Philosophy Now Forum

David Handeye wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:Yes, this is the basis of the materialist explanation for consciousness. Materialists explain consciousness as nothing more than matter in motion. So yes, it it physical. In terms of tangibility, the argument is that if you can touch the brain you are touching the mind. Mind and brain are one and the same.

Yes? Yes what? Are you really saying materialists believe that touching Einstein's brain they're touching Einstein's mind? Are you serious?
I don't think materialists could be as ingenuous as you're describing them.
The point is that idealists do believe concepts really existing, somewhere out of the world or inside objects; materialists don't. For materialists concepts are flatus vocis, just names, every materialist is a nominalist. No reasonable materialist could really think that touching a brain he\she could touch also the thoughts stored in it.

Idealism is not antithetical to materialism. It is the converse of Realism.

Idealism is perfectly at home with the idea that Ideas are materially stored in neural networks. In fact it insists that all experience is primary, and that external objects are only inferred from that experience.
Idealism does not deny a material world, it simply identifies that the evidence we have for a material world is wholly dependant on our senses.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

David Handeye wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:Yes, this is the basis of the materialist explanation for consciousness. Materialists explain consciousness as nothing more than matter in motion. So yes, it it physical. In terms of tangibility, the argument is that if you can touch the brain you are touching the mind. Mind and brain are one and the same.

Yes? Yes what? Are you really saying materialists believe that touching Einstein's brain they're touching Einstein's mind? Are you serious?
I don't think materialists could be as ingenuous as you're describing them.
The point is that idealists do believe concepts really existing, somewhere out of the world or inside objects; materialists don't. For materialists concepts are flatus vocis, just names, every materialist is a nominalist. No reasonable materialist could really think that touching a brain he\she could touch also the thoughts stored in it.

Idealism is not antithetical to materialism. It is the converse of Realism.

Idealism is perfectly at home with the idea that Ideas are materially stored in neural networks. In fact it insists that all experience is primary, and that external objects are only inferred from that experience.
Idealism does not deny a material world, it simply identifies that the evidence we have for a material world is wholly dependant on our senses.

I would probably disagree with your interpretation of idealism in relation to materialism, but it is applicable in other ways when it comes to philosophy of mind.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/idealism


You might be thinking of this:

www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism

Ginkgo wrote:Not completely serious. If you read my Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy post would we can see that it is a bit more complicated. I do have an aversion to materialists conceptions of mind. However, I did make reference to Leibniz's Law and the problem of identity. Identity theory taken within a particular materialist explanation can claim mind states and brain states are identical. I think this is Dennett's position, but I tend to think the is confusing a reductionist account with an eliminationist account.
It depends on how we are prepared to interpret identity theory in relation to materialist explanations. Anyway, that's how I read it.

Well this is good reading, I'd say. And it's a bit different from your earlier post. Saying that mind states and brain states are identical is worth claiming for materialists.

Ginkgo wrote:
I would probably disagree with your interpretation of idealism in relation to materialism, but it is applicable in other ways when it comes to philosophy of mind.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/idealism


You might be thinking of this:

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_an ... ct_realism

The article specifically mentions Kant, in what is obviously a big field from Hindus to skeptical empiricists.
Kant specifically asserts the existence of the material world, as a reasonable conclusion from the inescapable idea that we are limited by our sensations.
In the specific context in which the poster, Handeye, mentions Idealism my objection was valid - from a Kantian point of view at least.

David Handeye wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:Not completely serious. If you read my Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy post would we can see that it is a bit more complicated. I do have an aversion to materialists conceptions of mind. However, I did make reference to Leibniz's Law and the problem of identity. Identity theory taken within a particular materialist explanation can claim mind states and brain states are identical. I think this is Dennett's position, but I tend to think the is confusing a reductionist account with an eliminationist account.
It depends on how we are prepared to interpret identity theory in relation to materialist explanations. Anyway, that's how I read it.

Well this is good reading, I'd say. And it's a bit different from your earlier post. Saying that mind states and brain states are identical is worth claiming for materialists.

Perhaps it is fair that we cannot speak of mind states. The mind being the thing the brain does, the correct way of speaking about mental activity is what condition is the brain in.
In other words the brain state is the condition of the mind; the brain states determines what thinking is happening, what memories can present. The Mind is the state of the brain.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:Idealism does not deny a material world, it simply identifies that the evidence we have for a material world is wholly dependant on our senses.

