Philosophy Now Forum

Londoner wrote: ↑Sun Jul 09, 2017 6:07 pm You say that either the proposers of the Ontological Argument or its opponents have 'misrepresented...the nature of the concept of "Supreme Being"

How do you know this?

Oh, very easily. It's because they fail to see the particulars of what it analytically claims as anything distinct from, say, pixies or unicorns. They just don't get -- or perhaps, don't want to realize -- that it is a special kind of concept, and one that is not a contingent one at all. Thus analogies with contingent, imaginary entities like pixies and unicorns are just missing the point.

That implies that we know the nature of that Supreme Being

No. I apologize for not emphasizing the phrase "nature of the concept" for you. We're not talking about the particular or personal nature of the Supreme Being (i.e. male/female, volitional or a force, and so on); we're asking about the rational coherence and implications of the concept itself.

To use Kant's language, we'd say that we're asking for an analytic, not synthetic judgment.

All it implies is that we understand the concept of what "Supreme Being" would entail. Not that we say we must investigate the nature of the Supreme Being Himself.

And if we do know the nature of the Supreme Being, we must already know what the Ontological Argument was supposed to prove, i.e. that the Supreme Being exists.

No. We don't have to take that for granted at the start. In fact, if we did, we would just be begging the question either way.

The Ontological Argument is analytic, not synthetic: so to pose it as if it were synthetic is incorrect, and is a misunderstanding of the point.

As for me, since I do not know the correct nature of the Supreme Being, I cannot know which form of the Ontological Argument you believe does work, so I do not know what to aim for.

You don't need to.

All you really have to do is answer the question of whether or not the concept of a "Supreme Being" is a coherent one.

Note, I'm not asking you, and the OA doesn't ask you, whether or not one does exist. More or less, what it is asking is, "When people ask the question about the existence or non-existence of a Supreme Being, are they asking a question that can be understood as coherent?" Or is what they are asking just as inscrutable and impossible to understand as if the Theists were asking, "Does a !(*&^$%# exist?" and the Atheists were saying, "We deny the existence of !(*&^$%# " ?

But beware: I can already alert you that if you say, "It's incoherent," then the proponent of the OA is going to ask you to explain why you find reason to regard it as incoherent. And he's going to have good reasons to suggest to you that it cannot be.

On the other hand, if you say, "It's coherent," then he's really got you already, if you actually understand the OA.

Ontological arguments take this form:
1. The concept of the greatest thing ever exists.
2. The greatest thing ever would be even better if it existed.
3. Wait a minute; I can conceive of something even greater than the conceptual greatest thing ever.
4. Since the concept of the greatest thing ever exists, it must refer to the actual greatest thing ever, which is greater than the merely conceptual greatest thing ever.

The concept of a supreme being is simple enough to understand. I have no trouble accepting it as coherent. The real issue, in my view, is the second premise; some version of the claim that a concept becomes greater when it stops being a concept, which immediately undermines the argument, because the initial premise is about a concept. But more to the point; it is complete bollocks.

Here is Plantinga’s modal ontological argument:

Premise 1: It is possible that God exists.
Premise 2: If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
Premise 3: If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
Premise 4: If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
Premise 5: If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
Conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

This argument is bullshit –- and, as I would suggest, knowing that Plantinga is intelligent, a deliberate effort at obfuscation. It is sad that intelligent theists resort to subterfuge. Do they ever ask themselves why their God needs a bodyguard of lies?

The bullshit consists in an equivocation between “possible” in the natural language sense, and “possible” in the modal logic sense. But if one does not attend to this distinction, then one becomes hopelessly befuddled –- as it appears that Plantinga would like, because it serves his apologetic purposes.

Consider: it is possible that Goldbach’s Conjectue is true: that every even integer greater than two can be expressed as the sum of two primes. We don’t know whether this is true or not. But it’s possibly true –- but only in the natural language sense of “possibly.” This “possibility” simply refers to our ignorance.

In the modal language sense, which deals with the heuristic of possible worlds, this conjecture is true at all possible worlds (i.e., necessarily true) or it is false at all possible worlds (necessarily false.)

In the modal sense, then, the conjecture cannot be possible. –- true at some worlds, and false at others. It is either true at all worlds or true at no worlds.

Plantinga’s argument illicitly trades on this equivocation between natural language “possible” and modal logic “possible.”

