“First for me it is essential/vital that you don't feel in any way offended. I get the feeling you understand me but I just want to reinforce to avoid any trouble/misunderstanding, I am not teaching or correcting you. This is an open discussion and I am also trying to argue something that I am not fully sure makes sense. When I refer to "you" I was not attacking you. The "you" has basically two meanings/usages for me. First the fact that our arguments are not thrown into the air, there is someone who is saying and arguing something. To talk is to perform and to perform is to take a stance as I said in my text. The other sense (perhaps in contradiction to the first one) is a neutral "you" as in the voice of the rationality that argues a specific argument. For example: once "you" (the person who demands an infinite answer and not necessarily you [reader] of this text or you [d63]) demands/argues X, "you" must also cope with the consequences implicit (or at least that I see as implicit) in that argument (even, and perhaps more importantly, if you did not want to argue such things yourself).
By the way this is more or less my response to our point about Lyotard, I am perfectly aware that he does not want an antidote, but that does not mean that his theory does not present/demand/propose one. The end of all grand narratives is itself a grand apocalyptic narrative. It is an absolute law saying "all meaning/sense is canceled, now everything is possible". Avant-garde for him is the reminder of the impossibility of the law, of the coping with the other, i.e., its irepresentability in thought and art. This is exactly the argument in the poem, this absolute "let it be", the "free play", the non-law that is itself as repressive as the total law. A law that says that everything is allowed is as absolute as the law that says nothing is. They are both total laws. In that sense despite not wanting to argue something absolute, I think Lyotard does. We fail (more often than we like to admit) when we argue something and philosophers are people too. For example: in my previous post I failed to communicate my argument respectfully and also failed in proposing an argument about Lyotard's philosophy. As to Derrida and contingency I think there is something to what you are saying but I would like (as always) to disagree a little. Language is not pure contingency and human agreement since this would means that language does not do anything, it is just a code pragmatically defined to describe things. Even if you perform, you would just perform within the functioning code/structure/organization/regime, you would not challenge it or propose anything else. I think there is something deeper in the performance, it is not just play (the "everything is possible" as in my criticism of Lyotard), there is an attempt at (re)organization. Again, you point at a very serious problem that is the relation between language and world. I don't want to say that there is a world and language simply describes it, I don't want to say that the world is just the creation of language (as an image or a construct) and I don't want to preserve a pragmatic relation where the two never touch and language is just a contingent form of organization that "works". Therefore I think Derrida is not just saying something about language, he is proposing a new model of truth, that is, a new ontology as I tried to very shortly propose in my previous post.
On that note I would just like to say I am honored by your interest (and to some extent by what you said about Seth Rogen and me looking similar). I just want to warn you that you might be disappointed by what you find since to put nicely "my bark is still stronger than my bite". I feel I am on a very initial stage and don't really have much to show. Those Telos articles were nice but they too are very initial. That said, I would never refuse a good philosophical discussion so feel free to buzz around and bother me as much as you want. If you want to invite other people into the discussion that is perfect is also perfect. If they too want to drown me in question, that is just what I want (again this does not mean that I will be able to answer everything, I reserve myself the right to fail) This article (as everything I write) is an invitation to a discussion.” –Yoni: viewtopic.php?f=23&t=15253
First of all, Yoni, this is priceless:
“First for me it is essential/vital that you don't feel in any way offended. I get the feeling you understand me but I just want to reinforce to avoid any trouble/misunderstanding, I am not teaching or correcting you. This is an open discussion and I am also trying to argue something that I am not fully sure makes sense.”
This is about the first time I’ve ever seen anything this humble (that is up-front (from anyone on these boards who claimed to have authority or, as is the case with you, has a legitimate claim to that authority –you are, after all, a graduate student. You have to understand that most of my philosophical training has consisted of the workshopping potential I’ve always seen in the boards in the face of many who see it as platform to establish their claim to fame. Because of this, too many of the discourses based on the second person perspective have ended up in what amounted to schoolyard brawls –some of which (because of my hairline trigger and lack of need for a guru (have gotten me kicked off boards. Throughout it all, I had always felt that those thinkers who had the advantage of publishing also had the advantage of third person detachment: they said that while I say this.
That said, as it turns out, my having bought the Derrida book, I’ve realized that this week will pretty much go on like the previous: me trying to advance about 15 to 20 pages into it, then going to the “library” and going more slowly over some random previous point while taking notes and trying to figure out what I am going to write about for that day, then coming home, putting on some music, and writing my about 500 word daily meditation. The only difference this week will be that I will taking those notes in terms of what I can bring back into this discourse.
My plan, however, for next week, is to set aside the books and focus on responding to your posts while going closely over your article and, hopefully, your post in Telos. I mainly do this to appease the frustration in reading your points, having all these connection form that I want to relay back to you, then only capturing a fragment, or even completely neglecting important points I started out to make, because of the point by point way I work here and the limited window I have for it. You’ve basically presented me with a backlog of points in previous posts that I want to get back to while keeping me busy with new points. Or to put it in terms we've been discussing: this discourse has become an infinite expanding universe that I must deal with through finite resources. And while that week of focus will never result in full satisfaction, it will allow me ,at least, to milk a little more out the experience and allow me to move on by, as has been said of writing poetry, abandoning it in despair.
(For instance, I’m feeling it yet again because of the window I have spent explaining what I’m doing rather than just doing it. Hopefully, this will have expended all the preliminaries (the only way out sometimes being through (and I’ll be able to focus the rest of our discourse on the subject at hand.)
That said:
“The end of all grand narratives is itself a grand apocalyptic narrative. It is an absolute law saying "all meaning/sense is canceled, now everything is possible". Avant-garde for him is the reminder of the impossibility of the law, of the coping with the other, i.e., its irepresentability in thought and art. This is exactly the argument in the poem, this absolute "let it be", the "free play", the non-law that is itself as repressive as the total law.”
I find myself of 2 minds here. On one hand, I agree with you. Your point about the grand narrative I believe was reiterated by Kellner and Best. At the same time, what you are presenting is a variation of the skeptic’s paradox which I attacked in a letter to the editor as concerns Arnold Zuboff’s article in Philosophy Now “Theories that Refute Themselves” (issue 106: https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Th ... Themselves). If you want to read it, I will post the as yet unpublished letter below. But the main point was that Zuboff based his argument on a paradox that works like most paradoxes do: by failing to make the leap from what can be justified semantically to what can be justified existentially. Saying that you cannot say that there no absolute truths since to do so is just a claim to an absolute truth has nothing to do with actually experiencing a world in which there are no absolute truths.
There have, however, been instances where I’ve sensed a subtle existential leap in variations of the skeptic’s paradox. Yours, Kellners, and Bests’ maybe one of those instances. But I struggle (perhaps out of respect or even guilt since I have found myself resorting to it from time to time (to articulate the leap. Part of it may be the nihilistic perspective that I have (inspired by Derrida’s d.constructive process( developed and which tells me that while there is no solid foundation for any moral or ethical assertion we might make, there is equally no solid foundation for not making it.
But I think this gets at one of the differences between us (and we need to articulate our differences if this is to be productive: while you seem to be emphasizing Performance as an answer to many of our problems:
“I believe Derrida’s performative understanding of language represents a significant change in the structure of knowledge that has not yet been fully considered, yet could serve us in understanding and coping with contemporary issues.”
