Advocate wrote: ↑Wed Oct 21, 2020 6:06 pm
...any questions that can be answered logically but not empirically and do not depend on perspective.
Is this definition necessary and sufficient?
Not sufficient certainly, and rather misleading.
Metaphysics traditionally consists of three things:
(1) "First principles"
(2) "Natural theology"
(3) Ontology
First principles are probably most familiar to contemporary people with an interest in philosophy via Kant's transcendental arguments. They're basically logical requirements or logical implications for things to be as they are (or if one has more of an epistemological bent, as Kant did, for things to be experienced as they are). To keep more of a metaphysical rather than epistemological bent, we would say that first principles are the "logical grounding of existence" or of nature per se.
Natural theology has been largely subsumed into philosophy of religion. Natural theology was largely concerned with arguments for God's existence, but it also included stuff like analysis of the divine nature or the world in general.
Ontology is the bulk of metaphysics in contemporary practice. Ontology is "philosophy of existence"--and it's a bit like the philosophical counterpart to physics. Ontology focuses on the nature of the world qua the world,
without a focus on epistemological concerns, unless one is prone to idealism or solipsism (in which case one believes that the world is solely mind, or can only be known (in more of an acquaintance sense)
as mind). Ontology looks at what things are/how they exist/what the nature of their existence is, etc., and specific popular topics include things like identity (including through time), time itself, relations including part/whole relations (aka mereology), the notion of ontic simples ("monads" were Leibniz' version of these), whether there are any real abstracts, whether there are any real types/"forms" etc. and so on. Ontology is often very focused on empirical data, but as philosophy, it doesn't really do empirical experiments, per se (otherwise it would just be science. . .there is plenty of overlap/quite a fuzzy boundary sometimes).
Whether anything in metaphysics/ontology depends on perspective is itself going to come down to one's particular ontological views. On my view, perspective is inescapable, but where I stress that I'm not using "perspective" to refer to mentality, I'm using it to refer to a broader sense of "situatedness," somewhat akin to how perspective is used in the visual arts.