truth is never "self-evident." The term "self-evident" is a circularity, used to hide the fact that one has run out of explanations and no longer wishes to be asked. Things are "evident" on the basis of particular grounds, or not at all. And the grounds must always be specified, if anything is to become evident-by-reasons.

Yes, I am aware that teleological and deontological ethics are opposed to each other. However, the point I am making is that deontological or teleological, ethics are grounded in human reason. You seem to have a problem with that.

Oh, it's not just MY problem: the whole field of Ethics understands that what you say is true: teleological and deontological ethics are "opposed" -- not just in methodology, but in conclusions.

A famous example is Kant's "lying" example. In exactly the same situation, Deontology says "Never lie," and Consequentialism says "Lie right away." So if we try to affirm BOTH systems, what we end up with is no moral guidance at all...for we never know which one to use, and they rationalize opposite actions for opposite reasons.

Ginkgo wrote: As free moral agents ethics is bound up with our duties and obligations towards each other. This can be exemplified in a variety of ways.

You'd best exemplify it for me, so I can get your point. If we are "free," why do we have to do anything in particular at all? How do we detect that we have even one "duty" or "obligation" toward other people? Can you give me one of those examples of which you speak, perhaps?

Yes, I know Kantian ethics is not divinely inspired, but the reasoning process is the same. Kantian ethics is prescriptive and is based on a universal law. Without having the benefit of Woods and Marx I am still of the opinion that Kant was a deontologist, not a teleologist. Perhaps you could give me a summary of Woods,or Marx. Kantian ethics is duty based that is why it is deontological. Moral duties and obligations are based on the inherent rightness or wrongness of actions. In other words, having intrinsic moral value in and of themselves.

If we are free moral agents and we live in a free society then it becomes obvious why we do things in a particular way. This is exemplified though the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative has been reformulated and expressed in a variety of ways throughout many societies. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." "Never treat people as a means to our own end."

Self-evident truths are not circular; they can be circular depending how they combine with other premises. When used in Kantian ethics it is not circular.

Immanuel Can wrote:
A famous example is Kant's "lying" example. In exactly the same situation, Deontology says "Never lie," and Consequentialism says "Lie right away." So if we try to affirm BOTH systems, what we end up with is no moral guidance at all...for we never know which one to use, and they rationalize opposite actions for opposite reasons

Are you now saying that Kant was a deontologist?

Ginkgo wrote:

Immanuel Can wrote:
A famous example is Kant's "lying" example. In exactly the same situation, Deontology says "Never lie," and Consequentialism says "Lie right away." So if we try to affirm BOTH systems, what we end up with is no moral guidance at all...for we never know which one to use, and they rationalize opposite actions for opposite reasons

Are you now saying that Kant was a deontologist?

No. I'm saying that through the example Kant chose, we can see the contrast between what would be "right" from a Deontological perspective as understood by the so-called Neo-Kantians, and what would be "right" from a Consequentialist one. They're opposites.

The important point is simply this: you can't have both. They rationalize opposite actions as exclusively "right". So there's no solution possible in saying, well, we'll just declare both are right: you won't have a clue which is actually moral.

Kant is thought by many, particularly the so-called Neo-Kantians, to be a pure Deontologist; but what Wood shows is that Kant was only secondarily Deontological in his views: his primary suppositions were really teleological in origin.

Kant would have probably thought he was being purely Deontological; but as Wood shows, he couldn't have even gotten to the premises required for things like the U-Principle or the Dignity Principle except that he was taking for granted certain teleological suppositions -- suppositions so generally agreed upon in his day that Kant surely felt they needed no defence, but which are not at all generally conceded by people today.

I would pose the problem this way: why should we treat people as "ends," anyway? What line of reasoning proves that true? Once we think we're just animals engaged in a kind of evolutionary power struggle as per Nietzsche, Rand or the Social Darwinists, what's the reason we must any longer think we can't use people as we see fit? And who says we owe it to anyone to be rational, or to keep our practices self-consistent? The Pragmatist say, "Let's just do what 'works' at the moment": how do we prove to the Pragmatists that that is wrong, and that they owe us to behave in a way that's "universalizable"? Are we just supposed to take Mr. Kant's word for it? That's the issue, really.

But you really need to read Wood. It's his case. And it's just not possible to make a case as complex and important as he makes, at least not in these spaces.

thedoc wrote:...in America there is free speech, which means that as a citizen you can say what you think and believe...

Over here we extend that privilege to dissenters.


(With apologies to all Americans who wouldn't play the nationalist bullshit card.)

Londoner wrote:

uwot wrote:My disagreement is with those theists that insist I do want some cake.

Those would be theists who are insisting that you are also a theist.

I don't think you mean that.

Londoner wrote:I do not think that is true of Mr Kant, but we can always ask him.

