Philosophy Now Forum

I object to the use of 'charged' language.

Ordinarily, so do I. But sometimes there simply is no language that is not either "charged" or "sanitized." And then one is forced to choose.

I understand your anxiety about it. For we like to think "neutral" language means "fair" language. And often it actually does. But sometimes it decidedly does not.

For instance, when on trial for his war crimes, Adolph Eichmann defended his actions in some very neutral language. He was "doing his job." He was "solving the problem." He was "obeying his orders." All true, all neutral and all clearly designed to deny a moral weight to actions that were morally repugnant.

In Eichmann's case, neutral language was not the friend of truth, but the enemy of justice. Had he been allowed to reframe the debate in the terms he wished to describe it, he might well have been acquitted on the grounds of his key defence strategy -- that he was simply a petty bureaucrat, too unimportant to be blamed for anything as huge as the killing of 6 million innocent people. Neutrality would have served the cause of grave injustice there.

So sometimes we just cannot be neutral. If the situation is one of sufficient gravity, we are forced to select language morally appropriate to the case; and to fail to do so is sometimes to surrender to evil right at the start. Admittedly, this is usually not the case: but in the murder of Jews, as in the murder of babies, I think we're facing one of those exceptional cases. Unless the debate proceeds on the basis of accurately identifying the action in question, then no moral conclusion will be possible.

And this fact is not unknown to the proponents of abortion, you will note: the manipulation of language toward neutrality is their prime strategy. This is why they call themselves "pro-choice," not "pro-abortion." Because they know that only a despot or a thug can disagree with "choice," but any moral person can take rational exception to abortion. Yet it is not all "choices" that are in question in the debate: it's only one -- the "choice" to abort. Nothing else is of concern. And they know this. So calling the debate a "choice" debate is mere propaganda designed to put the opponent on the linguistic back foot. And we see that accurate language favours the other side again.

A more dispassionate and philosophical way to put this point is simply to say that ontology precedes ethics. One cannot decide the moral weight of the question unless one has already established the nature of the entity in play. What is it "in reality" is the ontological question. If it's a baby, there can be but one "choice" that is moral. If it is a cluster of cells owned by the woman in question, then there is no morality involved in her "choice." It's simply an option she takes or does not. But neutral language, if that is what we select, grants her carte blanche, just as it would have handed it to Eichmann.

Ontology precedes ethics. That's a good axiom for any debate. I wish it were original with me, but it's not.

Of course, you must certainly realize that referring to "abortion" as "murder" is not an appeal ontology at all. "Murder" has no being. It is a concept, just like "abortion" or "killing," etc.

And neutral language is most certainly fair in the face of significant disagreement concerning the morality of an act. Eichmann is a red herring. We are not speaking of acts which the whole of civilized society roundly rejects as abhorrent (and Eichmann's language wasn't even neutral. It was actually how he saw his role. Hence Hannah Arendt's "Banality of Evil"). Rather, we are speaking of a moral issue about which there is significant and serious debate. As such, we have words that do not elide moral considerations but also do not couch the discussion in only one of several possible moral positions. "Kill" would have been one such word.

Anyway, this is my last response on the topic. To refer to abortion as "murder" in the context of a rational debate immediately pushes the debate toward irrationality. We do have words that are morally neutral. They should be used. Otherwise, you'll need to demonstrate that "murder" is, in fact, the correct term. This will prove to be a difficult task for a whole host of reasons, not least of which is that I'll be on the other side.

ReliStuPhD wrote:Of course, you must certainly realize that referring to "abortion" as "murder" is not an appeal ontology at all. "Murder" has no being. It is a concept, just like "abortion" or "killing," etc.

And neutral language is most certainly fair in the face of significant disagreement concerning the morality of an act. Eichmann is a red herring. We are not speaking of acts which the whole of civilized society roundly rejects as abhorrent (and Eichmann's language wasn't even neutral. It was actually how he saw his role. Hence Hannah Arendt's "Banality of Evil"). Rather, we are speaking of a moral issue about which there is significant and serious debate. As such, we have words that do not elide moral considerations but also do not couch the discussion in only one of several possible moral positions. "Kill" would have been one such word.

Anyway, this is my last response on the topic. To refer to abortion as "murder" in the context of a rational debate immediately pushes the debate toward irrationality. We do have words that are morally neutral. They should be used. Otherwise, you'll need to demonstrate that "murder" is, in fact, the correct term. This will prove to be a difficult task for a whole host of reasons, not least of which is that I'll be on the other side.

It seems to come down to 2 points that need to be clarified. As I have stated before, it needs to be determined when the abortion involves an individual human being. 2nd, and here I must agree with RelistuPhD, that murder is not the appropriate term, as murder involves 'malicious intent', and I would say this is not present in most, if not all, abortions. Another term, for the taking of a human life, must be found, and there several to choose from. Of course if it is determined that it is not a human life, there is nothing to debate. Ending the potential for human life, assuming that the life is not already human, should be considered no different whether abortion or birth control that prevents the formation of the fetus.

