Philosophy Now Forum

Posted: **Sat Jan 14, 2023 8:55 pm**

@Veritas Aequitas -- regarding intersubjectivity being the basis of objectivity: to clarify, I don't disagree with this position in regards to external, objective reality. Quite the opposite; I fully agree that our understanding of the physical world that we can experience through our senses is developed through intersubjective consensus based on scientific principles and best-practices.

What I do disagree with is the idea that the same approach can be applied in relation to subjective points of reference. Science is explicitly designed to be applied to objective points of reference, meaning anything we can identify (through our subjective perception) as being distinct from our subjective perception itself.

Because we have no choice but to rely on our subjective perception, we can't be certain of the true nature of what we observe. That's why we employ various scientific techniques to mitigate biases and distortions innate to our sense-based awareness. The reason why this works is because we reference external "things" which we can examine collectively. When our independent observations of an external entity overlap, we gain confidence that we've arrived at a more accurate understanding of the "true" nature of our particular point of reference.

However, when it comes to the subjective context, our point of reference is always limited to one concrete individual subject. So for example, let's say subject "Bob" really likes pineapple pizza and is happy to pay 10 $ for it. Subject "Mario" on the other hand considers it an abomination and wouldn't eat it even if he was paid 10 $ for it. This simple observation tells us that there is no such thing as an objective value for pineapple pizza. Prices are therefore entirely subjective, and so are all other kinds of values.

As far as I'm aware, my position in this regard is not particularly controversial. I mean, if you're saying prices are objective -- and hence predictable -- how about you demonstrate it relative to the stock market or even forex?

Regarding Morality from human nature, you keep claiming that "oughtness" can be derived from the study of biological facts. This is an incredibly controversial claim from a philosophical point of view as it contradicts the is-ought-problem -- but from what I understand, you define "oughtness" as that which an (organic) system normally does based on its biological design. So a cat "ought" to find appropriate shelter, keep itself clean, hunt for food, search for a mating partner, ensure the well-being of its offspring and so on and so forth, because that's what they've evolved to do in order to pass on their genes.

The problem with this approach is that you can't use it to resolve complex moral questions, such as in a court of law. Human nature is not so specific that we can always refer to it. Quite the opposite: human nature is vague enough that it can easily be construed to justify pretty much anything. For this reason, it's an extremely limited approach and it also lends itself to the naturalistic fallacy. But maybe I'm still not getting it -- so for example, how would you approach the trolley problem based on your approach?

Posted: **Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pm**

@iambiguous -- The approach to objective Morality I'm presenting here doesn't really fit into any established paradigms, and I'm not highly proficient at communicating it (yet). As such, I noticed that some of my explanations -- rather unsurprisingly -- caused a few misunderstandings. Primarily, I would like to stress that my approach is intended to inform us of the exact objective moral state of any given situation, at any given time. It is applicable regardless of whether someone agrees or disagrees with it. So yes, it applies even if we deny it, because it's not derived from subjective concerns and values.

Before I proceed, I would like to say that I completely understand where you're coming from. Abortion in particular is one of those subjects that involves a myriad different interests and who is to say who's right and wrong? Whose interests matter more? How do we weigh certain facts? For every seemingly sensible answer there are countless viable counter-arguments. It's quite overwhelming. Objective Morality does not resolve these questions because they are subjective in nature, and thus can only be resolving relative to the individual values of the people involved. However, objective Morality can inform us about the morality of any given choice, predict its moral consequences and inform us how to get from an immoral state to a moral one.

So let's start with the question of at which stage of pregnancy the collection of cells in the mothers womb becomes significant enough to constitute a "person". Subjectively, this question can be easy or it can drive you completely mad. The only thing we can all agree on is that we'll never agree to a single answer. Some people will claim to have an objectively right answer, but frankly that's nonsense, because personhood is a value. It's something that we subjectively assign to entities that meet certain criteria. These criteria are not entirely arbitrary, but not specific enough to allow for only one, definitive answer. Objectively, there is no such thing as personhood, because values don't exist outside of our subjective perception. Objectively, a person is just a collection of atoms, as is anything else.

Therefore, we don't care about this question within the context of objective Morality, and we don't have to. Because the only thing that matters from a moral point of view are the rights and duties of the people involved. For example, let's say the mother desires an abortion because she isn't willing to sacrifice her career for it. The father however had a vasectomy shortly after his wife's pregnancy and desperately wants a child. From a morally objective point of view, the father can invoke his right for his wish to be respected within the context of the marriage, but the mother can of course claim the same right. If the mother ignores the fathers wish and undergoes the procedure, the father then, too, has a legitimate claim to not respect the mothers wishes within the context of the marriage. Therefore, he can for instance file for divorce and would no longer be morally bound to pay her 50% of his wealth (just as an example). From an objectively moral point of view, this would resolve the problem, but 2 rights would have to be broken during the process. As such it's not a perfect solution. A morally superior solution would therefore be for the mother to deliver the baby and then file for divorce. In this way, no rights have to be broken.

I specifically went with this example because it's plain to see that the stage of pregnancy is irrelevant for the father. From his point of view, the zygote is just as important as the child after it was delivered. Since we can't determine the value of anything objectively, we use objective Morality simply to inform the people involved about which moral rights they have or don't have and which moral consequences will follow by claiming the rights they have (or don't have).

I believe this approach can be applied to any situation and to any moral question, no matter how contentious, and still provide us with meaningful information about its moral state. However, my approach is literally only a couple of weeks old (well, I've been studying various existing approaches before it), so I'm here to test and improve it, before sending it out into the wild, so to speak...

Posted: **Mon Jan 16, 2023 10:14 pm**

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pm @iambiguous -- The approach to objective Morality I'm presenting here doesn't really fit into any established paradigms, and I'm not highly proficient at communicating it (yet). As such, I noticed that some of my explanations -- rather unsurprisingly -- caused a few misunderstandings. Primarily, I would like to stress that my approach is intended to inform us of the exact objective moral state of any given situation, at any given time. It is applicable regardless of whether someone agrees or disagrees with it. So yes, it applies even if we deny it, because it's not derived from subjective concerns and values.

Okay, but my own point is still this...

It is one thing to make a distinction between consensual descriptions of objective reality in regard to abortion as a medical procedure and another thing altogether regarding conflicting subjective assessments of the morality of abortion out in world existentially.

In other words, making that distinction in a philosophy forum is one thing, making it when confronting those for and against abortion outside a Planned Parenthood clinic, or before a legislative body, another thing altogether.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pmBefore I proceed, I would like to say that I completely understand where you're coming from. Abortion in particular is one of those subjects that involves a myriad different interests and who is to say who's right and wrong? Whose interests matter more? How do we weigh certain facts? For every seemingly sensible answer there are countless viable counter-arguments. It's quite overwhelming. Objective Morality does not resolve these questions because they are subjective in nature, and thus can only be resolving relative to the individual values of the people involved. However, objective Morality can inform us about the morality of any given choice, predict its moral consequences and inform us how to get from an immoral state to a moral one.

So, what then "for all practical purposes" is it really being resolved? At the Planned Parenthood clinic, you will encounter any number of individuals who have lived very, very different lives predisposing them to very, very different value judgments in regard to actual flesh and blood "real world" abortions. How then is this...

"Morality can inform us about the morality of any given choice, predict its moral consequences and inform us how to get from an immoral state to a moral one."

...to be explained to them such that the alleged "natural right" of the fetus to acquire a life outside the womb is intertwined morally -- objectively? -- with the alleged "political right" of a woman to choose to destroy that life? This when we can't even pin down definitively [from the point of conception on] when a "clump of cells" becomes a "human being"?

You say:

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pmSo let's start with the question of at which stage of pregnancy the collection of cells in the mothers womb becomes significant enough to constitute a "person". Subjectively, this question can be easy or it can drive you completely mad. The only thing we can all agree on is that we'll never agree to a single answer. Some people will claim to have an objectively right answer, but frankly that's nonsense, because personhood is a value. It's something that we subjectively assign to entities that meet certain criteria. These criteria are not entirely arbitrary, but not specific enough to allow for only one, definitive answer. Objectively, there is no such thing as personhood, because values don't exist outside of our subjective perception. Objectively, a person is just a collection of atoms, as is anything else.

That's my point too more or less. All I do then is to shift the focus away from what any particular individual believes and more towards how, existentially, given the life each of us as individuals lived, we came to acquire particular moral and political prejudices. Prejudices that are also embedded in the fact that given a world awash in contingency, chance and change, new experiences, new relationships and/or access to new information and knowledge might result in our completely altering our point of view.

But: what still ever and always remains the same is the fact of human sexuality, the fact of pregnancy, the fact that some pregnancies are unwanted and the fact that abortion may or may not be an option in any particular jurisdiction.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pmTherefore, we don't care about this question within the context of objective Morality, and we don't have to.

Tell that to those who predicate their moral convictions on God. For most here a human life begins at the point of conception. Why? Because that is when God Himself installs a soul in each of us. And then from the cradle to the grave this God will judge us in regard to the behaviors we choose in regard to things like abortion.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pmBecause the only thing that matters from a moral point of view are the rights and duties of the people involved. For example, let's say the mother desires an abortion because she isn't willing to sacrifice her career for it. The father however had a vasectomy shortly after his wife's pregnancy and desperately wants a child. From a morally objective point of view, the father can invoke his right for his wish to be respected within the context of the marriage, but the mother can of course claim the same right. If the mother ignores the fathers wish and undergoes the procedure, the father then, too, has a legitimate claim to not respect the mothers wishes within the context of the marriage. Therefore, he can for instance file for divorce and would no longer be morally bound to pay her 50% of his wealth (just as an example). From an objectively moral point of view, this would resolve the problem, but 2 rights would have to be broken during the process. As such it's not a perfect solution. A morally superior solution would therefore be for the mother to deliver the baby and then file for divorce. In this way, no rights have to be broken.