Sorry Hobbes, I don't agree absolutely. Idealism does deny a material world: remember Fichte (I posing not-I), Schelling (absolute identity of Nature and Spirit), Hegel (the world is not material, it's ideal: it's subject and spirit, activity, ideas in fieri). For idealism the world proceeds from concepts, all material things are spirit (synthetis of ideas (thesis) and nature (antithesis). For idealism beyond material things there is a concept, for which that thing appears for what it is; the essence of reality is ideal.
The material world is not wholly dependant on our senses, but it's wholly dependant on the perfect rationality of ideas, which being rational become reality. Reality is all phenomena, manifestation of the absolute, the reason, the spirit, the idea, finally of God. For idealism concepts (objectives) are the thoughts of God before He's making the world, as the world is not a done, but it's a doing, the absolute (or God, or Reason, or Spirit) is countinuosly making itself, that is the world itself, the universe itself, reality itself.
Idealism denies material world. At least here in Europe, I don't know there you are writing from.

David Handeye wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote:Idealism does not deny a material world, it simply identifies that the evidence we have for a material world is wholly dependant on our senses.

Sorry Hobbes, I don't agree absolutely. Idealism does deny a material world: remember Fichte (I posing not-I), Schelling (absolute identity of Nature and Spirit), Hegel (the world is not material, it's ideal: it's subject and spirit, activity, ideas in fieri). For idealism the world proceeds from concepts, all material things are spirit (synthetis of ideas (thesis) and nature (antithesis). For idealism beyond material things there is a concept, for which that thing appears for what it is; the essence of reality is ideal.
The material world is not wholly dependant on our senses, but it's wholly dependant on the perfect rationality of ideas, which being rational become reality. Reality is all phenomena, manifestation of the absolute, the reason, the spirit, the idea, finally of God. For idealism concepts (objectives) are the thoughts of God before He's making the world, as the world is not a done, but it's a doing, the absolute (or God, or Reason, or Spirit) is countinuosly making itself, that is the world itself, the universe itself, reality itself.
Idealism denies material world. At least here in Europe, I don't know there you are writing from.

Sorry you are wrong. The dichotomy is Idealism/Realism. NOT Idealism/Materialsim. You are confusing ontological claims with epistemological ones.
Kant is an idealist who does not deny materialism. Therefore Idealism is not antithetical to materialism, even though some idealists are not also materialists.

The point about the empiricists who inspired Kant to this view, (such as Hume), is that they assertea that we can only know the material world vis the senses, and thus our perception of the material world is limited by them.

It is completely different, and I would say utterly absurd notion, to deny the basic intuition that the world we know is material. We would be unable to share our experiences were there not a material substrate between which and within which we all live.
The existence of a material world does not deny that we are limited and enabled by sensation, as this is the unavoidable basis of all knowledge about the world.

Extreme idealism that suggests that there is nothing that is not mental is rare and ridiculous. When pressed no one I have ever known as managed to sustain this fantasy for long.

I don't need god, and the concept i utterly irrelevant to this discussion.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:Sorry you are wrong. The dichotomy is Idealism/Realism. NOT Idealism/Materialsim. You are confusing ontological claims with epistemological ones.
Kant is an idealist who does not deny materialism. Therefore Idealism is not antithetical to materialism, even though some idealists are not also materialists.

The point about the empiricists who inspired Kant to this view, (such as Hume), is that they assertea that we can only know the material world vis the senses, and thus our perception of the material world is limited by them.

It is completely different, and I would say utterly absurd notion, to deny the basic intuition that the world we know is material. We would be unable to share our experiences were there not a material substrate between which and within which we all live.
The existence of a material world does not deny that we are limited and enabled by sensation, as this is the unavoidable basis of all knowledge about the world.

Extreme idealism that suggests that there is nothing that is not mental is rare and ridiculous. When pressed no one I have ever known as managed to sustain this fantasy for long.

I don't need god, and the concept i utterly irrelevant to this discussion.

Perhaps I am wrong. I only try to think by myself.
Now, who cares dichotomies? I have never wrote that Idealism is antithetical to Materialism.
Kant was not an idealist, I could say he was a gnoseological idealist, but I think he was properly a rationalist, 'cause he thought we have inborn ideas, such as time, space, cathegories, reason's ideas (God, soul), and the inborn idea of duty.
Extreme idealism is Hegel's Absolute Idealism, and it does not suggest that everything is mental (that is solipsism), it only suggests that the real nature of material world is ideal, from which idealism.
Materialism suggests that the real nature of material world is matter, from which materialism.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:
There is no tautology, except definition. What we have is the same thing described different ways.

If you say that brain state cause concepts - you are making the mistake. The concept is the brain state. There is no other way to express it.

I agree! For a materialist there are no concepts, only brain states. For a materialist "concept" is just a clumsy way of saying "this particular brain state".
For a materialist concepts do not exist. For a materialist the signifier "concept " is defined as "a particular brain state."
In other words the answer to the thread's question is there is no such thing as a concept. Only electrical impules in a bag of protoplasm exists. Unfortunately, materialists must use language to express their view, language requires concepts and they think concepts do not exist!