It seems to come down to 2 points that need to be clarified. As I have stated before, it needs to be determined when the abortion involves an individual human being.

Or "beings," since the mother and baby, at least, and then also father, family and society at large, to say nothing of the Supreme Being, are also affected by this particular action.

There is no reason to concede any rationality to the view that says this is merely an "individual" problem at all. An "individual" will force the decision, it's true; but that does not imply nothing but that "individual" has a legitimate stake in this equation.

See, this is the problem: we're not even agreed on how many "moral counters" are on the table. And the most important, clearly, has to be the unborn child, who has the biggest stake in the decision either way. That's what makes the ontological question the primary one.

...murder involves 'malicious intent', and I would say this is not present in most, if not all, abortions.

I think this is pretty clearly untrue. The vast majority of abortions are optional, done for the convenience of disposing of an unwanted or untimely child; and in all cases the intent is the premeditated killing of the subject. I do believe this qualifies as "malicious intent." The vexed question is really whether or not killing-with-malicious-intent is every warranted.

The problem, again, is we're keeping (arguably) the most important moral counter off the table if we let you frame it this way. And then the battle is lost before it is begun. This is begging the essential question, the ontological one.

Ending the potential for human life, assuming that the life is not already human, should be considered no different whether abortion or birth control that prevents the formation of the fetus.

Well, except the birth control advocates are clearly going to cry "foul" on your argument there, on the grounds that they draw the line between egg/sperm and fertilized zygote. Now, they may or may not be right to do so, but at least they have a credible line they might be able to defend. The pro-abortionist has none. He/she knows that third-trimester, last-minute abortion is murder, because a second of time cannot make a moral difference there; but there is no earlier line to which the pro-abortionist can refer in order to reestablish a morally defensible perspective.

Meanwhile, the pro-birth-control advocate does have a line to defend if he or she so wishes. And, of course, the anti-abortionist is not in moral jeopardy with regard to the life of the child; for not-killing is not murder, by definition.

ReliStuPhd:

Eichmann is a red herring. We are not speaking of acts which the whole of civilized society roundly rejects as abhorrent

Actually, many societies accept things we consider morally abhorrent. ISIS, for one. That's a society. North Korean society is also lovely these days. And who can forget the great accomplishments of Stalinist societies in the last century? You're really up against it if you argue that "civilized" entails "moral." Historically, it's just not true.

German society prior to and during WWII was the most technologically sophisticated, educated group of people you could find...they were very "civilized." And generally speaking, they did not reject what Eichmann did as "abhorrent." Some turned blind eyes, and others participated; but few actively dissented -- to our lasting shame as members of the human race, I might add.

I actually find the parallels very compelling. You have technological bureaucrats and manipulators of information advocating for the systematic killing of the innocent, and couching their evil in the language of neutrality. Meanwhile, the general populace looks on and pretends the moral situation is somehow unclear...when really they know full well it is very clear indeed.

Banal all that is...but deeply evil, as Arendt realized.

Eichmann was a "red" something...but the parallel's not fishy.

IC, I would hope that you don't equate my raising a question as being the same as me stating my position. Sometimes I play "Devil's advocate" for sake of argument, not to state my position. Sometimes I withhold my position, to avoid the personal attacks that sometimes are the result of taking a position.

Immanuel Can wrote: I actually find the parallels very compelling. You have technological bureaucrats and manipulators of information advocating for the systematic killing of the innocent, and couching their evil in the language of neutrality. Meanwhile, the general populace looks on and pretends the moral situation is somehow unclear...when really they know full well it is very clear indeed.

I am currently on the fringes of this debate about bureaucrats over-riding the decisions of the health care professional and patient on the necessity of particular treatments. Forgive me if I just observe this for now.

thedoc:

IC, I would hope that you don't equate my raising a question as being the same as me stating my position. Sometimes I play "Devil's advocate" for sake of argument, not to state my position. Sometimes I withhold my position, to avoid the personal attacks that sometimes are the result of taking a position.

That's absolutely fine. Where would we be without the aforementioned sort of "advocate"? It would make things pretty boring, I suspect.

This can be a tough debate. I realize that people get very personally involved with it, because many of them have already become stakeholders in preventing the thought that abortion could be immoral, especially in the full-blown sense its detractors claim it is. And our Western societies in general have been working very hard on foreclosing on this issue because it is so politically volatile.

Of course, that's not the same as resolving it in some moral way, right?

Still, the hope of philosophy is that we can discuss are persons of reason and goodwill; it's a vain hope sometimes, I admit; but that's the hope.

I am currently on the fringes of this debate about bureaucrats over-riding the decisions of the health care professional and patient on the necessity of particular treatments. Forgive me if I just observe this for now.

I think ReliStuPhd has had enough of the debate too, judging from his last declaration. So I may not have much more to discuss if you're out of the picture. But if I can be of service in continuing to advocate some line of thought that is of use to you I will do so, for your observational purposes.