Philosophy Now Forum

Whay do I need a quote!?

How can induction be sceptical?

I write: "I don't think Hume is attacking a possible notion of necessary connections in nature."

Then you answer:

That is precisely what he is doing. Have you been reading Hume or a secondary source?

I believe I'm quite thorough on Hume in what this thread is about. I'm asking you if you can give a quote of Hume where he states that there are no necessary connections in nature since you say that Hume does just that.

If Hume's Custom or Habit isn't skeptical, then what is? It's like we tumble about in this world and throw out assertions wildly. No, I believe we are more rational than that and as I've pointed out with the factors 1. through 4., there's room for improvement.

Edit: You write:

Have you been reading Hume or a secondary source?

My leap into this problem has been initiated by George Couvalis, The Philosophy of Science - Science and Objectivity in the spring of 2000. From there, I've been reading various excerpts. I've been thinking you like to know. If you want to prove that I'm off the track regarding my knowledge of Hume, you should come up with some references, preferably to the original texts, but I like very much that you come up with quotes.

Aetixintro wrote:Is there some part of Leibniz's Monadology you like to cite in this regard? To my knowledge, this Hume's notion of custom or habit has been standing there like a rock for ages! I'm currently unaware of anyone trying to clear it out of the way.

Not really as my 'memory' is not up to it at present. You appeared to be proposing that 'all' can be 'understood' in the 'instant'? If so, then it sounds like a 'monad' as this can also be understood in this way?

You may want to look up something:
Problem of induction on Wikipedia
The Problem of Induction on SEP

Thanks but no thanks as I've had to do a course in this and i've forgotten my answers and do not, at present, wish to recall them(a thought I will chase is the "SEP" bit, as the acronym escapes me?

I have also made a thread about this over at Philosophyforums. Just throw some more, please! Cheers!

Out of courtesy and, of course, within the PN context I will follow this up and hope to contribute.

From section VII of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:

"We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connection. Some events seem conjoined but never connected. We have no idea of connection or power. And such ideas are absolutely without any meaning, either by philosophers or by any in common life. Because of our mind expecting an effect due to the custom of our experience, we project onto a cause a power that is not there. We project onto two events a connection which we feel in the mind and from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection."

I don't think this could be much clearer. Hume is clearly stating that we project necessary connections into the world through custom or habit.

Thanks for the answer, Rortabend.

I'll start with importing some from http://forums.philosophyforums.com/thre ... 894-2.html.
Hume in SECTION IV, PART I from AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING given in http://18th.eserver.org/hume-enquiry.html:

When I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference.

The reason for my interest in his knowledge of physics lies in this quote. I'm a little interested in snooker and there is no doubt that these people in the sport know what they're doing in playing those balls. There should be a very real possibility for constructing a machine that with a cue strikes a ball A with a given power into ball B and that the final position of ball B is known down to very minuteness even before the machine delivers the strike, ie. that the machine will be capable of doing this according to laws of nature. You let the machine strike the ball A once and then you reposition the balls. The following strikes are known, ie. final position of ball B! Thereby I find "...that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause?" strange indeed. It doesn't take much physics to understand that the assertion of Hume here is false.

What I note in your quote (of Fri Sep 18, 2009 11:47 am) is that Hume speaks of the idea "of power or necessary connection." It's also remarkable that the title of the two works relevant to Philosophy of Science relates to human nature by "A Treatise of Human Nature" and "An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding". It leads me to believe that, as I've written earlier, "I read Hume [such that Hume is] to assert a criticism of the abilities of consciousness to gain cognition of nature and nature's workings. As such, it's an internal view, bringing forward the fact that we are not intimate with nature to the degree that we can know what nature "is doing". So his view concentrates on the limitation of consciousness and doesn't say very much definitive about "laws of nature"." This means in short that we come up empty in regards to objective idea or knowledge of the necessary conncetions of nature. I speculate that if Hume has wanted to make a global skeptical argument in Epistemology he would have written a book about it and it's likewise in Philosophy of Science. He has had the option to be elaborate on nature in the external, "laws of nature" sense, but he fails to publish anything extensive. To interpret Hume in the sense that he's addressing relations outside the human nature scope of his works is to take it too far. He's simply to swift to bring about a plausible argument beyond this scope that is already mentioned.

