Is morality just a subset of reason?

[Hobbes' Choice]

Moral reasoning is only possible if objective morality exists and can be known. I think it does and is, and you think it doesn't. You have no moral premises you can start with, and I do. So you cannot reason within the moral categories, but I can.

So hey, go ahead and throw...you won't hit anything...even by your own reckoning.

You are just idiotically shooting yourself in the foot and contradicting what you said above, like I knew you would. You are now standing there with egg on your face, You are just too stupid to notice it.

There is no objective truth in the statement "killing is wrong". When you add "murder" you are making a culturally defined, and culturally subjective claim. Culture decides what is and what is not murder, and culture is a variable, and is thing we can chose to adopt or not.

In pure objective terms killing cannot be wrong, or right. It might be unfortunate for the killed. But it is stupid to claim that it is wrong objectively. Such an idea means nothing whatever.

[Immanuel Can]

I'll ignore the impotent rage and gratuitous abuse at the beginning of your last message. We all have our hobbies, I suppose.

...There is no objective truth in the statement "killing is wrong". When you add "murder" you are making a culturally defined, and culturally subjective claim. Culture decides what is and what is not murder, and culture is a variable, and is thing we can chose to adopt or not.

No, you say culture decides. I disagree. You're objectively wrong about morality being subjective. I can say so.

But if you claim I'm wrong, you're only saying something subjective, by your own admission: and that means that I'm not wrong if I, or my "culture" thinks I'm right about this.

I do. And if they do too, I'm fine, according to your own reasoning.

Consequently, your whole view is simply self-defeating. If it's "true," then it's only relatively so...meaning, "not outside of a limited context." So "false" in every other context. So you are quite entitled to your limited context. It binds no one but you, as you can see.

In pure objective terms killing cannot be wrong, or right. It might be unfortunate for the killed. But it is stupid to claim that it is wrong objectively.

This is desperately silly, and borderline amoral as well. There's no way you live consistently with the implications of that. So let's see...

I wonder if you would say the same of rape? Incest? Child molestation? Torture? I'm sure your wife and children will be massively interested in your answer.

[mysterio448]

If reason can only be used within the context of moral presuppositions, then what does one use to determine the moral presuppositions themselves?

Christians say, "They are revealed by God." Atheists have no reason to think that there are any moral premises at all, just as David Hume so astutely pointed out.

Well, this factors into my idea that morality is a subset of reason. I do not understand a "moral premise" to be synonymous with "moral absolute"; I understand a "moral premise" to simply be one component of a "moral argument." A moral premise cannot decide on moral actions any more than a premise in ordinary logic constitutes a conclusion. When I say that morality is a subset of reason, this means that there are no moral absolutes but only moral arguments built from certain premises relevant to the situation at hand and a conclusion that follows from those premises.

No, you couldn't. I see you've accidentally fallen into the fallacy of ambivalence between the word "reason" and the word "reasons." Don't worry: it's a common mistake.

You could only "override" a particular moral judgment you made by positing contrary "reasonS," yet not by reason itself. Pure reason would have no opinion on the matter...but you might have opinions and your own reasons for doing what you did. That's quite different.

To illustrate, you may have reasons for abandoning your spouse. That does not mean that pure reason compelled you to do it, or to stay. Reason is a procedure, not a premise. It does not care what you do, and is not capable, any more than maths can care.

Once again, when I talk about "reason," I am talking about arguments where a number of relevant premises form a conclusion. This is exactly the kind of thing that could override one's assumption that murder is wrong.

No. One is merely procedural, the other is premise-based.

Now, reason can use premises, but it does not depend on any particular premises. And reason, since it does not contradict premises itself but only points out when it is possible to see that two premises contradict each other, has no view.

Again, I do not understand a "moral premise" to be a "moral absolute." I understand it to simply be an assessment of the facts of the given situation.

