Philosophy Now Forum

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Jul 23, 2021 6:30 pm Actually, if there is ANY such thing as "free will," then Determinism is false.

That does not follow directly from saying that

all things -- including human will, whatever it may appear, is nothing more than the inevitable product of prior physical or ideal forces.

but only if the will is something apart from prior physical or ideal forces, which is just an assumption, and a very debatable one.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Jul 23, 2021 6:30 pm "mind" is not a concept that Determinism can accept in the causal chain. "Brain," yes: because it's made of matter; but "mind," no, because it's immaterial and seems to start causal chains of its own.

Can you accept computer data in the causal chain? Or software? I see such things as different ways of describing things that can also, in any given embodiment, also (very inconveniently) be described in physical terms, and see no reason why thoughts should not be seen similarly.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Jul 23, 2021 6:30 pm The word they use for that is "epiphenomenon."

An epiphenomenon is not a synonym for an illusion, although it can give rise to one. In fact, most explanations of epiphenomena that I have seen confuse two different cases: necessary effects & contingent effects. Take the P-Zombie question. Do you think the exact same brain processes can occur with or without consciousness? If so, what contingency does cause the difference? If not (as I believe), then consciousness is part and parcel of the same phenomenon as the brain processes, at a different level of organisation, and that phenomenon can legitimately be described in terms of the former. The word used for this is emergence (although the term is unfortunately often abused).

It may be you're confused between "prediction" and "predetermination".

I am not confused. You can make predictions with or without certainty. My point is that some people are worried that being predetermined entails being predictable with certainty. My examples refute this.

RogerSH wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 9:15 am

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Jul 23, 2021 6:30 pm all things -- including human will, whatever it may appear, is nothing more than the inevitable product of prior physical or ideal forces.

but only if the will is something apart from prior physical or ideal forces, which is just an assumption, and a very debatable one.

No, that's backwards. Determinism has to hold that the will is strictly a product of prior forces. A belief in free will allows that its not. So there's no "debate" allowed by the Determinist side: it's all or nothing, for them.

Can you accept computer data in the causal chain? Or software?

The Determinist (who is not me, of course) can accept computer data and software, but only because they are products of human engineering, and only because human engineering is itself also a product of prior forces. Any other telling of the story -- like, say, one in which human ingenuity starts a causal chain -- they cannot accept.

Do you think the exact same brain processes can occur with or without consciousness?

Do Determinists think that? Yes. But I'm not one.

My point is that some people are worried that being predetermined entails being predictable with certainty. My examples refute this.

Well, I wouldn't be worried about that at all. I think it's obvious that "predictability with (absolute) certainty is not possible epistemologically. But "predetermined" does mean "predictable with absolute certainty in principle" if not in fact.

In other words, if Determinism is true, then in theory, a master computer with an infinite capacity for data could predict what will happen before it does: or so they must believe. For they can only believe that if all the prior physical causes are set, then the outcome is 100% decided before it happens.

I think that's still hogwash. But it's what they have to believe.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Jul 23, 2021 6:30 pm Actually, if there is ANY such thing as "free will," then Determinism is false. Because Determinism is an absolute claim, a claim that all things -- including human will, whatever it may appear, is nothing more than the inevitable product of prior physical or ideal forces.

... another, "-ism," wrong as all are.

If what you mean by determinism is that all events are the, "inevitable product of prior physical forces," "including human will," what do you call the view that regards ontological (natural) existence of more attributes than the mere physical, like life, consciousness, and volitional consciousness (human minds)? That view regards all physical aspects of existence as determined by physical forces, but the other attributes of existence determined by those attributes using the physical.

All merely physical entities are totally determined physically. The physical aspects of living entities (organisms) are determined physically, but the living behavior of organisms is determined by the life attribute. In addition to those aspects determined physically and by the life attribute, in conscious organisms, consciousness determines the living behavior. In addition to the physically, living, and consciously determined aspects of volitionally conscious organisms (human beings) all consciously determined behavior must be consciously chosen.

I believe everything is, "determined," in the sense that nothing just happens by caprice or without explanation. I do not agree that the only determining aspects of reality are physical ones. Life, consciousness, and volition are real attributes of the natural world in addition to the physical attributes.

RCSaunders wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 2:58 pm

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Jul 23, 2021 6:30 pm Actually, if there is ANY such thing as "free will," then Determinism is false. Because Determinism is an absolute claim, a claim that all things -- including human will, whatever it may appear, is nothing more than the inevitable product of prior physical or ideal forces.

... another, "-ism," wrong as all are.

It's just an attempt to give a label to a theory. And it's probably helpful if we can identify the theory by something.

If what you mean by determinism is that all events are the, "inevitable product of prior physical forces," "including human will," what do you call the view that regards ontological (natural) existence of more attributes than the mere physical, like life, consciousness, and volitional consciousness (human minds)? That view regards all physical aspects of existence as determined by physical forces, but the other attributes of existence determined by those attributes using the physical.

It's not so much the "existence" of human minds that the Determinists have to deny, since they can define down "mind" to mean "brain" or "brain plus epiphenomena of brain." It's the postulate that the "mind" can be the initiator of a causal chain, rather than merely a passive link in a greater chain of causes and effects.