Okay, that, in my view, is your own rooted existentially in dasein subjective take on the matter. In a No God world, however, others might think it through and come to entirely different assessments...conclusions. Then what? What is to be done in a community that must have laws on the book dealing with the objective reality of unwanted pregnancies and abortions? What of objective morality in a world that is bursting at the seams with such conflicting assessments? And, one way or the other, the fetus is still either destroyed or is delivered.

So, what then are the consequences here of your objective Morality? Who gets rewarded? Who gets punished?

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pmI specifically went with this example because it's plain to see that the stage of pregnancy is irrelevant for the father. From his point of view, the zygote is just as important as the child after it was delivered. Since we can't determine the value of anything objectively, we use objective Morality simply to inform the people involved about which moral rights they have or don't have and which moral consequences will follow by claiming the rights they have (or don't have).

Again, in my view, here in an "ethical theory" forum discussion, that frame of mind is one thing. However, how would it play out among men and women dealing with an actual "real time" unwanted pregnancy? What would the community permit? What would it prohibit? The well beyond theoretical arguments reality...the existential parameters of objective Morality then.

Posted: **Tue Jan 17, 2023 1:40 am**

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Jan 16, 2023 10:14 pm In other words, making that distinction in a philosophy forum is one thing, making it when confronting those for and against abortion outside a Planned Parenthood clinic, or before a legislative body, another thing altogether.

As I mentioned before, the purpose of an objective moral system, in my opinion, is to inform. When you claim a certain right, it permits others to claim a comparable right. For example, if I steal from you, you then have the right to steal from me in return. This is the only sense in which stealing is "immoral" from an objective point of view -- because it gives others moral permission to steal from you.

So, for instance, if you believe abortion is so evil that you'd be willing to murder a doctor that provides abortions, all that happens (morally speaking) is you lose your own right to not be murdered. So you can claim the right to kill someone for whatever reason you like, but others then can claim the same right towards you (not necessarily murder you, but at least restrict your freedom such that you can't exercise your "right" to murder others).

In this way this logic works regardless of the context.

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Jan 16, 2023 10:14 pm But: what still ever and always remains the same is the fact of human sexuality, the fact of pregnancy, the fact that some pregnancies are unwanted and the fact that abortion may or may not be an option in any particular jurisdiction.

Some things, such as human biology, are outside of our control. Others, such as laws, are perfectly within our control. This is where objective Morality would arguably be most useful. I have already provided a few examples how we can analyze the moral relationships within different abortion-related situations. The same approach can be applied to virtually any situation one can imagine and consistently lead to the same results. There is no reason why laws should be different from one region to another. That which is moral is that which should be legal, and that which is immoral is that which should be illegal. A law informed by objective Morality is necessarily fair, because it enforces only those rights that have been claimed. For example, if you violently lash out at others, you lose your right to be free from coercion. As such, it is legitimate for the police (or anyone else) to detain you in some form, until you "earn" your right to be free from coercion again. If objective Morality was deeply embedded within society, we would have no need for a million (often questionable) laws, because moral relationships can be trivially derived for any situation (with some training).

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Jan 16, 2023 10:14 pm So, what then are the consequences here of your objective Morality? Who gets rewarded? Who gets punished?

That's easy: those who respect the rights of others are rewarded by having their own rights respected. Those who disregard the rights of others get punished by having their rights disregarded.

Rights are earned by consistently respecting them relative to other people and lost by failing to do so. In this way, complete fairness and justice can be ensured (to the greatest extent that is practically possible).

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Jan 16, 2023 10:14 pm Again, in my view, here in an "ethical theory" forum discussion, that frame of mind is one thing. However, how would it play out among men and women dealing with an actual "real time" unwanted pregnancy? What would the community permit? What would it prohibit? The well beyond theoretical arguments reality...the existential parameters of objective Morality then.

In my opinion, society is currently morally illiterate, for the most part. Right now, the best approach we have is based on empathy; trying to understand the position others are in. While this is nice and all, it's merely intuitive. Imagine having to construct a bridge only based on intuition, without an objective mathematical framework. It's hard. That's why we need to integrate objective Morality, such that every person at any time can calculate the morally correct decisions for themselves, rather than essentially just winging it. This is of course not a fast or easy process. First, the theoretical basis must be thoroughly established, and this alone can take decades.

What I'm proposing is essentially the same thing that utilitarians have been promoting for hundreds of years by now, except utilitarianism is inherently flawed because it requires countless assumptions to be made, and as such leads to widely different conclusions, thus making it impossible to use on a large scale. The approach I propose doesn't require any assumptions at all. It is always applicable, whether you accept it or not (at least from what I can surmise). As such, it can be applied universally.

Posted: **Tue Jan 17, 2023 6:55 pm**

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 1:40 am
iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Jan 16, 2023 10:14 pm So, what then are the consequences here of your objective Morality? Who gets rewarded? Who gets punished?
That's easy: those who respect the rights of others are rewarded by having their own rights respected. Those who disregard the rights of others get punished by having their rights disregarded.

Rights are earned by consistently respecting them relative to other people and lost by failing to do so. In this way, complete fairness and justice can be ensured (to the greatest extent that is practically possible).

I have some questions.

1 Capitalising the noun - as in 'objective Morality' - which iambiguous echoes - seems a bit odd. Do you have a reason for doing it?

2 Does your theory depend on an equivocation on the word right? I'm wondering if the objectivity you're claiming for it comes from its disregard for the moral rightness of a right. The reciprocity of respecting and therefore earning rights seems to by-pass the moral rightness and wrongness of actions.

For example, if I kill someone, then others have the right to kill me. What does this have to do with morality? How does it demonstrate what is 'objectively' morally right and wrong? The golden rule - do as you would be done by - which also invokes reciprocity - is similarly morally neutral, or amoral.

Are you saying that morality is, and has only ever been, about reciprocal recognition of rights - that what we call moral rightness and wrongness amount to nothing more than that?

Posted: **Wed Jan 18, 2023 1:17 am**

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 6:55 pm 1 Capitalising the noun - as in 'objective Morality' - which iambiguous echoes - seems a bit odd. Do you have a reason for doing it?

Just a habit from being German

Feel free to ignore it.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 6:55 pm 2 Does your theory depend on an equivocation on the word right? I'm wondering if the objectivity you're claiming for it comes from its disregard for the moral rightness of a right. The reciprocity of respecting and therefore earning rights seems to by-pass the moral rightness and wrongness of actions.

I'm not sure what you mean by "the moral rightness of a right" or "the moral rightness and wrongness of actions". Are you referring to moral standards based on moral / cultural relativism? I disregard such things in my approach, as it's based on first principles. I assume that we know absolutely nothing about Morality and then go from there.

The term "right" has a wide range of meanings, so I try to distinguish it by calling it a "moral right" or a "moral duty". But I use them in the normal, colloquial manner, just that the context is special (the logic of how they are derived).

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 6:55 pm For example, if I kill someone, then others have the right to kill me. What does this have to do with morality? How does it demonstrate what is 'objectively' morally right and wrong? The golden rule - do as you would be done by - which also invokes reciprocity - is similarly morally neutral, or amoral.

I wouldn't say that the golden rule is amoral. Rather, I would call it a subjectively moral principle, similar to "you should not cause unnecessary harm or suffering". Any prescriptive proposition is moral in a sense; it's just that subjective moral statements appeal to the values of a particular subject, whereas an objective moral approach simply describes moral states (and in this way also provides us with information how we subjectively ought to act, as well as predict the moral consequences of our actions (regardless whether they're moral or not)).

It's also helpful to clarify that Morality, as far as I'm concerned, is just a vague, subjective concept, relating to what we ought to do in some sense or another, which is used in countless different ways.

Therefore, as I mentioned before, I start from a blank slate. In the natural world, there is no such thing as Morality. It emerges once rights are claimed (i.e. "it is immoral for anyone to take my stuff because I have a legitimate right to my stuff"), but rights can only be "legitimately" claimed when the corresponding duties are followed (i.e. "I won't take your stuff as long as you don't take mine"). In this way, the logic of Morality emerges. If a moral right is violated, those who claim to respect this right have a duty to ensure that the infraction is appropriately rectified (the specifics of which can be derived by the type of right that was violated). In this way, concrete justifications for moral "oughts" emerge.

This in turn enables us to distinguish between contexts where Morality does or doesn't exist, as well as in what sense exactly. Logically, there are two distinct moral states which can describe a society or group of people (usually the actual moral state is somewhere in-between):

- voluntary agreement (everyone respects each others rights and no rights are being infringed upon)
- might makes right (everyone disregards each others rights and rights are constantly being violated)

Importantly, the latter is not identical to a state of amorality. For example, you can't claim a right to not be eaten by a tiger in the wild. Moral rights can therefore only be reasonably claimed in regards to other individuals that have the capability of respecting your rights.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 6:55 pm Are you saying that morality is, and has only ever been, about reciprocal recognition of rights - that what we call moral rightness and wrongness amount to nothing more than that?

