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Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:12 am
by Age
Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Oct 30, 2021 2:03 pm
Not every clever or wise philosopher owes his status to Academia. But most do benefit from Academia because it does help you to be a clever or wise philosopher if you are tutored by people who have already learned what philosophy is about and what it is not about.
Are 'you', "belinda", a clever or wise "philosopher"?
If yes, then what is 'philosophy' about and what is 'philosophy' not about?
But if you are NOT a clever NOR wise "philosopher", then you will ALSO NOT know the answer, correct?
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:13 am
by Age
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sat Oct 30, 2021 6:00 pm
Age wrote: ↑Fri Oct 29, 2021 10:37 pm
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Tue Oct 26, 2021 12:30 am
If one puts forth the proposition, that identities aren't attainable, is this proposition negated through the dimension, that the term thinker is a symmetry to philosopher and doctor and worker?
What actually exists are there are animals, or things, known as 'human beings', and these human beings are provided with identities, or labeled with names, but these human beings are never actually those given names, labels, nor identities. What exists are human beings, which are made up of physical matter, thoughts, and feelings - emotional and physical.
The President of the United States isn't the President, supermarket employees aren't supermarket employees, and the Taliban aren't the Taliban?
Okay. If you say so.
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 1:43 pm
by trokanmariel
Skepdick wrote: ↑Sat Oct 30, 2021 9:56 pm
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sat Oct 30, 2021 9:44 pm
I'm concerned with disproportionalities, in taxonomy. For example, philosopher is a typical taxonomy, and so is fan, but, whereas to be a royal family philosopher or a United States presidency philosopher are common (in relative terms), it's much more uncommon to hear or speak of a philosopher or fan of September 1998's daylight (the daylight having perhaps occurred on any day of the month), or a philosopher or fan of Philosophy Now discussion threads
That's just Bayes' theorem.
What is more probable?
That any given person is a philosopher; or that any given person is a philosopher who is 176cm tall.
P(philosopher) > P(philosopher + 176cm)
You're saying, that it's more probable for a person to be a United States presidency philosopher than a philosopher of daylight in 1998?
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:19 pm
by Skepdick
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 1:43 pm
You're saying, that it's more probable for a person to be a United States presidency philosopher than a philosopher of daylight in 1998?
No. I am saying that it's more probable for a random person from the planet's population to satisfy one condition; than it is for them to satisfy two conditions.
It's more probable that you have 11 fingers than it is that you have 11 fingers AND a pet pig.
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:29 pm
by trokanmariel
Skepdick wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:19 pm
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 1:43 pm
You're saying, that it's more probable for a person to be a United States presidency philosopher than a philosopher of daylight in 1998?
No. I am saying that it's more probable for a random person from the planet's population to satisfy one condition; than it is for them to satisfy two conditions.
It's more probable that you have 11 fingers than it is that you have 11 fingers AND a pet pig.
But how does that connect to the disproportionalities of taxonomy?
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:34 pm
by Skepdick
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:29 pm
But how does that connect to the disproportionalities of taxonomy?
Say you have a taxonomy with two categories.
Category A: Philosophers (1 criterion)
Category B: 60+ years old philosophers of presidency who have yellow pet pigs (4 criteria)
Category A will have disproportionatelly more candidates than Category B.
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:40 pm
by trokanmariel
Skepdick wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:34 pm
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 2:29 pm
But how does that connect to the disproportionalities of taxonomy?
Say you have a taxonomy with two categories.
Category A: Philosophers (1 criterion)
Category B: 60+ years old philosophers of presidency who have yellow pet pigs (4 criteria)
Category A will have disproportionatelly more candidates than Category B.
The example that you've shown - thanks for the clarification, by the way - is what I interpret to be about disproportionality being linked to mirror; in other words, bayes theorem is about examples only being related through doppelganger
But what if the United States presidency causes the absence of comparison, despite using comparison itself?
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 5:13 pm
by Sculptor
John = Philospher
Bob = Philosopher.
BUT
John is NOT equal to Bob. Therefore Philosopher is not equal to Philosopher.
If you want more words and less clarity, why not read Adorno's Negative Dialectics???
If Horkheimer's thinking described a dialectical pattern, Adorno's thinking was that pattern.
He understood Hegel's "self-movement of the concept" not as a "theory of
development," but as a movement of thought in which "all categories are
themselves and not themselves," in which a concept was "observed so closely
that it was maintained and transformed at the same time."
In 1942 Adorno wrote three short pieces similar in format to Benjamin's
theses on history. But whereas Benjamin juxtaposed opposites in a visual
sense, using theological images (the angel of history, the Messiah, the chessplaying
dwarf) to express historical materialism, its polar opposite, Adorno's
pieces "developed" dynamically from one pole to another.
By virtue of the logic of the philosophic aporia, without waiting for the ideological
supplement of the philosopher, it displaces the empirical hegemony of the existent as such into
that which is intrinsic [Wesenhafte]. The conception of being as an entity, whose thinking
determination invariably misses what is thought by cutting it into pieces and thereby, according
to the current political term, subverts it, hearkens back to the Eleatic unity of conclusiveness just
like the system once did and today the world.
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 5:50 pm
by trokanmariel
Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 5:13 pm
John = Philospher
Bob = Philosopher.
BUT
John is NOT equal to Bob. Therefore Philosopher is not equal to Philosopher.
If you want more words and less clarity, why not read Adorno's Negative Dialectics???