In other words, to put it simply, a Determinist can say that "the initial event," (whether we think of the Big Bang or just the chemical composition of your breakfast) made your brain enter state A at point X, and this issued in action Z. But a Determinist cannot say that your mind, regardless of the Big Bang or the chemical composition of your breakfast, chose action Z.

...consciousness determines the living behavior.

This, a Determinist cannot say. He can only say your The Big Bang or the chemical composition of your breakfast determined your consciousness, which then was conditioned toward living behavour Z.

I believe everything is, "determined," in the sense that nothing just happens by caprice or without explanation.

Yep, I agree. But that's not enough for Determinism.

Determinism has to say there's not only an "explanation," but that the right or complete "explanation" is an extremely long chain of prior events, rather than that "RC decided...X."

Every person has his/her own will. Thus, each person can choose different actions to the same stimulus.

jayjacobus wrote: ↑Sun Jul 25, 2021 10:17 pm Every person has his/her own will. Thus, each person can choose different actions to the same stimulus.

I'd say that's right. Determinists would have to say no, and that his "will" is just a way of talking about the stimuli and the prior causes that produced the stimuli...not of anything that can alter the course that prior causes have set.

But it seems obvious to me they're wrong. If they believed their own nonsense, they'd never argue in favour of it. After all, they have to say there's no "will" for them to persuade.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jul 26, 2021 12:57 am

jayjacobus wrote: ↑Sun Jul 25, 2021 10:17 pm Every person has his/her own will. Thus, each person can choose different actions to the same stimulus.

I'd say that's right. Determinists would have to say no, and that his "will" is just a way of talking about the stimuli and the prior causes that produced the stimuli...not of anything that can alter the course that prior causes have set.

But it seems obvious to me they're wrong. If they believed their own nonsense, *they'd never argue in favour of it. After all, they have to say there's no "will" for them to persuade.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 11, 2021 12:08 am*A5334E71-C403-4596-9559-FE6225142035.jpeg

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 1:58 pm

RogerSH wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 9:15 am

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Jul 23, 2021 6:30 pm all things -- including human will, whatever it may appear, is nothing more than the inevitable product of prior physical or ideal forces.

but only if the will is something apart from prior physical or ideal forces, which is just an assumption, and a very debatable one.

No, that's backwards. Determinism has to hold that the will is strictly a product of prior forces. A belief in free will allows that its not. So there's no "debate" allowed by the Determinist side: it's all or nothing, for them.

Can you accept computer data in the causal chain? Or software?

The Determinist (who is not me, of course) can accept computer data and software, but only because they are products of human engineering, and only because human engineering is itself also a product of prior forces.

Well, I'm a physicalist, and according to physics the multiverse is deterministic but any universe "strand" isn't. Questions about freedom of will only make sense within a universe, so for practical purposes I'm not a determinist either in your sense - but that doesn't prevent there being very many processes that are deterministic. And what I am arguing is that free will would be compatible with complete determinism, so is certainly compatible with a world in which many processes are deterministic. In fact, a decision that is not the product of prior forces could not be the product of a will. (The will itself being the product of prior forces is a different matter that I'll come back to below).

The point about software is this. Suppose a computer contains the object code for a program that (e.g.) renders a CGI, but the source code and compiler have been deleted. How can we explain the capabilities of the computer? The program (as defined by the source code) appears to be the cause of the behaviour but is not materially present. Is it an illusion, or an epiphenomenon, or what? Of course, one can choose one’s terms so that is classified as an illusion, but this leaves no way to make sense of what happens. Explaining the capability in terms of the changes in the hardware bits is beyond impractical. It is far more intelligible to say that, where the context allows, when we refer to the program we mean the logical structure that was created in the source code (in the context of the compiler) and then rearranged as the object code and embodied in hardware. Then we can indeed legitimately say that the behaviour is caused by the program. This is a rather roundabout convention but a vastly more useful one, and one that conforms to normal usage.
Although the cases are different, exactly the same approach can be taken to the mind and the brain. When I say “the mind” I refer to whatever ultra-complex arrangements of matter exist in the brain to enable it to function in the way that we normally associate with the behaviour of minds. With this convention there is no problem with the idea that minds can cause things. It follows that the mind, so defined, is a part of the causal relationships within the material world. Metaphysicians may find this unorthodox, but it is simply a formalisation of everyday usage in the light of basic neuroscience.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 1:58 pm Well, I wouldn't be worried about that at all. I think it's obvious that "predictability with (absolute) certainty is not possible epistemologically. But "predetermined" does mean "predictable with absolute certainty in principle" if not in fact.

In other words, if Determinism is true, then in theory, a master computer with an infinite capacity for data could predict what will happen before it does: or so they must believe. For they can only believe that if all the prior physical causes are set, then the outcome is 100% decided before it happens.

I mean predictability in principle, of course, and such examples as mathematical conjectures and searches show that determinism doesn't entail predictability even in principle.