Morality and Immorality are two sides of the same coin; to act morally means being deserving of morality, and to act immorally means being deserving of immorality.

I'm arguing that the only sense in which an action can possibly (and concretely) be objectively morally "wrong" is by annulling a right which "existed" before the act. This approach stands in contrast to deontology, which claims that certain acts can be right or wrong in and of themselves. In this context, that which is immoral ought not to be done by virtue of i.e. not being universalizable, or by it treating ends-in-themselves as means-to-an-end. In this way, there is no direct relation between the act and the nature of its immorality. Lying is therefore essentially indistinguishable from murder; both "ought" not to be done. For this reason, deontological approaches ring hollow -- they don't tell us what it means for something to be immoral and how we should deal with immoral acts, which leads to strange and cruel conclusions. Virtue ethics has a similar problem: it can tell us who is honest or dishonest, brave or fearful, just or unjust and so on, but at no point does it inform us about what any of this means. What exactly does it mean for someone to be dishonest, or fearful, or unjust? What is the appropriate response or punishment to any of those, if any?

In the absence of an objective approach to Morality, our only choice is to refer to our own, subjective values -- which is perfectly workable on an individual level, but due to it being subjective, can't be scaled and applied universally.

So to be clear: objective Morality does not replace subjective moral approaches. Rather, it restricts them such that circumstances in which they would otherwise lead to weird conclusions or contradict one another don't occur.

Posted: **Wed Jan 18, 2023 8:29 pm**

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Jan 16, 2023 10:14 pm
It is one thing to make a distinction between consensual descriptions of objective reality in regard to abortion as a medical procedure and another thing altogether regarding conflicting subjective assessments of the morality of abortion out in world existentially.

In other words, making that distinction in a philosophy forum is one thing, making it when confronting those for and against abortion outside a Planned Parenthood clinic, or before a legislative body, another thing altogether.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 1:40 am As I mentioned before, the purpose of an objective moral system, in my opinion, is to inform. When you claim a certain right, it permits others to claim a comparable right. For example, if I steal from you, you then have the right to steal from me in return. This is the only sense in which stealing is "immoral" from an objective point of view -- because it gives others moral permission to steal from you.

Okay, the pro-life folks inform the pro-choice folks about their own "objective moral system" and then the pro-choice folks turn around and inform the pro-life folks about their own "objective moral system". Then what, they can both at least agree that there is an objective moral system? And that, for all practical purposes, "we're right from our side and you're right from yours"?

What on earth does that have to do with the real world where in any particular community laws will be enacted either prescribing or proscribing particular behaviors in regard to abortion? Either rewarding or punishing the behaviors that flesh and blood men and women actually choose.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 1:40 am So, for instance, if you believe abortion is so evil that you'd be willing to murder a doctor that provides abortions, all that happens (morally speaking) is you lose your own right to not be murdered. So you can claim the right to kill someone for whatever reason you like, but others then can claim the same right towards you (not necessarily murder you, but at least restrict your freedom such that you can't exercise your "right" to murder others).

In this way this logic works regardless of the context.

Again, though, my own point here focuses less on what one believes about abortion and more on how, existentially, what one believes is the embodiment of dasein rather than any "objective moral system" that can be derived using the tools of philosophy. Claiming rights here is one thing, establishing that the rights you claim are logically and epistemologically sound -- the soundest -- another thing altogether.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pmBefore I proceed, I would like to say that I completely understand where you're coming from. Abortion in particular is one of those subjects that involves a myriad different interests and who is to say who's right and wrong? Whose interests matter more? How do we weigh certain facts? For every seemingly sensible answer there are countless viable counter-arguments. It's quite overwhelming. Objective Morality does not resolve these questions because they are subjective in nature, and thus can only be resolving relative to the individual values of the people involved. However, objective Morality can inform us about the morality of any given choice, predict its moral consequences and inform us how to get from an immoral state to a moral one.

So, what then "for all practical purposes" is it really being resolved? At the Planned Parenthood clinic, you will encounter any number of individuals who have lived very, very different lives predisposing them to very, very different value judgments in regard to actual flesh and blood "real world" abortions. How then is this...

"Morality can inform us about the morality of any given choice, predict its moral consequences and inform us how to get from an immoral state to a moral one."

...to be explained to them such that the alleged "natural right" of the fetus to acquire a life outside the womb is intertwined morally -- objectively? -- with the alleged "political right" of a woman to choose to destroy that life? This when we can't even pin down definitively [from the point of conception on] when a "clump of cells" becomes a "human being"?

You say:

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pmSo let's start with the question of at which stage of pregnancy the collection of cells in the mothers womb becomes significant enough to constitute a "person". Subjectively, this question can be easy or it can drive you completely mad. The only thing we can all agree on is that we'll never agree to a single answer. Some people will claim to have an objectively right answer, but frankly that's nonsense, because personhood is a value. It's something that we subjectively assign to entities that meet certain criteria. These criteria are not entirely arbitrary, but not specific enough to allow for only one, definitive answer. Objectively, there is no such thing as personhood, because values don't exist outside of our subjective perception. Objectively, a person is just a collection of atoms, as is anything else.

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Jan 16, 2023 10:14 pmThat's my point too more or less. All I do then is to shift the focus away from what any particular individual believes and more towards how, existentially, given the life each of us as individuals lived, we came to acquire particular moral and political prejudices. Prejudices that are also embedded in the fact that given a world awash in contingency, chance and change, new experiences, new relationships and/or access to new information and knowledge might result in our completely altering our point of view.

But: what still ever and always remains the same is the fact of human sexuality, the fact of pregnancy, the fact that some pregnancies are unwanted and the fact that abortion may or may not be an option in any particular jurisdiction.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 1:40 am Some things, such as human biology, are outside of our control. Others, such as laws, are perfectly within our control. This is where objective Morality would arguably be most useful.

But the laws that are enacted in any given community/legal jurisdiction are often predicated precisely on the assumptions made by those with the power to either prescribe or proscribe abortion...based further on the assumptions made about human biology here. In other words, biologically when does the unborn become a human being rather than just a clump of cells? Well, let's ask the 5 or 6 conservative Catholics on the United States Supreme Court here in America today.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 1:40 am I have already provided a few examples how we can analyze the moral relationships within different abortion-related situations.

Yes, and those who embrace entirely different moral and political prejudices can provide their own examples. Given their own "situations". That, in fact, is why some embrace the assumptions embedded in "situational ethics".

Instead, in my own opinion, you prefer to keep this up in the "philosophical clouds":

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 1:40 am The same approach can be applied to virtually any situation one can imagine and consistently lead to the same results. There is no reason why laws should be different from one region to another. That which is moral is that which should be legal, and that which is immoral is that which should be illegal. A law informed by objective Morality is necessarily fair, because it enforces only those rights that have been claimed. For example, if you violently lash out at others, you lose your right to be free from coercion. As such, it is legitimate for the police (or anyone else) to detain you in some form, until you "earn" your right to be free from coercion again. If objective Morality was deeply embedded within society, we would have no need for a million (often questionable) laws, because moral relationships can be trivially derived for any situation (with some training).

How is this really any different from Kant's own deontological morality? Right and wrong encompassed rationally. That's what makes certain behaviors categorical and imperative. Only Kant attached his own rendition of God to this. Why? Because there are conflicting renditions of what it means for the police to be "fair". So, in the end, with Heaven and Hell itself on the line for many, God will be the ultimate judge of what is fair.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pm Because the only thing that matters from a moral point of view are the rights and duties of the people involved. For example, let's say the mother desires an abortion because she isn't willing to sacrifice her career for it. The father however had a vasectomy shortly after his wife's pregnancy and desperately wants a child. From a morally objective point of view, the father can invoke his right for his wish to be respected within the context of the marriage, but the mother can of course claim the same right. If the mother ignores the fathers wish and undergoes the procedure, the father then, too, has a legitimate claim to not respect the mothers wishes within the context of the marriage. Therefore, he can for instance file for divorce and would no longer be morally bound to pay her 50% of his wealth (just as an example). From an objectively moral point of view, this would resolve the problem, but 2 rights would have to be broken during the process. As such it's not a perfect solution. A morally superior solution would therefore be for the mother to deliver the baby and then file for divorce. In this way, no rights have to be broken.

Okay, that, in my view, is your own rooted existentially in dasein subjective take on the matter. In a No God world, however, others might think it through and come to entirely different assessments...conclusions. Then what? What is to be done in a community that must have laws on the book dealing with the objective reality of unwanted pregnancies and abortions? What of objective morality in a world that is bursting at the seams with such conflicting assessments? And, one way or the other, the fetus is still either destroyed or is delivered.

So, what then are the consequences here of your objective Morality? Who gets rewarded? Who gets punished?

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pm That's easy: those who respect the rights of others are rewarded by having their own rights respected. Those who disregard the rights of others get punished by having their rights disregarded.

Rights are earned by consistently respecting them relative to other people and lost by failing to do so. In this way, complete fairness and justice can be ensured (to the greatest extent that is practically possible).

Again, the real world...

John believes in respecting the rights of his unborn son or daughter to be delivered to him out of the womb.

Mary believes in respecting her own right to abort the "clump of cells" growing in her womb because forcing her to give birth will be have devastating consequences for the life she wants to live.

