How there could be more than one Mind?

[bahman]

Is that a yes or a no?

We experience our thoughts using Mind.

How do we think without a mind?

We cannot experience without Mind hence we cannot think without Mind.

You've not answered my question.

Does a mind know what it thinks yes or no.

No, Mind doesn't know what it thinks. Mind simply allows experience, decision and act.

[bahman]

Mind is what a brain of peculiar and particular complexity, embedded in a body of peculiar and particular complexity, embedded in the world, does (and that's all mind is, and ain't that enough?) So there's gonna be as many minds as there are brains/bodies.

What is your definition of mind?

[henry quirk]

As I said, mind (self-referring thinking) is what a certain kind of brain in a certain kind of body does, in the same way legs do walking.

[Terrapin Station]

As I noted a couple times, yes, "Mind" is a catch-all term for all the mental states we have. I don't think there's anything useless about that either semantically--it's useful to have a catch-all term like that, or existentially, as those varieties of mental states are allowing me to reason and type this, for example. I find that quite handy.

The problem is that you don't believe in laws of nature.

Why is that a problem in the context of my comment above?

What is the use of experience under materialism?

It depends on the experience, of course, but here's a real-life example: Just about a half-hour ago, I bought a bunch of stuff I needed from the drug store a couple blocks from my apartment. One of the things I bought was garbage bags. When I got home and unpacked my purchases, the garbage bags weren't there. I double-checked my receipt and went back to the store. Sure enough, the clerk still had my garbage bags behind the counter.

That's all made possible by the ability to have experiences.

You defined mind as a set mental states. We however have ability to experience, decide and act. Why we should experience mental state at all?

Mental states are experiences. It's a stream of awareness of both external and internal phenomena. A more pertinent question would be why we should have any sort of mental state that we don't experience (or why we'd believe that we do).

Do you believe in causality?

Yes, I believe that some events involve causality.

Well, we cannot have one mind and different beings under materialism.

Sure you could. One SciFi scenario for how that could work is that the one mind functions like a central radio station which then broadcasts its signal to creatures like humans, where their brains act like receivers.

If what you say is true then what is the difference between mind and matter? Mind simply a form of matter.

Right. On my personal view, there is no difference. Minds are matter.

[bahman]

As I said, mind (self-referring thinking) is what a certain kind of brain in a certain kind of body does, in the same way legs do walking.

How what brain does should be so rich? Could you explain how what a brain does should reach to experience?

[bahman]

As I noted a couple times, yes, "Mind" is a catch-all term for all the mental states we have. I don't think there's anything useless about that either semantically--it's useful to have a catch-all term like that, or existentially, as those varieties of mental states are allowing me to reason and type this, for example. I find that quite handy.

The problem is that you don't believe in laws of nature.

Why is that a problem in the context of my comment above?

The problem is that you cannot explain how matter move under materialism unless you don't believe in laws of nature.

What is the use of experience under materialism?

It depends on the experience, of course, but here's a real-life example: Just about a half-hour ago, I bought a bunch of stuff I needed from the drug store a couple blocks from my apartment. One of the things I bought was garbage bags. When I got home and unpacked my purchases, the garbage bags weren't there. I double-checked my receipt and went back to the store. Sure enough, the clerk still had my garbage bags behind the counter.

That's all made possible by the ability to have experiences.

You are of course ignoring that you cannot explain experience under materialism.

You defined mind as a set mental states. We however have ability to experience, decide and act. Why we should experience mental state at all?

Mental states are experiences. It's a stream of awareness of both external and internal phenomena. A more pertinent question would be why we should have any sort of mental state that we don't experience (or why we'd believe that we do).

I am mostly interested to understand how a mental state, simply a specific configuration of electromagnetic field, could lead to experience.

Do you believe in causality?

Yes, I believe that some events involve causality.

Can you give me an example of non-causal event?

Well, we cannot have one mind and different beings under materialism.

Sure you could. One SciFi scenario for how that could work is that the one mind functions like a central radio station which then broadcasts its signal to creatures like humans, where their brains act like receivers.

I agree on this.

If what you say is true then what is the difference between mind and matter? Mind simply a form of matter.

Right. On my personal view, there is no difference. Minds are matter.

Cool. So you know how experiences arises from mental states?

[henry quirk]

"How what brain does should be so rich? Could you explain how what a brain does should reach to experience?"

The human brain is one of the most complex, dynamic, organic structures in the universe (as far as we know). A compact information processor of incredible capacity -- like a human brain -- embedded in an effective body -- with all its means of apprehending information -- apparently results in 'self', an 'I'.

Honestly, though, I got no clue how it all works.

However, in the absence of any evidence for 'soul' or 'spirit' I gotta go with a mundane, if mysterious, explanation of why I am 'I'.

I see no profit in postulatin' etherealness just cuz I don't have a handle on 'mind'.

[Terrapin Station]

The problem is that you cannot explain how matter move under materialism unless you don't believe in laws of nature.