I would say that a moral argument is an argument that consists of a number of premises, where the premises involve both the relevant objective details or circumstances of the situation as well as the relevant subjective details: that is, what the individual is trying to achieve or considers to be most important or valued in the context of the situation. The fact is, nothing is right or wrong, good or evil, outside of the mind of a sentient being; therefore a moral argument cannot be made with purely objective premises, but must also involve some subjective premises. The conclusion of a moral argument is something that is purely relative and is only applicable to the premises of the overall argument. For example, in the OP I suggested the idea that murder is not really wrong in and of itself. The conclusion that murder is wrong must be placed within the context of certain objective premises (facts) and subjective premises (goals/needs/desires, etc.). Some of the facts (or at least assumptions) of the situation were that Japan was fighting against the US, and that Japan had a stubborn nationalistic pride and would be very resistant to a direct ground invasion, and that a ground invasion would be very difficult and produce many casualties, and that nothing short of an extreme show of power could make Japan surrender. Some of the subjective premises were that the US wanted to win the war, they cared more about the well-being of their own citizens then they did about the Japanese citizens, and they wanted to defeat Japan with minimum casualties. Through some combination of objective and subjective premises, the US came to the conclusion that they should drop nuclear bombs on Japan.

Now, the statement "It is good to drop nuclear bombs on civilian cities" is not itself to be considered an absolute moral fact. This conclusion is only applicable within the context of the premises provided. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the individual to not only form a logical conclusion based on the premises, but also to make sure that the premises provided are honest and relevant. The conclusion can only be as righteous as the quality of the set of moral premises provided. Put another way, if we want the right moral answers, it is our job to ask the right moral questions.

[Immanuel Can]

When I say that morality is a subset of reason, this means that there are no moral absolutes but only moral arguments built from certain premises relevant to the situation at hand and a conclusion that follows from those premises.

But morality then has nothing at all to do with reason. It has to do with things like wishes or cultural preferences, but is not a subject for which reason has any application in the generation of premises. So it what sense does "morality" belong to the field (or "set") of reason-capable entities?

Once again, when I talk about "reason," I am talking about arguments where a number of relevant premises form a conclusion. This is exactly the kind of thing that could override one's assumption that murder is wrong.

But there "reason" is not doing any work. For if one rejects the premises, then reason has no further way of clarifying the situation. For "reason" to work, it needs, at the minimum, two defensible premises. Absent either of these two premises being granted, the conclusions simply do not follow. So what's doing the work are those two initial premises.

So it would read something like:

P1: I'm in ISIS.
P2: ISIS believes murdering infidels is good.
C: Therefore, murder is right.

Not exactly the sort of case one would want to defend, would one? Or are you happy with it? Because if you accept that there are no objective moral premises, then this is precisely the argument you would have to believe to be "rational." After all, its premises are granted by its culture, and if I were an ISIS member, then the two premises rationally produce the conclusion. Slitting people's throats in the desert becomes not just an excusable act, but actually a moral one then. Yikes.

Again, I do not understand a "moral premise" to be a "moral absolute." I understand it to simply be an assessment of the facts of the given situation.

That explanation won't help: "facts" usually means "objective realities." But you don't believe in moral facts, just in moral fancies, if I understand you aright. So what "facts" can be salient to making a moral judgment? I can understand that they might issue in a prudential judgment (i.e. a judgment that 'works' best to produce a desired outcome), but never a moral one. For "moral" doesn't really mean anything then. It's just a word. A better way to put it would be "what works for me." But nothing makes "what works for me" distinctively deserving of the kind of approbation that comes with a word like "moral." And nothing makes it obligatory to anyone else.

I would say that a moral argument is an argument that consists of a number of premises, where the premises involve both the relevant objective details or circumstances of the situation as well as the relevant subjective details: that is, what the individual is trying to achieve or considers to be most important or valued in the context of the situation.