Apply your objective Morality -- complete fairness and justice -- here.

Oh, and just out of curiosity, what might Kant say?

Start here: https://www.google.com/search?q=immanue ... s-wiz-serp

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pm I specifically went with this example because it's plain to see that the stage of pregnancy is irrelevant for the father. From his point of view, the zygote is just as important as the child after it was delivered. Since we can't determine the value of anything objectively, we use objective Morality simply to inform the people involved about which moral rights they have or don't have and which moral consequences will follow by claiming the rights they have (or don't have).

iambiguous wrote: ↑Mon Jan 16, 2023 10:14 pm Again, in my view, here in an "ethical theory" forum discussion, that frame of mind is one thing. However, how would it play out among men and women dealing with an actual "real time" unwanted pregnancy? What would the community permit? What would it prohibit? The well beyond theoretical arguments reality...the existential parameters of objective Morality then.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pm In my opinion, society is currently morally illiterate, for the most part.

Okay, but how is that not just another way of saying that society -- whatever that means to different people -- does not think like you do here? And would not many others all up and down the moral spectrum [philosophically or otherwise] say much the same thing?

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pm Right now, the best approach we have is based on empathy; trying to understand the position others are in.

Empathy for the unborn more or less than for the woman agonizing over an unwanted pregnancy?

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pm While this is nice and all, it's merely intuitive. Imagine having to construct a bridge only based on intuition, without an objective mathematical framework. It's hard. That's why we need to integrate objective Morality, such that every person at any time can calculate the morally correct decisions for themselves, rather than essentially just winging it. This is of course not a fast or easy process. First, the theoretical basis must be thoroughly established, and this alone can take decades.

Indeed. Philosophers and others have been grappling [intuitively and otherwise] with the morality of abortion now going all the way back to the pre-Socratics in the West. Not fast and easy in the least.

And of course: the "theoretical basis." Who knows how many more decades will pass before that is finally achieved. The Einstein of morality?

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Sat Jan 14, 2023 11:44 pm What I'm proposing is essentially the same thing that utilitarians have been promoting for hundreds of years by now, except utilitarianism is inherently flawed because it requires countless assumptions to be made, and as such leads to widely different conclusions, thus making it impossible to use on a large scale. The approach I propose doesn't require any assumptions at all. It is always applicable, whether you accept it or not (at least from what I can surmise). As such, it can be applied universally.

Again, in my view, this frame of mind is entirely "thought out" in your head. Theoretically. And in no way, shape or form in regard to abortion or any other "conflicting goods" are you able to actually demonstrate how it can be "applied universally".

Posted: **Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am**

iambiguous wrote: ↑Wed Jan 18, 2023 8:29 pm Again, though, my own point here focuses less on what one believes about abortion and more on how, existentially, what one believes is the embodiment of dasein rather than any "objective moral system" that can be derived using the tools of philosophy. Claiming rights here is one thing, establishing that the rights you claim are logically and epistemologically sound -- the soundest -- another thing altogether.

I really don't get the sense you're arguing against my position, since I actually agree with many of the points you make -- but in a general sense, not so much in relation to my proposed approach to objective Morality.

Look, you asked me to provide you with an answer in regards to the question of abortion through the lens of my particular approach, which I've tried to. But it's a very complex topic and it would take a book (at least!) to tackle this subject from every conceivable angle. I already simplified it to a worrisome degree and this might have caused misunderstandings in itself.

I don't think it's wise to delve deeper without first becoming fully aware on what we're actually doing, and what can be reasonably expected. Right now, I'm concerned if I was able to properly convey any foundational aspects of my approach, as you seem to be asking questions that I was sure I have already answered at least once.

So to clarify once more: I posit that objective Morality on the basis of moral rights / duties, as proposed, is descriptive, and as such can be universally applied to any circumstance. You can't "agree" or "disagree" with it in the same sense you can't disagree with the idea that two plus two is four. It's simply a description of states and relationships, just like describing "left and right" or "east and west" or "zenith and nadir" etc.
You can use different terms for it, you can also not be consciously aware of it, at all. But the states and relationships it describes are "real", in the sense that they are (abstract) properties of actual people and things (just like "distance", "alignment", "containment", etc.)

Objective Morality, as proposed, is not designed to convince people to have or not have abortions. It's there to inform us how to interpret actions in a moral sense, in the absence of personal moral preferences. As such, it's useful if you want to get an accurate and meaningful idea of the moral implications of an action from a neutral, detached point of view. It's not useful to hysterical half-wits or close-minded bigots. Just like any intellectual model or framework, it's a tool for those who have a desire to align their subjective perception with reality.

Now, regardless of whether my approach is actually coherent or not, it's necessary to properly understand it before anything further can be said about it. I would therefore welcome it if you could try to explain it in your own words, maybe with the help of a simpler moral question, such as theft or deception. Although my proposed approach appears quite simple to me, it's probably far from intuitive to anyone else and most likely can be misunderstood in ways that I can't even conceive of.

Posted: **Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm**

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Wed Jan 18, 2023 1:17 am
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 6:55 pm 1 Capitalising the noun - as in 'objective Morality' - which iambiguous echoes - seems a bit odd. Do you have a reason for doing it?
Just a habit from being German
Feel free to ignore it.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 6:55 pm 2 Does your theory depend on an equivocation on the word right? I'm wondering if the objectivity you're claiming for it comes from its disregard for the moral rightness of a right. The reciprocity of respecting and therefore earning rights seems to by-pass the moral rightness and wrongness of actions.
I'm not sure what you mean by "the moral rightness of a right" or "the moral rightness and wrongness of actions". Are you referring to moral standards based on moral / cultural relativism? I disregard such things in my approach, as it's based on first principles. I assume that we know absolutely nothing about Morality and then go from there.

And it's those 'first principles' that I'm questioning. I don't see how you get from 'I claim this right, and accept that you have the same right' to any moral fact. Your factual premise seems to be that to claim a right you deny to others is inconsistent - which is true, but has no moral implication.

The term "right" has a wide range of meanings, so I try to distinguish it by calling it a "moral right" or a "moral duty". But I use them in the normal, colloquial manner, just that the context is special (the logic of how they are derived).

And that's what I'm getting at: having what we call a right is, in itself, not a moral matter. For example, the right to own people as slaves isn't (arguably) a morally right thing to have.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 6:55 pm For example, if I kill someone, then others have the right to kill me. What does this have to do with morality? How does it demonstrate what is 'objectively' morally right and wrong? The golden rule - do as you would be done by - which also invokes reciprocity - is similarly morally neutral, or amoral.
I wouldn't say that the golden rule is amoral. Rather, I would call it a subjectively moral principle, similar to "you should not cause unnecessary harm or suffering".

Not so. If I like unnecessary harm and suffering, then the golden rule is that I should or can inflict them on others. Or, (less extremely), if I accept economic exploitation by a capitalist, then I can or should economically exploit others.

Any prescriptive proposition is moral in a sense

If by prescriptive you mean imperative, this is just false.

; it's just that subjective moral statements appeal to the values of a particular subject

No, they express moral opinions.

, whereas an objective moral approach simply describes moral states

But what is a 'moral state' that exists independently from my/our/everyone's moral opinions?

(and in this way also provides us with information how we subjectively ought to act, as well as predict the moral consequences of our actions (regardless whether they're moral or not)).

It's also helpful to clarify that Morality, as far as I'm concerned, is just a vague, subjective concept, relating to what we ought to do in some sense or another, which is used in countless different ways.

Talk of concepts doesn't explain or clarify anything. What and where are they, and how could a concept be 'objective'?

Therefore, as I mentioned before, I start from a blank slate. In the natural world, there is no such thing as Morality. It emerges once rights are claimed (i.e. "it is immoral for anyone to take my stuff because I have a legitimate right to my stuff")

There's the rub. Claiming the right to have my stuff is not the same as claiming it's morally right for me to have my stuff, and so morally wrong for someone to nick it.

, but rights can only be "legitimately" claimed when the corresponding duties are followed (i.e. "I won't take your stuff as long as you don't take mine").

But that's a matter of opinion, not a fact. Your premise is that we should not claim a right that we deny to others - and that's not a factual assertion with a truth-value, so it doesn't constitute a factual (and therefore objective) foundation.

In this way, the logic of Morality emerges. If a moral right is violated, those who claim to respect this right have a duty to ensure that the infraction is appropriately rectified (the specifics of which can be derived by the type of right that was violated). In this way, concrete justifications for moral "oughts" emerge.

The expression 'the logic of morality' can only refer to moral conclusions following from moral premises. You've smuggled in the expression 'moral right' - 'if a moral right is violated' - as though a right is automatically a moral right. And it isn't. That's what I meant by equivocation on the word right.

This in turn enables us to distinguish between contexts where Morality does or doesn't exist, as well as in what sense exactly. Logically, there are two distinct moral states which can describe a society or group of people (usually the actual moral state is somewhere in-between):

- voluntary agreement (everyone respects each others rights and no rights are being infringed upon)
- might makes right (everyone disregards each others rights and rights are constantly being violated)

Importantly, the latter is not identical to a state of amorality. For example, you can't claim a right to not be eaten by a tiger in the wild. Moral rights can therefore only be reasonably claimed in regards to other individuals that have the capability of respecting your rights.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Jan 17, 2023 6:55 pm Are you saying that morality is, and has only ever been, about reciprocal recognition of rights - that what we call moral rightness and wrongness amount to nothing more than that?
Morality and Immorality are two sides of the same coin; to act morally means being deserving of morality, and to act immorally means being deserving of immorality.

