Calvin on the Sensus Divinitatis

[Arising_uk]

Wide and various, though by no means uncontested. For example, I've always been fascinated by the inability of naturalists to see order and design in the universe. ...

Oh they see order they just don't assume design.

It appears they find my recognition of it surprising, and yet it seems to perfectly obvious to me that I cannot believe they cannot see it on every side. ...

Not surprising at all as it made perfect sense before Physics and Biology. I think you cannot believe it because you cannot conceive of not believing in a 'God'.

Or take consciousness...how does a purely material world suddenly "cough up" this completely non-material property, something the dead opposite of "material"? ...

You are assuming it's a non-material property, so you show me a disembodied consciousness and I'll agree with you.

The experiment to show how organic compounds can occur from inorganic chemicals was done in the 50s and has been further confirmed.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miller-Urey_experiment

Or take the question of evil: atheists think it is a serious problem for theists...and yet it's surely far greater for atheists, who don't even have a way of legitimizing a category by which evil can be recognized. If "evil" actually exists, then that fact alone argues very powerfully for the existence of objective value, and objective value argues for God.

By "exists" you mean an actual entity!? We call it moral and immoral.

As Rand pointed out the only thing needed for value to exist is life.

You realize, of course, that I cannot do any justice to all these lines of thoughts here, because of space. The only important point for our purposes is that you can see I think I see plenty of evidence, and by faith connect the dots to God. For some reason, the atheist does not.

Obviously because they don't have this faith in the first place. You appear to be putting the cart before the horse by using a faith in 'God' to connect the dots to 'God'?

No, I didn't say a person could "nuance" God, only that discussing the attributes of God has to be nuanced, in the sense that you're dealing with something profound that is capable of nuance.

We have a different conception of "profound" as I think for it to be profound nuance would not come into it.

Actually, the secularist has a huge problem with an Uncaused Cause. ...

Actually they don't. If by the secularists you mean the cosmologists then they say there is no meaning to be made about talking about before the Big Bang, as the BB is not a bang in the sense of an explosion in Space and Time but the occurrence of the expansion of SpaceTime that allows such bangs in Space and Time.

I love the way the theist tries to have their cake and not eat it as they appear to avoid the issue of what caused 'God' then?

Something had to precipitate the Big Bang, and before that, the existence of the "noble gasses," so called, that prepared for the Big Bang. ...

According to the theory there were no noble gases before the Big Bang? Unless you can come-up with a way to describe what you say that avoids any mention of 'causation' and 'before' with respect to something that is the basis for 'cause' and 'before' then I think you talking metaphysical nonsense.

This "Cause" had to set into motion all the laws upon which science itself depends, and convert an accident (a "bang"), into a creative and generative force. We can argue afterwards about what mechanism took over after that, but the problem remains: why is there something rather than nothing, since "nothing" is precisely what we should expect from nothing -- if that's all there was at the start.

Describe this 'nothing' to me?

Although personally I think this is the right approach for the theist when faced with cosmology and biology, just keep saying that a 'God' started it and you can keep your faith intact but you'll have to drop the idea that its currently interfering. Like I've said Spinoza's 'God' is fine by me and I like the way it tells with Fredkin's, Zuses's, et al metaphysics.

My take as to why some theists wish to oppose physics and biology is that they haven't yet come-up with a way to patch the dent to their last-patched Ethics i.e. the one that was knocked-up to deal with Copernicus, i.e. the one that made Man instead of the Earth the apple of 'God's' eye. So obfuscation is the name of the game at present.

Why did *anything* start to exist? ...

Why not? Although Krauss has a nice explanation. Also who said that 'nothing' existed in the first place?

Being itself is what is incomprehensible, from a materialist perspective.

Depends which 'Being' you are talking about? You mean existence per se? If so it appears eminently comprehensible from a 'how' perspective.

That's a hard problem to grasp, but it's fundamental. It's not just "what is" that we need to account for, but for the property of "being" itself. On a naturalist worldview, it can never be explained, and yet the naturalist is just as bound to have to locate the origin of being in an Uncaused Cause as the theist is.

I told you, there's not an issue with an uncaused cause as you can't meaningfully talk about it, or you can but you have to be a theist to do so.

In any case, how should purely material processes suddenly generate entirely different properties like qualia and consciousness?

"Qualia" is still a debated term in Philosophy.

If you mean the subjective experience of something like colour then for me 'qualia' are what the Body makes of sensation, i.e. perception.