Your claim here is a mass of contradictions. Firstly, "relevant objective details" cannot include morality if there are no objective moral facts. There's nothing objective about morality to become a "detail," in that case. Secondly, it's not clear what a "circumstance" (of the relevant kind) would be, so that needs to be made specific and informative before your claim can be assessed. But the bigger problem is why anyone should take "subjective details" as morally obligatory. They would seem to be matters of pure taste, with no compulsory force at all. Why should anyone care about anyone's "subjective" position, or think their own "subjective" preferences placed any obligation on other people to give a fig?

The fact is, nothing is right or wrong, good or evil, outside of the mind of a sentient being; therefore a moral argument cannot be made with purely objective premises, but must also involve some subjective premises.

Non-sequitur. God is claimed to be a "sentient being." Therefore, moral arguments with objective premises would be entirely warranted. However, if you deny that premise, you lose morality altogether as well. For the fact that some being "makes an argument" or claims a thing does not go one step in showing the argument is reasonable or the claim is justified...not unless the Being in question has the authority to make it stick for other beings.

And you don't. Nor do I.

The conclusion can only be as righteous as the quality of the set of moral premises provided. Put another way, if we want the right moral answers, it is our job to ask the right moral questions.

Well, in some sense this is certainly true. But I'm a Theist, so I can think so: I have grounds to call some premises "right."

But for you, what makes a moral premise "good" if there is no objectivity to the idea of "good"? Or what makes something "righteous" if it's really nothing more that the expression of personal bias of some animal, human or otherwise, or even of some herd of such animals? And what can a "right" moral question be when you've denied the objective existence of any "right"? You see, you toss value laden terms into your judgments, but then turn around and deny the objective reality of all those same value terms.

If rationality is what you want, then you're going to have to pick a horse and ride it. If morality can be objectively "right" or "good," then you'll have to give up mere subjectivism. If it cannot, then you are powerless to call even subjective morality "good" in any meaningful sense. You have no good or evil, no right or wrong: only the provisional prejudices of individuals or groups.

And anything -- literally anything has to be considered "moral" if it meets the criteria of "working for and being supported by some cultural group." So on your description, the years of slavery in the American south would have to be accepted as "moral."

Happy yet?

[Hobbes' Choice]

I'll ignore the impotent rage and gratuitous abuse at the beginning of your last message. We all have our hobbies, I suppose.

...There is no objective truth in the statement "killing is wrong". When you add "murder" you are making a culturally defined, and culturally subjective claim. Culture decides what is and what is not murder, and culture is a variable, and is thing we can chose to adopt or not.

No, you say culture decides. I disagree. You're objectively wrong about morality being subjective. I can say so.
:

Rubbish.
Prove that killing is not objectively right!
I dare you.

[Hobbes' Choice]

I wonder if you would say the same of rape? Incest? Child molestation? Torture? I'm sure your wife and children will be massively interested in your answer.

Yes. I would say that proscriptions against rape and molestation are culturally defined, and are relative to cultural logic.
There is no context to claim objectivity.
You are confusing objective with right and subjective with wrong. It's a school boy error.

[Immanuel Can]

Prove that killing is not objectively right! I dare you.

Do you mean, "prove independent of the God hypothesis, or prove while assuming the existence of God?"

For if God exists, it's very, very easy to do so. If He does not, it's impossible. So which do you want?

Well, you know I'm a Theist, so you cannot expect me to do my moralizing Atheistically: that would be self-contradictory. So you must be asking me to do it Theistically. On that assumption, then...

Premise 1: God does not want us to kill each other
Premise 2: What God wants is right.
Conclusion: Killing each other is wrong.

Q.E.D., if God exists.

Why?

Premise 1 is justified by revelation -- if God actually did exist and did say "You shall not kill," as in the Ten Commandments, say, then that premise would have to be believed.

Premise 2 is analytically obvious, as the Supreme Being would, by definition be the only frame of reference for "right," if He existed -- no concepts would exist that were not Supreme-Being dependent.