I see it as one tool among many in the philosopher’s toolbox. And while I admire (and even envy (your idealism, I’m a little skeptical about the ability of theory to change anything in the face of human praxis –that is outside of a minimally participating trickle-down effect.
Note for tomorrow: I need to get to the point that the problem with dismissing grand narratives is that if the solution lies in a lot of people using different methods, that may well include people who still believe in grand narratives.
Derrida’s Performance
Re: Derrida’s Performance
Last edited by d63 on Sun Apr 26, 2015 7:59 pm, edited 3 times in total.
Re: Derrida’s Performance
"Dear Editor: Arnold Zuboff's article, Theories that Refute Themselves (issue 106), holds to the classicist tradition of acting as if it is the only approach that could possibly be in touch with reality while twisting that reality to its own ends. For instance: his assertion that pragmatism seeks to dispel correspondence. This likely refers to the dialectic between the correspondence and coherence truth tests that traditionally dominated philosophy -that is up until the pragmatic synthesis came along, incorporated both, and added a democratic dimension. But this escapes Zuboff. And there is a big difference between dispelling something and calling it what it is: a tool, one among many, that may or may not work for a given task. And if Pragmatism has an issue, it is with all the fussing and browbeating around the right method when these tools are a natural part of our evolutionary makeup. It’s how we think. Beyond that, for Pragmatism at least, all that has ever, does, and will count is discourse and what works.
l also noticed the irony in Zuboff's dismissal of Wittgenstein's Language Game when the first half of his article pretty much proves the point. He offers a survey of various reincarnations of the skeptic's paradox, a classic language game, and gotcha moment, that has been thrown at many non-classicist isms (relativism, skepticism, existentialism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, pragmatism, etc.), all of which ride on the nihilistic perspective: that which taps into the underlying nothingness and sees all assertions breaking down to assumptions that float on thin air. The problem is that the tactic falls short of the Classicist fantasy of an argument so undeniable that the opposition can only submit. It only preaches to the choir. Say, for example, one was to approach the skeptic and the nihilistic perspective and huff, indignantly:
"You cannot say there are no absolutes since to do so is to offer an absolute."
The skeptic would do what they're wired to do, scrutinize, and inevitably realize that there is a big difference between saying we live in a world in which there are no absolutes and actually living in one, then go right on being a skeptic. The nihilistic perspective would just cross its arms, glare, and snort:
“Right! Nothing is engraved in stone; not even that nothing is engraved in stone. So what’s your point?”
The skeptic’s response reflects on the weakness of the tactic: the failed leap from semantic justification (the language game) to an existential justification that works with the skeptic’s reality. The nihilistic perspective’s response goes to an assumption that pretty much floats on thin air. Zuboff is describing self refuting theories. But he assumes (as many neo-classicists do) that there is no room for them in philosophical inquiry - that is in the face of a reality that can often be contradictory, ironic, and paradoxical. And, existentially, isn't Neo-Classicism just as self refuting in its claim to dominion over reality while insisting on some absolute truth it has yet to produce?"
l also noticed the irony in Zuboff's dismissal of Wittgenstein's Language Game when the first half of his article pretty much proves the point. He offers a survey of various reincarnations of the skeptic's paradox, a classic language game, and gotcha moment, that has been thrown at many non-classicist isms (relativism, skepticism, existentialism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, pragmatism, etc.), all of which ride on the nihilistic perspective: that which taps into the underlying nothingness and sees all assertions breaking down to assumptions that float on thin air. The problem is that the tactic falls short of the Classicist fantasy of an argument so undeniable that the opposition can only submit. It only preaches to the choir. Say, for example, one was to approach the skeptic and the nihilistic perspective and huff, indignantly:
"You cannot say there are no absolutes since to do so is to offer an absolute."
The skeptic would do what they're wired to do, scrutinize, and inevitably realize that there is a big difference between saying we live in a world in which there are no absolutes and actually living in one, then go right on being a skeptic. The nihilistic perspective would just cross its arms, glare, and snort:
“Right! Nothing is engraved in stone; not even that nothing is engraved in stone. So what’s your point?”
The skeptic’s response reflects on the weakness of the tactic: the failed leap from semantic justification (the language game) to an existential justification that works with the skeptic’s reality. The nihilistic perspective’s response goes to an assumption that pretty much floats on thin air. Zuboff is describing self refuting theories. But he assumes (as many neo-classicists do) that there is no room for them in philosophical inquiry - that is in the face of a reality that can often be contradictory, ironic, and paradoxical. And, existentially, isn't Neo-Classicism just as self refuting in its claim to dominion over reality while insisting on some absolute truth it has yet to produce?"
Re: Derrida’s Performance
“This is because I believe that, in evolutionary terms, the advancement of our culture must be a process of brainstorming (simple discourse between a lot of different people using a lot of different methods (without the constraints of transcendental criteria, of throwing it all on the table and picking through it to find what works and, ultimately, what keeps working: the gift that keeps on giving –a little like evolution.” –me: posting.php?mode=reply&f=23&t=15253#preview
“Your proposal of an infinite discourse creating evolution is not enough for me because it would be just the infinite return of the same discourse, the same order appearing in different angles (Derrida's iterability in a sense). To perform must be to propose something different. It must demands a new reality "as if" it was possible/real (I believe current philosopher such as Ranciere and Nancy formulate this question).” –Yoni: ibid
Okay. But you’re going to have to explain how you are going achieve this end outside of the evolutionary process I am describing. I return to my point concerning language:
“And that makes perfect sense to me given that discourse is ultimately a creative act. One person strings a sentence together based on previous sentences they have strung together. Then the other responds with a sentence built off of other sentences they have previously strung together.”
The only other alternative to me is divine inspiration. It just seems that if there is any hope of achieving your goal, we will have to take our cue from the computer programmers who work mainly by working off each other. Here I have to take the Deleuzian approach of repeating what we know until the momentum and inertia push us beyond it through difference. Even Derrida cannot claim to have happened in a vacuum. As radical as his moves in the language game of culture may seem, he is still a product of the trajectory of that perhaps evolutionary process.
“But then it is all about seeing what the mind can do, isn't it? The way I see it, Yoni, we believe in things like afterlives, higher powers, and higher principles; but our point A to point B is a given. And what better thing can we do with that than see what the mind can do and do some good in the process?”
“I don't like to talk in concepts of mind, I prefer the notions of Being or presence/existence but spirit is the same I think: our reality is always limited/finite in a sense, so the meaning/truth of the world is always already despite barely being it. I think once we shift the question towards this finitude, we might be able to cope with the political issue of being-together since politics is nothing more that being this "togertheness" (am I clear or have I transited into ontological gibberish?)”
First of all, if anything seems unclear to me, it wouldn't be because you were talking gibberish. The only reason I see for that is your training having given you a level of comfort with the terminology that is well above my pay grade.
That said, I have to respectfully challenge you again as to how you get to concepts of Being without seeing what your mind can do. I sense a spiritual element in your point. So I have to ask mainly so I don’t do anything to offend you: are you Jewish?
That asked, I have to take an off bounce/ trajectory on your point about Being as concerns my own experience with it (perhaps out of a desire to show off –that is mainly in the spirit of the experiment of seeing what your response will be. Back in my old Sartre/Existentialism days, I use to talk a lot about Being and Nothingness -not Sartre’s book, but the actual concepts. I actually formed a lot of my intellectual constructs around it. The problem I came up against was that while Being (via beings (was incontestable, the concept of nothingness or non-being was always contentious since we can never look at it directly. I eventually came to the tactic of talking in terms of presence/absence since absence seemed like a much more credible term. But, as far as I’m concerned, the two are not interchangeable. The Being/Nothingness dyad is an ontological issue. The presence/absence dyad, on the other hand, is a phenomenological one.