The expression 'deserving of morality/immorality' is incoherent.

I'm arguing that the only sense in which an action can possibly (and concretely) be objectively morally "wrong" is by annulling a right which "existed" before the act. This approach stands in contrast to deontology, which claims that certain acts can be right or wrong in and of themselves. In this context, that which is immoral ought not to be done by virtue of i.e. not being universalizable, or by it treating ends-in-themselves as means-to-an-end. In this way, there is no direct relation between the act and the nature of its immorality. Lying is therefore essentially indistinguishable from murder; both "ought" not to be done. For this reason, deontological approaches ring hollow -- they don't tell us what it means for something to be immoral and how we should deal with immoral acts, which leads to strange and cruel conclusions. Virtue ethics has a similar problem: it can tell us who is honest or dishonest, brave or fearful, just or unjust and so on, but at no point does it inform us about what any of this means. What exactly does it mean for someone to be dishonest, or fearful, or unjust? What is the appropriate response or punishment to any of those, if any?

This paragraph seems to be critical - and I need to mull it over. But my first thought is that the failure of deontology - its inability to explain why an action is intrinsically morally right or wrong - demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to establish moral objectivity - including yours.

In the absence of an objective approach to Morality, our only choice is to refer to our own, subjective values -- which is perfectly workable on an individual level, but due to it being subjective, can't be scaled and applied universally.

Not so. We can collectively develop and agree about moral values and codes. It's what we've been doing since human societies began. And universality merely refers to scope, which is itself a moral matter.

So to be clear: objective Morality does not replace subjective moral approaches. Rather, it restricts them such that circumstances in which they would otherwise lead to weird conclusions or contradict one another don't occur.

I don't think your theory establishes the existence - or even the possibility - of objective morality - the existence of moral facts.

Posted: **Thu Jan 19, 2023 4:16 pm**

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm And it's those 'first principles' that I'm questioning. I don't see how you get from 'I claim this right, and accept that you have the same right' to any moral fact. Your factual premise seems to be that to claim a right you deny to others is inconsistent - which is true, but has no moral implication.

We start off from an amoral position, that is correct. The moral implications emerge further down the road. I hope it will become clearer in the points to follow.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm And that's what I'm getting at: having what we call a right is, in itself, not a moral matter. For example, the right to own people as slaves isn't (arguably) a morally right thing to have.

Here's how it works: if I claim to have the right to own another person, then other people can claim the right to own me. The implication is that by claiming a right to enslave, I lose my right to not be enslaved. This is why slavery is immoral; because it undermines your own claim to have the right to not be enslaved. Furthermore, by enslaving others, it also produces a duty in those who claim to have a right to not be enslaved. As such, it becomes moral (a moral duty) for people to "enslave" (i.e. detain) you, if you attempt to enslave someone. This is how moral implications emerge. Does this make any sense?

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm Not so. If I like unnecessary harm and suffering, then the golden rule is that I should or can inflict them on others. Or, (less extremely), if I accept economic exploitation by a capitalist, then I can or should economically exploit others.

The logic here doesn't check out; the golden rule doesn't say "treat others how you like", but "treat others as you would like them to treat you".

The correct conclusions are: if I expect to be unnecessarily harmed by others, then I "should" harm others.
And: if I expect to be economically exploited by others, then I should economically exploit others.

So yes, the golden rule is "moral" in the sense that it appeals to an "ought", but I fully agree with you in that it can go both ways. As such, it's not a "moral" rule in the sense of leading to outcomes that you would deem to be "good". That's my point: it's subjective. If you are an evil bastard that doesn't need or expect any sympathy from others, the golden rule will tell you that you shouldn't have any sympathy towards others. If you, personally, want to be treated fairly and nicely, the golden rule will urge you to treat others in the same way.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm If by prescriptive you mean imperative, this is just false.

No, I would define any proposition which includes an "ought" as prescriptive, including the ones with no moral value, such as "if you want to arrive at location X quickly, you ought to take the subway". I distinguish between moral and amoral propositions on the basis of whether they are specific to the subjects goals and interests (if you want X, you have to do Y -- a.k.a. hypothetical imperatives) or general (you ought to do Y). An example for the latter could be: "You should brush your teeth twice a day", particularly in reference to children. The implication is that you are "good" by brushing your teeth regularly (so there's a moral implication). However, the degree of "goodness" is relative to the beholder. For example, if you are a thug, then "you ought to look threatening". Ergo, you're "good" by looking threatening (so there's a moral implication here, as well).

This distinction seems perfectly usable to me, but it's different from yours. You seem to require that that which is moral must "actually" be "good", i.e. it must not cause harm, etc. My point is that from an objective point of view, we can't know what "good" is without reference to the subject (is-ought-problem). As such, it makes no sense to apply personal, subjective expectations for what it means to be moral, when attempting to derive it without subjective concerns.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm No, they express moral opinions.

Pretty sure both are true: for example, if I tell my kid "you should brush your teeth", I appeal to the values of the child (i.e. trusting me that I have their best interests in mind) but I also express my "moral opinion" of what they ought to do.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm But what is a 'moral state' that exists independently from my/our/everyone's moral opinions?

A moral state is identified by the rights that are respected / duties that are followed. In this way, the moral content of a state is distinct when no rights are being violated vs. when some rights are being violated. We can also classify rights; so for example, many rights violations can be categorized as "lack of etiquette". These are distinct from rights violations that can be categorized as "property rights violations", etc.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm Talk of concepts doesn't explain or clarify anything. What and where are they, and how could a concept be 'objective'?

We have to be careful that our definitions of "objectivity" and "subjectivity" align. To me, any concept that can be derived on the basis of our observations regarding externally identifiable "objects" is objective. So for example, the concept of "distance" or "proportion" is objective, because -- even though it's just an abstract concept -- we can apply it to observed reality and thus describe it to some degree of accuracy.

Subjective is that which does not belong to external "objective" reality, but is part of our perception and evaluation of it. So for instance, the sugar content of a fruit can be determined objectively, but it's "sweetness" is a subjective experience and as such not part of the object itself. So in order to find out how "sweet" a fruit is, we need to eat it and experience it for ourselves. Since it's subject-dependent, it's therefore possible that it appears extremely sweet to me, but exceedingly bland to you (for instance if you have Covid and your sense of taste is impaired).

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm There's the rub. Claiming the right to have my stuff is not the same as claiming it's morally right for me to have my stuff, and so morally wrong for someone to nick it.

I'm not saying there is some kind of moral value to the act of claiming a right. It has to be viewed in the entire context: if I consistently respect other peoples right to X, I can morally legitimately claim to have right X. Therefore, when my morally legitimate right to X is not respected, I can identify the violation as immoral.

Now, we don't have to use moral terminology. I'm making a case that when understood and applied properly, this approach informs us of what's moral or not in a way that tendentially aligns with our moral intuitions and expectations. Therefore, it makes sense to use moral terminology. Now, if you can apply my approach correctly, and identify conclusions that are contradictory in some way (even if they simply go against our intuitive understanding of what moral behavior would constitute), then that would be evidence of something wrong with my approach.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm But that's a matter of opinion, not a fact. Your premise is that we should not claim a right that we deny to others - and that's not a factual assertion with a truth-value, so it doesn't constitute a factual (and therefore objective) foundation.

Not quite; it's admittedly a bit nuanced and not easy to explain: my point is that objectively we can either claim a right or not (regardless of whether it's "morally legitimate" or not). But if we claim an illegitimate right, it means that other people have no duty to respect it. If we respect an illegitimate right, it means we have no legitimate claim to that right. If we don't respect illegitimate rights, we can legitimately retain our claims to that right. And so on.

Hopefully you see what I mean: objectively, we are simply describing the current moral state, at any given point in time. In this sense, it can be applied universally. That's what I mean by it being "objective". But make no mistake -- there is no objective "ought".

However, subjectively, we "ought" to respect other people's rights. This appeal lies outside of objective Morality, because it's subjective. But even if we choose to not respect other people's rights, objective Morality is still applicable. Hopefully this makes sense.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm The expression 'the logic of morality' can only refer to moral conclusions following from moral premises. You've smuggled in the expression 'moral right' - 'if a moral right is violated' - as though a right is automatically a moral right. And it isn't. That's what I meant by equivocation on the word right.

I see, I'm pretty sure the problem here is that we have different definitions for the term "moral". I already explained above what I mean, exactly. Hopefully that cleared it up. Otherwise let me know.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm The expression 'deserving of morality/immorality' is incoherent.

Again, this is because your definition for "morality" is different from mine. It would be helpful if you could provide your own definition.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm This paragraph seems to be critical - and I need to mull it over. But my first thought is that the failure of deontology - its inability to explain why an action is intrinsically morally right or wrong - demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to establish moral objectivity - including yours.

Well, I beg to differ =)
My proposed approach is distinct from Deontology. It can have flaws in other ways for sure, but it doesn't have much in common with deontological approaches. Rather, it can be combined with them to resolve the contradictions inherent to them.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm Not so. We can collectively develop and agree about moral values and codes. It's what we've been doing since human societies began. And universality merely refers to scope, which is itself a moral matter.

