Philosophy Now Forum

creativesoul wrote:

A_Seagull wrote:
How can you 'deduce' that a cat is on the mat? What is the logical process that leads to that conclusion? Is it necessarily deductive in nature?

We deduce that there is a cat on the mat without actually looking. Drawing connections, associations, and/or correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception. I do not know what sense of "necessarily" you're using here.


How are these questions germane to what I've been arguing?

The questions relate to the OP.

But if you don't get it, you don't get it. A problem is only a problem if you think it is a problem. So no problem

raw_thought wrote:The common sense understanding of truth is the correspondence theory of truth. From now on referred to as CTT. If the CTT is true,what does it refer to?

What makes it true I think you want to ask. What it refers to is obviously a particular theory of truth. What makes it true to S is that S judges it to have what S considers the right relation to what S counts as the relevant set of facts. My truth theory is subjectivist and "meta" in that it can incorporate any other truth theory (not just correspondence, but coherence, consensus, pragmatic, etc.) as the relation that someone sees as the apt one.

As an untrained and unlettered swine, I'm a little perplexed as to the heavy emphasis and importance placed on "truth" by philosophers. What the OP referred to as CTT (I like the concept) is temporal and ephemeral, always changing with the learning and fashions of different places and times. Scientists would say that the "truth" is a moving feast, always subject to review.

The problem seems to come when considering the objective truths of cause and effect in our environments, and the subjective truth of being. I don't know if it's a perspective effect but that kind of dualist notion always brings to my mind the dualism in modern cosmology between "stuff" and dark energy. Given the obliqueness of the connection, it would first seem best to consider if this is the result of the same perspective effect, whatever that may be.

In human affairs, usually an inconvenience.

Greta wrote:The problem seems to come when considering the objective truths of cause and effect in our environments.

Standardly, what you're referring to there are facts, not truths.

Part of the reason for the distinction is this: there are truths, and there are falsehoods, right? We need to be able to say that "I flushed my car keys down the toilet" is a falsehood (at least hopefully we can say that in most cases). Well, if truths are identical to states of affairs as they are in the world, then what are falsehoods identical to? States of affairs as they are not in the world? Do such things exist? If so, where? What sorts of things are they? If not, then how are there falsehoods after all?

So because of the metaphysical quagmire it would otherwise cause, truth and falsehood are standardly parsed as properties of propositions instead. And thus truth is different than fact.

...assumptions which are accepted.

Terrapin Station wrote:

Greta wrote:The problem seems to come when considering the objective truths of cause and effect in our environments.

Standardly, what you're referring to there are facts, not truths.

Part of the reason for the distinction is this: there are truths, and there are falsehoods, right? We need to be able to say that "I flushed my car keys down the toilet" is a falsehood (at least hopefully we can say that in most cases). Well, if truths are identical to states of affairs as they are in the world, then what are falsehoods identical to? States of affairs as they are not in the world? Do such things exist? If so, where? What sorts of things are they? If not, then how are there falsehoods after all?

So because of the metaphysical quagmire it would otherwise cause, truth and falsehood are standardly parsed as properties of propositions instead. And thus truth is different than fact.

The car keys flushed down the loo is hopefully neither fact nor truth, and with this example the two can't be readily parsed. However, we can misinterpret correct facts to create untruths so the distinction philosophically seems to be that facts are phenomena while truths are Kant's noumena.

Greta wrote:The car keys flushed down the loo is hopefully neither fact nor truth,

Right. As I said, it's a falsehood. We have need of saying that some things are false.

However, we can misinterpret correct facts to create untruths so the distinction philosophically seems to be that facts are phenomena while truths are Kant's noumena.

That's not at all the standard philosophical distinction, and if you try to read that into most philosophical, scientific etc. literature you're going to wind up very confused.

Again, the problem arises because we have two truth-value possibilities (barring modalities, etc.) for something like "The cat is on the mat"--that's either true or false.

So if "true" is noumena in the Kantian sense, then what is "false"? A completely different sort of thing ontologically? Why would the two different truth values be two completely different sorts of things ontologically?

Terrapin Station wrote:

Greta wrote:The car keys flushed down the loo is hopefully neither fact nor truth,

Right. As I said, it's a falsehood. We have need of saying that some things are false.

We sorted out that need a long time ago - mostly commonsense, augmented by science, which is really just commonsense applied in a more detailed, less presumptuous way. That leaves the subjective/objective divide, which both science and "commonsense people" tend to leave alone.