First, the comment that you are saying this in response to has nothing to do with explaining how matter moves. So even if that were a problem when one isn't a realist on physical laws, your comment about this, in context, would be irrelevant.

Next, certainly no one is going to be an antirealist on physical laws if being an antirealist on physical laws results in not being able to explain how matter moves. One would have to be a moron to take a position where it's clear that one thus cannot explain how matter moves, right?

But likewise, one would have to be a moron to assume that people are going to buy stances where they subsequently can't explain how matter moves.

So the conclusion to reach is this: "Antirealists probably can explain, at least in their view, how matter moves, even though I may not understand how they explain it and/or might not agree with them."

So how do antirealists explain how matter moves? Well, here's one way: we say things like, "This oxygen atom o moved with respect to these two hydrogen atoms, h1 and h2 because of the interaction of their electrons with their nuclei--they entered into a covalent bond." We don't believe that we're saying something about an extramental physical law when we say things like that. We believe that we're saying something about a way that a lot of atoms tend to behave, and we talk and think about it instrumentally in terms of physical laws.

You are of course ignoring that you cannot explain experience under materialism.

You didn't say anything about explaining anything. You asked what use experiences are under materialism. When you ask me what use they are, I'll tell you what use they are. If you want an explanation, I'll give you an explanation:

The explanation is that a property of our brains, in particular structures, undergoing particular processes, is mental phenomena such as awareness of visual data that we conceptually count as "the store," "garbage bags," etc., conceptualization being another type of brain process (namely that of abstraction into types). Our brains gain the visual data by lightwaves interacting with our eyes, which then send information via optic nerves to our brains, which then process the information via neurons enterting particular states, via singals traveling along synapses, etc.

That's an explanation, a rather sketchy explanation, but I'm not about to type thousands of words or something like that, because I know it's ultimately going to be a waste of time, of experience qua materialism.

I am mostly interested to understand how a mental state, simply a specific configuration of electromagnetic field, could lead to experience.

Lord knows why you think we're talking only about electromagnetic fields.

Can you give me an example of non-causal event?

I have to give you examples of events that might be causal or acausal. We can never know with any certainty, which is probably what you're really wanting. An example of an event that might be acausal: an apple falling off of the tree in my backyard. An example of an event that might be causal: an apple falling off the tree in my backyard.

Again, the point being that we don't really know what events are causal or acausal. There's a difference between instrumental explanations and what's really the case ontologically. I'm sure you're looking for that latter. All we really have in this case is the former.

I agree on this.

Cool--one thing that we agree on at long last. So we could possibly have one mind and many beings under materialism.

Cool. So you know how experiences arises from mental states?

Yes, I explained that above.

[bahman]

First, the comment that you are saying this in response to has nothing to do with explaining how matter moves. So even if that were a problem when one isn't a realist on physical laws, your comment about this, in context, would be irrelevant.

Well, I am not sure about what you said. I think the problem started from the point that I argued that dualism is the only approach since monist/materialist cannot explain the subject matter well when it come to consciousness. This problem arises when we realize that matter moves based on laws of nature so being conscious of the state of matter is irrelevant hence materialism is logically impossible.

Next, certainly no one is going to be an antirealist on physical laws if being an antirealist on physical laws results in not being able to explain how matter moves. One would have to be a moron to take a position where it's clear that one thus cannot explain how matter moves, right?

Yes.

But likewise, one would have to be a moron to assume that people are going to buy stances where they subsequently can't explain how matter moves.

Yes.

So the conclusion to reach is this: "Antirealists probably can explain, at least in their view, how matter moves, even though I may not understand how they explain it and/or might not agree with them."

I haven't hear of any anti-realist explanation on how matter moves.

So how do antirealists explain how matter moves? Well, here's one way: we say things like, "This oxygen atom o moved with respect to these two hydrogen atoms, h1 and h2 because of the interaction of their electrons with their nuclei--they entered into a covalent bond." We don't believe that we're saying something about an extramental physical law when we say things like that. We believe that we're saying something about a way that a lot of atoms tend to behave, and we talk and think about it instrumentally in terms of physical laws.

The example that you are using is in fact a realistic view.

You didn't say anything about explaining anything. You asked what use experiences are under materialism. When you ask me what use they are, I'll tell you what use they are. If you want an explanation, I'll give you an explanation:

The explanation is that a property of our brains, in particular structures, undergoing particular processes, is mental phenomena such as awareness of visual data that we conceptually count as "the store," "garbage bags," etc., conceptualization being another type of brain process (namely that of abstraction into types). Our brains gain the visual data by lightwaves interacting with our eyes, which then send information via optic nerves to our brains, which then process the information via neurons enterting particular states, via singals traveling along synapses, etc.

That's an explanation, a rather sketchy explanation, but I'm not about to type thousands of words or something like that, because I know it's ultimately going to be a waste of time, of experience qua materialism.