So I guess the only important question here is: any comments?
“Your proposal of an infinite discourse creating evolution is not enough for me because it would be just the infinite return of the same discourse, the same order appearing in different angles (Derrida's iterability in a sense). To perform must be to propose something different. It must demands a new reality "as if" it was possible/real (I believe current philosopher such as Ranciere and Nancy formulate this question).” –Yoni: ibid
Okay. But you’re going to have to explain how you are going achieve this end outside of the evolutionary process I am describing. I return to my point concerning language:
“And that makes perfect sense to me given that discourse is ultimately a creative act. One person strings a sentence together based on previous sentences they have strung together. Then the other responds with a sentence built off of other sentences they have previously strung together.”
The only other alternative to me is divine inspiration. It just seems that if there is any hope of achieving your goal, we will have to take our cue from the computer programmers who work mainly by working off each other. Here I have to take the Deleuzian approach of repeating what we know until the momentum and inertia push us beyond it through difference. Even Derrida cannot claim to have happened in a vacuum. As radical as his moves in the language game of culture may seem, he is still a product of the trajectory of that perhaps evolutionary process.
“But then it is all about seeing what the mind can do, isn't it? The way I see it, Yoni, we believe in things like afterlives, higher powers, and higher principles; but our point A to point B is a given. And what better thing can we do with that than see what the mind can do and do some good in the process?”
“I don't like to talk in concepts of mind, I prefer the notions of Being or presence/existence but spirit is the same I think: our reality is always limited/finite in a sense, so the meaning/truth of the world is always already despite barely being it. I think once we shift the question towards this finitude, we might be able to cope with the political issue of being-together since politics is nothing more that being this "togertheness" (am I clear or have I transited into ontological gibberish?)”
First of all, if anything seems unclear to me, it wouldn't be because you were talking gibberish. The only reason I see for that is your training having given you a level of comfort with the terminology that is well above my pay grade.
That said, I have to respectfully challenge you again as to how you get to concepts of Being without seeing what your mind can do. I sense a spiritual element in your point. So I have to ask mainly so I don’t do anything to offend you: are you Jewish?
That asked, I have to take an off bounce/ trajectory on your point about Being as concerns my own experience with it (perhaps out of a desire to show off –that is mainly in the spirit of the experiment of seeing what your response will be. Back in my old Sartre/Existentialism days, I use to talk a lot about Being and Nothingness -not Sartre’s book, but the actual concepts. I actually formed a lot of my intellectual constructs around it. The problem I came up against was that while Being (via beings (was incontestable, the concept of nothingness or non-being was always contentious since we can never look at it directly. I eventually came to the tactic of talking in terms of presence/absence since absence seemed like a much more credible term. But, as far as I’m concerned, the two are not interchangeable. The Being/Nothingness dyad is an ontological issue. The presence/absence dyad, on the other hand, is a phenomenological one.
So I guess the only important question here is: any comments?
Re: Derrida’s Performance
I will try to answer as organized and clearly as possible (and also sucint but I already feel I will fail on this part). I am Jewish but I don’t see the connection to any of my previus arguments. So if you think there is a connection I would like to hear about it.
If it is just the question of the spiritual or the divine power I will definetly disagree with you (which does not mean that you are not right, it just means I don’t see it). In fact I think my attempt is precesely to oppose any absolute/infinite object that might be an external fator to the philosophical system as will be my argument about nothigness. For now let me focus on the linguistic.
I disagree with you that the only two options in front of us are either a pragmatic returno f the same or a divine power. First thing because they do not differ so much in their essence. The pragmatic return as I said is problematic because it cannot create change since it maintains itself in the discurse of what works and what works is what is. The idea that the more people talking the better is extremelly problematic since all they talk about is the same thing (the same pragmatic discourse). It is the same common sense and therefore a consensus. To argue that change is possible within this strucutre is either to demands that things slowly change unpredictably and without intention and therefore introducing a mysterious hand that guides the process, OR, to argue that every change operates within the same pragmatic logic and therefore not really changes anything but a reforms. So even if you are pragmatic, change can only come from divine power. I will not waste our time and space (since afterall I am writing and occupying space even if “virtual” [but that is another question]) opposing the argument of divine power since since nobody seems to be defending it.
Now, you touched a very importante point: where does this change come from? My answer is from a sovereign decision (as in Schmitt’s or Paul Kahn’s political theology [but don’t be fooled by the term]). This is not the descontextualized decision, but the decision that descontextualizes. It comes out of the context only to create a context of the decision. It is a total decision of a total power but it is not arbitrary or irrational as in the divine power. It is not capricious. It is a violent decision that makes itself. Its existence precedes its essence in the sense that only as an already given existence/presence as a decision it constructs the context/essence of itself. The emblematic example is a revolution that is a decision that constructs the context of itself. For example: Kafka’s revolution creates Kafka’s predecessors. In this sense it creates change, by making the impossible. It is the breaking of the pragmatic discourse and the inclusion of the exception, that which does not speak in the infinite return of the same, that which is not included in the pragmatic common sense.
As to nothigness I didn’t see how your change in concepts solved the problem so I would like to hear more about it. My problem with purely phenomenological answer is that the lack ontology. It is essential to think the presence of things (their phenomen) together with their existence (their ontology.)For now I will limit myself to saying that the fact that we cannot see absence/nothingness does not mean it cannot be thught. I think that thinking the absolute difference between Being (I used the concept of being rather than mind because it refer to our existence as a whole, as in the question of ontology rather than the question of mind as in an epistemological question. What I am trying to say is that for me it is not what the mind can do but what existence can do) and nothigness is very problematic. It is precesely this thinking of infinitude that demands absolute answer which can never be since no thing IS absolutly, or in other words, nothing is absolutly so therefore it can never be. Still it is possible to finitely think nothigness just like I just tried to do.
Again I hope it is clear and if not I am sorry. I was trying to be as direct and to the point as possible
If it is just the question of the spiritual or the divine power I will definetly disagree with you (which does not mean that you are not right, it just means I don’t see it). In fact I think my attempt is precesely to oppose any absolute/infinite object that might be an external fator to the philosophical system as will be my argument about nothigness. For now let me focus on the linguistic.
I disagree with you that the only two options in front of us are either a pragmatic returno f the same or a divine power. First thing because they do not differ so much in their essence. The pragmatic return as I said is problematic because it cannot create change since it maintains itself in the discurse of what works and what works is what is. The idea that the more people talking the better is extremelly problematic since all they talk about is the same thing (the same pragmatic discourse). It is the same common sense and therefore a consensus. To argue that change is possible within this strucutre is either to demands that things slowly change unpredictably and without intention and therefore introducing a mysterious hand that guides the process, OR, to argue that every change operates within the same pragmatic logic and therefore not really changes anything but a reforms. So even if you are pragmatic, change can only come from divine power. I will not waste our time and space (since afterall I am writing and occupying space even if “virtual” [but that is another question]) opposing the argument of divine power since since nobody seems to be defending it.