That's correct, but I would argue that consensus by itself is sub-optimal. If there is a consensus in a society that women are to be subservient to men, and they have the means of enforcing it, does that proposition therefore become "moral"? My point is that each subjective viewpoint must be considered by itself (individualism). So an aggregate of a majority of subjective viewpoints does not override a single subjective viewpoint or an aggregate of a minority of viewpoints. If ten men agree to rape one woman, the claim of the "majority" shouldn't be respected.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm I don't think your theory establishes the existence - or even the possibility - of objective morality - the existence of moral facts.

I'm pretty sure you don't really understand it yet

I welcome you to describe it in your own words. Once you can describe and utilize it properly, you should be able to explain why my theory doesn't establish the existence of objective Morality.

Posted: **Thu Jan 19, 2023 4:34 pm**

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 4:16 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm And it's those 'first principles' that I'm questioning. I don't see how you get from 'I claim this right, and accept that you have the same right' to any moral fact. Your factual premise seems to be that to claim a right you deny to others is inconsistent - which is true, but has no moral implication.
We start off from an amoral position, that is correct. The moral implications emerge further down the road. I hope it will become clearer in the points to follow.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm And that's what I'm getting at: having what we call a right is, in itself, not a moral matter. For example, the right to own people as slaves isn't (arguably) a morally right thing to have.
Here's how it works: if I claim to have the right to own another person, then other people can claim the right to own me. The implication is that by claiming a right to enslave, I lose my right to not be enslaved. This is why slavery is immoral; because it undermines your own claim to have the right to not be enslaved. Furthermore, by enslaving others, it also produces a duty in those who claim to have a right to not be enslaved. As such, it becomes moral (a moral duty) for people to "enslave" (i.e. detain) you, if you attempt to enslave someone. This is how moral implications emerge. Does this make any sense?

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm Not so. If I like unnecessary harm and suffering, then the golden rule is that I should or can inflict them on others. Or, (less extremely), if I accept economic exploitation by a capitalist, then I can or should economically exploit others.
The logic here doesn't check out; the golden rule doesn't say "treat others how you like", but "treat others as you would like them to treat you".

The correct conclusions are: if I expect to be unnecessarily harmed by others, then I "should" harm others.
And: if I expect to be economically exploited by others, then I should economically exploit others.

So yes, the golden rule is "moral" in the sense that it appeals to an "ought", but I fully agree with you in that it can go both ways. As such, it's not a "moral" rule in the sense of leading to outcomes that you would deem to be "good". That's my point: it's subjective. If you are an evil bastard that doesn't need or expect any sympathy from others, the golden rule will tell you that you shouldn't have any sympathy towards others. If you, personally, want to be treated fairly and nicely, the golden rule will urge you to treat others in the same way.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm If by prescriptive you mean imperative, this is just false.
No, I would define any proposition which includes an "ought" as prescriptive, including the ones with no moral value, such as "if you want to arrive at location X quickly, you ought to take the subway". I distinguish between moral and amoral propositions on the basis of whether they are specific to the subjects goals and interests (if you want X, you have to do Y -- a.k.a. hypothetical imperatives) or general (you ought to do Y). An example for the latter could be: "You should brush your teeth twice a day", particularly in reference to children. The implication is that you are "good" by brushing your teeth regularly (so there's a moral implication). However, the degree of "goodness" is relative to the beholder. For example, if you are a thug, then "you ought to look threatening". Ergo, you're "good" by looking threatening (so there's a moral implication here, as well).

This distinction seems perfectly usable to me, but it's different from yours. You seem to require that that which is moral must "actually" be "good", i.e. it must not cause harm, etc. My point is that from an objective point of view, we can't know what "good" is without reference to the subject (is-ought-problem). As such, it makes no sense to apply personal, subjective expectations for what it means to be moral, when attempting to derive it without subjective concerns.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm No, they express moral opinions.
Pretty sure both are true: for example, if I tell my kid "you should brush your teeth", I appeal to the values of the child (i.e. trusting me that I have their best interests in mind) but I also express my "moral opinion" of what they ought to do.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm But what is a 'moral state' that exists independently from my/our/everyone's moral opinions?
A moral state is identified by the rights that are respected / duties that are followed. In this way, the moral content of a state is distinct when no rights are being violated vs. when some rights are being violated. We can also classify rights; so for example, many rights violations can be categorized as "lack of etiquette". These are distinct from rights violations that can be categorized as "property rights violations", etc.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm Talk of concepts doesn't explain or clarify anything. What and where are they, and how could a concept be 'objective'?
We have to be careful that our definitions of "objectivity" and "subjectivity" align. To me, any concept that can be derived on the basis of our observations regarding externally identifiable "objects" is objective. So for example, the concept of "distance" or "proportion" is objective, because -- even though it's just an abstract concept -- we can apply it to observed reality and thus describe it to some degree of accuracy.

Subjective is that which does not belong to external "objective" reality, but is part of our perception and evaluation of it. So for instance, the sugar content of a fruit can be determined objectively, but it's "sweetness" is a subjective experience and as such not part of the object itself. So in order to find out how "sweet" a fruit is, we need to eat it and experience it for ourselves. Since it's subject-dependent, it's therefore possible that it appears extremely sweet to me, but exceedingly bland to you (for instance if you have Covid and your sense of taste is impaired).

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm There's the rub. Claiming the right to have my stuff is not the same as claiming it's morally right for me to have my stuff, and so morally wrong for someone to nick it.
I'm not saying there is some kind of moral value to the act of claiming a right. It has to be viewed in the entire context: if I consistently respect other peoples right to X, I can morally legitimately claim to have right X. Therefore, when my morally legitimate right to X is not respected, I can identify the violation as immoral.

Now, we don't have to use moral terminology. I'm making a case that when understood and applied properly, this approach informs us of what's moral or not in a way that tendentially aligns with our moral intuitions and expectations. Therefore, it makes sense to use moral terminology. Now, if you can apply my approach correctly, and identify conclusions that are contradictory in some way (even if they simply go against our intuitive understanding of what moral behavior would constitute), then that would be evidence of something wrong with my approach.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm But that's a matter of opinion, not a fact. Your premise is that we should not claim a right that we deny to others - and that's not a factual assertion with a truth-value, so it doesn't constitute a factual (and therefore objective) foundation.
Not quite; it's admittedly a bit nuanced and not easy to explain: my point is that objectively we can either claim a right or not (regardless of whether it's "morally legitimate" or not). But if we claim an illegitimate right, it means that other people have no duty to respect it. If we respect an illegitimate right, it means we have no legitimate claim to that right. If we don't respect illegitimate rights, we can legitimately retain our claims to that right. And so on.

Hopefully you see what I mean: objectively, we are simply describing the current moral state, at any given point in time. In this sense, it can be applied universally. That's what I mean by it being "objective". But make no mistake -- there is no objective "ought".

However, subjectively, we "ought" to respect other people's rights. This appeal lies outside of objective Morality, because it's subjective. But even if we choose to not respect other people's rights, objective Morality is still applicable. Hopefully this makes sense.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm The expression 'the logic of morality' can only refer to moral conclusions following from moral premises. You've smuggled in the expression 'moral right' - 'if a moral right is violated' - as though a right is automatically a moral right. And it isn't. That's what I meant by equivocation on the word right.
I see, I'm pretty sure the problem here is that we have different definitions for the term "moral". I already explained above what I mean, exactly. Hopefully that cleared it up. Otherwise let me know.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm The expression 'deserving of morality/immorality' is incoherent.
Again, this is because your definition for "morality" is different from mine. It would be helpful if you could provide your own definition.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm This paragraph seems to be critical - and I need to mull it over. But my first thought is that the failure of deontology - its inability to explain why an action is intrinsically morally right or wrong - demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to establish moral objectivity - including yours.
Well, I beg to differ =)
My proposed approach is distinct from Deontology. It can have flaws in other ways for sure, but it doesn't have much in common with deontological approaches. Rather, it can be combined with them to resolve the contradictions inherent to them.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm Not so. We can collectively develop and agree about moral values and codes. It's what we've been doing since human societies began. And universality merely refers to scope, which is itself a moral matter.
That's correct, but I would argue that consensus by itself is sub-optimal. If there is a consensus in a society that women are to be subservient to men, and they have the means of enforcing it, does that proposition therefore become "moral"? My point is that each subjective viewpoint must be considered by itself (individualism). So an aggregate of a majority of subjective viewpoints does not override a single subjective viewpoint or an aggregate of a minority of viewpoints. If ten men agree to rape one woman, the claim of the "majority" shouldn't be respected.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:20 pm I don't think your theory establishes the existence - or even the possibility - of objective morality - the existence of moral facts.
I'm pretty sure you don't really understand it yet
I welcome you to describe it in your own words. Once you can describe and utilize it properly, you should be able to explain why my theory doesn't establish the existence of objective Morality.

Thanks. I'll work through your responses. And I appreciate the time and trouble you're taking to explain your theory.

My problem is I can't formulate your theory. Please can you do it syllogistically - with a premise or two and a conclusion? I'd find that very helpful.

Posted: **Thu Jan 19, 2023 5:19 pm**

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 4:16 pm Here's how it works: if I claim to have the right to own another person, then other people can claim the right to own me.

But so far, there's nothing morally right or wrong in this situation. And anyway, what does the word can mean here? If it means should be able to, the question is: why? You seem to be smuggling in an opinion.

The implication is that by claiming a right to enslave, I lose my right to not be enslaved.