The modal ontological argument accepts at face value the theist’s claim that God is a necessary being. And then parsed out in modal logic, we get the following conclusions: If god exists, he necessarily exists. If god fails to exist, then he necessarily fails to exist. Just like Goldbach’s Conjecture, of which more here.

That’s about the size of it. Proof that God exits?

davidm wrote: ↑Sun Jul 09, 2017 9:48 pm Here is Plantinga’s modal ontological argument:

Premise 1: It is possible that God exists.
Premise 2: If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
Premise 3: If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
Premise 4: If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
Premise 5: If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
Conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

This argument is bullshit –- and, as I would suggest, knowing that Plantinga is intelligent, a deliberate effort at obfuscation. It is sad that intelligent theists resort to subterfuge. Do they ever ask themselves why their God needs a bodyguard of lies?

The bullshit consists in an equivocation between “possible” in the natural language sense, and “possible” in the modal logic sense. But if one does not attend to this distinction, then one becomes hopelessly befuddled –- as it appears that Plantinga would like, because it serves his apologetic purposes.

Consider: it is possible that Goldbach’s Conjectue is true: that every even integer greater than two can be expressed as the sum of two primes. We don’t know whether this is true or not. But it’s possibly true –- but only in the natural language sense of “possibly.” This “possibility” simply refers to our ignorance.

In the modal language sense, which deals with the heuristic of possible worlds, this conjecture is true at all possible worlds (i.e., necessarily true) or it is false at all possible worlds (necessarily false.)

In the modal sense, then, the conjecture cannot be possible. –- true at some worlds, and false at others. It is either true at all worlds or true at no worlds.

Plantinga’s argument illicitly trades on this equivocation between natural language “possible” and modal logic “possible.”

The modal ontological argument accepts at face value the theist’s claim that God is a necessary being. And then parsed out in modal logic, we get the following conclusions: If god exists, he necessarily exists. If god fails to exist, then he necessarily fails to exist. Just like Goldbach’s Conjecture, of which more here.

That’s about the size of it. Proof that God exits?

Premise 3 does not follow from premise 2. There are certainly other problems.

Premise 1 is questionable, just because something is possible, does not mean that it is certain to happen, there is a difference between "possible" and "necessary". It is possible that "invisible pink Unicorns" exist, but that doesn't mean that they do in fact.

thedoc wrote: ↑Sun Jul 09, 2017 10:19 pm Premise 3 does not follow from premise 2. There are certainly other problems.

Premise 1 is questionable, just because something is possible, does not mean that it is certain to happen, there is a difference between "possible" and "necessary". It is possible that "invisible pink Unicorns" exist, but that doesn't mean that they do in fact.

Actually, this ostensible defect is made non-defective by the adjective "supreme." There are no "supreme invisible pink unicorns," for a " pink unicorn" is a bounded creature...even if invisible, and certainly if fictional...not a "supreme" one.

To say that an entity is the "supreme" or, a la Plantinga, "that which is possessed of all great-making properties," is automatically to include "existence" among them: that is, unless one thinks that Entity X-1, which has all the consummately great-making properties of a possible Entity X, minus the property of existence, is actually "greater" than Entity X itself, which does actually exist. But I think it's clear that this is an impossible case to make.

This is a fact to which davidm also pays no attention, and so he makes his own form of the "unicorn" mistake.

The statement, "This is the Supreme Being, but He doesn't happen to actually exist," is incoherent because self-contradictory. The "this" there could not possibly refer to the Supreme Being. But the rational coherence of the Supreme Being concept was already given at stage 1.

The truth is that if you grant premise one, the OA is solid from then on down, purely on analytic coherence. The question in hand is whether or not to grant premise 1.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Jul 09, 2017 6:23 pm You say that either the proposers of the Ontological Argument or its opponents have 'misrepresented...the nature of the concept of "Supreme Being"
How do you know this?

Oh, very easily. It's because they fail to see the particulars of what it analytically claims as anything distinct from, say, pixies or unicorns. They just don't get -- or perhaps, don't want to realize -- that it is a special kind of concept, and one that is not a contingent one at all. Thus analogies with contingent, imaginary entities like pixies and unicorns are just missing the point.

So what is this special kind of concept?

To use Kant's language, we'd say that we're asking for an analytic, not synthetic judgment.

All it implies is that we understand the concept of what "Supreme Being" would entail. Not that we say we must investigate the nature of the Supreme Being Himself....