Terrapin Station wrote:

However, we can misinterpret correct facts to create untruths so the distinction philosophically seems to be that facts are phenomena while truths are Kant's noumena.

That's not at all the standard philosophical distinction, and if you try to read that into most philosophical, scientific etc. literature you're going to wind up very confused.

Again, the problem arises because we have two truth-value possibilities (barring modalities, etc.) for something like "The cat is on the mat"--that's either true or false.

So if "true" is noumena in the Kantian sense, then what is "false"? A completely different sort of thing ontologically? Why would the two different truth values be two completely different sorts of things ontologically?

I was about to say "no, I'm not confused" but that's not true . We are all confused in varying degreess, hence these kinds of conversations.

Still, my personal level of confusion seems functional enough. Start with the obvious, commonsense, which works in almost all situations. That breaks the back of most truth-related problems. If it looks, walks and quacks like a duck then it might as well be a duck - unless there is contention that demands closer analysis, ie. science.

Science's advances increasingly highlight the limitations of commonsense when applied to things outside of human society and the more familiar aspects of nature. The limitation especially applies to dynamics at the extremes of our physical laws such as the birth and existence of the universe, subatomic realms, black holes and, arguably, life and consciousness.

Greta, I'm not clear on your view.

You'd say that truths, ontologically, are phenomena, right?

So falsehoods, ontologically are . . . "common sense"?

Are phenomena and common sense the same sort of ontological things in your view?

Terrapin Station wrote:Greta, I'm not clear on your view.

You'd say that truths, ontologically, are phenomena, right?

So falsehoods, ontologically are . . . "common sense"?

Are phenomena and common sense the same sort of ontological things in your view?

The ontological status of truths and falsehoods are human values. Whilst the material component of a true thing might exist the fact that such things are "true" is only in relationship with statements which describe them, and they have to be evaluated by experience and sense.

A truth is not a phenomenon, as in a philosophical meaning that would be the object of perception, not its value.

A_Seagull wrote:

creativesoul wrote:

A_Seagull wrote:
How can you 'deduce' that a cat is on the mat? What is the logical process that leads to that conclusion? Is it necessarily deductive in nature?

We deduce that there is a cat on the mat without actually looking. Drawing connections, associations, and/or correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception. I do not know what sense of "necessarily" you're using here.


How are these questions germane to what I've been arguing?

The questions relate to the OP.

But if you don't get it, you don't get it. A problem is only a problem if you think it is a problem. So no problem

I answered the questions. I'm not in a position to be able to know how you think these questions are related to the OP. Nor is there only one such possible relation. So, I asked because I cannot read minds, and I am interested in your answer.

Greta wrote:As an untrained and unlettered swine, I'm a little perplexed as to the heavy emphasis and importance placed on "truth" by philosophers.

Well, it's not just philosophers. Nor is it all philosophers. Some think/believe that we can do without it. On my view, truth is central to everything ever thought, believed, and/or spoken.

What the OP referred to as CTT (I like the concept) is temporal and ephemeral, always changing with the learning and fashions of different places and times.

The world indeed is always changing. This is not a problem for truth. It is also not a problem for true statements as long as they are properly indexed. At time t1...

The problem seems to come when considering the objective truths of cause and effect in our environments, and the subjective truth of being...

The problem is had by virtue of the notion of truth being used. Invoking the objective/subjective dichotomy is fraught with baggage and unnecessary over-complication and thus unnecessary confusion. I mean...

What is the common denominator shared between cause and effect and being that you're calling "truth"?

Terrapin Station wrote:Greta, I'm not clear on your view.

You'd say that truths, ontologically, are phenomena, right?

So falsehoods, ontologically are . . . "common sense"?

Are phenomena and common sense the same sort of ontological things in your view?

Greta seems to be using the term "truth" as reality, they way things are, states of affairs, etc. While this makes perfect sense in many conversations, it is found to be sorely lacking when it comes to talking about what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so.

creativesoul wrote:Greta seems to be using the term "truth" as reality, they way things are, states of affairs, etc. While this makes perfect sense in many conversations, it is found to be sorely lacking when it comes to talking about what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so.

One hopes that when talking of what kinds of things can be true and what makes them so, that those discussions are grounded on prosaic facts of today's reality. Otherwise we might find ourselves declaring this, that or the other to be "just an illusion". Or we fight figure that the likelihood of us actually being brains in vats or just simulations run by advanced future beings is greater than us simply existing as is.