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

David Handeye wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote:Idealism does not deny a material world, it simply identifies that the evidence we have for a material world is wholly dependant on our senses.

Sorry Hobbes, I don't agree absolutely. Idealism does deny a material world: remember Fichte (I posing not-I), Schelling (absolute identity of Nature and Spirit), Hegel (the world is not material, it's ideal: it's subject and spirit, activity, ideas in fieri). For idealism the world proceeds from concepts, all material things are spirit (synthetis of ideas (thesis) and nature (antithesis). For idealism beyond material things there is a concept, for which that thing appears for what it is; the essence of reality is ideal.
The material world is not wholly dependant on our senses, but it's wholly dependant on the perfect rationality of ideas, which being rational become reality. Reality is all phenomena, manifestation of the absolute, the reason, the spirit, the idea, finally of God. For idealism concepts (objectives) are the thoughts of God before He's making the world, as the world is not a done, but it's a doing, the absolute (or God, or Reason, or Spirit) is countinuosly making itself, that is the world itself, the universe itself, reality itself.
Idealism denies material world. At least here in Europe, I don't know there you are writing from.

Sorry you are wrong. The dichotomy is Idealism/Realism. NOT Idealism/Materialsim. You are confusing ontological claims with epistemological ones.
Kant is an idealist who does not deny materialism. Therefore Idealism is not antithetical to materialism, even though some idealists are not also materialists.

The point about the empiricists who inspired Kant to this view, (such as Hume), is that they assertea that we can only know the material world vis the senses, and thus our perception of the material world is limited by them.

It is completely different, and I would say utterly absurd notion, to deny the basic intuition that the world we know is material. We would be unable to share our experiences were there not a material substrate between which and within which we all live.
The existence of a material world does not deny that we are limited and enabled by sensation, as this is the unavoidable basis of all knowledge about the world.

Extreme idealism that suggests that there is nothing that is not mental is rare and ridiculous. When pressed no one I have ever known as managed to sustain this fantasy for long.

I don't need god, and the concept i utterly irrelevant to this discussion.

I would say that Kant is a representationalist. for Kant we can only ever experience appearances. This is not the materialists position.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:
I would probably disagree with your interpretation of idealism in relation to materialism, but it is applicable in other ways when it comes to philosophy of mind.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/idealism


You might be thinking of this:

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_an ... ct_realism

The article specifically mentions Kant, in what is obviously a big field from Hindus to skeptical empiricists.
Kant specifically asserts the existence of the material world, as a reasonable conclusion from the inescapable idea that we are limited by our sensations.
In the specific context in which the poster, Handeye, mentions Idealism my objection was valid - from a Kantian point of view at least.

Kant asserts the existence of the material world as a representation. On this basis the world is an idea in the mind.

Since a materialist must reject appearances (qualia) he cannot be a Kantian.

Everything I know about the external world comes from either my sense experience of it or my cognitive understanding of it. If I accept that all that is but a mental projection and nothing more then I would be an idealist. But I am not because I use reason or logic and evidence or proof as tools to disprove it. Of course I am still using my brain to do it and so technically I have not refuted idealism although I know that objects can be mind independent as their physicality is so real as to not be anything but what they are. And some objects are older than I am and so this logically means they existed before I did so can not simply be mind dependent. Now the the physicality of objects could be false but if a foundational basis for under standing the world is convincing beyond all reasonable doubt it shall be assumed to be real even if it is not. And would then suggest that that it matters not if idealism or materialism is true long as one of the models is accepted for reasons of practicality I try to avoid dogmatic labels but to date everything that is known to exist is either physical or contingent up on the physical. Therefore materialism is more valid than idealism

What is materialism? That matter is the only reality. One must then define matter. Modern physics' definition of matter is more mind like then Newtonian.
Massless particles, particles with no volume, a particle can violate the law of the excluded middle...A and not A.
Matter has more in common with universals (concepts) then billard balls.

raw_thought wrote:Since a materialist must reject appearances (qualia) he cannot be a Kantian.

That is rubbish.
You are confusing materialism with Realism.

A realist says that what we observe is real. If you can kick it, it is real. He is unwilling to submit to the fact that how we see the real world is not modified by our apprehension of it. But Kant demands that we can never know the thing in itself, but that regardless of that we are no warrant to reject the intuition that what we observe is a material world. When all is said and done Kant was a scientist too.
An idealist demands that we cannot know the world of real things except through our senses. But obviously that implies that what we are observing is material; that our senses are made of material, and that our brain is material.

Whilst I can agree that some idealist insist that as our experience is fully mental, as it must be, then we simply can say nothing of a material world. But their opinion does not exhaust Idealism, and each Idealist is free to infer from his senses that the world of appearances is due to the essential materialist truth.

Thus there is no conflict between an idealist position and a materialist perspective, as there is between a naive realist and an Idealist.