So then the conclusion is necessary, and follows the logical form of a categorical syllogism, and hence is both what logicians call valid and sound.

The only point at which it's contestable is not it's logical structure, but rather the supposition of the existence of God. And that's the very thing I claimed: that the belief in the non-existence of God is your problem in morality.

Now it's your turn. So you explain to me why I should believe any moral premise is true, using only Atheistic suppositions. You pick it. Go on. Make my day.

Here's one: prove to me that slavery in the Old Southern US was "wrong."

[Immanuel Can]

Yes. I would say that proscriptions against rape and molestation are culturally defined, and are relative to cultural logic.
There is no context to claim objectivity.

Ah. So you have no moral objection to anything any society approves? Well, welcome to ISIS: here's your throat-slitting knife. Welcome to Northern Pakistan...here's your license to revenge-rape. Welcome to the Amazon: here's your shovel, so you can bury your twin baby girls alive....all of that is just dandy, according you your view.

You are confusing objective with right and subjective with wrong.

No, I'm not. You're jumping to illogical conclusions there.

A "subjective" claim cannot be known to be morally wrong or right at all. "Subjective morality" is a contradiction in terms, because "subjective" means "entirely up to my private tastes or the contingent tastes of my society." There can be no moral judgment at all derived from that. How then can you condemn anyone or any society for anything, or praise any of them in a morally-relevant way either?

That's why you're confused: you still imagine that "moral" means "what I want." I'm simply pointing out that in addition to being narcissistic, it's incoherent. Morality is always, by definition, about our treatment of, or relations to others, not merely about private taste.

If you were the only being on Earth that counted in any moral equation, as in pure subjectivism, you would never have a moral question. How could you? There is no other being you could ask one about! You could only ask, "What do I want to do next?" but "Is it morally right to do it?" would become an irrelevant question -- who would you ask, and to whom would you owe any answer?

That realization should tell you something.

[Hobbes' Choice]

Prove that killing is not objectively right! I dare you.

Do you mean, "prove independent of the God hypothesis, or prove while assuming the existence of God?"

For if God exists, it's very, very easy to do so. If He does not, it's impossible. So which do you want?

The moment you mention God, you loose all sense of reason.

God has nothing to do with it.


Well, you know I'm a Theist, so you cannot expect me to do my moralizing Atheistically: that would be self-contradictory. So you must be asking me to do it Theistically. On that assumption, then...

Premise 1: God does not want us to kill each other

False Assumption
Premise 2: What God wants is right.
Conclusion: Killing each other is wrong.

Rubbish.

Q.E.D., if God exists.

Why?

Premise 1 is justified by revelation -- if God actually did exist and did say "You shall not kill," as in the Ten Commandments, say, then that premise would have to be believed.

Premise 2 is analytically obvious, as the Supreme Being would, by definition be the only frame of reference for "right," if He existed -- no concepts would exist that were not Supreme-Being dependent.

So then the conclusion is necessary, and follows the logical form of a categorical syllogism, and hence is both what logicians call valid and sound.

The only point at which it's contestable is not it's logical structure, but rather the supposition of the existence of God. And that's the very thing I claimed: that the belief in the non-existence of God is your problem in morality.

Now it's your turn. So you explain to me why I should believe any moral premise is true, using only Atheistic suppositions. You pick it. Go on. Make my day.

Here's one: prove to me that slavery in the Old Southern US was "wrong."

I asked you to demonstrate it was OBJECTIVE.
PLONK!!!

[Immanuel Can]

The moment you mention God, you loose all sense of reason.

God has nothing to do with it.

Prove it. Prove He doesn't exist. If that's your epistemic standard, the one you think I can't meet, then meet it yourself.

You're begging the question. You're saying, "I don't believe in God, so IC can't refer to Him in debate." That's irrational, because I'm a Theist: by definition, I make God basic to all my premises. Unless you can prove it's irrational to do that, you're stuck, chum.

