Philosophy Now Forum

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 4:52 pm "So called 'same,' not literally."

In other words, in a conventional manner of speaking, but they're not literally the same or identical. Basically, it's a way of not insisting that everyone adapt to nominalism in how they speak about things, even though nominalism has things right.

So when you use the word "sameness" and the word "right" it's not a literal referent to a mental state?

It would be incredibly laborious and annoying in casual conversation to have to explain the nominalistic view of what conventional/colloquial-speak "sameness" amounts to every time something related to it comes up. So nominalists, in casual conversation, will usually just employ conventional language. That doesn't imply that they literally think that numerically distinct things are the same. Just that they're not going to explain all of that every time they'd need to.

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 4:56 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 4:52 pm "So called 'same,' not literally."

In other words, in a conventional manner of speaking, but they're not literally the same or identical. Basically, it's a way of not insisting that everyone adapt to nominalism in how they speak about things, even though nominalism has things right.

So when you use the word "sameness" and the word "right" it's not a literal referent to a mental state?

No. (ignoring the grammatical weirdness in the question, by the way--the referent isn't something mental, rather.)

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 4:58 pm It would be incredibly laborious and annoying in casual conversation to have to explain the nominalistic view of what conventional/colloquial-speak "sameness" amounts to every time something related to it comes up.

Yea! Because it's incoherent

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 4:58 pm So nominalists, in casual conversation, will usually just employ conventional language. That doesn't imply that they literally think that numerically distinct things are the same. Just that they're not going to explain all of that every time they'd need to.

I can't wait to hear your views on philosophy of mathematics!

If you are a nominalist, where the hell do numbers exist?

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:00 pm I can't wait to hear your views on philosophy of mathematics!

If you are a nominalist, where the hell do numbers exist?

Nominalism doesn't necessarily imply antirealism on mathematics. But yes, I'm an antirealist on mathematics. Mathematical objects, including numbers, are ways of thinking about relations. Usually it's initially based on experienced relations, but then for more complex mathematical ideas we think about relations among the abstractions we've created.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:03 pm Nominalism doesn't necessarily imply antirealism on mathematics. But yes, I'm an antirealist on mathematics. Mathematical objects, including numbers, are ways of thinking about relations. Usually it's initially based on experienced relations, but then for more complex mathematical ideas we think about relations among the abstractions we've created.

But you are a physicalist in general. So if you can think about numbers then... they are just mental states. What else could they be?

But then you are an anti-realist (about your mental states).

This is so confusing!

I agree with a lot of mathematician Reuben Hersh's views on the ontology of mathematics, by the way. He wrote a great book called What Is Mathematics, Really?

https://www.amazon.com/What-Mathematics ... 8&me=&qid=

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:05 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:03 pm Nominalism doesn't necessarily imply antirealism on mathematics. But yes, I'm an antirealist on mathematics. Mathematical objects, including numbers, are ways of thinking about relations. Usually it's initially based on experienced relations, but then for more complex mathematical ideas we think about relations among the abstractions we've created.

But you are a physicalist. So if you can think about numbers then... they are just mental states. What else could they be?

Right, they're mental/brains states. Any thinking is. (Not sure why this would be confusing, by the way.)

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:08 pm I agree with a lot of mathematician Reuben Hersh's views on the ontology of mathematics, by the way. He wrote a great book called What Is Mathematics, Really?

https://www.amazon.com/What-Mathematics ... 8&me=&qid=

Mathematics is a language.

If you are a mathematical anti-realist, I also expect you to be a linguistic anti-realist.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:08 pm

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:05 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:03 pm Nominalism doesn't necessarily imply antirealism on mathematics. But yes, I'm an antirealist on mathematics. Mathematical objects, including numbers, are ways of thinking about relations. Usually it's initially based on experienced relations, but then for more complex mathematical ideas we think about relations among the abstractions we've created.

But you are a physicalist. So if you can think about numbers then... they are just mental states. What else could they be?

Right, they're mental/brains states. Any thinking is.

So how are you an anti-realist about thinking?

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:09 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:08 pm I agree with a lot of mathematician Reuben Hersh's views on the ontology of mathematics, by the way. He wrote a great book called What Is Mathematics, Really?

https://www.amazon.com/What-Mathematics ... 8&me=&qid=

Mathematics is a language.

If you are a mathematical anti-realist, I also expect you to be a linguistic anti-realist.

Yes. Meaning is an important part of language, obviously, and meaning is "only found in the head."

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:09 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:08 pm

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:05 pm
But you are a physicalist. So if you can think about numbers then... they are just mental states. What else could they be?

Right, they're mental/brains states. Any thinking is.

So how are you an anti-realist about thinking?

The real/anti-real distinction is a distinction of whether something is mental-only versus whether it occurs in the world external to minds. It maps to the objective/subjective distinction, as well as the cognitive/noncognitive distinction.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:10 pm

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:09 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:08 pm I agree with a lot of mathematician Reuben Hersh's views on the ontology of mathematics, by the way. He wrote a great book called What Is Mathematics, Really?

https://www.amazon.com/What-Mathematics ... 8&me=&qid=

Mathematics is a language.

If you are a mathematical anti-realist, I also expect you to be a linguistic anti-realist.

Yes. Meaning is an important part of language, obviously, and meaning is "only found in the head."

So you do reject denotation?

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:12 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:10 pm

Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:09 pm
Mathematics is a language.

If you are a mathematical anti-realist, I also expect you to be a linguistic anti-realist.

Yes. Meaning is an important part of language, obviously, and meaning is "only found in the head."

So you do reject denotation?

Not at all. It's just that denotative meaning occurs in the head, as all meaning does.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jan 19, 2021 5:11 pm The real/anti-real distinction is a distinction of whether something is mental-only versus whether it occurs in the world external to minds. It maps to the objective/subjective distinction, as well as the cognitive/noncognitive distinction.

So your mental states are not real?