However, if we look at it then what about chemical reactions such as making a bonfire from wood and the numerous other instances. When we are hungry, we need food to drive our biochemical engine or else we die. Let's take the example of the bicycle. You have this chain from the gearwheel with the pedals going back to the gearwheel with the bicycle-wheel. Certainly, we don't find a "chained" connection in nature like that. The necessary connections we are discussing are of the kind that it takes clouds in the sky for rain to happen. It takes combustible objects to make fire. It takes sturdy or hard materials to make constructions. I think I can continue endlessly.

I sense this isn't nailed to the wall yet. I'm not satisfied until "Hume's Custom or Habit" lies 6ft under. I'll see if I can improve with more posts or editions. Cheers!

Arising_uk,

Not really as my 'memory' is not up to it at present. You appeared to be proposing that 'all' can be 'understood' in the 'instant'? If so, then it sounds like a 'monad' as this can also be understood in this way?

We experience "all", the sum of laws of nature, in the "instant". This situation confounds us because it's so complex. Ideally, we like to "isolate" each feature, law, of nature by themselves and thus, we can be certain of this law having effect under given conditions. There's nothing unreasonable about this, although it may be incredibly difficult to make this ideal happen.

SEP - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

"...hope to contribute." I appreciate it!

I'm sorry to have replied to you in reverse order, but I've prioritised the most "dangerous" first. Hmm... and now the news!

The reason for my interest in his knowledge of physics lies in this quote. I'm a little interested in snooker and there is no doubt that these people in the sport know what they're doing in playing those balls. There should be a very real possibility for constructing a machine that with a cue strikes a ball A with a given power into ball B and that the final position of ball B is known down to very minuteness even before the machine delivers the strike, ie. that the machine will be capable of doing this according to laws of nature. You let the machine strike the ball A once and then you reposition the balls. The following strikes are known, ie. final position of ball B! Thereby I find "...that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause?" strange indeed. It doesn't take much physics to understand that the assertion of Hume here is false.

No offence but if this is your understanding to Hume it's a bit deficit. Can you see how logically anything is possible when two balls interact in billiards? This is the skepticism of induction.

Honestly, Wootah, do you think it's possible that objects begin to levitate tomorrow? The skepticism of induction is "Hume's Custom or Habit". When you write:

Can you see how logically anything is possible when two balls interact in billiards?

Are you implying there can be a nuclear explosion in this instance? In my machine example, are you in doubt that the machine delivers ball B by a strike on it to the exact location every time? If you have been reading me, logics and mathematics are a part of the solution of our unbreakable belief of the machine's deliverance of ball B. Let me repeat:

Factors
1. Consistency and coherency (deduced from Descartes' Meditations)
2. The sum of natural laws (the usual consideration of our beings in nature)
3. Logics and mathematics are necessary aspects of nature and our minds (I hold the view that logics and mathematics are for real in a variety of senses)

4. The factors of 1. through 3. bridge our experience from one instant to the next and so on. Forever?

5. Point beside: 1. through 4. refute, in my opinion, "Hume's Custom or Habit", the problem of induction.
...
This schema can be used in every instance of the universe.

Where's the deficiency of my understanding of Hume, "Hume's Custom or Habit"?

The reason for my interest in his knowledge of physics lies in this quote. I'm a little interested in snooker and there is no doubt that these people in the sport know what they're doing in playing those balls. There should be a very real possibility for constructing a machine that with a cue strikes a ball A with a given power into ball B and that the final position of ball B is known down to very minuteness even before the machine delivers the strike, ie. that the machine will be capable of doing this according to laws of nature. You let the machine strike the ball A once and then you reposition the balls. The following strikes are known, ie. final position of ball B! Thereby I find "...that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause?" strange indeed. It doesn't take much physics to understand that the assertion of Hume here is false.

False of what we have observed so far. How do you know it won't turn into a chicken next time? How do you know that emeralds are green and not grue? You can't solve the problem of induction with physics. It is a philosophical problem, not a scientific one.

