Philosophy Now Forum

phyllo wrote: ↑Mon Feb 16, 2026 12:04 pm Imagine that nothing is known about the personal beliefs of the people having the discussion.

They don't need to show or prove anything about their own beliefs.

The discussion is entirely about the logical consistency in the Problem of Evil.

Well, we've still got a significant problem: that word, "evil."

In order to discuss what "evil" is, or why it exists (assuming it does), or who is responsible for it (assuming anybody is), we all have to know already what "evil" actually IS. Or rather, we have to take for granted that we have common ground about what evil looks like, how to define it, and how to recognize it.

As for logic, logic is a procedure, like mathematics is a procedure. You can plug any sorts of assumptions into it, and logic will work, provided the rules of logic are followed. But one of the fundamental rules of logic is "no equivocation of terms." That means that when discussing or debating something, the key terms being discussed must retain a singular, clear and stable meaning. To remain logical, we have to use the same meaning for the words, and keep that meaning stable throughout the whole discussion. Failure to achieve this is called a "fallacy of amphiboly," and always results in illogic.

In the case of employing logic to discuss evil, that means that logic itself tells us we have to have a singular, clear, common and stable definition of "evil." If you and I don't have a common understanding on a key term, we'll lapse into a fallacy of amphiboly, almost certainly, and end up discussing very different things, and miss each other like ships in the night.

But here's the problem that remains for us: Theism tells us what "evil" is. (We can agree with the Theistic definitions, or disagree, but Theism certainly has positions on moral terms like "evil.") However, skepticism -- Atheism in particular, Materialism, Physicalism, and all forms of moral subjectivism -- has no grounds for any definition of evil. For such worldviews, "evil" must mean something like, "phenomena I don't feel good about," or "things I don't like," and no more than that. And the problem, of course, is that not only can such a definition not show that anything is "evil" or "horrible" or "bad" in any objective and stable sense, but that this definition is also not at all the definition assumed by the Theist, who does not think that "evil" can be defined on something so thin as a personal feeling.

So the Theist and the subjectivist skeptic have no common concept of evil from which to start. No logical syllogisms they work out will then be logically valid and correct. They'll fall afoul of the fallacy of amphiboly.

But if you can propose a way a subjectivist or skeptic can assert an objective conception of "evil," then I think logic will serve us admirably, going forward. At the moment, however, we do not have that established.

Forget about skepticism.

Surely, the two sides can agree on at least a few examples of evil.

If skeptics and atheists are such a stumbling block for you then consider two theists who take opposite sides on the problem of evil.

phyllo wrote: ↑Mon Feb 16, 2026 9:06 pm Forget about skepticism.

Can we? Skeptics are awfully common around here.

Surely, the two sides can agree on at least a few examples of evil.

I think so. But the problem is grounding their choices in some sort of rational basis.

For the Theist, grounding comes from God. But for the skeptic or Atheist, from where does it come? How does one justify an attribution of "evil," when objective truth in moral matters is simply not believed to exist?

This is why the problem of evil is, in some ways, far more serious for the skeptic than for the Christian. A Christian can at least ask, "Why has God allowed there to be things which are contrary to His will (i.e. evil)?" and that question makes sense within the assumptions of the Christian. But how does an Atheist or other skeptic ask such a question? It's simply not cogent, given his worldview.

And worse, I suggest that every Atheist and skeptic knows and feels that evil exists, and experiences evil. For I do not think that skeptics themselves are worse people than others, or are devoid of conscience, or of the ability to recognize good and evil -- I've met many who are very morally alert, in their own instinctual way, and darn nice to know, too. They have moral intutions, for sure.

But from skeptical worldview assumptions, such a person can make no sense of that intuition at all. Why should we feel, or think we know, or have the experience of some things being evil, when the world itself is merely composed of morally-indifferent particles or fizzes of morally -uncaring energy? In such a case, our moral instincts become very strange indeed, for they seem to be urgently indicating, and universally something we have convinced ourselves simply cannot ever exist. They seem to be lying to us, outright.

If skeptics and atheists are such a stumbling block for you then consider two theists who take opposite sides on the problem of evil.

Can you suggest two such Theistic positions? Maybe having a practical case will help us.

Really??

You can imagine that two theists could have opposing views on the problem of evil?

Is this a case of No True Theist would think that there is a problem of evil?

phyllo wrote: ↑Tue Feb 17, 2026 3:29 pm Really??

You can imagine that two theists could have opposing views on the problem of evil?

I'm not sure what you mean by "opposing views," actually. Do you just mean that one could say that, for example, abortion is evil, and another might say it's good? But why couldn't one simply be mistaken? Maybe God doesn't agree with abortion, but the other Theist naively assumes He does...why is such a case even problematic? People think all kinds of things: but only certain things will be coherent and rationally-consistent, of course.

Is this a case of No True Theist would think that there is a problem of evil?