The Ontological Argument is analytic, not synthetic: so to pose it as if it were synthetic is incorrect, and is a misunderstanding of the point.

Except that if it was purely analytic it would not amount to a proof; it would be a tautology. My concept of Jehovah is identical to my concept of Jehovah. But that would not be an argument that my concept is right, that it is better than any other concept, or not having a concept at all.

All you really have to do is answer the question of whether or not the concept of a "Supreme Being" is a coherent one.

I do not think there is any problem in coming up with concepts that are coherent. The idea of a Pixie or Unicorn can be coherent. The problem is how far you extend them, for example whether your concept of a Unicorn includes it being like any other animal. Then it would no longer be purely analytic, no longer purely a concept. If I claimed Unicorns exist-like-normal-animals, rather than exist-like-concepts, but cannot provide the sort of empirical evidence for Unicorns that goes with exist-like-normal-animals, then my claim would no longer be coherent.

Note, I'm not asking you, and the OA doesn't ask you, whether or not one does exist. More or less, what it is asking is, "When people ask the question about the existence or non-existence of a Supreme Being, are they asking a question that can be understood as coherent?" Or is what they are asking just as inscrutable and impossible to understand as if the Theists were asking, "Does a !(*&^$%# exist?" and the Atheists were saying, "We deny the existence of !(*&^$%# " ?

'Existence' purely as a concept? Or in some wider sense? That is where the problem arises, the Ontological Argument is usually understood to want to move beyond God as existing purely as a concept.

But beware: I can already alert you that if you say, "It's incoherent," then the proponent of the OA is going to ask you to explain why you find reason to regard it as incoherent. And he's going to have good reasons to suggest to you that it cannot be.

On the other hand, if you say, "It's coherent," then he's really got you already, if you actually understand the OA.

As I have said, I do think finding coherent concepts of Supreme Beings is difficult. But the OA wants to move beyond that, to argue God is 'greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind'.

uwot wrote: ↑Sat Jul 08, 2017 10:18 amWhat we know is that the evidence believers present is only sufficient to persuade those who wish to believe.

..ok, so why would one not wish to believe?

uwot wrote:It is no more compelling than the Christmas presents under the tree is evidence that Santa Claus put them there.

Really. You are still compelled to compare belief in our reality having an intelligent backbone, to that of someone believing in presents that they have written and wished for from some dude flying reindeer across the sky and delivering presents to billions of people in a single night?

Is that really an intelligent comparison?

Londoner wrote: ↑Mon Jul 10, 2017 9:52 am So what is this special kind of concept?

Well, for one thing, it's the difference between a "necessary" and a "contingent" being. There's a lot you can say about one that you cannot say about the other. But even more, the concept of "supreme," puts this particular concept in a category of one. Nothing you can draw by way of analogy is going to be quite the same as an Entity posited to have the characteristic of "supremacy" in a given perfection. So a philosopher is going to have to drop the "unicorn" or "pixie" analogies right away, or just miss the concept totally.

Except that if it was purely analytic it would not amount to a proof; it would be a tautology.

Yes and no. All definitions are, in a sense, tautological; on one side of the explanation is a word, and on the other a phrase that is the equivalent of that word. To say one is, in a definition, to imply the other. That's tautological, but it's profound and useful as well.

But in another sense, it's not tautological. To make sure you have the right-hand side of the definition correct when you have the left-hand word is far from a trivial activity. It's necessary to understanding properly what you're talking about, and it's essential to achieving the recognition of agreement (or disagreement) with other people.

The fundamental question, again, is, "Is it even possible that the Supreme Being could exist?" And I still don't have your answer to that question. If I did, I could walk you the next step, and we'd be able to talk about it and see if you thought it was tautological or not. Until I have your position, I don't know how to point you in the right direction.

My concept of Jehovah is identical to my concept of Jehovah. But that would not be an argument that my concept is right, that it is better than any other concept, or not having a concept at all.

Nobody is saying that this is the case. The OA does not make that move. But its detractors have often made the mistake of assuming it does, then dismissing it from there.

I do not think there is any problem in coming up with concepts that are coherent.

Nobody was questioning that. But what we need to know is whether or not you regard the concept of a Supreme Being as coherent.

Remember: it's a concept-group of one, by definition. For that reason, no other concepts are going to furnish relevant analogies to it. The danger in floating any such analogy is immediately going to be that one tries to imagine a contingent, non-supremacy situation and extrapolate from that to the concept of Supreme Being. And that move will be no more guarded from failure than extrapolating from marshmallow to cosmos.