But so far I'm not claiming that right. And still, so far, moral rightness and wrongness are not the issue. If your premise is 'it's morally wrong to claim a right that you deny to others', then that's a moral assertion, not a factual one with a truth-value. And we're stuck with subjectivity.

This is why slavery is immoral; because it undermines your own claim to have the right to not be enslaved.

Not so - and this the crux. You're introducing the idea of moral wrongness (what you call 'immorality') out of the blue, with no preparation, logical or otherwise.

Furthermore, by enslaving others, it also produces a duty in those who claim to have a right to not be enslaved. As such, it becomes moral (a moral duty) for people to "enslave" (i.e. detain) you, if you attempt to enslave someone. This is how moral implications emerge. Does this make any sense?

Not at all. I think it's grossly immoral to say that a slave owner should be enslaved. If that's what your supposed objective morality concludes, then it's nothing of the sort.

Posted: **Fri Jan 20, 2023 1:42 am**

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 5:19 pm But so far, there's nothing morally right or wrong in this situation. And anyway, what does the word can mean here? If it means should be able to, the question is: why? You seem to be smuggling in an opinion.

Yes, precisely -- I'm having a bit of trouble communicating this properly, because the way it works is by utilizing both objective and subjective contexts in specific ways. The objective context is descriptive, whereas the subjective context prescriptive. This is very easy to mix up, so I advise to read this very carefully. "Prescriptive subjective context" means it's a personal decision. So you can decide to express your right, but you don't have to -- it's up to you, hence it's subjective.

"Descriptive objective context" means it's completely independent from what you choose to do subjectively. It merely describes whatever choice you make in terms of what rights were exercised, whether they've been justified and what rights and duties are produced on that basis, as a consequence.

This entire system only works with both contexts present. But it's important not to mix them up and constantly be aware of what belongs to what context. If anything about my terminology here isn't clear please let me know.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 5:19 pm But so far I'm not claiming that right. And still, so far, moral rightness and wrongness are not the issue. If your premise is 'it's morally wrong to claim a right that you deny to others', then that's a moral assertion, not a factual one with a truth-value. And we're stuck with subjectivity.

No, that's not what I'm claiming. In general, the way my approach works is by not relying on any appeals to be moral. I fully agree with you that such a thing would constitute moral subjectivity and is therefore not worth talking about. In my approach, you can choose to do "whatever you want", because your choices are subjective, and that's a fact. But based on the logic I present, we can identify the moral implications of your choices objectively, and in this way inform ourselves about what an appropriate moral response would be. I realize this is a bit abstract, but yeah...

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 5:19 pm Not so - and this the crux. You're introducing the idea of moral wrongness (what you call 'immorality') out of the blue, with no preparation, logical or otherwise.

That was not my intention, but my formulation was indeed a bit confusing. I was referencing our current, modern position that slavery is "immoral" (whatever that means, exactly). So I wasn't trying to explain how I would reach the conclusion that slavery is immoral. Rather, I simply started off at the current, socially accepted status quo, and my goal was to show why it is so, or at least provide you with a rough idea. You see, in the absence of objective Morality, we really can't say why slavery is wrong. We simply find it "disturbing". But just a couple hundred years ago, this might have been quite different. I'm sure there have been plenty decent and intelligent people who accepted slavery as an inevitable (amoral) aspect of the world and society. It's really not obvious why owning other humans would be wrong, unless you've grown up in a society where it is considered as such. But objective Morality offers a simple and clear logical pathway to the correct conclusion. Well, at least it becomes quite apparent with a foundational understanding of it.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 5:19 pm Not at all. I think it's grossly immoral to say that a slave owner should be enslaved. If that's what your supposed objective morality concludes, then it's nothing of the sort.

This touches upon another one of the fundamental aspects of my proposed approach which I have mentioned a few times, but haven't fully explained yet. The idea is that rights are inferrable based on actions, but they are also abstractible into more generic forms.

Here is what I mean: if you are friendly and polite to your neighbors, we can infer that you have the right to be treated in a friendly and polite way. So you don't have to explicitly claim this right, unless you feel the need to communicate it for some reason. If you explicitly claim to have this right, your claim is considered "legitimate", since you have "earned" it on the basis of your consistently friendly and polite behavior.

However, the concept of "friendly and polite" is of course an abstraction of a long series of individual interactions, which your neighbors would describe as "friendly and polite". But there is no reason to stop at this point: we can abstract it further to make it more generic. So when it comes to being friendly and polite, this could be abstracted to be "socially appropriate behavior".

In other words, when it comes to identifying (implied) rights, we're less interested in the concrete, specific actions, and more in the general attitude they exhibit. This makes it easier to reason about and draw lines between them. This is important because there are obviously a million kinds of behavior that one could fit into the category of "socially appropriate behavior". In this way, we only have to work with this generic category. This isn't an exact science of course and subject to the limitations of language. So it can be best compared with classifications as we know them from biology and other natural sciences.

Thinking back to the example of slavery, "to enslave someone" is not really the most generic way to think about it. I would argue that the most generic category for slavery is coercion. Slavery is defined by coercion of some kind. If it's not coercive in any way, then it can't really be called slavery. This of course depends on the characteristics of the concrete act. For example, labor, confinement and physical / emotional / sexual abuse can all be additional aspects of slavery and as such can be included in our analysis (in this way, an actual analysis can become fairly complex), but in this example, I'll limit myself to only coercion.

In my original formulation from before, I tried to keep things simple, but it was admittedly a bit confusing. However, with this information in mind, I can formulate it in a more detailed and proper way:

By enslaving -- and thus coercing -- others, you produce a moral duty for those who claim to have a right to not be coerced. Thus, every person claiming the right to not be coerced has a duty to prevent you from exercising your illegitimate right to coerce others, and they are under no obligation to respect your right to not be coerced, as you have forfeited this right by attempting to enslave others.

To be clear: there is no moral obligation to coerce the slaver -- rather, it becomes permissible. The phrasing in my original formulation was too simplistic. The obligation is simply to prevent the enslavement from happening. But realistically, coercion would most likely be necessary in such a situation, so objective Morality informs us here that it would be morally OK to use physical coercion to stop a slaver from enslaving others.

Posted: **Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm**

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Fri Jan 20, 2023 1:42 am
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 5:19 pm But so far, there's nothing morally right or wrong in this situation. And anyway, what does the word can mean here? If it means should be able to, the question is: why? You seem to be smuggling in an opinion.
Yes, precisely -- I'm having a bit of trouble communicating this properly, because the way it works is by utilizing both objective and subjective contexts in specific ways. The objective context is descriptive, whereas the subjective context prescriptive. This is very easy to mix up, so I advise to read this very carefully. "Prescriptive subjective context" means it's a personal decision. So you can decide to express your right, but you don't have to -- it's up to you, hence it's subjective.

"Descriptive objective context" means it's completely independent from what you choose to do subjectively. It merely describes whatever choice you make in terms of what rights were exercised, whether they've been justified and what rights and duties are produced on that basis, as a consequence.

This entire system only works with both contexts present. But it's important not to mix them up and constantly be aware of what belongs to what context. If anything about my terminology here isn't clear please let me know.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 5:19 pm But so far I'm not claiming that right. And still, so far, moral rightness and wrongness are not the issue. If your premise is 'it's morally wrong to claim a right that you deny to others', then that's a moral assertion, not a factual one with a truth-value. And we're stuck with subjectivity.
No, that's not what I'm claiming. In general, the way my approach works is by not relying on any appeals to be moral. I fully agree with you that such a thing would constitute moral subjectivity and is therefore not worth talking about. In my approach, you can choose to do "whatever you want", because your choices are subjective, and that's a fact. But based on the logic I present, we can identify the moral implications of your choices objectively, and in this way inform ourselves about what an appropriate moral response would be. I realize this is a bit abstract, but yeah...

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 5:19 pm Not so - and this the crux. You're introducing the idea of moral wrongness (what you call 'immorality') out of the blue, with no preparation, logical or otherwise.
That was not my intention, but my formulation was indeed a bit confusing. I was referencing our current, modern position that slavery is "immoral" (whatever that means, exactly). So I wasn't trying to explain how I would reach the conclusion that slavery is immoral. Rather, I simply started off at the current, socially accepted status quo, and my goal was to show why it is so, or at least provide you with a rough idea. You see, in the absence of objective Morality, we really can't say why slavery is wrong. We simply find it "disturbing". But just a couple hundred years ago, this might have been quite different. I'm sure there have been plenty decent and intelligent people who accepted slavery as an inevitable (amoral) aspect of the world and society. It's really not obvious why owning other humans would be wrong, unless you've grown up in a society where it is considered as such. But objective Morality offers a simple and clear logical pathway to the correct conclusion. Well, at least it becomes quite apparent with a foundational understanding of it.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 5:19 pm Not at all. I think it's grossly immoral to say that a slave owner should be enslaved. If that's what your supposed objective morality concludes, then it's nothing of the sort.
This touches upon another one of the fundamental aspects of my proposed approach which I have mentioned a few times, but haven't fully explained yet. The idea is that rights are inferrable based on actions, but they are also abstractible into more generic forms.

Here is what I mean: if you are friendly and polite to your neighbors, we can infer that you have the right to be treated in a friendly and polite way. So you don't have to explicitly claim this right, unless you feel the need to communicate it for some reason. If you explicitly claim to have this right, your claim is considered "legitimate", since you have "earned" it on the basis of your consistently friendly and polite behavior.

