Philosophy Now Forum

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Feb 13, 2021 4:36 pm re Stilley's Thesis

I have read through the major portion of Stilley's thesis.
Her thesis has rather a strong religious [Catholic] bent.
Stilley agreed Gewirth's argument is valid but have a bit of apprehension of Searle's argument for her purpose.

Here are some notable point re the Is-Ought Problem and her views on Gewirth's argument;
pages are according to my file not the original.

• She [Anscombe] argues that the emphatic Ought is only useful when utilized in certain contexts—such as within the context of a theory of a divine legislator—and that these contexts no longer exist or are obsolete.
  Like Hume and Moore, she too realizes that the theoretical issues involved in the notion of an Ought are legion and that a solution must be sought. -10
  
  Moreover, his [Searle’s] counterexample seems to be valid. -30
  Thus, it would seem that—in spite of objections to the contrary-- at least this revised derivation [of Searle’s] is valid.78 -40
  In regard to the question of whether the derivation commits any fallacies, there is no reason to suppose that the second formulation of Searle’s counter-argument even though his first formulation may seem to do so. -45
  
  .. there is no reason to conclude that Gewirth’s derivation cannot be imitated by natural law theorists.134 -66
  In principle, then, it would be possible for natural law theorists to imitate Gewirth’s derivation by imitating his methodology of starting from the perspective of the agent and relying on self-evident principles. -67

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Feb 14, 2021 9:28 am I am doing my best to explain my actions which is done specifically for my own selfish interests i.e. for efficiency sake from my own perspective. I don't think what I have done is extreme in any way nor it is a serious issue.

Right, so you're just doing it for your own purposes, and those purposes actually aren't that you think it leads to more thoughtful/worthwhile responses from others.

So far no critic of Gewirth's paper has raised that point.

A big part of what you want to be doing in a philosophical context is thinking stuff that you never thought before, in a manner where you really challenge yourself. So that you'd have to think about something you never encountered before, think about something that challenges you to think in a way that you never thought before, so that you can successfully meet the challenge within the limitations set up, is a good thing. That's a lot of the value to philosophy.

Re the rest of your comment, you're getting confused over concentrating on the standard philosophical distinction of action/actor/etc. (What Gewirth is explaining there is a standard distinction).

I should have quoted more and explained this in more detail, I suppose but here's a fuller explanation of the problem. The argument goes:

"When we act, we do so for a purpose. From the perspective of the moral agent, doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are good in at least some sense. The very fact that the agent sees P as worthy of pursuit implies that P is of value to the agent. It also implies that the agent sees X as being of value insofar it is the means of attaining P."

Let's take "helping a little old lady across the street" as an example of X--something we do in a moral context. (The example could be anything; I'm just giving a simple one; it doesn't matter what the example would be, though, if you don't like this one.)

Re you getting confused via sidetracking on "action," re that standard distinction in philosophy, X is an action as long as S (the actor performing the action) is doing X intentionally--they have in mind, as a conscious thought/motivation, "I'm going to help this little old lady across the street." No one is disputing this part. So it's an action or "purposive" in that sense.

What's at dispute is this: the claim that the moral agent is doing X for purpose P, where P is not identical to X. Gewirth's argument apparently hinges on a claim that such scenarios are universal.

My objection at this early stage is that that is not always the case. S will often do X with no other motivation than doing X; there often is no underlying motivation or purpose P.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sun Feb 14, 2021 4:38 pm Re the rest of your comment, you're getting confused over concentrating on the standard philosophical distinction of action/actor/etc. (What Gewirth is explaining there is a standard distinction).

NOPE! I am not confused.
I am sticking to represent what is Gewirth's intention, not expressing my own views.
You have to counter Gewirth's argument where he has qualified what he meant by 'action' in the strict sense.
If you argue otherwise that would be a straw man.

I should have quoted more and explained this in more detail, I suppose but here's a fuller explanation of the problem. The argument goes:

"When we act, we do so for a purpose. From the perspective of the moral agent, doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are good in at least some sense. The very fact that the agent sees P as worthy of pursuit implies that P is of value to the agent. It also implies that the agent sees X as being of value insofar it is the means of attaining P."

Do you agree with Gewirth's definition of 'action' in the strict sense? If not, whatever you counter would be a straw man.

If you agree, note again, his definition of action re purposiveness [linked above];

• By 'purposive' I mean that the agent intends to do what he does, envisaging some purpose or goal which may consist
  • either in the performance of the action itself
    or in some outcome of that performance;
  in either case, insofar as it is the purpose of his action the agent regards it as some sort of good.
  Gewirth pg 48

Let's take "helping a little old lady across the street" as an example of X--something we do in a moral context. (The example could be anything; I'm just giving a simple one; it doesn't matter what the example would be, though, if you don't like this one.)