I asked you to demonstrate it was OBJECTIVE.

God is an OBJECTIVE fact, silly. That's the point. And it doesn't matter a fig whether or not you believe it's so, just as it doesn't matter whether or not you believe in the Rocky Mountains. They'll be there even if you deny them.

You denying an objective reality does not prove it's less real.

I wrote:

Here's one: prove to me that slavery in the Old Southern US was "wrong."

But you've given me nothing on this.

So now you're pro-slavery? Or are you terrified by the prospect, knowing people who read this will roast you alive if you do? Or do you just insist that people who "think" slavery is wrong are only speaking subjectively, and so are not objectively "bad" for slavery?

Come on, pal: ante up. If you know what you're talking about, tell me all about your moral perspective on chattel slavery.

[Hobbes' Choice]

The moment you mention God, you loose all sense of reason.

God has nothing to do with it.

Prove it. Prove He doesn't exist. If that's your epistemic standard, the one you think I can't meet, then meet it yourself.

You're begging the question. You're saying, "I don't believe in God, so IC can't refer to Him in debate." That's irrational, because I'm a Theist: by definition, I make God basic to all my premises. Unless you can prove it's irrational to do that, you're stuck, chum.

I asked you to demonstrate it was OBJECTIVE.

God is an OBJECTIVE fact, silly. That's the point. And it doesn't matter a fig whether or not you believe it's so, just as it doesn't matter whether or not you believe in the Rocky Mountains. They'll be there even if you deny them.

You denying an objective reality does not prove it's less real.

I wrote:

Here's one: prove to me that slavery in the Old Southern US was "wrong."

But you've given me nothing on this.

So now you're pro-slavery? Or are you terrified by the prospect, knowing people who read this will roast you alive if you do? Or do you just insist that people who "think" slavery is wrong are only speaking subjectively, and so are not objectively "bad" for slavery?

Come on, pal: ante up. If you know what you're talking about, tell me all about your moral perspective on chattel slavery.

Your entire approach is ridiculous.
You have all your work ahead of you. Not only do you insist the there is something called, God; you also insist that you know his mind. You are absurd.

I'm not pro slavery. The Bible is pro-slavery. I'm not pro-war. The Bible is pro-war. I'm not pre-abuse, not pro-racist. The Bible has those things covered.

But beyond all the laughs you have given me, you have not said a thing that makes any of your idiotic pronouncements "OBJECTIVE".
I shall not let you dictate morality. Morals are to be judged on their own merits.

[Immanuel Can]

Come on, Hobbes...none of this bluster is fooling anyone. You can distract all you want, but no one's going to bite.

Give me your account of why slavery is wrong.

Prove it.

Go ahead. I'm waiting. And I'll keep waiting as long as you keep yammering.

[mysterio448]

But morality then has nothing at all to do with reason. It has to do with things like wishes or cultural preferences, but is not a subject for which reason has any application in the generation of premises. So it what sense does "morality" belong to the field (or "set") of reason-capable entities?

Morality has everything to do with reason. Morality is about taking the relevant wishes and cultural preferences and combining them to form a certain conclusion -- that is what reason is all about.

But there "reason" is not doing any work. For if one rejects the premises, then reason has no further way of clarifying the situation. For "reason" to work, it needs, at the minimum, two defensible premises. Absent either of these two premises being granted, the conclusions simply do not follow. So what's doing the work are those two initial premises.

You misunderstand me. The premises of a moral argument consist of at least one objective fact or assumption and at least one subjective condition (needs/wants/goals). It is not a matter of other people accepting or rejecting the premises; the premises are merely the conditions of the situation that one is using to form the moral argument. As I explained in my previous post, the conclusion of the moral argument is not an absolute, but is only valid within the context of the argument itself.

So it would read something like:

P1: I'm in ISIS.
P2: ISIS believes murdering infidels is good.
C: Therefore, murder is right.