The idea of a Pixie or Unicorn can be coherent.

This is the classic mental mistake that detractors of the OA make. There are no identifiable inherent "great making" properties to unicorns or pixies. So there is no more to be said about them than that. They are contingent, non-supreme entities.

If I claimed Unicorns exist-like-normal-animals, rather than exist-like-concepts, but cannot provide the sort of empirical evidence for Unicorns that goes with exist-like-normal-animals, then my claim would no longer be coherent.

Here you've mixed up analytic and synthetic. Synthetic proofs (empirical ones) are not necessary for analytic ones, and do not presuppose synthetic demonstrations either.

You don't need to see a physical, empirical "1" to understand the concept of "1". It is not also necessary for you to demonstrate the physical existence of a "1" in order to know what it means to speak coherently or use the concept of "1"-ness.

'Existence' purely as a concept? Or in some wider sense? That is where the problem arises, the Ontological Argument is usually understood to want to move beyond God as existing purely as a concept.

Yes, it does: but it does not do that until the conclusion. To jump ahead to the conclusion and then just to declare it impossible by fiat would require proof on your part, or skeptics would have reason to call you for bluffing.

So what proof for the non-existence of God would justify your move, if you were to rule out you accepting the possibility that the OA is right, even before tracking the logical demonstration?

As I have said, I do think finding coherent concepts of Supreme Beings is difficult.

"Supreme Being" is only one. There are not multiple "concepts" of the SB, but only multiple subsequent explanations or guesses at what the NATURE of the SB might be.

Here we are talking only about potential existence, and not (yet) about nature. That's important to keep in mind.

But the OA wants to move beyond that, to argue God is 'greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind'.

The OA does, but don't let that sway you. It doesn't ask you to do it unilaterally or without reason. It offers a logical line of reasoning instead.

Am I understanding you correctly if I say you do not disagree that the concept of a Supreme Being is coherent to you?

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jul 10, 2017 3:13 am
This is a fact to which davidm also pays no attention, and so he makes his own form of the "unicorn" mistake.

I've made no mistake at all. I agree that p1 is the key: It is possible that God exists.

But what does Plantinga mean by this? See my above post: Does he mean possible in the natural language sense, or possible in the modal sense?

If he means it in the modal sense, then he's just wrong. In the modal sense, "possible" means that God exists at some possible worlds but not at others. But God, if he exists, is a necessary being. Therefore he exists at all possible worlds. If, otoh, God fails to exist, he fails to exists at all possible worlds -- i.e., necessarily fails to exist. So God is not possible in the modal sense.

But if Plantinga just means "possible" in the natural language sense, then we are back to Goldbach's Conjecture, discussed above. In any case, it is quite clear that Plantinga is deliberately equivocating between the natural language sense and the modal sense of "possible" -- which makes him dishonest. He is hoping to wow the hoi-polloi with word games.

I do think that modal logic has really helped to clarify St. Anselm's ontological argument. Even Kurt Godel offered a modal ontological argument. But what it gets down to is simply that such new arguments have cleared the metaphysical decks and established as a matter of logic either that God (as defined by theists) necessarily exists or necessarily fails to exist. Obviously this is not a proof that God exists. Sorry.

davidm wrote: ↑Mon Jul 10, 2017 6:40 pm In any case, it is quite clear that Plantinga is deliberately equivocating between the natural language sense and the modal sense of "possible" -- which makes him dishonest. He is hoping to wow the hoi-polloi with word games.

Let us suppose for a minute that a putative shift in meaning is an error that Plantinga has made. Even were this so, this is a claim you cannot know enough to make. It's a claim about motive...not about the alleged error in the idea, but in the man's internal motive for making the alleged error. I would have no objection to you pointing it out.

However, this is not what you do. You actually speak to the issue of motive. Do I need to point out to you why this is not a rational claim to make, let alone a charitable one?

I should at least like to get Dr. Plantinga's response before making any such conclusion about motive. My suggestion is that you write to him and and see what you get. If your objection is substantial, than I expect he would be excited to address it, and you might well find his motives better than you are presently prepared to think. I think you owe him that courtesy.

... what it gets down to is simply that such new arguments have cleared the metaphysical decks and established as a matter of logic either that God (as defined by theists) necessarily exists or necessarily fails to exist. Obviously this is not a proof that God exists. Sorry.

