Philosophical Realism is Solipsistic 3

[Atla]

As the saying goes, if you can't explain it simply...

And Atla would rate the difficulty of understanding Kantianism at maybe 3.5 out of 10. It's not THAT difficult.

[Atla]

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.

To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensiblity). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. (CPR, A369)

Well too bad he got space and time wrong. Instead, there are likely two kinds of space and time.
He also got perception wrong, perception is likely indirect instead of direct.

Maybe we should pool our resources and have a time machine built for VA, so he can go back to the late 18th century, when these two wrong philosophies still sounded plausible. Both transcendental idealism and realism are untenable.

[Iwannaplato]

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be
Maybe we should pool our resources and have a time machine built for VA, so he can go back to the late 18th century, when these two wrong philosophies still sounded plausible. Both transcendental idealism and realism are untenable.

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations

Kant said this?
I thought he called them whatever the German is for phenomena. Representations causes all sorts of problems, right off because it implies strongly that they are representing something. But further it implies a symmetry with whatever it is representing.

And I keep thinking there's a regress here. I perceive a representation. The representation isn't all I experience, I am also warm and sweaty, tired, maybe slightly irritated....It seems like we just have another ding an sich - the representation - then my perception of it in the field of all I am experiencing. So, there's a representaiton of the representation. And that's not even bringing the problem with memories of perceptions, where the original perceptions are now like ding an sich for the memories.

We do assume and certainly Kant does that our memories of prior perceptions are somehow correct about those prior perceptions. And those perceptions are no longer present. So they are like ding and sich.

[Atla]

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be
Maybe we should pool our resources and have a time machine built for VA, so he can go back to the late 18th century, when these two wrong philosophies still sounded plausible. Both transcendental idealism and realism are untenable.

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations

Kant said this?
I thought he called them whatever the German is for phenomena. Representations causes all sorts of problems, right off because it implies strongly that they are representing something. But further it implies a symmetry with whatever it is representing.

And I keep thinking there's a regress here. I perceive a representation. The representation isn't all I experience, I am also warm and sweaty, tired, maybe slightly irritated....It seems like we just have another ding an sich - the representation - then my perception of it in the field of all I am experiencing. So, there's a representaiton of the representation. And that's not even bringing the problem with memories of perceptions, where the original perceptions are now like ding an sich for the memories.

We do assume and certainly Kant does that our memories of prior perceptions are somehow correct about those prior perceptions. And those perceptions are no longer present. So they are like ding and sich.

Yeah the "representation" word didn't sit well with me either, hopefully it's just a minor issue here.

Interpreters of Kant couldn't even agree whether or not he was using noumena and things-in-themselves as synonyms.

[Veritas Aequitas]

So I raised a 3rd thread with assistance from ChatGPT which I think is a super valid presentation of my argument.
This 3rd improved argument is no different from the other 2 arguments if only the opponents are not so ignorant and tribalistic and dogmatic.

But unfortunately despite assistance from ChatGPT, ChatGPT itself considers that argument poor......I asked CHATgpt about the deduction in your third thread and even it said......

The deduction presented in the argument is not logically valid. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises given.

Let's analyze the argument step by step:

Premise 1 states that philosophical realists (who are also transcendental realists) believe in a mind-independent reality.

Premise 2 states that Kant argues that Transcendental Realism leads to difficulties and gives way to Empirical Idealism, which considers mere appearances as self-subsistent beings existing outside us.

Premise 3 states that Empirical Idealism considers the objects of outer sense as distinct from the senses themselves, implying that reality and other minds are confined to the empirical idealist's mind.

The problem arises in the conclusion:

"Conclusion: Therefore, philosophical realists (who are transcendental realists) are implicitly solipsistic, as they subscribe to a view that confines reality and other minds to the mind of the empirical idealist."

The conclusion jumps to a claim about philosophical realists being implicitly solipsistic. However, the premises do not necessarily lead to this conclusion. The argument does not establish a direct connection between the belief in mind-independent reality and being implicitly solipsistic.

Additionally, there seems to be an unwarranted leap in the conclusion by assuming that Empirical Idealism's position on reality and other minds applies directly to philosophical realists who are also transcendental realists. The two groups may have different views on the nature of reality and the mind, and the argument fails to demonstrate a connection between the two.

To strengthen the argument, more explicit premises and logical steps would be needed to show how the belief in mind-independent reality, in the context of philosophical realists who are also transcendental realists, would lead to implicit solipsism. As it stands, the argument does not provide a valid deduction for its conclusion.