However, the concept of "friendly and polite" is of course an abstraction of a long series of individual interactions, which your neighbors would describe as "friendly and polite". But there is no reason to stop at this point: we can abstract it further to make it more generic. So when it comes to being friendly and polite, this could be abstracted to be "socially appropriate behavior".

In other words, when it comes to identifying (implied) rights, we're less interested in the concrete, specific actions, and more in the general attitude they exhibit. This makes it easier to reason about and draw lines between them. This is important because there are obviously a million kinds of behavior that one could fit into the category of "socially appropriate behavior". In this way, we only have to work with this generic category. This isn't an exact science of course and subject to the limitations of language. So it can be best compared with classifications as we know them from biology and other natural sciences.

Thinking back to the example of slavery, "to enslave someone" is not really the most generic way to think about it. I would argue that the most generic category for slavery is coercion. Slavery is defined by coercion of some kind. If it's not coercive in any way, then it can't really be called slavery. This of course depends on the characteristics of the concrete act. For example, labor, confinement and physical / emotional / sexual abuse can all be additional aspects of slavery and as such can be included in our analysis (in this way, an actual analysis can become fairly complex), but in this example, I'll limit myself to only coercion.

In my original formulation from before, I tried to keep things simple, but it was admittedly a bit confusing. However, with this information in mind, I can formulate it in a more detailed and proper way:

By enslaving -- and thus coercing -- others, you produce a moral duty for those who claim to have a right to not be coerced. Thus, every person claiming the right to not be coerced has a duty to prevent you from exercising your illegitimate right to coerce others, and they are under no obligation to respect your right to not be coerced, as you have forfeited this right by attempting to enslave others.

To be clear: there is no moral obligation to coerce the slaver -- rather, it becomes permissible. The phrasing in my original formulation was too simplistic. The obligation is simply to prevent the enslavement from happening. But realistically, coercion would most likely be necessary in such a situation, so objective Morality informs us here that it would be morally OK to use physical coercion to stop a slaver from enslaving others.

Thanks again. I'm still trying to understand your theory, and I may well not have grasped it yet. But here are my conclusions so far.

1 I think your theory is incorrect, because you want to ground moral objectivity on the claiming and acknowledgement of rights, both of which are subjective - matters of choice. (And if we mean anything by the objective/subjective distinction, then this is a contradiction in your theory.) And an example shows this.

I claim the right to coerce people, and acknowledge their right to coerce me; therefore, (it's a fact that) the coercion of people is morally right.

Now, since that argument is invalid, then so is the following.

I claim the right not to be coerced, and I acknowledge that others have the same right; therefore, (it's a fact that) the coercion of people is morally wrong.

The non-moral premises simply don't entail the moral conclusions. And substituting 'We' or 'All of us' for 'I' in the premise makes no difference. The argument remains invalid, because of the lack of entailment.

2 Your explanation begins in a state before morality, with the claiming of a right. So the right claimed has no moral significance - it isn't morally right (good) or wrong (bad). And yet you've stated that you use the word 'right' to mean 'moral right' - which is an equivocation. If the claiming of rights precedes and informs moral rights, those must be different things. Otherwise, your argument begs the question.

Posted: **Fri Jan 20, 2023 8:16 pm**

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am
iambiguous wrote: ↑Wed Jan 18, 2023 8:29 pm Again, though, my own point here focuses less on what one believes about abortion and more on how, existentially, what one believes is the embodiment of dasein rather than any "objective moral system" that can be derived using the tools of philosophy. Claiming rights here is one thing, establishing that the rights you claim are logically and epistemologically sound -- the soundest -- another thing altogether.
I really don't get the sense you're arguing against my position, since I actually agree with many of the points you make -- but in a general sense, not so much in relation to my proposed approach to objective Morality.

In a "general sense"? But my point here revolves precisely around the distinction I make between discussing the morality of abortion theoretically in an "ethical theory" forum, and taking whatever conclusions you come to here to a Planned Parenthood clinic where there is a confrontation between those who support a woman's right to choose and those who do not. Given all of the vast and varied sets of existential circumstances that can unfold pertaining to any one particular unwanted pregnancy.

That's why, above, I noted this:

This being posted in the "ethical theory" sub-forum, what is discussed and debated will probably not revolve around my own main interest here...connecting the dots between conclusions reached theoretically and the applicability of these "definitions and deductions" pertaining to actual moral conflicts out in the world of human interactions.

You agreed to explore this distinction with me in regard to abortion.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 amLook, you asked me to provide you with an answer in regards to the question of abortion through the lens of my particular approach, which I've tried to. But it's a very complex topic and it would take a book (at least!) to tackle this subject from every conceivable angle. I already simplified it to a worrisome degree and this might have caused misunderstandings in itself.

Yes, and it is a "complex topic". And precisely because, in my view, "I" here is rooted existentially in dasein. Historically, culturally and in terms of our own uniquely personal experiences, we can become predisposed to embrace all manner of conflicting "personal opinions". Which is something I attempted to explore existentially in this thread. Starting in particular with the OP: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=194382

On the other hand, is there in a "general sense" a philosophical argument that takes into account these enormous differences? Is there a philosophical/ethical assessment that does in fact reflect the "wisest", most rational and virtuous set of behaviors a mere mortal in a No God world can embody in regard to the morality of abortion. Yes? Okay, let's hear it.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 amI don't think it's wise to delve deeper without first becoming fully aware on what we're actually doing, and what can be reasonably expected. Right now, I'm concerned if I was able to properly convey any foundational aspects of my approach, as you seem to be asking questions that I was sure I have already answered at least once.

My own reaction to this is similar to my own reaction to Alexis Jacobi in regards to race on the Christianity thread. Only after I grasp his own "theoretical foundation" for arguing that the Northern European white race/stock is intellectually superior to all other races, can we then go on to discuss "what is to be done" about the "demographic crisis" in America.

Is that what you are suggesting here as well in regard to abortion? That we must first pin down technically [using the tools of philosophy] how rational men and women need first to go about defining the words we use in propounding our deductions about human morality before we can ever consider taking those conclusions to, say, those marching Washington D.C. this very moment in protest against actual flesh and blood abortions: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politi ... -rcna66514

How do you suppose they would react to your arguments here?

You're up on the podium and you note this:

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 amSo to clarify once more: I posit that objective Morality on the basis of moral rights / duties, as proposed, is descriptive, and as such can be universally applied to any circumstance. You can't "agree" or "disagree" with it in the same sense you can't disagree with the idea that two plus two is four. It's simply a description of states and relationships, just like describing "left and right" or "east and west" or "zenith and nadir" etc.
You can use different terms for it, you can also not be consciously aware of it, at all. But the states and relationships it describes are "real", in the sense that they are (abstract) properties of actual people and things (just like "distance", "alignment", "containment", etc.)

Objective Morality, as proposed, is not designed to convince people to have or not have abortions. It's there to inform us how to interpret actions in a moral sense, in the absence of personal moral preferences. As such, it's useful if you want to get an accurate and meaningful idea of the moral implications of an action from a neutral, detached point of view. It's not useful to hysterical half-wits or close-minded bigots. Just like any intellectual model or framework, it's a tool for those who have a desire to align their subjective perception with reality.

On the other hand, sure, there are any number of PN members here who will go on and on and on in discussing
human morality in this manner. Sustaining didactic [and some cases pedantic] exchanges which revolves entirely around "the absence of personal moral preferences." I'm just not one of them. So, by all means, carry on in exploring objective Morality of abortion as that pertains solely to "ethical theory".

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 amNow, regardless of whether my approach is actually coherent or not, it's necessary to properly understand it before anything further can be said about it. I would therefore welcome it if you could try to explain it in your own words, maybe with the help of a simpler moral question, such as theft or deception. Although my proposed approach appears quite simple to me, it's probably far from intuitive to anyone else and most likely can be misunderstood in ways that I can't even conceive of.

Well, in my view, discussions that interest you here seem to revolve entirely around dueling definitions and deductions. Words put in a particular order defending yet more words put in a particular order. The "agony of choice in the face of uncertainty" endured by any number of women confronting an unwanted pregnancy, well, that's for another forum altogether.

I'm more interested in exploring human morality as it was broached by William Barrett in Irrational Man:

"For the choice in...human [ethical] situations is almost never between a good and an evil, where both are plainly marked as such and the choice therefore made in all the certitude of reason; rather it is between rival goods, where one is bound to do some evil either way, and where the ultimate outcome and even---or most of all---our own motives are unclear to us. The terror of confronting oneself in such a situation is so great that most people panic and try to take cover under any universal rules that will apply, if only to save them from the task of choosing themselves."

Only, from my frame of mind, you agreed to bring your own theoretical assumptions regarding objective Morality "down to Earth". But I just don't really see that happening at all here pertaining to our discussion of abortion.

So, by all means, let's move on to others.

Unless, of course, you will focus in more on the points I made here:

Okay, the pro-life folks inform the pro-choice folks about their own "objective moral system" and then the pro-choice folks turn around and inform the pro-life folks about their own "objective moral system". Then what, they can both at least agree that there is an objective moral system? And that, for all practical purposes, "we're right from our side and you're right from yours"?

What on earth does that have to do with the real world where in any particular community laws will be enacted either prescribing or proscribing particular behaviors in regard to abortion? Either rewarding or punishing the behaviors that flesh and blood men and women actually choose.

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