I presume you mean Mr Can. He has made his position clear: he believes it is his duty as a christian to proselytise. I have made it clear that I respect that and would do likewise if I believed as he does. The problem is that Mr Can has a limited range of unsophisticated arguments. In the past these have been exposed, and Mr Can has retreated; only to return with just the slightest variation on the same arguments. But there is progress, Mr Can has not used the argument that atheists are irrational for a while, although the evidence is that he still harbours that belief. What is also interesting is the way he polarises opinion; people will perceive themselves as with or against him, regardless of the content of his posts.

Londoner wrote:

I have no strong option on whether or not there is such a thing as god, but as an atheist, I do not believe it. On the other hand, I disagree strongly with any theist who insists that their belief entitles them to dictate how I should live my life.

Or presumably vice-versa. So would you never criticise anyone else's beliefs or behaviours? Maybe that is the case, but if so that is just your position.

It isn't. I wouldn't criticise anyone's personal belief, but as I thought was clear in the above, I will criticise any belief that is used to justify meddling in other people's affairs.

Londoner wrote:It doesn't necessarily go with atheism, indeed some atheists consider that they have a moral system - and one superior to the ones associated with organised religion.

Frankly they are right. If a code of laws cannot be sustained on its own merits, without divine approval, it is a poor code.

Londoner wrote:So, while I understand you are telling me what you think, you cannot claim it as the meaning of 'atheism'.

People believe all sorts of things and attribute it to atheism, but atheism itself is just not believing in any god.

Londoner wrote:

As I have made abundantly clear, there is no reason not to believe in any god that pleases you. I have also made the point that anyone who thinks they have evidence that any supernatural being does not exist is an idiot. There are many atheists for whom the lack of any evidence that a god exists is sufficient reason to believe it doesn't, but that is very different to thinking that any empirical evidence can demonstrate the existance of a god, which by definition does not admit empirical evidence.

You will see that in the case of Mr Can, his belief arises from a number of sources.

Yes. And contrary to his whinging that I am not interested in engaging in them, we have been through various ontological, teleological and cosmological arguments. This thread opened thus:

Aetixintro wrote:I have for a time been sympathic to the Atheist claim of believing in something close to science, but here's the limit!

It can hardly be said that Atheists can believe in Ethics/Morals and Meaning for real.

Whatever else it has been, it has been a debate on that issue. Mr Can's position is that moral values are real, they cannot be derived from experience, therefore they must be god given.

Londoner wrote:Incidentally, empirical evidence cannot demonstrate the existence of anything. The assumption that it does is not itself empirical.

You are pushing against an open door with that one. In my view underdetermination is fatal to any claim to knowledge about the existence of things.

Londoner wrote:

We could have a much more fruitful discussion if you could appreciate the difference between personal belief and organised religion.

I can be a democrat. There can be organised democracies. What is your point?

That personal belief is harmless, until like minded goons club together and undemocratically start imposing their will.

Immanuel Can wrote: Actually, I'm pretty sure "to exist" IS a predicate, at least in grammar.

Suppose I say 'snow is white'. I'm not saying two separate things, about 'being' and colour, because for the snow to be white (or anything else) it must necessarily 'be'. If that wasn't the case, then we would have things that exist, distinct from existing 'as' anything. 'Snow is'. 'What is it?' 'It isn't anything'.

If we treat 'is' as a predicate we also get into a problems with 'a dragon is a creature with wings' (or just with 'is not'). To sort them out we have to separate the is' as a claim that the subject exists, in the sense of not being imaginary, from the 'is' that links the description to the subject. If we don't, we get into logical problems that are too tedious to go into. As well as being off topic, except that it does relate to the Ontological Argument.

Me: A lot of philosophy has attempted to split the two. Over here is raw experience, cold fact. Over there are concepts, logic etc. And this is how we stick the two together. But we can never quite manage it, because we can never separate out the 'raw experience'. It always comes with a bit of the other stuff already mixed in. (See the gap between early and later Wittgenstein).

Yes, I think we agree on the fact that the mix always exists; I wonder, though, if we're on quite the same page on the question of whether or not the "mix" is so polluted as not to allow for definite understanding. I would say that the "mixing" is not terminal. Perhaps you would say it obscures all possible truth claims. But then, that statement would be a truth claim.

The inability to sort out the mix frustrates a project that rules what it is, and isn't, possible to say. To put it another way, to make philosophy like science, a system which does not attempt to address certain areas of experience, except unlike science it would say that those areas are meaningless.

The idea is that all meaningful statements must be ultimately reduce-able to very simple sense-experiences. So when we say 'snow' that word means the 'atomistic' experiences 'whiteness', 'coldness', 'dampness', etc. all joined together with the logical connection 'and'. As a consequence, if you talk about God that is meaningless, (or if it has any meaning it is only as a description of your own mental state, the equivalent of 'ouch'.) The same goes for ethics and metaphysics; they are literally nonsense. or, more kindly, 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'.

As I wrote, this project floundered because we can never identify those atoms of experience. However simple, they always come encumbered with logical and conceptual baggage. I do not think that constitutes a truth-claim in the sense of being certain that it would be impossible to distinguish concepts from experience, but we do know that we can't (and don't) do it. If you like, we know it empirically.

