VA's non-binary (am)Bivalence

[Iwannaplato]

Why are, from my perspective, the empirical selves of other humans, not things-in-themselves too?

That is the problem with narrow, shallow and dogmatic-ideological* thinking.
* ideology philosophical realism with very strong fangs.

Point is the empirical selves of other humans must be dealt on a specific basis, the particular and not the general e.g. to understand apples we deal with what-is-an-apple.
"Things-in-themselves" are the plural of "thing-in-itself" or [thing-in-itself]s.
So, things[10]-in-themselves are 10 x [a thing-in-itself].

The empirical self of an individual is not the thing-in-itself.
The empirical self [the I-THINK] is not the self-in-itself [the I AM] which is the independent soul that can survives physical death.

He's not bringing the soul idea in, or at least, he doesn't need to yet.
He's wondering if, like the Moon, other people don't stop existing when they are not perceived by others?

And then I'll add my question - why do you, if you do, consider the subjective self - not the body that but experiencing of other other people - to be real? For you what is not observable is False/Illusory, iow not real.

We cannot observe the experiencing other others. We can observe behaviors and physical reactions. But I cannot, even if we were in the same room observe your inner life, your qualia, the felt emotions.

Do you consider the felt experience of other people to be real or False/illusory?

If you consider them real, why do you consider it real, given that it is not observable?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Why are, from my perspective, the empirical selves of other humans, not things-in-themselves too?

It is obvious the thing-in-itself in relation to human[s] refer to the soul that is supposed to exists an an absolutely independent thing that survives physical death.

Principle
Whatever is reality [fact, truth, knowledge, objectivity] is contingent upon a human-based framework and system [FSERC].

I agree with "all human behaviors [experiences, feelings, thinking, actions] are considered real within the human-based psychological framework and system [FSERC].
Because these human activities are FSERC-ed, they cannot be absolutely independent things-in-themselves but are thing contingent-upon-the-human-based-FSERC.

[FlashDangerpants]

Abstract: In this paper I argue that bivalent systems in logic and beyond are often too inexact and that bivalence about truth-values and other value spectra will consequently and generally need to be replaced with multivalence.
https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... version_11

Cool. You have now become a moral relativist.

[Atla]

Why are, from my perspective, the empirical selves of other humans, not things-in-themselves too?

That is the problem with narrow, shallow and dogmatic-ideological* thinking.
* ideology philosophical realism with very strong fangs.

Point is the empirical selves of other humans must be dealt on a specific basis, the particular and not the general e.g. to understand apples we deal with what-is-an-apple.
"Things-in-themselves" are the plural of "thing-in-itself" or [thing-in-itself]s.
So, things[10]-in-themselves are 10 x [a thing-in-itself].

The empirical self of an individual is not the thing-in-itself.
The empirical self [the I-THINK] is not the self-in-itself [the I AM] which is the independent soul that can survives physical death.

That has almost nothing to do with what Kant meant by the thing-in-itself. The self-in-itself doesn't have to be (fundamentally) independent, nor does it have to survive physical death, nor does it have to be the soul, nor does it have to be the only option for a thing-in-itself in relation to humans, nor does it have to be impossible to exist. Did you speed-read the CPR over and over for 3 years?