Philosophy Now Forum

[520]. Moore has every right to say he knows there's a tree there in front of him. [based on his specified FSK]
Naturally he may be wrong. [if compared to a more credible FSK]
(For it is not the same as with the utterance "I believe there is a tree there".)

But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance.
If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know such a thing, he can't do it by assuring them that he knows this and that. [his specified FSK may not credible]

For one need not believe him. [if based on another FSK]
If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could have replied: "I believe it". [whose is more credible must be assessed - using a methodology based on a set of rational criteria]

602. Should I say "I believe in physics", or "I know that physics is true"? [The 'know' and 'true' is qualified to the science-physics FSK, not based on personal conviction]

603. I am taught that under such circumstances this happens.
It has been discovered by making the experiment a few times.
Not that that would prove anything to us, if it weren't that this experience was surrounded by others which combine with it to form a system. [conditioned upon the science-physics FSRC]
Thus, people did not make experiments just about falling bodies but also about air resistence and all sorts of other things.
But in the end I rely on these experiences, or on the reports of them, I feel no scruples about ordering my own activities in accordance with them. - But hasn't this trust also proved itself?
So far as I can judge - yes. [to have some degree of reliance and truth, there is need for some sort of methodology of assessment of each FSK]

604. In a court of law the statement of a physicist that water boils at about 100C would be accepted unconditionally as truth.
If I mistrusted this statement what could I do to undermine it? Set up experiments myself? What would they prove? [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment to have degree of trust]

605. But what if the physicist's statement were superstition and it were just as absurd to go by it in reaching a verdict as to rely on ordeal by fire? [physicist must comply with the science-physics FSK, this is why we need some sort of methodology of assessment]

606. That to my mind someone else has been wrong is no ground for assuming that I am wrong now.
- But isn't it a ground for assuming that I might be wrong?
It is no ground for any unsureness in my judgement, or my actions. [there is no absolute ground but FSK as ground]

607. A judge might even say "That is the truth - so far as a human being can know it.” [within a specific FSK] But what would this rider [additional remark] [Zusatz] achieve?
("beyond all reasonable doubt"). [what is truth require to assess the credibility of each FSK]

608. Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of physics? [needed to be guided by credibility of each FSK]
Am I to say I have no good ground for doing so?
Isn't precisely this what we call a 'good ground'? [upon the credibility of science-physics FSK]

609-612 -Indicate Strong Relativistic Sentiments – Science Physics FSK
609. Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this?
Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle.
(And for that we consider them primitive.)
Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it?
- If we call this "wrong" aren't we using our Language-Game [FSK] as a base from which to combat theirs? [where diff FSKs are used, we require credibility of each FSK, so need a methodology of assessment]

610. And are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings. [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment]

611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment]

612. I said I would 'combat' the other man, - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.) [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment]

613. If I now say "I know that the water in the kettle in the gas-flame will not freeze but boil", I seem to be as justified in this "I know" as I am in any. [‘know’ has to refer to the science-physics FSK]
'If I know anything I know this'.
- Or do I know with still greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so-and-so? [depend on which FSK]
And how does that compare with the proposition that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass?
- I don't know confidently what I am to answer here.
- But still there is a difference between cases. [degrees of credibility of each FSK]
If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don't know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. [yes, refer to the science-physics FSK]

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Mar 20, 2024 7:58 am See this analysis re paragraph 520.

[520]. Moore has every right to say he knows there's a tree there in front of him. [based on his specified FSK]
Naturally he may be wrong. [if compared to a more credible FSK]
(For it is not the same as with the utterance "I believe there is a tree there".)

But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance.
If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know such a thing, he can't do it by assuring them that he knows this and that. [his specified FSK may not credible]

For one need not believe him. [if based on another FSK]
If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could have replied: "I believe it". [whose is more credible must be assessed - using a methodology based on a set of rational criteria]

Moore has every right in insisting his 'I know' is of certainty, but is the FSK that support his 'I know' credible and objective?
As such we need a methodology to assess the credibility and objectivity of Moore's claim against a valid standard.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Mar 19, 2024 1:51 pm And this is a contradiction: there's no reality outside a model (an 'FSRC'); but the objectivity of a model can be assessed against reality, using 'the generally accepted criteria any rational person would readily accept'.

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Thu Mar 21, 2024 11:06 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Mar 19, 2024 1:51 pm And this is a contradiction: there's no reality outside a model (an 'FSRC'); but the objectivity of a model can be assessed against reality, using 'the generally accepted criteria any rational person would readily accept'.

Recently VA has been taking on the quite impossible task of converting On Certainty into a subset of his KFC-buckets. If he actually read page 1 of the Tractatus though...