Now, you touched a very importante point: where does this change come from? My answer is from a sovereign decision (as in Schmitt’s or Paul Kahn’s political theology [but don’t be fooled by the term]). This is not the descontextualized decision, but the decision that descontextualizes. It comes out of the context only to create a context of the decision. It is a total decision of a total power but it is not arbitrary or irrational as in the divine power. It is not capricious. It is a violent decision that makes itself. Its existence precedes its essence in the sense that only as an already given existence/presence as a decision it constructs the context/essence of itself. The emblematic example is a revolution that is a decision that constructs the context of itself. For example: Kafka’s revolution creates Kafka’s predecessors. In this sense it creates change, by making the impossible. It is the breaking of the pragmatic discourse and the inclusion of the exception, that which does not speak in the infinite return of the same, that which is not included in the pragmatic common sense.
As to nothigness I didn’t see how your change in concepts solved the problem so I would like to hear more about it. My problem with purely phenomenological answer is that the lack ontology. It is essential to think the presence of things (their phenomen) together with their existence (their ontology.)For now I will limit myself to saying that the fact that we cannot see absence/nothingness does not mean it cannot be thught. I think that thinking the absolute difference between Being (I used the concept of being rather than mind because it refer to our existence as a whole, as in the question of ontology rather than the question of mind as in an epistemological question. What I am trying to say is that for me it is not what the mind can do but what existence can do) and nothigness is very problematic. It is precesely this thinking of infinitude that demands absolute answer which can never be since no thing IS absolutly, or in other words, nothing is absolutly so therefore it can never be. Still it is possible to finitely think nothigness just like I just tried to do.
Again I hope it is clear and if not I am sorry. I was trying to be as direct and to the point as possible
Re: Derrida’s Performance
“That asked, I have to take an off bounce/ trajectory on your point about Being as concerns my own experience with it (perhaps out of a desire to show off –that is mainly in the spirit of the experiment of seeing what your response will be. Back in my old Sartre/Existentialism days, I use to talk a lot about Being and Nothingness -not Sartre’s book, but the actual concepts. I actually formed a lot of my intellectual constructs around it. The problem I came up against was that while Being (via beings (was incontestable, the concept of nothingness or non-being was always contentious since we can never look at it directly. I eventually came to the tactic of talking in terms of presence/absence since absence seemed like a much more credible term. But, as far as I’m concerned, the two are not interchangeable. The Being/Nothingness dyad is an ontological issue. The presence/absence dyad, on the other hand, is a phenomenological one.”
“As to nothingness I didn’t see how your change in concepts solved the problem so I would like to hear more about it. My problem with purely phenomenological answer is that the lack ontology. It is essential to think the presence of things (their phenomena) together with their existence (their ontology.)For now I will limit myself to saying that the fact that we cannot see absence/nothingness does not mean it cannot be thought. I think that thinking the absolute difference between Being (I used the concept of being rather than mind because it refer to our existence as a whole, as in the question of ontology rather than the question of mind as in an epistemological question. “
The main reason I made this distinction is that throughout my process on the boards I have come up against hardcore materialists or what could also be referred to as metaphysical atheists (those who don’t stop at not believing in God (theological atheism (but go further in not believing in any transcendent property (love, consciousness, etc., etc. (and found myself distracted by a lot of arguments about whether nothingness can exist rather than making the argument I was based on its possibility. I just thought it a lot less contentious to speak in terms of presence and absence since absence is a much more tangible phenomenon: it can actually be observed. Nothingness, on the other hand, can only be inferred by the fact (and may the wrath of Strunk rest in its grave (that things are. I could easily see such metaphysical atheists argue that Sartre was actually confusing absence for nothingness when Pierre didn’t show up at the café.
(It was mainly a practical matter that I developed for another more finished piece I wrote on another board: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopi ... 5&t=179930(
In other words, as much as we may hate to do so, we have to concede to the metaphysical atheists that any talk about Nothingness, in the ontological sense, requires a leap of faith. But I am perfectly willing to take that leap with you. Once again, I have developed conceptual constructs around it. The main one is what is as about as close to a religion as I get. I personally believe that all perceiving things are the eyes and ears of God, that it is through them that nothing becomes something. To me it is the answer to Leibniz’s question: why all this rather than nothing: to which the answer would be: so that there can be something.
And it is this sense of nothing expanding into to something that underlies my sense of philosophy and the creative act as a function of our evolution as a species. But then I have to make this argument by appealing to resonance and seduction through the language game of writing ‘as if’ everything I say is true.
“As to nothingness I didn’t see how your change in concepts solved the problem so I would like to hear more about it. My problem with purely phenomenological answer is that the lack ontology. It is essential to think the presence of things (their phenomena) together with their existence (their ontology.)For now I will limit myself to saying that the fact that we cannot see absence/nothingness does not mean it cannot be thought. I think that thinking the absolute difference between Being (I used the concept of being rather than mind because it refer to our existence as a whole, as in the question of ontology rather than the question of mind as in an epistemological question. “
The main reason I made this distinction is that throughout my process on the boards I have come up against hardcore materialists or what could also be referred to as metaphysical atheists (those who don’t stop at not believing in God (theological atheism (but go further in not believing in any transcendent property (love, consciousness, etc., etc. (and found myself distracted by a lot of arguments about whether nothingness can exist rather than making the argument I was based on its possibility. I just thought it a lot less contentious to speak in terms of presence and absence since absence is a much more tangible phenomenon: it can actually be observed. Nothingness, on the other hand, can only be inferred by the fact (and may the wrath of Strunk rest in its grave (that things are. I could easily see such metaphysical atheists argue that Sartre was actually confusing absence for nothingness when Pierre didn’t show up at the café.
(It was mainly a practical matter that I developed for another more finished piece I wrote on another board: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopi ... 5&t=179930(
In other words, as much as we may hate to do so, we have to concede to the metaphysical atheists that any talk about Nothingness, in the ontological sense, requires a leap of faith. But I am perfectly willing to take that leap with you. Once again, I have developed conceptual constructs around it. The main one is what is as about as close to a religion as I get. I personally believe that all perceiving things are the eyes and ears of God, that it is through them that nothing becomes something. To me it is the answer to Leibniz’s question: why all this rather than nothing: to which the answer would be: so that there can be something.
And it is this sense of nothing expanding into to something that underlies my sense of philosophy and the creative act as a function of our evolution as a species. But then I have to make this argument by appealing to resonance and seduction through the language game of writing ‘as if’ everything I say is true.
Re: Derrida’s Performance
"Again I hope it is clear and if not I am sorry. I was trying to be as direct and to the point as possible."
Unfortunately, my friend, you may be engaging in a noble but, ultimately, futile project. I'm thinking here of Lacan's point that language is like an attorney that represents us to the attorney (the language (of the other. Even though, as I would still argue, language is an agreement, it is not an homogeneous one. It is rather heterogeneous in the way a language can arrive at slight variations of agreements in the various circumstances it can find itself being practiced in (ex. Ebonics. And this can go down to the individual themselves in their own individual context. This is how two individuals can actually be in agreement yet can still find themselves in a debate –sometimes to the point of hostility.
As Voltaire put it: if you want to talk to me, you’ll have to define your terms.
And this aspect of it seems to get amplified when it comes to philosophy since every philosophical process involves an individual accumulation of terms and meanings and associations (via di̕fferrance (that aren’t always translatable to another process. For instance, I have read through your article about 5 times now, and there are still parts of it that seem impenetrable to me. And I do not blame this on you as much as I attribute it to my symbolic filter (as Hofstadter put it (as well as the terms (and their associative networks –once again: di̕fferrance (we have picked up along the way. And you are in good company. I find myself, for instance, experiencing the same thing with Joe Hughes’ reader guide to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. And that is secondary text.