Re you getting confused via sidetracking on "action," re that standard distinction in philosophy, X is an action as long as S (the actor performing the action) is doing X intentionally--they have in mind, as a conscious thought/motivation, "I'm going to help this little old lady across the street." No one is disputing this part. So it's an action or "purposive" in that sense.

What's at dispute is this: the claim that the moral agent is doing X for purpose P, where P is not identical to X. Gewirth's argument apparently hinges on a claim that such scenarios are universal.

My objection at this early stage is that that is not always the case. S will often do X with no other motivation than doing X; there often is no underlying motivation or purpose P.

I am not confused.
I am sticking to represent what is Gewirth's intention, not expressing my own views.

As per Gewirth's definition of 'purposiveness' i.e. one of the purpose is related to
in some outcome of that performance - see above.
which is
"the old lady is helped to cross the street"
is good because otherwise she could be killed by a vehicle driven by a person.
Note the moral standard 'no human ought to kill another'

Gewirth's "action is the strict sense" is qualified to a point where action is reducible to some intention [subliminal, spontaneous or deliberated] anticipating some purpose that is good [morally] {or evil which is not the topic here}.

As far as Gewirth's intention is concern P [purpose] is always linked to X [action] of S, otherwise the actions are the exceptions Gewirth stated above.

Point is you'll need to read Gewirth's paper to give a proper counter.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Feb 15, 2021 6:25 am
I am not confused.
I am sticking to represent what is Gewirth's intention, not expressing my own views.

As per Gewirth's definition of 'purposiveness' i.e. one of the purpose is related to
in some outcome of that performance - see above.
which is
"the old lady is helped to cross the street"
is good because otherwise she could be killed by a vehicle driven by a person.
Note the moral standard 'no human ought to kill another'

Gewirth's "action is the strict sense" is qualified to a point where action is reducible to some intention [subliminal, spontaneous or deliberated] anticipating some purpose that is good [morally] {or evil which is not the topic here}.

As far as Gewirth's intention is concern P [purpose] is always linked to X [action] of S, otherwise the actions are the exceptions Gewirth stated above.

Point is you'll need to read Gewirth's paper to give a proper counter.

You completely ignored my more detailed explanation of the objection. Are you capable of understanding the more detailed explanation of the objection and addressing it?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 15, 2021 4:34 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Feb 15, 2021 6:25 am
I am not confused.
I am sticking to represent what is Gewirth's intention, not expressing my own views.

As per Gewirth's definition of 'purposiveness' i.e. one of the purpose is related to
in some outcome of that performance - see above.
which is
"the old lady is helped to cross the street"
is good because otherwise she could be killed by a vehicle driven by a person.
Note the moral standard 'no human ought to kill another'

Gewirth's "action is the strict sense" is qualified to a point where action is reducible to some intention [subliminal, spontaneous or deliberated] anticipating some purpose that is good [morally] {or evil which is not the topic here}.

As far as Gewirth's intention is concern P [purpose] is always linked to X [action] of S, otherwise the actions are the exceptions Gewirth stated above.

Point is you'll need to read Gewirth's paper to give a proper counter.

You completely ignored my more detailed explanation of the objection. Are you capable of understanding the more detailed explanation of the objection and addressing it?

I am very determined and aggressive in dealing with relevant counters to my accepted arguments. With high intellectual integrity, there is no way I will run from it nor let it go.
As you can see I am doing my best in attempting to address your argument.

If I missed your point, you have to make it more simpler.
Btw, you are the handicap one since you did not read Gewirth's paper [re this OP] but rather depend on secondary sources.
In addition, we are approaching the issue from two very contrasting paradigms which I believe your paradigm is groundless and illusory.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Feb 16, 2021 5:54 am Btw, you are the handicap one since you did not read Gewirth's paper

Didn't I already address that? Maybe I didn't because I didn't want to go off on a tangent. I've read it and a lot of secondary literature about it.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Feb 16, 2021 5:54 am

Alright, to make it simpler, Gewirth is saying that when we act (morally), we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to the action we undertook in X. Do you agree with this?

[quote="Veritas Aequitas" post_id=495627 time=1613027606 user_id=7896]
In addition to the above, one of [b]the strongest argument [/b]against the is-ought problem and its resolution is from [color=#BF0000][b]Alan Gerwith[/color][/b]'s;
[/quote]

"One of the strongest" could be literally anything down to the second weakest. And it's not particularly strong because it's obtuse.