Not only is this syllogism framed incorrectly but is also blatantly invalid. I would re-phrase the syllogism this way:
P1: Members of ISIS believe murdering infidels is good.
P2: I am a member of ISIS.
C: Therefore, I believe murdering infidels is good.

Not exactly the sort of case one would want to defend, would one? Or are you happy with it? Because if you accept that there are no objective moral premises, then this is precisely the argument you would have to believe to be "rational." After all, its premises are granted by its culture, and if I were an ISIS member, then the two premises rationally produce the conclusion. Slitting people's throats in the desert becomes not just an excusable act, but actually a moral one then. Yikes.

Since your syllogism was invalid, I will refer to my rendition of it. The conclusion in my re-phrased argument is a specific conclusion rather than a general conclusion as was in your syllogism. The specific conclusion was a perfectly valid conclusion based on the premises given. It is not to be understood as a moral absolute, obviously, but as one individual's motivation for their actions. Now, just because an individual comes to this conclusion with the premises given doesn't mean that the conclusion is immutable or irrevocable; if the same individual were to provide a different set of premises, he may very well come to a completely different conclusion.

That explanation won't help: "facts" usually means "objective realities." But you don't believe in moral facts, just in moral fancies, if I understand you aright.

You do not understand me aright. As I said before, a moral argument involves at least one objective fact of the situation and at least one subjective condition. In the WWII example, one of the facts (or at least assumptions) was that an American ground invasion against Japan would be extremely difficult and would cost many American lives; one of the subjective conditions in the situation was that the US wanted to minimize American casualties. The idea that the US wanted to cut down on their casualties is a fact. The opinion can be considered a fact in the sense that it is a fact that the individual holds that particular opinion.

So what "facts" can be salient to making a moral judgment? I can understand that they might issue in a prudential judgment (i.e. a judgment that 'works' best to produce a desired outcome), but never a moral one. For "moral" doesn't really mean anything then. It's just a word. A better way to put it would be "what works for me." But nothing makes "what works for me" distinctively deserving of the kind of approbation that comes with a word like "moral." And nothing makes it obligatory to anyone else.

I'm confused. I don't know how you would define the word "moral" but I understand it to refer to "a judgment that works best to produce a desired outcome." If an action does not produce a desired outcome, then in what sense is the action good?

I believe that morality is a subset of reason, yet it is somewhat different from how we normally think about reason. Common reason is typically concerned with finding the right answers, but I think morality is a type of reason that is equally concerned with finding the right questions. Morality is about asking oneself what is most relevant and most valued, and then drawing conclusions from those premises. Morality is not about fixed answers but is about the dynamic process of reasoning and about looking at the situation from the most appropriate perspective.

And also, your comment about morality being "obligatory" assumes moral absolutism. But I am a moral relativist.

Your claim here is a mass of contradictions. Firstly, "relevant objective details" cannot include morality if there are no objective moral facts. There's nothing objective about morality to become a "detail," in that case. Secondly, it's not clear what a "circumstance" (of the relevant kind) would be, so that needs to be made specific and informative before your claim can be assessed. But the bigger problem is why anyone should take "subjective details" as morally obligatory. They would seem to be matters of pure taste, with no compulsory force at all. Why should anyone care about anyone's "subjective" position, or think their own "subjective" preferences placed any obligation on other people to give a fig?

The "relevant objective details" are simply the circumstances in the situation at hand, such as the WWII case which I explained in my previous post. Also, as I have said before, I believe that morality is a subset of reason and, by association, logic. You keep referring to moral "facts," however the truth is that logic does not pertain to facts. Logic is about judging the validity of arguments. So within the context of this thread, it is pointless to talk about "moral facts." Morality is a subset of reason: this means that it is not the conclusions themselves that are obligatory but the reasoning process itself.