And all this makes sense in the context of my recent excursion into Deleuze’s Logic of Sense in that communication is not so much a matter of the direct exchange of information as the rather oblique manner of working from the sense of what the other is communicating: the performance. This is why I should also preemptively apologize if I’m not directly addressing your points or if I seem to be going off on my own trajectory. If I seem to be doing so, it is only because your suspicion is likely true. But that would only be because I am often working from a sense of what you are saying. It’s the only process by which (through repetition and difference –that of playing what I’m doing and saying against what you are doing and saying (I can hope to get a clearer understanding of what you are doing.
On the uptake, though, your article has participated in a revision in my approach to my process. Up until now, I had thought the best approach to a difficult philosophy (once again: damn the French and their weird obscure philosophies anyway! (was to familiarize myself with the secondary text until I had enough information to delve into the actual text: to use it as a ladder until I was ready to climb into the thought of the actual philosopher. But my five readings of Joe Hughes’ book as well as the very short introduction to Derrida I’m reading now is starting to suggest how ineffective that approach is. Now I’m starting to see the secondary text as secondary to the “performance” of the actual text. I’m starting to see secondary text as supplemental to just diving into the original text and working from the sense I get from it.
Unfortunately, my friend, you may be engaging in a noble but, ultimately, futile project. I'm thinking here of Lacan's point that language is like an attorney that represents us to the attorney (the language (of the other. Even though, as I would still argue, language is an agreement, it is not an homogeneous one. It is rather heterogeneous in the way a language can arrive at slight variations of agreements in the various circumstances it can find itself being practiced in (ex. Ebonics. And this can go down to the individual themselves in their own individual context. This is how two individuals can actually be in agreement yet can still find themselves in a debate –sometimes to the point of hostility.
As Voltaire put it: if you want to talk to me, you’ll have to define your terms.
And this aspect of it seems to get amplified when it comes to philosophy since every philosophical process involves an individual accumulation of terms and meanings and associations (via di̕fferrance (that aren’t always translatable to another process. For instance, I have read through your article about 5 times now, and there are still parts of it that seem impenetrable to me. And I do not blame this on you as much as I attribute it to my symbolic filter (as Hofstadter put it (as well as the terms (and their associative networks –once again: di̕fferrance (we have picked up along the way. And you are in good company. I find myself, for instance, experiencing the same thing with Joe Hughes’ reader guide to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. And that is secondary text.
And all this makes sense in the context of my recent excursion into Deleuze’s Logic of Sense in that communication is not so much a matter of the direct exchange of information as the rather oblique manner of working from the sense of what the other is communicating: the performance. This is why I should also preemptively apologize if I’m not directly addressing your points or if I seem to be going off on my own trajectory. If I seem to be doing so, it is only because your suspicion is likely true. But that would only be because I am often working from a sense of what you are saying. It’s the only process by which (through repetition and difference –that of playing what I’m doing and saying against what you are doing and saying (I can hope to get a clearer understanding of what you are doing.
On the uptake, though, your article has participated in a revision in my approach to my process. Up until now, I had thought the best approach to a difficult philosophy (once again: damn the French and their weird obscure philosophies anyway! (was to familiarize myself with the secondary text until I had enough information to delve into the actual text: to use it as a ladder until I was ready to climb into the thought of the actual philosopher. But my five readings of Joe Hughes’ book as well as the very short introduction to Derrida I’m reading now is starting to suggest how ineffective that approach is. Now I’m starting to see the secondary text as secondary to the “performance” of the actual text. I’m starting to see secondary text as supplemental to just diving into the original text and working from the sense I get from it.
Last edited by d63 on Fri May 01, 2015 3:33 pm, edited 3 times in total.
Re: Derrida’s Performance
We, for instance, share a common anti-representational sensibility. Yet, we disagree on the particulars.
Re: Derrida’s Performance
“Life is a performance and we are but players on its stage....if I read the right article, I believe I have, I would agree first that yoni is humble. At the same time, I believe all people in some kind of authority or "expert" should be humble. The day you think you know everything about anything you fail. I say this, because if you think you have nothing else to learn, you become stagnant....caught up in your own rigid ideals.” –Ken
Yes, Yonathon’s humility is impressive. What is really telling to me is how lacking in humility many of the trolls can be that I have encountered on these boards who claim to have the authority that Yoni has proof of. I had always suspected, when confronted with such, that this was the case and that I had every reason to question their authority based on their lack of humility: their desire to turn it all into a pissing contest. I had always suspected them to be wannabes compensating for their lack through aggression. Yoni kind of added a little foundation to my assumption.
(And I should note here that I am mainly talking in terms of the past since the boards have done an effective job of eliminating the problem. While I have watched trolls turn the Yahoo and MySpace boards into wastelands, I’m not seeing so much of that these days. Roger???)
Unfortunately, he seems to have given up on me either out of lack of time (he had, after all, just published one of his first articles which likely wetted his taste for more (or frustration as I am older and a little more set in my ways. I’m open to new ideas, but can be a little stubborn in holding my own. Either way, I was flattered and appreciated his taking out the time out to go with me as far as he did and I look forward to further articles from him.
“I also agree that the use of "you" is often perceived as an affront directed at the individual the text is about, when often then not, "you" is used as a broader term meaning not the speaker or writer. In an ideal world, all would be understood in language and translation, unfortunately this is not true.”
The thing here, Ken, is that I was comparing experiences on the boards in which the second person perspective can lead to schoolyard brawls to the third person perspective of people writing books and articles in which they can keep it a little cooler and articulate through third person detachment. It’s not a guarantee against mean spiritedness (as Rand’s Virtue of Selfishness obviously demonstrates (I tried to read it, but got so nauseous by about the third essay, I had to put it down (but it gives the addressor a little more space to think before they assert.
But I agree: the second person perspective is a mixed package in being so personal. Saying “love ya, man!” is a lot more powerful, performance-wise, than “I love that person”. However, in situations of disagreement, it can get personal: “Fuck you: you fucking p****!!!!” But once again: the third person perspective is not a guarantee:
“Fuck that fucking p****!!!!!!!”
Sometimes, anger can overwhelm the distance that the 3rd person perspective allows us. All it can be is a cushion.
“I personally believe that is why philosophers and also scientists (for what is philosophy, but the science of thought) use eloquent or what my less educated friends call "big words". There is less misinterpretation if you use a word that means, usually, the same thing no matter how it is read. Less eloquent vocabulary will get confused because they rely on more than just the word itself (ie, when speaking, you have body language, tone, and so on). This makes me think of the first "hard" book I ever read. It was called Foucault's Pendulum. I believe it was translated from Italian. I was maybe 17 and I had to read the book with a dictionary. Then I asked myself and then the person that recommended it why the words were so hard to grasp. I was told about it being translated. The reason I bring this up is because, again, the use of eloquent vocabulary leaves less room for misinterpretation. No matter what, though, there is always something lost in translation...even if it's just translating the thought process you have into words.”
First of all, I could just Google this, but have to test myself: is Foucault’s Pendulum Umberto Eco’s?