No, the strongest argument is this:
a) OUGHTs exist
b) There is nowhere for OUGHTs to come from but ISes.
Therefore OUGHTs come from ISes.

It's logically sound, valid, and true. The fact that you're depending on a more complex answer shows you don't understand the question.

How OUGHTs come from ISes is an empirical question. The nature of morality is semantic.

Advocate wrote: ↑Tue Feb 16, 2021 3:51 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Feb 11, 2021 8:13 am In addition to the above, one of the strongest argument against the is-ought problem and its resolution is from Alan Gerwith's;

"One of the strongest" could be literally anything down to the second weakest. And it's not particularly strong because it's obtuse.

No, the strongest argument is this:
a) OUGHTs exist
b) There is nowhere for OUGHTs to come from but ISes.
Therefore OUGHTs come from ISes.

It's logically sound, valid, and true. The fact that you're depending on a more complex answer shows you don't understand the question.

How OUGHTs come from ISes is an empirical question. The nature of morality is semantic.

Right, the whole issue is whether any facts imply any moral stances a la a logical implication. It's not that people are saying that "Joe feels that we ought to help elderly folks cross intersections" isn't a fact about Joe, or that they're saying that "Joe feels that we ought to help elderly folks cross intersections" isn't a fact about Joe's brain--how it works/how it functions. No one is saying anything like that.

The issue is whether "Elderly folks get hit crossing intersections more often than other demographics," assuming that would be a fact, implies "One ought to help elderly folks cross intersections."

[quote="Terrapin Station" post_id=496595 time=1613487783 user_id=12582]
[quote=Advocate post_id=496587 time=1613487086 user_id=15238]
[quote="Veritas Aequitas" post_id=495627 time=1613027606 user_id=7896]
In addition to the above, one of [b]the strongest argument [/b]against the is-ought problem and its resolution is from [color=#BF0000][b]Alan Gerwith[/color][/b]'s;
[/quote]

"One of the strongest" could be literally anything down to the second weakest. And it's not particularly strong because it's obtuse.

No, the strongest argument is this:
a) OUGHTs exist
b) There is nowhere for OUGHTs to come from but ISes.
Therefore OUGHTs come from ISes.

It's logically sound, valid, and true. The fact that you're depending on a more complex answer shows you don't understand the question.

How OUGHTs come from ISes is an empirical question. The nature of morality is semantic.
[/quote]

Right, the whole issue is whether any facts [i]imply [/i]any moral stances a la a logical implication. It's not that people are saying that "Joe feels that we ought to help elderly folks cross intersections" isn't a fact about Joe, or that they're saying that "Joe feels that we ought to help elderly folks cross intersections" isn't a fact about Joe's brain--how it works/how it functions. No one is saying anything like that.

The issue is whether "Elderly folks get hit crossing intersections more often than other demographics," assuming that would be a fact, [i]implies[/i] "One ought to help elderly folks cross intersections."
[/quote]

Whether we should help old folks is a different question than whether OUGHTs come from ISes. In particular circumstances, particular variables must be balanced. There is no implication in that particular IS about that particular OUGHT because you left out the variables of what we want, individually and collectively. It IS the case that most people, especially old ones, believe we should protect old people. Morality IS a contingent understanding and the link through those contingencies to proper actions is always a distinct, circumstance dependent question.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Feb 16, 2021 3:10 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Feb 16, 2021 5:54 am

Alright, to make it simpler, Gewirth is saying that when we act (morally), we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to the action we undertook in X. Do you agree with this?

No I do not agree with,
"that when we act (morally), we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to the action we undertook in X."

I am not sure what you meant by 'identical'.

This what what Stilley wrote;

• "
  In step one, Gewirth comments on the fact when we act, we do so for a purpose.
  
  From the perspective of the moral agent, doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are good in at least some sense.
  The very fact that the agent sees P as worthy of pursuit implies that P is of value to the agent.
  It also implies that the agent sees X as being of value insofar it is the means of attaining P."

Stilley further added;

• "Gewirth admits that although X and P are not necessarily seen by the agent as morally valuable, the very fact that they are seen as worthy of pursuit implies that they are of value and therefore good in at least an instrumental sense."110

So, in alignment with the above why don't you state accordingly,

• When S act, S do so for a purpose.
  when S act (morally), doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are [morally] good in at least some sense.

My addition comments to the above is,
When S act, S do so for a purpose.
The purpose may be explicit and conscious to S, e.g.
when S eat food, his purpose is to satisfy his hunger which is good for his well-being.
But there is an underlying hidden purpose which is generic to human nature, i.e. to survive and avoid premature death.