So I would not take this failure as ruling out the idea you can have 'knowledge ' of God, rather it implies that your knowledge is not of a different (or inferior) kind to knowledge generally.

Me: This is why I tend to be more sympathetic to religious claims than many on these boards. Atheist or theist, I do not think we can ever draw a sharp line between 'facts' and our conceptual frameworks. And, with conceptual frameworks, all that matters is that they work for us; that they meet our needs.

Yeah, this is where our agreement hits a roadblock. I would respond that one can have a completely consistent "framework" that one has devised, and that framework not be good or true at all. More than that, the claim, "The purpose of frameworks is to 'meet our needs,' " as you put it, is itself an unsupported claim. I would tend to deny it.

It doesn't meet our needs because it is perfect, it meets our needs/remains consistent because we constantly adjust it. We want a consistent framework because that enables us to predict future experience; when it fails we readjust it to take it into account.

What "works" for a Quaker or a Zoroastrian is nothing like what "works" for a Wiccan or a Nazi. So to leave our inquiry at the point of saying that something "works," and that it's "good" if such a thing "works," is both gratuitous and uninformative.

Quite a lot of what such people believe will be common; 'fire burns' etc. But the important point is that a theory is simply an attempt to provide a consistent description of experience and there isn't just one single, correct, theory. For example, I can have the theory that the whole world is just my dream, or that every event that happens is willed by God, or that we all live in The Matrix. Since all these theories can be made consistent with our experiences, there is no way that we can use experience to show which one (if any) is correct.

As far as 'good' comes in, we can speculate our choice of theory might reflect our emotions. A brutalised person might prefer a theory that is modeled around conflict...but then they might do the opposite and have a theory that denies this world is real. But now we are doing psychology on straw men, a sign that we are no longer doing proper philosophy.

uwot wrote:My disagreement is with those theists that insist I do want some cake.
Those would be theists who are insisting that you are also a theist.
I don't think you mean that.

I did, so if I have misunderstood you, you will have to explain. Moral: avoid metaphors.

I presume you mean Mr Can. He has made his position clear: he believes it is his duty as a christian to proselytise. I have made it clear that I respect that and would do likewise if I believed as he does. The problem is that Mr Can has a limited range of unsophisticated arguments. In the past these have been exposed, and Mr Can has retreated; only to return with just the slightest variation on the same arguments. But there is progress, Mr Can has not used the argument that atheists are irrational for a while, although the evidence is that he still harbours that belief. What is also interesting is the way he polarises opinion; people will perceive themselves as with or against him, regardless of the content of his posts.

I think theists can be annoying to argue with because they tend to have a mission. They won't explore interesting arguments for fear this will somehow compromise them. But on the other hand, they do tend to be given a hard time; as you say it does tend to be Mr Can against the world on these boards.

It isn't. I wouldn't criticise anyone's personal belief, but as I thought was clear in the above, I will criticise any belief that is used to justify meddling in other people's affairs...

Frankly they are right. If a code of laws cannot be sustained on its own merits, without divine approval, it is a poor code.

Why isn't having 'a code of laws' 'meddling in other peoples affairs'?

I do not think there is a substance called 'merit' that we can objectively identify. By saying they have merit you are giving them your approval. And if you say that others should/must share your opinion, that is to assert that your approval is more than just a 'personal belief'. On what is that assertion based on? It must be on some claim of transcendental authority.

People believe all sorts of things and attribute it to atheism, but atheism itself is just not believing in any god.

So you keep saying, but I disagree.

Suppose John says: 'I don't believe in gravity'. Mary asks: 'Why not?' John relies: 'No reason'. Then Mary asks: 'What do you mean by gravity?' How will John reply?

He can deny he means anything by 'gravity', but in that case his saying 'I don't believe in gravity' was meaningless. But if he gives a description of 'gravity' then it will be in terms of more general things, 'scientific laws' or 'spacetime'. In which case, his disbelief in gravity must relate to more than just the word 'gravity'. It might be a rejection of science as a whole, or of relativity.

In other words, there is no 'just not believing'. If we are saying something meaningful, then it has to relate to the rest of our ideas.

We could have a much more fruitful discussion if you could appreciate the difference between personal belief and organised religion.

I can be a democrat. There can be organised democracies. What is your point?

That personal belief is harmless, until like minded goons club together and undemocratically start imposing their will.

If the goons are like minded, and the majority, then their imposing their will would be democratic.

Is personal belief sacrosanct, in the sense that nobody should be allowed to impose anything, on anyone? Because even that super-libertarian idea incorporates a 'should' that is supposed to govern everyone else, i.e. the law that there shall be no laws. (And presumably policemen whose job would be to prevent anyone becoming a policeman).

It is the same point as above. I do no see how one can have a completely unconnected belief or disbelief. It must be about something and it cannot be entirely personal.

uwot wrote:

thedoc wrote:...in America there is free speech, which means that as a citizen you can say what you think and believe...

Over here we extend that privilege to dissenters.

I believe the dissenters are also citizens.