That asked, I agree with you: the reason philosophers turn to such Latin-ate terms (the “big words” as you call them (is for precision and concision. The problem is that these terms never stay stable in time. They evolve like any word does and pick up different associations along the way for more than one person. Therefore, as I believe Yoni was getting at, via Derrida, these terms for any individual always ride on an infinite network of association: diffe̕rrance. And I would respectfully counter your point:
“The reason I bring this up is because, again, the use of eloquent vocabulary leaves less room for misinterpretation.”
With a point I made to Yoni:
“I'm thinking here of Lacan's point that language is like an attorney that represents us to the attorney (the language (of the other. Even though, as I would still argue, language is an agreement, it is not an homogeneous one. It is rather heterogeneous in the way a language can arrive at slight variations of agreements in the various circumstances it can find itself being practiced in (ex. Ebonics. And this can go down to the individual themselves in their own individual context. This is how two individuals can actually be in agreement yet can still find themselves in a debate –sometimes to the point of hostility.”
But then you more or less suggested this with:
“No matter what, though, there is always something lost in translation...even if it's just translating the thought process you have into words.”
But I would implore you not to take this self deconstruction (actually, as I would spell it, d.construction (as a weakness in your process. Take it, rather, as a sign of integrity.
Yes, Yonathon’s humility is impressive. What is really telling to me is how lacking in humility many of the trolls can be that I have encountered on these boards who claim to have the authority that Yoni has proof of. I had always suspected, when confronted with such, that this was the case and that I had every reason to question their authority based on their lack of humility: their desire to turn it all into a pissing contest. I had always suspected them to be wannabes compensating for their lack through aggression. Yoni kind of added a little foundation to my assumption.
(And I should note here that I am mainly talking in terms of the past since the boards have done an effective job of eliminating the problem. While I have watched trolls turn the Yahoo and MySpace boards into wastelands, I’m not seeing so much of that these days. Roger???)
Unfortunately, he seems to have given up on me either out of lack of time (he had, after all, just published one of his first articles which likely wetted his taste for more (or frustration as I am older and a little more set in my ways. I’m open to new ideas, but can be a little stubborn in holding my own. Either way, I was flattered and appreciated his taking out the time out to go with me as far as he did and I look forward to further articles from him.
“I also agree that the use of "you" is often perceived as an affront directed at the individual the text is about, when often then not, "you" is used as a broader term meaning not the speaker or writer. In an ideal world, all would be understood in language and translation, unfortunately this is not true.”
The thing here, Ken, is that I was comparing experiences on the boards in which the second person perspective can lead to schoolyard brawls to the third person perspective of people writing books and articles in which they can keep it a little cooler and articulate through third person detachment. It’s not a guarantee against mean spiritedness (as Rand’s Virtue of Selfishness obviously demonstrates (I tried to read it, but got so nauseous by about the third essay, I had to put it down (but it gives the addressor a little more space to think before they assert.
But I agree: the second person perspective is a mixed package in being so personal. Saying “love ya, man!” is a lot more powerful, performance-wise, than “I love that person”. However, in situations of disagreement, it can get personal: “Fuck you: you fucking p****!!!!” But once again: the third person perspective is not a guarantee:
“Fuck that fucking p****!!!!!!!”
Sometimes, anger can overwhelm the distance that the 3rd person perspective allows us. All it can be is a cushion.
“I personally believe that is why philosophers and also scientists (for what is philosophy, but the science of thought) use eloquent or what my less educated friends call "big words". There is less misinterpretation if you use a word that means, usually, the same thing no matter how it is read. Less eloquent vocabulary will get confused because they rely on more than just the word itself (ie, when speaking, you have body language, tone, and so on). This makes me think of the first "hard" book I ever read. It was called Foucault's Pendulum. I believe it was translated from Italian. I was maybe 17 and I had to read the book with a dictionary. Then I asked myself and then the person that recommended it why the words were so hard to grasp. I was told about it being translated. The reason I bring this up is because, again, the use of eloquent vocabulary leaves less room for misinterpretation. No matter what, though, there is always something lost in translation...even if it's just translating the thought process you have into words.”
First of all, I could just Google this, but have to test myself: is Foucault’s Pendulum Umberto Eco’s?
That asked, I agree with you: the reason philosophers turn to such Latin-ate terms (the “big words” as you call them (is for precision and concision. The problem is that these terms never stay stable in time. They evolve like any word does and pick up different associations along the way for more than one person. Therefore, as I believe Yoni was getting at, via Derrida, these terms for any individual always ride on an infinite network of association: diffe̕rrance. And I would respectfully counter your point:
“The reason I bring this up is because, again, the use of eloquent vocabulary leaves less room for misinterpretation.”
With a point I made to Yoni:
“I'm thinking here of Lacan's point that language is like an attorney that represents us to the attorney (the language (of the other. Even though, as I would still argue, language is an agreement, it is not an homogeneous one. It is rather heterogeneous in the way a language can arrive at slight variations of agreements in the various circumstances it can find itself being practiced in (ex. Ebonics. And this can go down to the individual themselves in their own individual context. This is how two individuals can actually be in agreement yet can still find themselves in a debate –sometimes to the point of hostility.”
But then you more or less suggested this with:
“No matter what, though, there is always something lost in translation...even if it's just translating the thought process you have into words.”
But I would implore you not to take this self deconstruction (actually, as I would spell it, d.construction (as a weakness in your process. Take it, rather, as a sign of integrity.
Re: Derrida’s Performance
"OK, so what I just wrote may be fanciful crap but it does express what I feel about mainstream philosophy, of which I think Heidegger is a part. Philosophy needs to start again, this time without the bonds that tie us to outworn ideas, if this is possible." -Roger Chapman
Actually, Roger, I'm not seeing so much "fanciful crap" as someone who has their own systems of meaning (of differance (and is expressing themselves in those terms. This is why, while I had hoped to bounce off of your points, I cannot because I don't understand it enough to be confident in any response I might make. And this is primarily because of my own systems of meaning that are not exactly coordinated with yours.
Dealing with our impasse, I realized that there are 2 aspects to writing: the internal and the external. The internal is how we capture our thoughts for ourselves. The external is how we communicate those thoughts to others via the rules that constitute the Lacanian symbolic order in which we must work: the very agreement that allows us to communicate.
That said though, you have provided me with a useful intro to today's rhizome:
“Of course, the French word ‘différence’ (with an e) already brings into view the semantic dimension of, precisely, difference. Derrida appeals to a second sense belonging to the Latin verb ‘differre’ but completely absent from the French ‘différence’ that was in fact derived from it; namely, ‘the action of putting off’ – deferring. The point here is to get a semantic dimension of sameness into play as well (and into play without a commitment to a deferred presence; the only essential thing at issue when someone defers doing something is that instead of doing x now, they intend to do x later – whether ‘doing x’ can escape the logic of identity-in-différance being elaborated is a further question). French ‘différence’ (with an e) does not have this semantic component. Thence the value of a neologism which will compensate for this lack, with a term with greater semantic wealth: ‘we provisionally give the name différance to this sameness which is not identical’.” -Glendinning, Simon (2011-08-25). Derrida: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (p. 66). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
?: now, did anyone get that… If not, you’re in good company. At least I consider myself to be such. And if you do, you are perfectly free to skip over the following. But then you knew that, didn’t you?