That is the "should/ought" you mentioned here,

• Isn't there an "embedded" "should/ought" in ensuring human survival, improved human well-being and constructing a hospitable environment? And aren't there "embedded" "should/oughts" in what counts as human well-being?
  viewtopic.php?p=496890#p496890

Besides the DNA/RNA embedded "should/ought" to eat to ensure human survival, there are other DNA/RNA embedded "should/ought" related to morality [as defined] e.g. the 'ougth-not-to_ness to kill humans.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Feb 17, 2021 6:30 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Feb 16, 2021 3:10 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Feb 16, 2021 5:54 am

Alright, to make it simpler, Gewirth is saying that when we act (morally), we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to the action we undertook in X. Do you agree with this?

No I do not agree with,
"that when we act (morally), we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to the action we undertook in X."

I am not sure what you meant by 'identical'.

Note that the issue isn't whether you agree with this. The issue is whether this is what Gewirth's argument is.

Re "identical," I had explained this already in the earlier post, but here's the idea again.

So let's say that the moral act in question is helping an elderly person cross an intersection. So that's X--"helping an elderly person across the road."

The next step is the purpose P, "behind" the moral action. If P is identical to X, then P is "helping an elderly person across the road."

So you're disagreeing that Gewirth's argument hinges on saying that when we act morally, we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to X.

Or in other words, you're saying that Gewirth's argument can be fulfilled by saying that when we act morally, we (at least sometimes) do X ("helping an elderly person across the road"), for purpose P ("helping an elderly person across the road"). Is this correct?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:21 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Feb 17, 2021 6:30 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Feb 16, 2021 3:10 pm

Alright, to make it simpler, Gewirth is saying that when we act (morally), we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to the action we undertook in X. Do you agree with this?

No I do not agree with,
"that when we act (morally), we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to the action we undertook in X."

I am not sure what you meant by 'identical'.

Note that the issue isn't whether you agree with this. The issue is whether this is what Gewirth's argument is.

I do not agree with your using strawman for Gewirth's argument.

Gewirth did not use the term 'identical'.
Presumably you intend it to be A = A, the law of identity? If so, NAH, this not applicable in this case.

Re "identical," I had explained this already in the earlier post, but here's the idea again.

So let's say that the moral act in question is helping an elderly person cross an intersection. So that's X--"helping an elderly person across the road."

The next step is the purpose P, "behind" the moral action. If P is identical to X, then P is "helping an elderly person across the road."

So you're disagreeing that Gewirth's argument hinges on saying that when we act morally, we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to X.

Or in other words, you're saying that Gewirth's argument can be fulfilled by saying that when we act morally, we (at least sometimes) do X ("helping an elderly person across the road"), for purpose P ("helping an elderly person across the road"). Is this correct?

The above is a strawman.
Gewirth did not use the term 'identical'.

In my earlier posts I suggested why don't you state something like,

• When S act, S do so for a purpose.
  when S act (morally), doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are [morally] good in at least some sense.

which is directly in alignments with Gewirth's intention.
Note Stilley stated 'both X and P' are morally good, not just P.

Note 'purpose P' is not merely "helping an elderly person across the road" [which is of value to the elderly person]
but also include the inherent purpose [ moral obligation] of S to take the action which is related to morality's core maxim, i.e. 'no humans ought to be killed by another or prematuredly*'
* non-natural death.

Thus "helping an elderly person across the road" is an obvious purpose to S, but there is also a subliminally triggered moral purpose that S is achieving and has value to S but he may or may not reflect upon.
Where S feels very happy with his action and for other non-moral reasons, that is not relevant to this point.

Therefore all cases of actions qualified as benevolent are reducible to morality, moral facts and its physical referents in the brain.
Note Gewirth identified 'actions' which do not qualify for the above considerations.

All the academics in the world and in history haven't produced a useful version of philosophy yet so maybe their tools of symbolic logic and obscure jargon aren't the right tools for the job?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Feb 18, 2021 8:25 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:21 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Feb 17, 2021 6:30 am
No I do not agree with,
"that when we act (morally), we do X for purpose P, where P is not identical to the action we undertook in X."

I am not sure what you meant by 'identical'.

Note that the issue isn't whether you agree with this. The issue is whether this is what Gewirth's argument is.

I do not agree with your using strawman for Gewirth's argument.

Gewirth did not use the term 'identical'.

Holy moly. I'm not saying he used that term.

I'm saying, that re Gewirth's argument, re "When we act (morally), we do X for purpose P"

Either it's going to be the case that he's saying that P can be identical to X

OR

It's going to be the case that he's saying that P is not (in any case) identical to X.

Do you agree with this simple dichotomy? Yes or no.

If no, then what would you say is a third option?