Philosophy Now Forum

Yeah, he's talking about the web of belief. That's not the same thing. He means something like confidence. Confidence and infallibility have little to do with one another, despite the fact that we can safely place confidence in what is infallible.

Just because we are certain about something does not mean it is correct. Just because something is infallible does not mean we are certain about it.

Jaded Sage wrote:Yeah, he's talking about the web of belief. That's not the same thing. He means something like confidence. Confidence and infallibility have little to do with one another, despite the fact that we can safely place confidence in what is infallible.

Just because we are certain about something does not mean it is correct. Just because something is infallible does not mean we are certain about it.

Thanks for the clarification, but I'm still uneasy. Focusing only on your final sentence for the time being, I'd refer you back to the first paragraph of my first post. It makes no sense to me to say that a thing ("something") is fallible or infallible. Fallibility and infallibility are surely properties of our (putative) knowledge; not the objects of that (putative) knowledge.

If fallibility and infallibility are not properties of knowledge, may I ask what you take them to be properties of? Statements perhaps? But then the answer to the original question ("Is there anything infallible?") is trivially YES! Of course some statements are true; the question we ought to be addressing, as I see it, is that of our knowledge of the truth of these statements. In other words, are there any statements whose truth WE cannot be wrong about.

I grant that we do apply the terms to other things than knowledge: we might say for example that God, Donald Trump, or even the Pope, is infallible. I'd take such cases to be elliptical for saying God (or the Pope) has only true beliefs; all of that which he takes to be knowledge really is knowledge -- unlike the rest of us who doubtless think we know certain things, but are in fact mistaken.

I may well be confused, nevertheless I'm enjoying hearing your views. I wonder how other members view the matter...

Durian_Freak wrote:I may well be confused, nevertheless I'm enjoying hearing your views. I wonder how other members view the matter...

Oh Christ, you just had to open Pandora's Box.

Yeah, you are a bit confused. When I say "something" I'm not referring to an object, but what could be something like knowledge.

Durian Freak wrote:
It seems to me that the truth of a statement S is known with certainty is just another way of saying our knowledge of the truth
of statement S is infallible. If a proposition is known with certainty then we cannot be wrong about it which is simply to say we
enjoy infallible knowledge of that proposition

It is possible that a proposition is only assumed to be known with certainty. Now an axiomatically deductive system of logic like mathematics
can determine the truth value of a proposition as it uses proof to validate its conclusions. But an inductive system like science uses evidence
that is less rigorous than proof so more susceptible to error. It does use proof too but only in the form of negative proof or disproof however

surreptitious57 wrote:

It is possible that a proposition is only assumed to be known with certainty. Now an axiomatically deductive system of logic like mathematics
can determine the truth value of a proposition as it uses proof to validate its conclusions. But an inductive system like science uses evidence
that is less rigorous than proof so more susceptible to error. It does use proof too but only in the form of negative proof or disproof however

[/quote]



I think everything you've said above is exactly right, with the exception of the very last sentence, and despite what Karl Popper may have said about deductive falsification (as opposed to inductive confirmation which he eschewed).

Once again Quine's name comes up in the form of the so-called 'Duhem-Quine thesis'. In its less radical formulations at least, I believe it's universally accepted these days that scientific hypotheses are never tested in isolation, but rather as part of a package of theories, hypotheses and background assumptions. When observation conflicts with the particular theory/hypothesis under scrutiny all we can say for sure is that something is wrong somewhere in the package. Logic alone cannot tell us where the problem lies: it may lie with the hypothesis under test; it may lie elsewhere. There can be no definitive (i.e. logical) refutation or disproof; at the end of the day a judgement call is still required -- what Duhem refers to as 'good sense'.

Your first sentence is very significant, I think. For example, if Bob claims to know a certain proposition, perhaps that his wife is faithful to him, and later it becomes clear to all, including poor cuckolded Bob himself, that things are not so, we can say either:

(1) Bob knew his wife was faithful, but he was wrong

or

(2) Bob thought he knew he wife was faithful, but he was wrong

I'm guessing most of us would intuitively select (2) as the appropriate response. Likewise, and referring back to my comments in my post at the bottom of the previous page, if Bob claimed (mistakenly) to know with certainty that a proposition P was true, it seems to me the appropriate response would be to say that since he was wrong, he did not know P at all; a fortiori he did not know it with certainty.