The thing is I can explain the concept of Diffe̕rrance in a very blue-collarized and perhaps vulgarized way. Diffe̕rrance is a neologism of two words: difference and defer. It is a description of how language works through differentiating (for instance: the difference between a river and a brook (and through the deferral of meaning in that the definition of any word is always dependent on the definitions of the other words that are used to define it. And I got this understanding from a graphic guide, Derrida for Beginners, which many “serious” philosophers would scoff at since it doesn’t get at a full understanding of the term.
But I could easily counter this by pointing out that my description of it is merely a steppingstone into a fuller understanding of Diffe̕rrance. And the thing is, my description would give a lot of people something they can use until they reach a deeper understanding of it.
And I wouldn’t take issue with Glendinning had he of called his book a “study” of Derrida rather than an “intro”. But he chose to call it an intro then proceeded to engage in a lot of etherspeak as if he was more interested in showing off his comfort with the Derridaian nomenclature than actually explaining what the man meant –or, at least, what he thought Derrida meant.
It, to me, felt more like self indulgence than a sincere attempt to introduce anyone to the thought of Derrida. But this goes back to the point I made with Roger: that it’s not so much a matter of self indulgence as the comfort with an internal use of language as compared to an external one.
Glendinning felt like a professor saying it’s easy then proceeding to bamboozle you with a big bang of formulas expanding from a simple formula.
Actually, Roger, I'm not seeing so much "fanciful crap" as someone who has their own systems of meaning (of differance (and is expressing themselves in those terms. This is why, while I had hoped to bounce off of your points, I cannot because I don't understand it enough to be confident in any response I might make. And this is primarily because of my own systems of meaning that are not exactly coordinated with yours.
Dealing with our impasse, I realized that there are 2 aspects to writing: the internal and the external. The internal is how we capture our thoughts for ourselves. The external is how we communicate those thoughts to others via the rules that constitute the Lacanian symbolic order in which we must work: the very agreement that allows us to communicate.
That said though, you have provided me with a useful intro to today's rhizome:
“Of course, the French word ‘différence’ (with an e) already brings into view the semantic dimension of, precisely, difference. Derrida appeals to a second sense belonging to the Latin verb ‘differre’ but completely absent from the French ‘différence’ that was in fact derived from it; namely, ‘the action of putting off’ – deferring. The point here is to get a semantic dimension of sameness into play as well (and into play without a commitment to a deferred presence; the only essential thing at issue when someone defers doing something is that instead of doing x now, they intend to do x later – whether ‘doing x’ can escape the logic of identity-in-différance being elaborated is a further question). French ‘différence’ (with an e) does not have this semantic component. Thence the value of a neologism which will compensate for this lack, with a term with greater semantic wealth: ‘we provisionally give the name différance to this sameness which is not identical’.” -Glendinning, Simon (2011-08-25). Derrida: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (p. 66). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
?: now, did anyone get that… If not, you’re in good company. At least I consider myself to be such. And if you do, you are perfectly free to skip over the following. But then you knew that, didn’t you?
The thing is I can explain the concept of Diffe̕rrance in a very blue-collarized and perhaps vulgarized way. Diffe̕rrance is a neologism of two words: difference and defer. It is a description of how language works through differentiating (for instance: the difference between a river and a brook (and through the deferral of meaning in that the definition of any word is always dependent on the definitions of the other words that are used to define it. And I got this understanding from a graphic guide, Derrida for Beginners, which many “serious” philosophers would scoff at since it doesn’t get at a full understanding of the term.
But I could easily counter this by pointing out that my description of it is merely a steppingstone into a fuller understanding of Diffe̕rrance. And the thing is, my description would give a lot of people something they can use until they reach a deeper understanding of it.
And I wouldn’t take issue with Glendinning had he of called his book a “study” of Derrida rather than an “intro”. But he chose to call it an intro then proceeded to engage in a lot of etherspeak as if he was more interested in showing off his comfort with the Derridaian nomenclature than actually explaining what the man meant –or, at least, what he thought Derrida meant.
It, to me, felt more like self indulgence than a sincere attempt to introduce anyone to the thought of Derrida. But this goes back to the point I made with Roger: that it’s not so much a matter of self indulgence as the comfort with an internal use of language as compared to an external one.
Glendinning felt like a professor saying it’s easy then proceeding to bamboozle you with a big bang of formulas expanding from a simple formula.
-
marjoram_blues
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Re: Derrida’s Performance
I've followed this jamming session as best I can. Sorry to interrupt the flow...but, not really. I need to ask a question about Listik's belief that Derrida's understanding of language 'could serve us in understanding and coping with contemporary issues'.I believe Derrida’s performative understanding of language represents a significant change in the structure of knowledge that has not yet been fully considered, yet could serve us in understanding and coping with contemporary issues.
© Yonathan Listik 2015
Yonathan Listik performs and professes philosophy without conditions at Tel Aviv University.
As a final statement, it leaves the reader wanting more. Probably the intention. Can you provide examples of how it could so serve?
Re: Derrida’s Performance
Actually, Majoram, I was a little confused on that issue myself.I had suggested that it, in a spirit similar to Rorty and Deleuze, could, via creative inertia and momentum, accelerate our cultural evolution. But Yoni (Yonathon) said he was after something more. I wasn't sure what that could be or how it could be achieved outside of the evolutionary process I had described. After our conversation, I did run into an article on To the Best of Our knowledge, in which an acquaintance of John Cage quoted him as pointing out that improvisation (what I associate with the evolutionary process) was not radically free, since it still depends on conventions that the artist has grown comfortable with. This reminded me a lot of what Yoni had said several times. This left me a little more sympathetic with Yoni's point. But I would still argue against Cage and Yoni that improvisation is not just a matter of repeating what one already knows, it is one of repeating what one knows in the hope that the creative inertia will get the individual beyond their self. And while I'm sympathetic with the idea of wading into completely unfamiliar waters, I can't help but believe that such an action is only as useful as it can be assimilated by and, thereby, change the symbolic order.
Re: Derrida’s Performance
Now guys, today I am, as Deleuze encourages us, writing at the edge of what I know and working with what is, given my present state of mind, diverse material that will straddle Yonathon Listik’s article in Philosophy Now, Derrida’s Performance, and Simon Glendiggen’s Derrida: a Very Short Introduction. Luckily, I have the time this may take for me to fumble around, this being my Friday. I would start with Yonathon’s point:
“Every word uttered has already been uttered and gains meaning from these past uses, and in this sense every word is parasitic on its previous usages to gain its present meaning. Language carries its past and the possibility of its future (This is the meaning of iterability for Derrida).”
Now this, for me (via Deleuze’s take on time, is easy to understand in that, like a language (including that of an individual, words (especially in philosophy –once again: my question concerning the effect of philosophy on the language it presumes to study (evolve through the various connotations that tend to build around it.
But my question for Derrida, which Mr. Listik will hopefully be able to answer, is how we distinguish iterability from diffe̕rrance. What was the point of creating two different concepts for what seems to be the same thing?
Now on to Glendiggen’s points:
“We have now reached what might be called the first conclusion of Derrida’s text: ‘the logic of presence’ must be displaced, indeed will always already find itself destined to be displaced by the logic of différance.” -Glendinning, Simon (2011-08-25). Derrida: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (p. 68). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
Then:
“To write is to produce a mark … which my future disappearance will not in principle, hinder in its functioning… . For a writing to be a writing it must continue to ‘act’ and to be readable even when what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written… . The situation of the writer is, concerning the written text, basically the same as that of the reader.” – Ibid, pg.70
We, as boarders, experience a sense of this in that we are our always writing ourselves into a future in which we will not be present: the moment the reader reads what we have posted. And, hopefully, you are starting to sense the kind of confused ontology involved that I am sensing as I write this.