Non-sequitur. God is claimed to be a "sentient being." Therefore, moral arguments with objective premises would be entirely warranted. However, if you deny that premise, you lose morality altogether as well. For the fact that some being "makes an argument" or claims a thing does not go one step in showing the argument is reasonable or the claim is justified...not unless the Being in question has the authority to make it stick for other beings.

I am an atheist and a moral relativist. I don't believe any particular action is right or wrong in itself. The OP of this thread indicates that fact. If mass-murder of civilians can be justified then anything can potentially be justified given the right circumstances. Instead of denying this reality, I instead embrace it. I embrace the fact that morality is a reasoning process, and that as such the reasoning process should be carried out as accurately and carefully as possible.

Well, in some sense this is certainly true. But I'm a Theist, so I can think so: I have grounds to call some premises "right."

But for you, what makes a moral premise "good" if there is no objectivity to the idea of "good"? Or what makes something "righteous" if it's really nothing more that the expression of personal bias of some animal, human or otherwise, or even of some herd of such animals? And what can a "right" moral question be when you've denied the objective existence of any "right"? You see, you toss value laden terms into your judgments, but then turn around and deny the objective reality of all those same value terms.

If rationality is what you want, then you're going to have to pick a horse and ride it. If morality can be objectively "right" or "good," then you'll have to give up mere subjectivism. If it cannot, then you are powerless to call even subjective morality "good" in any meaningful sense. You have no good or evil, no right or wrong: only the provisional prejudices of individuals or groups.

And anything -- literally anything has to be considered "moral" if it meets the criteria of "working for and being supported by some cultural group." So on your description, the years of slavery in the American south would have to be accepted as "moral."

Happy yet?

First of all, I have never used the phrase, "working for and being supported by some cultural group." I don't know where you got that from, but I never said it.

Anyway, an act is ultimately only as good as its outcome. We all have different goals/values; so the closest thing we can come to what you might call "objective" moral good is to ascertain what goals/values we have in common and then try to come to a consensus on what we would consider a good outcome.

[Immanuel Can]

You misunderstand me. The premises of a moral argument consist of at least one objective fact or assumption and at least one subjective condition (needs/wants/goals). It is not a matter of other people accepting or rejecting the premises; the premises are merely the conditions of the situation that one is using to form the moral argument. As I explained in my previous post, the conclusion of the moral argument is not an absolute, but is only valid within the context of the argument itself.

Okay, fair enough. Let me try to understand you again. To summarize your above claims, as I can currently understand them:

Premise 1 = A particular "objective fact" as you put it....(OR an assumption?)
Premise 2 = Some statement of goals/needs/wants.
Conclusion = A moral judgment.

It would seem appropriate I get you perfectly clear before I continue. So have I got your gist yet?

... a moral argument involves at least one objective fact of the situation and at least one subjective condition. In the WWII example, one of the facts (or at least assumptions) was that an American ground invasion against Japan would be extremely difficult and would cost many American lives; one of the subjective conditions in the situation was that the US wanted to minimize American casualties. The idea that the US wanted to cut down on their casualties is a fact. The opinion can be considered a fact in the sense that it is a fact that the individual holds that particular opinion.

Let me run what I'm hearing from you on this again. My understanding interprets you to be saying this:

Premise 1 = An American ground invasion will be difficult and costly in lives.
Premise 2 = We want to minimize that.
Conclusion = It is moral to bomb the Japanese.


Can that be it? Did anyone bother to ask the Japanese?

I feel I must have you wrong, since as you can see, the above syllogism is not only invalid in form but merely prudential (i.e. a thing done for the sake of achieving some outcome). Or are you saying moral = prudential, that the fact of just having a goal is capable of morally justifying anything to achieve that goal? Or are you saying that "moral" isn't an informative word or real concept at all, and we ought just to go with "prudential" in its place? (I'm not being glib...I can't quite see how to make it work.)