Actually, you've bypassed premise 1 again. If one concedes that the existence of God is possible in the normal sense, then one has conceded it for all "possible worlds" as well. That's bundled into the nature of "Supreme Being" as a concept. You can't have the concept of "supreme-but-less-than-existing." By definition, you've reverted to speaking only of possible contingent beings...the unicorn-pixie mistake.

It is, for example, possible for unicorns or pixies to exist in some "possible worlds," but not in any actual ones. However, were the genuinely "Supreme Being" to exist, it is not possible that He would exist only under certain possible circumstances, but not under all actual ones -- and still, by definition, be "the Supreme Being".

So by accepting the concept at premise 1, you're committed to the conclusion. Now, do you want to go back and question premise 1, or would you still concede it's a coherent concept? Because really, those are the only two alternatives, IF you understand the analytic content of the words, "Supreme Being."

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jul 10, 2017 8:50 pm

davidm wrote: ↑Mon Jul 10, 2017 6:40 pm In any case, it is quite clear that Plantinga is deliberately equivocating between the natural language sense and the modal sense of "possible" -- which makes him dishonest. He is hoping to wow the hoi-polloi with word games.

Let us suppose for a minute that a putative shift in meaning is an error that Plantinga has made. Even were this so, this is a claim you cannot know enough to make. It's a claim about motive...not about the alleged error in the idea, but in the man's internal motive for making the alleged error. I would have no objection to you pointing it out.

However, this is not what you do. You actually speak to the issue of motive. Do I need to point out to you why this is not a rational claim to make, let alone a charitable one?

I think I have good grounds to question his motives because someone as intelligent as he is cannot possibly have done this by accident.

Here’s the problem, quite specifically:

Premise 1: It is possible that God exists.
Premise 2: If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.

No, no, no, no! This is wrong.

Again, let us attend to the natural language meaning of “possible,” and keep clear how it differs from the modal meaning of “possible.”

Which meaning does Plantinga intend in P1?

Does he intend the modal meaning of “possible”? If so, he’s made a mistake right off the bat. God is not possibly true or possibly false on the modal reading; God is either necessarily true or necessarily false.

Does he intend the natural language meaning? If so you cannot validly get P2 from P1, because P2 is clearly a modal statement, deploying as it does the heuristic of possible worlds. You cannot logically go from a P1 natural-language statement to a P2 modal statement. This is a sleight of hand.

Properly the argument would go:

P1 Possibly (in the natural language sense; i.e., a measure of our epistemic ignorance) God exists.
P2 If God exists, he exists at all possible worlds (Necessarily exists).
P3 If God does not exist, he fails to exist at all possible worlds (Necessarily fails to exist)
Conclusion: We don’t know if God exists or not.

Premise 1 : It is possible that God exists
Premise 2 : If it is possible that God exists then God exists in some possible worlds
Premise 3 : If God exists in some possible worlds then God exists in all possible worlds
Premise 4 : If God exists in all possible worlds then God exists in the actual world
Premise 5 : If God exists in the actual world then God exists
Conclusion : Therefore God exists

The basic flaw in the argument is in Premise 4 because the terms possible and actual are not synonymous but are treated as if they were
Things that are actual are only a subset of things that are possible not a totality of them because not everything that is possible is actual
Therefore if it is true that God exists in all possible worlds it does not automatically follow that he must exist in the actual world as well

surreptitious57 wrote: ↑Mon Jul 10, 2017 10:11 pm Premise 1 : It is possible that God exists
Premise 2 : If it is possible that God exists then God exists in some possible worlds
Premise 3 : If God exists in some possible worlds then God exists in all possible worlds
Premise 4 : If God exists in all possible worlds then God exists in the actual world
Premise 5 : If God exists in the actual world then God exists
Conclusion : Therefore God exists

The basic flaw in the argument is in Premise 4 because the terms possible and actual are not synonymous but are treated as if they were
Things that are actual are only a subset of things that are possible not a totality of them because not everything that is possible is actual
Therefore if it is true that God exists in all possible worlds it does not automatically follow that he must exist in the actual world as well

No, this not correct in modal logic. The error is as I stated: the illicit move from P1 to P2.

P4 is correct. If something exists in all possible worlds then it exists in the actual world by definition, since the actual world is a subset of all possible worlds.

Conversely, there are a vast number of possible but non-actual worlds, also called counterfactual worlds. These worlds are logically possible but are never realized.