The master computer (I am not the first to point out) cannot be part of the universe, otherwise it would have to describe itself as well as everything else, which gets into an infinite regress. How do you know such a computer could calculate any quicker than the original? It seems just as plausible that reproducing the complexity of the original would take just as long. But exploring further the implications of a hypothesis we don't actually believe seems a bit pointless....

RogerSH wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 7:17 pm

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 1:58 pm

RogerSH wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 9:15 am but only if the will is something apart from prior physical or ideal forces, which is just an assumption, and a very debatable one.

No, that's backwards. Determinism has to hold that the will is strictly a product of prior forces. A belief in free will allows that its not. So there's no "debate" allowed by the Determinist side: it's all or nothing, for them.

Can you accept computer data in the causal chain? Or software?

The Determinist (who is not me, of course) can accept computer data and software, but only because they are products of human engineering, and only because human engineering is itself also a product of prior forces.

Well, I'm a physicalist, and according to physics the multiverse is deterministic but any universe "strand" isn't.

The first thing we need to know about the Multiverse Hypothesis is that it's a "hypothesis," an imaginary model, not an empirical reality, of course. Worse still, if we understand the word "universe," then we also realize that if anything empirical were ever found to support the idea, it would, by definition be part of this "universe," not of some other one or a complex of them called the "Multiverse." So it's not only unscientific, but doomed to stay so.

The second thing is this: that an actual Physicalist cannot, by definition, accept any non-physical explanations of causality in any universe. If he does, he immediately ceases to be a Physicalist.

...that doesn't prevent there being very many processes that are deterministic.

Determinism is not merely the rather banal observation that some or even most things are physical. A person can believe in free will and not have a problem with that. Determinism means that there are NO non-physical causes in causal chain, and certainly none that initiate, or that can serve as a first-level explanation for any phenomenon or action.

In other words, Determinists believe that people don't make choices. Choices are made for people by prior forces, even if we are unaware of that.

And what I am arguing is that free will would be compatible with complete determinism,

Hmmm...it would not. Sorry, but the truth is that the two are mutually exclusive. Determinism is a denial of the very possibility of free will.

How can we explain the capabilities of the computer?

Computers are the products of human intelligence. So they represent no problem for free will. There's no actual analogy between computer and human. There are some figures of speech humans use to describe things computers do AS IF they were human functions (like "solving," "remembering," "assessing," and so on), but the truth is that computers do not understand the functions they perform. They are not capable of understanding anything.

Jori wrote: ↑Tue Jul 20, 2021 8:19 am When faced with a decision, the mind calculates the best choice.

It's possible to make whim choices, where you calculate nothing.

RogerSH wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 7:44 pm

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 1:58 pm Well, I wouldn't be worried about that at all. I think it's obvious that "predictability with (absolute) certainty is not possible epistemologically. But "predetermined" does mean "predictable with absolute certainty in principle" if not in fact.

In other words, if Determinism is true, then in theory, a master computer with an infinite capacity for data could predict what will happen before it does: or so they must believe. For they can only believe that if all the prior physical causes are set, then the outcome is 100% decided before it happens.

I mean predictability in principle, of course, and such examples as mathematical conjectures and searches show that determinism doesn't entail predictability even in principle.

That's because "prediction," as a word, is a description of what humans can or cannot know. Determinism, by contrast, is presented as a statement about what is actually true, whether humans know it or not.

The master computer (I am not the first to point out) cannot be part of the universe, otherwise it would have to describe itself as well as everything else, which gets into an infinite regress.

Right.

How do you know such a computer could calculate any quicker than the original?

It's not my postulate. I don't believe in it. I merely raised the example of an Ultimate Computer as an heuristic device, to illustrate how Determinism has to view the universe. Of course no such computer really exists...and it never could. It's a sort of illustrative fiction...rather like Determinism itself.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 8:22 pm That's because "prediction," as a word, is a description of what humans can or cannot know. Determinism, by contrast, is presented as a statement about what is actually true, whether humans know it or not.

I'm trying to make a further distinction: whether or not there is an algorithm by which the truth can be established. There are things that we can know, but don't know how to find out other than heuristically.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 8:14 pm The first thing we need to know about the Multiverse Hypothesis is that it's a "hypothesis," an imaginary model, not an empirical reality, of course. Worse still, if we understand the word "universe," then we also realize that if anything empirical were ever found to support the idea, it would, by definition be part of this "universe," not of some other one or a complex of them called the "Multiverse." So it's not only unscientific, but doomed to stay so.

I am speaking of the Everett interpretation of quantum theory, which I gather is increasingly popular among cosmologists, quantum computer buffs and others, in which the apparent universe is constantly splitting into different strands, so that "everything that can happen, does happen". Obviously, the "universe" on this understanding means something different from the metaphysical universe, rather "what we always thought was the universe". It is powerfully claimed to be the most parsimonious interpretation of current empirical knowledge. [Wallace, The Emergent Multiverse]

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Jul 27, 2021 8:14 pm The second thing is this: that an actual Physicalist cannot, by definition, accept any non-physical explanations of causality in any universe. If he does, he immediately ceases to be a Physicalist.

True! I mean I shall assume physicalism unless or until I find a good reason not to....