“Equally, any message is readable only to the extent that a (determinable) reader can read whatever the sender could write in the absolute absence of the (destined) receiver’s presence: writing can and must be able to do without the presence of the (destined) receiver.” -Ibid
As well as without the presence of the sender. Now we (or is it just me? (are wandering deeper into uncomfortable territory –perhaps to the immovable point at which we can move no further. On the other hand, we could return to the comfort of Listik’s point concerning the past/future dynamic at work in iterabily:
“Every word uttered has already been uttered and gains meaning from these past uses, and in this sense every word is parasitic on its previous usages to gain its present meaning. Language carries its past and the possibility of its future (This is the meaning of iterability for Derrida).”
Or are we just giving up? I suspect we are. Perhaps we’re living to fight (to push deeper into the quagmire of it (another day.
“Every word uttered has already been uttered and gains meaning from these past uses, and in this sense every word is parasitic on its previous usages to gain its present meaning. Language carries its past and the possibility of its future (This is the meaning of iterability for Derrida).”
Now this, for me (via Deleuze’s take on time, is easy to understand in that, like a language (including that of an individual, words (especially in philosophy –once again: my question concerning the effect of philosophy on the language it presumes to study (evolve through the various connotations that tend to build around it.
But my question for Derrida, which Mr. Listik will hopefully be able to answer, is how we distinguish iterability from diffe̕rrance. What was the point of creating two different concepts for what seems to be the same thing?
Now on to Glendiggen’s points:
“We have now reached what might be called the first conclusion of Derrida’s text: ‘the logic of presence’ must be displaced, indeed will always already find itself destined to be displaced by the logic of différance.” -Glendinning, Simon (2011-08-25). Derrida: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (p. 68). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
Then:
“To write is to produce a mark … which my future disappearance will not in principle, hinder in its functioning… . For a writing to be a writing it must continue to ‘act’ and to be readable even when what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written… . The situation of the writer is, concerning the written text, basically the same as that of the reader.” – Ibid, pg.70
We, as boarders, experience a sense of this in that we are our always writing ourselves into a future in which we will not be present: the moment the reader reads what we have posted. And, hopefully, you are starting to sense the kind of confused ontology involved that I am sensing as I write this.
“Equally, any message is readable only to the extent that a (determinable) reader can read whatever the sender could write in the absolute absence of the (destined) receiver’s presence: writing can and must be able to do without the presence of the (destined) receiver.” -Ibid
As well as without the presence of the sender. Now we (or is it just me? (are wandering deeper into uncomfortable territory –perhaps to the immovable point at which we can move no further. On the other hand, we could return to the comfort of Listik’s point concerning the past/future dynamic at work in iterabily:
“Every word uttered has already been uttered and gains meaning from these past uses, and in this sense every word is parasitic on its previous usages to gain its present meaning. Language carries its past and the possibility of its future (This is the meaning of iterability for Derrida).”
Or are we just giving up? I suspect we are. Perhaps we’re living to fight (to push deeper into the quagmire of it (another day.
Re: Derrida’s Performance
Sorry for the long absence. I have been really busy. Just to shortly respond marjoram_blues' question I must first point out that Derrida's project is not "to serve" for something (looking back I might have been a little bit unfortunate in my formulation). But going straight to my point, I think there is a real problem of thinking knowledge/meaning today. To leave it as purely pragmatic/aesthetic conception is problematic because the issue is not just how the world is organized but a deeper compromise to it. Language is not simply an arrangement of the world into an image, it is taking an actual position within its configuration. In that sense Derrida's performance (or his theory of language in general) can serve us in an ontological/scientific question as much as in a political/aesthetic question. For example the questions such as "what world we create when we discuss theories of matter?" or "What are the consequences/implications of the concept of "rights"?"
Once again I hope it is clear and I will watch out for future questions
Once again I hope it is clear and I will watch out for future questions
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marjoram_blues
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Re: Derrida’s Performance
Sorry, but your 'hope that it is clear' is well and truly dashedYoni wrote:Sorry for the long absence. I have been really busy. Just to shortly respond marjoram_blues' question I must first point out that Derrida's project is not "to serve" for something (looking back I might have been a little bit unfortunate in my formulation). But going straight to my point, I think there is a real problem of thinking knowledge/meaning today. To leave it as purely pragmatic/aesthetic conception is problematic because the issue is not just how the world is organized but a deeper compromise to it. Language is not simply an arrangement of the world into an image, it is taking an actual position within its configuration. In that sense Derrida's performance (or his theory of language in general) can serve us in an ontological/scientific question as much as in a political/aesthetic question. For example the questions such as "what world we create when we discuss theories of matter?" or "What are the consequences/implications of the concept of "rights"?"
Once again I hope it is clear and I will watch out for future questions
To lay out my problem again:
Re your first point in your reply above, nowhere did I talk about Derrida's project as 'to serve' for something.I need to ask a question about Listik's belief that Derrida's understanding of language 'could serve us in understanding and coping with contemporary issues'. As a final statement, it leaves the reader wanting more. Probably the intention. Can you provide examples of how it could so serve?
If you don't wish to use the word 'serve', perhaps in this context 'help' would be better? So, I was asking you to provide examples of how, in particular, Derrida's understanding of language could 'help' us in understanding and coping with contemporary issues.
I understand that there is a spectrum of adjectives used to describe various world views, concerns or issues. You mention: ontological/scientific/political/aesthetic/pragmatic.
You provide 2 questions as examples of where Derrida ['s Performance or Theory of Language in general ] might 'help' us in 'understanding and coping with contemporary issues':
"what world we create when we discuss theories of matter?" or "What are the consequences/implications of the concept of "rights"?"
I was/am asking in what way i.e. how ?
[ I appreciate that you are busy and am grateful for your time and energy, thanks !
]Re: Derrida’s Performance
I think the way Derrida is useful to us is by asking the impossible in full conscience of its impossibility. He purposely goes beyond the limit only to reorganize the limit itself. He knows that there is no world without a certain organization, or in other words, a certain sense in language, but nevertheless he asks for that which is impossible within this configuration, Derrida demands us to think that which is "without conditions" "as if" it was true.
Now there is a series of ways of interpreting this notion of "as if". I propose to read it not as pure fiction (a discourse interpreting the world) or as pure constructivism (a discourse making the world) but as a concept that runs through this distinction. That is, a discourse that plays on the ambiguity of the "without condition": at the same time without conditions of ever being real and as totally free to make whatever it wants. In my opinion if we think in this way, our performance in the world becomes a "profession" in the sense I explained in my text: both a compromise with the current configuration (taking responsibility for it) and a challenging of it.
Clearer?
It is me who is thankful for your interest. This is a great exercise for me. Thank you.
Now there is a series of ways of interpreting this notion of "as if". I propose to read it not as pure fiction (a discourse interpreting the world) or as pure constructivism (a discourse making the world) but as a concept that runs through this distinction. That is, a discourse that plays on the ambiguity of the "without condition": at the same time without conditions of ever being real and as totally free to make whatever it wants. In my opinion if we think in this way, our performance in the world becomes a "profession" in the sense I explained in my text: both a compromise with the current configuration (taking responsibility for it) and a challenging of it.
Clearer?
It is me who is thankful for your interest. This is a great exercise for me. Thank you.