If Horkheimer's thinking described a dialectical pattern, Adorno's thinking was that pattern.
He understood Hegel's "self-movement of the concept" not as a "theory of
development," but as a movement of thought in which "all categories are
themselves and not themselves," in which a concept was "observed so closely
that it was maintained and transformed at the same time."
In 1942 Adorno wrote three short pieces similar in format to Benjamin's
theses on history. But whereas Benjamin juxtaposed opposites in a visual
sense, using theological images (the angel of history, the Messiah, the chessplaying
dwarf) to express historical materialism, its polar opposite, Adorno's
pieces "developed" dynamically from one pole to another.
By virtue of the logic of the philosophic aporia, without waiting for the ideological
supplement of the philosopher, it displaces the empirical hegemony of the existent as such into
that which is intrinsic [Wesenhafte]. The conception of being as an entity, whose thinking
determination invariably misses what is thought by cutting it into pieces and thereby, according
to the current political term, subverts it, hearkens back to the Eleatic unity of conclusiveness just
like the system once did and today the world.
I'll address the beginning, of your statement (which I thank you for)
United Nations delegate doesn't use UN speech to promote Scream 2 = Samantha
United Nations delegate doesn't use UN speech to promote Scream 2 = Thomas
Samantha and Thomas are the same
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 6:39 pm
by Sculptor
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 5:50 pm
Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 5:13 pm
John = Philospher
Bob = Philosopher.
BUT
John is NOT equal to Bob. Therefore Philosopher is not equal to Philosopher.
If you want more words and less clarity, why not read Adorno's Negative Dialectics???
If Horkheimer's thinking described a dialectical pattern, Adorno's thinking was that pattern.
He understood Hegel's "self-movement of the concept" not as a "theory of
development," but as a movement of thought in which "all categories are
themselves and not themselves," in which a concept was "observed so closely
that it was maintained and transformed at the same time."
In 1942 Adorno wrote three short pieces similar in format to Benjamin's
theses on history. But whereas Benjamin juxtaposed opposites in a visual
sense, using theological images (the angel of history, the Messiah, the chessplaying
dwarf) to express historical materialism, its polar opposite, Adorno's
pieces "developed" dynamically from one pole to another.
By virtue of the logic of the philosophic aporia, without waiting for the ideological
supplement of the philosopher, it displaces the empirical hegemony of the existent as such into
that which is intrinsic [Wesenhafte]. The conception of being as an entity, whose thinking
determination invariably misses what is thought by cutting it into pieces and thereby, according
to the current political term, subverts it, hearkens back to the Eleatic unity of conclusiveness just
like the system once did and today the world.
I'll address the beginning, of your statement (which I thank you for)
United Nations delegate doesn't use UN speech to promote Scream 2 = Samantha
United Nations delegate doesn't use UN speech to promote Scream 2 = Thomas
Samantha and Thomas are the same
You have responded with nonsense.
Your statements do not even parse.
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 7:41 pm
by trokanmariel
Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 6:39 pm
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 5:50 pm
Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 5:13 pm
John = Philospher
Bob = Philosopher.
BUT
John is NOT equal to Bob. Therefore Philosopher is not equal to Philosopher.
If you want more words and less clarity, why not read Adorno's Negative Dialectics???
If Horkheimer's thinking described a dialectical pattern, Adorno's thinking was that pattern.
He understood Hegel's "self-movement of the concept" not as a "theory of
development," but as a movement of thought in which "all categories are
themselves and not themselves," in which a concept was "observed so closely
that it was maintained and transformed at the same time."
In 1942 Adorno wrote three short pieces similar in format to Benjamin's
theses on history. But whereas Benjamin juxtaposed opposites in a visual
sense, using theological images (the angel of history, the Messiah, the chessplaying
dwarf) to express historical materialism, its polar opposite, Adorno's
pieces "developed" dynamically from one pole to another.
By virtue of the logic of the philosophic aporia, without waiting for the ideological
supplement of the philosopher, it displaces the empirical hegemony of the existent as such into
that which is intrinsic [Wesenhafte]. The conception of being as an entity, whose thinking
determination invariably misses what is thought by cutting it into pieces and thereby, according
to the current political term, subverts it, hearkens back to the Eleatic unity of conclusiveness just
like the system once did and today the world.
I'll address the beginning, of your statement (which I thank you for)
United Nations delegate doesn't use UN speech to promote Scream 2 = Samantha
United Nations delegate doesn't use UN speech to promote Scream 2 = Thomas
Samantha and Thomas are the same
You have responded with nonsense.
Your statements do not even parse.
I've illustrated a principle, that despite the borders of money, nations and jobs, there is a principle for unity
Re: Is the proposition, that identities aren't attainable stopped through thinker being identical to philosopher?
Posted: Sun Oct 31, 2021 10:57 pm
by Sculptor
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 7:41 pm
Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 6:39 pm
trokanmariel wrote: ↑Sun Oct 31, 2021 5:50 pm
I'll address the beginning, of your statement (which I thank you for)
United Nations delegate doesn't use UN speech to promote Scream 2 = Samantha
United Nations delegate doesn't use UN speech to promote Scream 2 = Thomas
Samantha and Thomas are the same
You have responded with nonsense.
Your statements do not even parse.
I've illustrated a principle, that despite the borders of money, nations and jobs, there is a principle for unity
Allow me to refer you to the remarks I made above.