Rortabend writes:

False of what we have observed so far. How do you know it won't turn into a chicken next time? How do you know that emeralds are green and not grue? You can't solve the problem of induction with physics. It is a philosophical problem, not a scientific one.

What is false? The notion of this machine and ball B? Why can't you address what I actually write? I agree that this problem isn't solved by physics, but I see it as philosophy to make it clear what foundations, assumptions, that we build on when we are in the world, both subjectively and objectively. It may be that I thereby can be able to put physics in a new light and also the consequences of its descriptions. I suggest that you reread the thread and make the appropriate quotes.

Goodman's Paradox is a wholly different argument and I really think it's possible to deal with Problem of Induction and Goodman's Paradox separately. Still, I'm trying to attack Goodman's Paradox also in the Epistemology section.

I am addressing what you write. I'll say it again just in case you missed it. You can't settle the problem of induction through experiments or an appeal to laws of nature. Both of these appeals rely on inductive reasoning so they are circular.

That's not true! We understand "laws of nature" differently. I believe you take it to be the result of the sciences, but I use it as ""2. The sum of "natural laws" alternatively known as the "necessary connections of nature" or "necessary structures of nature" (the usual consideration of our beings in nature)" from post: Thu Sep 17, 2009 4:07 pm as part of a response to yours:

Aexintro,

It is circular to invoke laws of nature to defend induction. Take this simplified example. In the past event B has always followed event A. If this happens enough times then we may say that 'If A then B' is a law of nature. In other words, we are saying that there is a necessary connection between the two events. Now Hume questions our justification for thinking in this way. For no matter how many times you see B follow A it is always possible that on the next occasion, B will not follow A. To invoke laws of nature to defend induction thus assumes the very thing that Hume calls into question, namely that inductive inferences are justifiable.

That is the post: Thu Sep 17, 2009 3:11 pm.

Please note that I use "the sum" of natural laws. I simply don't need to point at a specific "law of nature", "feature of nature" other than "lawfulness" in nature that enables patterns of all sorts including the emergence of life and consciousness! I find it cool!

We seem to be arguing past each other here. Let me restate my point in reply to yours. It doesn't matter how many laws of nature you use, whether this be 'a sum' or an abstract feature called 'lawfulness', you cannot use them to defend induction because they rely on induction themselves. Hence your argument will be circular. In case you think I'm wrong, tell me, how did you acquire your belief in 'lawfulness'?

Apart from the striking initial feature that I exist, I do think and when I analyse a chain of thoughts in this first, single span of time I find I can make consistent and coherent thoughts and my mind can be no different. I don't need to wonder if I still can think the next day! Primarily, then it's contradictive to your own life and mind and experience of this single span of time, instance, principally. To understand this, is to understand some of nature! No induction is needed!

Is it necessary for me to repeat this argument every day in order to believe in it? No! Once I've made my argument, I can rely on it for the rest of the future as being a part of my mental, intellectual history. It's the same with the external world. When I go to bed tonight, I can definitely rely on waking up tomorrow! Is this supposed to go away? No, not without a good reason for being so. This is the consequence of being serious about a single span of time, instance. Again, there's no induction here!

Is it necessary for me to repeat this argument every day in order to believe in it? No! Once I've made my argument, I can rely on it for the rest of the future as being a part of my mental, intellectual history. It's the same with the external world. When I go to bed tonight, I can definitely rely on wakening up tomorrow! Is this supposed to go away? No, not without a good reason for being so. This is the consequence of being serious about a single span of time, instance. Again, there's no induction here!

For someone who is against Hume you sound awfully like him! This is exactly his point. Our belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is custom or habit. Yet there is no logical reason why it should.

When I go to bed tonight, I can definitely rely on wakening up tomorrow without induction! It's the "lawfulness" of nature that is this way! In any case, it's the same lawfulness that is going to prevent me from wakening up tomorrow if anything! Thus "lawfulness" is on both sides (of the available two sides) of the situation. This is the last time! I point to necessity of nature, assumptions. Hume points to custom or habit. We are totally in disagreement! Besides, the word "definitely" excludes induction by default, but I guess this escapes you. Reread the thread?