Actually, it's the opposite: it's "No True Atheist" ("true" meaning, "consistent with his own worldview suppositions) can explain the existence of evil.

Maybe God doesn't agree with abortion, but the other Theist naively assumes He does...why is such a case even problematic?

So God doesn't agree with any evil but is powerless to prevent it.

freewill is a bitch

-Imp

phyllo wrote: ↑Tue Feb 17, 2026 4:22 pm

Maybe God doesn't agree with abortion, but the other Theist naively assumes He does...why is such a case even problematic?

So God doesn't agree with any evil but is powerless to prevent it.

"Powerless?" Of course, that would be impossible. But He might be wise and merciful NOT to prevent it, if we think carefully about what we might mean by "prevent."

So ask yourself this, perhaps: what would "prevent" entail?

Impenitent wrote: ↑Tue Feb 17, 2026 6:16 pm freewill is a bitch

-Imp

And, at the same time, the greatest asset we have.

phyllo wrote: ↑Tue Feb 17, 2026 4:22 pm

Maybe God doesn't agree with abortion, but the other Theist naively assumes He does...why is such a case even problematic?

So God doesn't agree with any evil but is powerless to prevent it.

Why would the God of the Bible want to prevent evil after openly stating that it is He who created it...

"...I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things..." - Isaiah 45:7

...???
_______

"Powerless?" Of course, that would be impossible. But He might be wise and merciful NOT to prevent it, if we think carefully about what we might mean by "prevent."

Then God either likes evil or God is indifferent to evil. Which would not make God all-loving.

seeds wrote: ↑Tue Feb 17, 2026 8:59 pm
Why would the God of the Bible want to prevent evil after openly stating that it is He who created it...

"...I form the light, and create darkness: - Isaiah 45:7

...???
_______

the shadow knows...

-Imp

phyllo wrote: ↑Tue Feb 17, 2026 9:03 pm

"Powerless?" Of course, that would be impossible. But He might be wise and merciful NOT to prevent it, if we think carefully about what we might mean by "prevent."

Then God either likes evil or God is indifferent to evil. Which would not make God all-loving.

No, that doesn't follow. There are more than two options, actually. Rather we might ask, "If there can be any reasons for evil, what reasons would a good God have for allowing some measure of what we call evil to exist?"

We might also start with the question, what would it look like for God to prevent all evil? What would we be asking or expecting Him to do? And, are we really sure we want Him to do that?

Don't keep us in suspense.

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Feb 18, 2026 1:09 pm Don't keep us in suspense.

Well, let's think about it, together. See if you come to any conclusions like my own, or whether you think I've missed something.

How perfect is a "good" God supposed to be? How "just" should the "justice" of such a God be? How many cases of wrongdoing or injustice should a "good" God address, and how many should He overlook?

If we're going to accuse God of having gotten the balance wrong -- i.e. of "allowing evil" -- then we should be able to know also what the right balance would have been. If we say God didn't do what he should, we must also believe we know what he should have done. Otherwise, I can't make sense of such an accusation at all: how do we know God hasn't gotten the balance right, if we don't know what the right balance is? What are we really asking, then?

I think we can answer that.

But I also think the people who pose the dilemma of evil often fail to specify to themselves exactly what they're asking for. They have in mind that God being "good" would be an easy and positive thing. And they ask, "why doesn't God stop X," because they're assuming some sorts of cases of X that are clearly and perhaps extremely wicked.

So, for example, they might be thinking of genocide. Or they might be thinking of sexual abuse. Or of suffering children in the Developing World. Or maybe earthquakes and tornadoes. I can't say exactly what each has in mind, but I suspect it might be some list like that. And that makes it easy for them to pose the question, because they're not interrogating -- or even thinking particulary hard about -- what they are really asking. But if God stops genocides and rapes (for example), what about p*rn? If He stops murder, what about abortion? If He stops theft, what about embezzlement? And if he stops these, what about the evils we humans tend to want to overlook, such as racism, or lies, or promiscuity, or malicious gossip? Would a genuinely "good" God, then, be expected to overlook these lesser evils, but be iron-fisted about these other forms of wickedness?

I don't think the question can be controversial, do you? A genuinely "good" God, in the mode for which the skeptics are asking, would be a firm and unrelenting preventer of all of these misdeeds, from the greatest to the least. For why would a God who winked at some sins, and then crushed others ruthlessly, be considered "good"? I can't see it.

But now, the key question: is a world governed strictly by a God who operates on the terms implied by the skeptic's question a "good" world, or one we should want to see come about? And my conclusion would be that we probably don't, for various reasons that you can probably think out for yourself.

If you can see where the problem is, I'm happy to move on to the next step. Because I think you can see, and I certainly can, that there's a reverse problem as well. And I freely admit we're still well short of a case that God is good. We aren't nearly in the clear yet. But I think we can go further.