I doubt that whether we will be able to understand consciousness under materialism.

I have to give you examples of events that might be causal or acausal. We can never know with any certainty, which is probably what you're really wanting. An example of an event that might be acausal: an apple falling off of the tree in my backyard. An example of an event that might be causal: an apple falling off the tree in my backyard.

You example is of course causal.

Cool--one thing that we agree on at long last. So we could possibly have one mind and many beings under materialism.

Actually I have problem with that framework: how our experience under that framework could be local?

Yes, I explained that above.

You really didn't explain it. No one yet does not know it.

[Terrapin Station]

So how do antirealists explain how matter moves? Well, here's one way: we say things like, "This oxygen atom o moved with respect to these two hydrogen atoms, h1 and h2 because of the interaction of their electrons with their nuclei--they entered into a covalent bond." We don't believe that we're saying something about an extramental physical law when we say things like that. We believe that we're saying something about a way that a lot of atoms tend to behave, and we talk and think about it instrumentally in terms of physical laws.

The example that you are using is in fact a realistic view.

How can you read what I wrote and say that? "We don't believe that we're saying something about an extramental physical law when we say things like that." That makes it not realist.

I doubt that whether we will be able to understand consciousness under materialism.

And yet I just explained it.

You example is of course causal.

Again, it's as if you're not reading what I'm writing or you're not able to understand it. It could be an example of something causal or acausal. If you're telling me that you assume that it's causal, that's fine, but I'm pointing out that you're assuming that it's causal.

Actually I have problem with that framework: how our experience under that framework could be local?

You're like a radio receiving the signal from the central radio station.

You really didn't explain it.

I say I did. So we must disagree on what an explanation is.

[bahman]

So how do antirealists explain how matter moves? Well, here's one way: we say things like, "This oxygen atom o moved with respect to these two hydrogen atoms, h1 and h2 because of the interaction of their electrons with their nuclei--they entered into a covalent bond." We don't believe that we're saying something about an extramental physical law when we say things like that. We believe that we're saying something about a way that a lot of atoms tend to behave, and we talk and think about it instrumentally in terms of physical laws.

The example that you are using is in fact a realistic view.

How can you read what I wrote and say that? "We don't believe that we're saying something about an extramental physical law when we say things like that." That makes it not realist.

I have problem understanding your comment. Could you please elaborate?

I doubt that whether we will be able to understand consciousness under materialism.

And yet I just explained it.

No you didn't. We don't have yet a theory which explain how experience could emerge from electromagnetic field.

You example is of course causal.

Again, it's as if you're not reading what I'm writing or you're not able to understand it. It could be an example of something causal or acausal. If you're telling me that you assume that it's causal, that's fine, but I'm pointing out that you're assuming that it's causal.

I reread your comment several times. Your example is causal.

Actually I have problem with that framework: how our experience under that framework could be local?

You're like a radio receiving the signal from the central radio station.

And I said that there is a problem related to experiencing locally.

You really didn't explain it.

I say I did. So we must disagree on what an explanation is.

Yes, I disagree with your explanation.

[NielsBohr]

Lets define Mind and Mental state first. Mind is the essence of every beings with the abilities which allow experiences, decides and acts. Mental state is what Mind can experience and act upon. We know by fact that the experience decision and act are local phenomena. Mind however does not have any location since it is not mental state.

Now lets consider many beings and one Mind. One Mind allows that experiences to happen locally, where we are. The acts also happen locally after decisions are made. Now lets consider two Minds and many beings. Two Minds allows that the experiences as previous case. The decisions and acts are made in two different Minds hence we could have the conflict in decisions. Therefore we could only have one Mind.

Frankly speaking, your question about mind is the same as for the matter... and this is most probably why the alchemists guessed the transmutation.

In fact, why were there serval kinds of things, because from the alchemists guess, come the question: "Then, why were there matter different from mind?"

And, in any case this question were about to be solved, then: Why were the different dimensions (distance and time).

For me, such complexities were a justification for God.

[Terrapin Station]

No you didn't. We don't have yet a theory which explain how experience could emerge from electromagnetic field.

No one believes that consciousness "emerges from electromagnetic fields" per se.

[bahman]

No you didn't. We don't have yet a theory which explain how experience could emerge from electromagnetic field.

No one believes that consciousness "emerges from electromagnetic fields" per se.

You cannot equate consciousness to electromagnetic filed since otherwise any thing with electromagnetic field is conscious. In another hand the only stuff you have inside a brain is electromagnetic field hence consciousness can only be emerged from specific configuration of electromagnetic field.

[Terrapin Station]

No you didn't. We don't have yet a theory which explain how experience could emerge from electromagnetic field.

No one believes that consciousness "emerges from electromagnetic fields" per se.

You cannot equate consciousness to electromagnetic filed

And again, NO ONE BELIEVES that consciousness "emerges from electromagnetic fields" per se, so it's not something we have to worry about. No one is equating the two.