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Sorry, I was being lazy. It was late as I said. That wasn't in answer to the question, but my response to the translation. I've edited anadromously.Ollie.ha wrote: ↑Thu May 29, 2025 12:17 amThat helps a lot!!!!Martin Peter Clarke wrote: ↑Thu May 29, 2025 12:09 amNot even contingent then?Ollie.ha wrote: ↑Wed May 28, 2025 9:43 pm Total taboo with the “not such that” but I think you get the picture.
(x ¬ | ∃x) = ∅ ⊕ {∅}) ⊕ ∅
Translates: ((the reference x, is not, the reason for, the existence, of x) that being, false, or, true) or all that being false
Is this unsolvable?
I mean what happens if you prove x ¬ | ∃x?
Looks like a misuse of language to me. Truth is simply a type of relationship between the referrer and the the referenced. Falsehood is another type of relationship between the referrer and the referenced. Which relation is the case depends on how much the referrer represents the referenced.Ollie.ha wrote: ↑Thu May 22, 2025 1:57 am So - I have come to the conclusion that the word “ truth” could be better understood by calling it a “reference that is the same as itself”.
If we dissect reference itself we find that it has two components, the referenced, and the referencing. The relationship between those two is only the same if both are true, different if what is said or done is false (one but not both)
What is the nature of reference? How does it function? It’s questions like these that make for, what I consider, good rationalism.
I learned that the relationship between the referrer and the referenced is that if the thing you’re thinking exists, then the referrer “does not create” the referencedTrajk Logik wrote: ↑Wed Jun 04, 2025 12:59 pmLooks like a misuse of language to me. Truth is simply a type of relationship between the referrer and the the referenced. Falsehood is another type of relationship between the referrer and the referenced. Which relation is the case depends on how much the referrer represents the referenced.Ollie.ha wrote: ↑Thu May 22, 2025 1:57 am So - I have come to the conclusion that the word “ truth” could be better understood by calling it a “reference that is the same as itself”.
If we dissect reference itself we find that it has two components, the referenced, and the referencing. The relationship between those two is only the same if both are true, different if what is said or done is false (one but not both)
What is the nature of reference? How does it function? It’s questions like these that make for, what I consider, good rationalism.
In epistemology, philosophers are typically skeptical about how much of the world we know via our sensory representations. While our sensory representations might refer to some properties of some external thing, it does not exhaust what it means to be that thing. So are the representations of the world we experience true or false, or somewhere in between?