[Veritas Aequitas]

So I raised a 3rd thread with assistance from ChatGPT which I think is a super valid presentation of my argument.
This 3rd improved argument is no different from the other 2 arguments if only the opponents are not so ignorant and tribalistic and dogmatic.

But unfortunately despite assistance from ChatGPT, ChatGPT itself considers that argument poor......I asked CHATgpt about the deduction in your third thread and even it said......

The deduction presented in the argument is not logically valid. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises given.

Let's analyze the argument step by step:

Premise 1 states that philosophical realists (who are also transcendental realists) believe in a mind-independent reality.

Premise 2 states that Kant argues that Transcendental Realism leads to difficulties and gives way to Empirical Idealism, which considers mere appearances as self-subsistent beings existing outside us.

Premise 3 states that Empirical Idealism considers the objects of outer sense as distinct from the senses themselves, implying that reality and other minds are confined to the empirical idealist's mind.

The problem arises in the conclusion:

"Conclusion: Therefore, philosophical realists (who are transcendental realists) are implicitly solipsistic, as they subscribe to a view that confines reality and other minds to the mind of the empirical idealist."

The conclusion jumps to a claim about philosophical realists being implicitly solipsistic. However, the premises do not necessarily lead to this conclusion. The argument does not establish a direct connection between the belief in mind-independent reality and being implicitly solipsistic.

Additionally, there seems to be an unwarranted leap in the conclusion by assuming that Empirical Idealism's position on reality and other minds applies directly to philosophical realists who are also transcendental realists. The two groups may have different views on the nature of reality and the mind, and the argument fails to demonstrate a connection between the two.

To strengthen the argument, more explicit premises and logical steps would be needed to show how the belief in mind-independent reality, in the context of philosophical realists who are also transcendental realists, would lead to implicit solipsism. As it stands, the argument does not provide a valid deduction for its conclusion.

I believe the above is a strawman if the following point mentioned by ChatGPT [in OP] is not mentioned in the question to ChatGPT, i.e.

ChatGPT: This argument attempts to show that philosophical realists, according to Kantian reasoning, end up adopting a position that can be seen as indirectly solipsistic.

In my original question I provided ChatGPT with quotes from Kant's CPR.

My question to ChatGPT:

Your earlier argument which I agree is valid was stated as

"Conclusion: Therefore, philosophical realists (who are transcendental realists) are implicitly solipsistic, as they subscribe to a view that confines reality and other minds to the mind of the empirical idealist.

This argument attempts to show that philosophical realists, according to Kantian reasoning, end up adopting a position that can be seen as indirectly solipsistic. However, it's essential to recognize that the soundness of this argument depends on whether the premises are true, which can be a matter of philosophical debate and interpretation of Kant's work."

I presume the above is based on the quotations I provided from Kant, thus your qualification "according to Kantian reasoning end up adopting a position that can be seen as indirectly solipsistic."

I believe my debate opponent did not give you the background, thus you have to conclude that the argument is not valid.

However, given the references from Kant, I believe
"according to Kantian reasoning end up adopting a position that can be seen as indirectly solipsistic."

Do you agree with the above?

ChatGPT Responded:

I apologize for any confusion in my previous responses. I'll reexamine the argument and the Kantian references you provided.

Based on the quotations from Kant that you presented, it does seem that he is making a distinction between Transcendental Idealism and Transcendental Realism, with the former being aligned with Empirical Idealism and the latter potentially leading to difficulties. Kant argues that Empirical Idealism allows for an external empirical reality, including other minds, while Transcendental Realism treats mere appearances as self-subsistent beings existing outside us.

In this context, if we accept the premises you provided, one could argue that philosophical realists who are also transcendental realists may adopt a position that is indirectly solipsistic. This is because, according to Kant's distinction, Transcendental Realism treats appearances as external entities, but it is not certain that the objects corresponding to these appearances exist.

So, if a philosophical realist, according to Kantian reasoning, adopts Transcendental Realism, they may be susceptible to being indirectly solipsistic, as they believe in an external reality but still face uncertainty regarding the existence of corresponding objects.

To reiterate, the soundness of this argument is still subject to the interpretation of Kant's work and the accuracy of the premises. The Kantian perspective is complex and can be open to different interpretations, so engaging in philosophical debate and discussion is essential to thoroughly explore and assess these ideas.

If you find this interpretation aligns with your understanding of Kantian philosophy and the provided quotations, then yes, one could argue that "according to Kantian reasoning, philosophical realists who are also transcendental realists end up adopting a position that can be seen as indirectly solipsistic."

The point is the earlier argument is valid taking into account what is stated in Kant's CPR.

As stated, it does not confirm the argument is sound which is subject to further debate re what is stated in Kant's CPR.