If a proposition is indeed (really, actually, absolutely, right-on man) known with certainty, or just known simpliciter, then the proposition cannot be wrong.

Durian Freak wrote:

surreptitious57 wrote:
It is possible that a proposition is only assumed to be known with certainty. Now an axiomatically deductive system of logic like mathematics
can determine the truth value of a proposition as it uses proof to validate its conclusions. But an inductive system like science uses evidence
that is less rigorous than proof so more susceptible to error. It does use proof too but only in the form of negative proof or disproof however

I think everything you ve said above is exactly right with the exception of the very last sentence and despite what Karl
Popper may have said about deductive falsification ( as opposed to inductive confirmation which he eschewed )

Not all scientific hypotheses can be disproven or falsified but if only one can then this demonstrates that
science uses negative proof or disproof. So how commonly or frequently it is used is entirely superfluous

surreptitious57 wrote:

Durian Freak wrote:

surreptitious57 wrote: Not all scientific hypotheses can be disproven or falsified but if only one can then this demonstrates that
science uses negative proof or disproof. So how commonly or frequently it is used is entirely superfluous

This is at odds with my understanding of the Duhem-Quine thesis which I believe holds that NO empirical hypothesis can ever be tested in isolation, thus precluding any possibility of a logical disproof.

Since you evidently demur, why not give us an example, then, -- in deductive form -- of a scientific hypothesis that has been logically disproven?

I emphasize "logically disproven" to be as clear as possible that what we're discussing here is not the obvious point that scientists as a matter of fact do renounce or abandon theories and hypotheses that they no longer consider tenable on a fairly regular basis. Science moves on. No one believes in, say, phlogiston any more. Scientists will tell us the theory has been abandoned or discredited; they may even tell you, rather carelessly,that it has been 'disproven' -- exactly what the Duhem-Quine thesis denies is possible if 'disproven' is taken to mean logically demonstrated to be untrue.

In the face of daunting counter-evidence, the diehard defenders of phlogiston, I believe, ended up by claiming, rather implausibly, that phlogiston has a negative mass... ... the point being that a hypothesis/theory can always be defended if one is desperate enough. Pure logic, according the DQ thesis at least, cannot definitively close the door on any hypothesis. And this is where Duhem's 'good sense' comes into play.

This is a little off topic, but could you tell us a bit about what is meant by "good sense"?

Jaded Sage wrote:This is a little off topic, but could you tell us a bit about what is meant by "good sense"?

Read what Pierre Duhem says himself here:

http://curiousleftist.wordpress.com/201 ... n-science/

The point, in a nutshell, is that logic and evidence alone can never compel us to accept any given empirical hypothesis (i.e., theories cannot be proven in any strict logical sense) -- a point Surreptitious already endorses -- but neither can they compel us to reject any given hypothesis (i.e., theories cannot be disproven in any strict logical sense).

On reflection this result shouldn't be particularly surprising, for if logic and evidence alone could compel us to accept or reject particular hypotheses/theories, we should expect to see universal consensus among the scientific community at all times (assuming all scientists have access to the same evidence and can all do their sums right). Clearly this is not the case.

At the end of the day, a judgement call still has to be made.

Durian Freak wrote:

surreptitious57 wrote:
Not all scientific hypotheses can be disproven or falsified but if only one can then this demonstrates that
science uses negative proof or disproof. So how commonly or frequently it is used is entirely superfluous

why not give us an example then - in deductive form - of a scientific hypothesis that has been logically disproven

Science does not actually use logic to disprove hypotheses. If it did then they would not have to be tested. So instead it uses observation
and experimentation to disprove them. As physical phenomenon do not always conform to our preconceived logical expectations of them

Sounds like "good sense" is intuition.