1 The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of [KFC-Buckets], not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the [KFC-Buckets], and by their being all the [KFC-Buckets].
1.12 For the totality of [KFC-Buckets] determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
1.13 The [KFC-Buckets] in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into [KFC-Buckets].
1.21 Each item can be the case [in accord with KFC-Buckets] or not the case [in accord with KFC-Buckets] while everything else remains the same.

... that sort of fits what he writes much more readily.

Atla wrote: ↑Wed Mar 20, 2024 2:38 pm Only 19 more years until VA finally realizes that the position with the higher score is.. realism. The most credible FSK is the realism-FSK.

Sucks to be VA

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Thu Mar 21, 2024 10:36 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Mar 20, 2024 7:58 am See this analysis re paragraph 520.

[520]. Moore has every right to say he knows there's a tree there in front of him. [based on his specified FSK]
Naturally he may be wrong. [if compared to a more credible FSK]
(For it is not the same as with the utterance "I believe there is a tree there".)

But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance.
If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know such a thing, he can't do it by assuring them that he knows this and that. [his specified FSK may not credible]

For one need not believe him. [if based on another FSK]
If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could have replied: "I believe it". [whose is more credible must be assessed - using a methodology based on a set of rational criteria]

Moore has every right in insisting his 'I know' is of certainty, but is the FSK that support his 'I know' credible and objective?
As such we need a methodology to assess the credibility and objectivity of Moore's claim against a valid standard.

Are you trying to smuggle your stupid credibility theory into On Certainty now?
You take some total fucking liberties.

OC wrote:[15.] It needs to be shown that no mistake was possible.
Giving the assurance "I know" doesn't suffice.
For it is after all only an assurance that I can't be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a mistake about that.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 2:57 am When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 8:57 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 2:57 am When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

You didn't get that little hit about objectivity within language games from Wittgenstein, did you?
Did you just decide it must be there because that would be in keeping with your own theory?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 9:58 am

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 8:57 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 2:57 am When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

You didn't get that little hit about objectivity within language games from Wittgenstein, did you?
Did you just decide it must be there because that would be in keeping with your own theory?

The term 'language-game' is mentioned literally and implied many times in 'On Certainty'.
At the same time, W alluded to a greater Framework and System above language-game [linguistic -builder] by reference to historical, science, physics, chemistry, biology and other framework and system of knowledge [FSKs].
These later fields of knowledge are too broad to be termed as merely language-games because they have specific constitution, rules and processes.

Many writers had explained this extension to Framework and System is a sign of W's more matured and systematic philosophy above his PI's language game and other bits & pieces without any united theme. Are you aware of this point?

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 11:36 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 9:58 am

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 8:57 am
You didn't get that little hit about objectivity within language games from Wittgenstein, did you?
Did you just decide it must be there because that would be in keeping with your own theory?

The term 'language-game' is mentioned literally and implied many times in 'On Certainty'.
At the same time, W alluded to a greater Framework and System above language-game [linguistic -builder] by reference to historical, science, physics, chemistry, biology and other framework and system of knowledge [FSKs].
These later fields of knowledge are too broad to be termed as merely language-games because they have specific constitution, rules and processes.

Many writers had explained this extension to Framework and System is a sign of W's more matured and systematic philosophy above his PI's language game and other bits & pieces without any united theme. Are you aware of this point?

I asked you if you got that bit about objectivity from Wittgenstein himself, or if you added it becuase it suits you. Please answer that question.

15. It needs to be shown that no mistake was possible.
Giving the assurance "I know" doesn't suffice.
For it is after all only an assurance that I can't be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a mistake about that.

16. "If I know something, then I also know that I know it, etc.” amounts to: "I know that" means "I am incapable of being wrong about that.” But whether I am so must admit of being established objectively.

108. "But is there then no objective truth? [note two senses of objectivity]
Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon”?
If we are thinking within our system [upon a FSK], then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon.
Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics [upon a FSK] forbids us to believe it.
For this demands answers to the questions "How did he overcome the force of gravity”?
"How could he live without an atmosphere”? and a thousand others which could not be answered.
But suppose that instead of all these answers we met the reply: "We don't know how one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there; and even you can't explain everything.” [without reference to a FSK- useless]
We should feel ourselves intellectually very distant from someone who said this.

194. With the word "certain" we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. [upon personal conviction] That is subjective certainty.
But when is something objectively certain? [only when upon a specified FSK]
When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Mar 22, 2024 2:57 am When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Mar 23, 2024 4:07 am Show me a few paras [of whatever] in the context of the whole of 'On Certainty' where my above claim is false?