I'm confused. I don't know how you would define the word "moral" but I understand it to refer to "a judgment that works best to produce a desired outcome." If an action does not produce a desired outcome, then in what sense is the action good?

Prudentially, not morally. I understand "moral" to imply value judgment, and "prudence" merely to imply efficacy. That's the normal distinction in Moral Theory.

To illustrate, if prudence = morality, then these two arguments are identical in their sense.

My neighbour's wife is beautiful.
I desire beautiful things.
I must have what I desire.
I must have my neighbour's wife.

And

My neighbour's wife is beautful.
I desire beautiful things.
I must have what I desire.
I am right to have my neighbour's wife. (Here "must have," the prudential form, is supplanted by "am right," the moral form.)

Would you say that they are the same? Or is there a meaning in the latter that is absent from the former? If so, what would that meaning be?

Morality is a subset of reason: this means that it is not the conclusions themselves that are obligatory but the reasoning process itself.

What causes reason to be "obligatory"? Don't a whole lot of people do without it, and pursue impulses rather than reasoning? And if so, and if they prefer not to reason, how would it become "obligatory" that they do otherwise? (Again, sincere question here.)

I have never used the phrase, "working for and being supported by some cultural group." I don't know where you got that from, but I never said it.

Sorry: I should have clarified my use of quotation marks there. I wasn't attempting to quote you, just do indicate that the enclosed expression was suspect or "loose" in application. To rephrase, I mean that every "goal" (to use your word) is taken by a particular individual or cultural group. And it seems to me that if having a "goal" issues in a favourable moral judgment, then it becomes automatic that whatever that individual or group takes as it's "goal" confers "goodness" or "rightness" or "morality," if you will, on that "goal."

Hence the ISIS example. They are certainly individuals or a cultural group, and they certainly have goals. But "moral"? That seems too much to think.

Anyway, an act is ultimately only as good as its outcome.

Okay, but then how do we judge the "goodness" of the outcome, so as to evaluate the act? Do we mean that an act is "good" merely if proves efficacious for some purpose ("goal") we can get some group to want to achieve? Again, you can see the problem I'm having with your view: it looks like you're saying, "If it works, and if people want it, it's right." And it looks like you're saying that's what morality is.

But that's not what morality is in any theory I know but Pragmatism: and Pragmatism is inherently amoral, since it identifies "moral" and "prudent" as the same concept.

I feel I'm missing a piece of what you're trying to say. It just doesn't seem to work as a description of "morality." Any way I turn it, it looks merely like prudential self-interest, and seems to lack the duty-causing and value-conferring elements that are inherent to usual accounts of morality: that is, I can't see why anyone would be compelled to respect and accept-as-justified someone else's merely prudential reasoning.

[Hobbes' Choice]

Come on, Hobbes...none of this bluster is fooling anyone. You can distract all you want, but no one's going to bite.

Give me your account of why slavery is wrong.

Prove it.

Go ahead. I'm waiting. And I'll keep waiting as long as you keep yammering.

I feel deeply sorry for you.
You are obviously a person with a brain, and know how to use it. But the moment you bring god into the conversation you loose all sense of proportion and reason. You last offering (above) is a sad reflection to deal with salient points that I have made; not "yammering". This is just a reflection of your failure.

I cannot prove that slavery is right or wrong. I can offer you opinions as to the effects of slavery on the economy and the well being of the slaves and the slavers. But it is absurd to try to prove it one way or the other. It all depends on what you feel is important.
The fact is that there are currently more slaves on the planet than at any time in history.
In Biblical times slavery was morally justified and perfectly legal, yet your "god" said nothing whatever against the practice. On the contrary, there are many references to douloi , in the bible, and their status goes unchallenged.

I try to live by the principle of equality of opportunity, and inalienable rights to freedom. From those premises it is easy enough to show how slavery transgresses these position; but it is even easier to demonstrate that these are not natural rights in any sense.
None of this has anything to do with the object/subject argument.