That's a question that the worlds greatest scientists and philosophers cannot answer. Something very spooky is going on in this universe, in addition to the purely material stuff.

This is an assumption. Something interesting and complicated is certainly going on tho'.

You're being sarcastic, of course. ...

No, I'm not. Just literal according to the KJ word of 'God'.

There's actually a lot one can learn from that passage, even if one is only prepared to see in it a human legend. But you won't get anything out of it by getting the details wrong. If you want, we can discuss it further; but I have a sense you don't actually care a whole lot about Biblical exegesis, perhaps, and would rather simply "take your shot" and then move on: correct?

I'm one of the few I've met who has actually read the Bible front to back, not that I remember a lot of it now as it was just an exercise. But what i do remember has me thinking I have not got the detail wrong.

Yes, C.S. Lewis. He's very simple, straightforward and homespun. ..

Thats one way of putting it, another is manipulative, patriarchal and parochial with a reactionary gender view. Still, enjoyed some of his stuff when young.

A lot of people have found him helpful in catching the broad outlines of certain theistic issues (like "mere Christianity"), though like any theist he is not without his detractors, of course.

See above.

Wolterstorff has the very best philosophical book I have read so far on the issue of "Justice," and Plantinga is really good on a number of things. Both are very highly regarded in secular circles as well as theistic ones. There are very, very bright minds around that operate from a theistic perspective, just as there are bright atheists. What we have to stop doing is dismissing each other out of hand. We need to start talking and listening sympathetically.

I have no problem with theists, I just don't hold to their belief and as long as they do not wish to hold me to them as well all is fine and dandy, although I have issues with them teaching them to children before they can reason I resign myself to the fact that they are not my kids.

Rather like you and I are doing right now, I think.

Which? Discussing sympathetically or dismissing.

[Immanuel Can]

Oh they see order they just don't assume design.

True. But one has to wonder why. When one sees something of immense and intricate interdependent complexity, it is very hard to resist the obvious implication...that one is dealing with a designed product of some kind. Even Dawkins admits this (see his first chapter opener in "The Blind Watchmaker"); but though he sees it, he claims that "nevertheless we must resist the impulse to see design." Well? Why "must" we, if it's the obvious conclusion?

Only, I think, because if we don't we're going to undermine our own atheism.

I think you cannot believe it because you cannot conceive of not believing in a 'God'.

I became a Christian at about age 22, at university, while studying the great atheists. My biggest signpost to God was the agnostic writer, Thomas Hardy. I can very well conceive of not believing in God; I just don't do it anymore.

You are assuming it's a non-material property, so you show me a disembodied consciousness and I'll agree with you.

Are you a skeptic with regard to "consciousness"? If you are, it's a funny thing that you're debating. Who can believe you without consciousness?
Don't make the causal fallacy of assuming that if physical events and mental events happen contemporaneously, that must logically mean one is the cause of the other. It does not follow. The one can "cause" the other, the other can "cause" the one, or there can be a third thing that is the "cause" of both.

It reminds me of the blonde lady who goes into her doctor's office and says, "Doctor, when I drink tea it makes my right eye hurt."
He says, "Take the spoon out of the teacup."

She thinks she has located the cause because of contemporaneity; the truth is there is a third cause.

So causality is not so easy to establish. What is easy to establish is that "consciousness" is not itself a property of material objects. There are plenty of material objects that, so far as we can detect, have absolutely none of it. That makes it a rather spooky "supervenient" property, and one that materialism itself does not explicate.

By "exists" you mean an actual entity!? We call it moral and immoral.

It doesn't matter. Materialism has none of it, whatever you want to call it.

As Rand pointed out the only thing needed for value to exist is life.

Ah, but Rand mistook an "is" for an "ought." She thought that just because something exists and "has" values (as humans do) that those values are somehow justified. That's an obvious fallacy. David Hume would run roughshod over her for that. "Exist" does not mean "are warranted."

Obviously because they don't have this faith in the first place. You appear to be putting the cart before the horse by using a faith in 'God' to connect the dots to 'God'?

You've got me wrong there again. I'm not arguing for circularity at all.

We have a different conception of "profound" as I think for it to be profound nuance would not come into it.

No, what I think we've got is a different concept of "nuance." I see now you suppose it means some insidious quality, whereas I only meant it to mean "complex and worthy of careful, subtle thought." A simple miscommunication, I think.

I love the way the theist tries to have their cake and not eat it as they appear to avoid the issue of what caused 'God' then?

That's a misunderstanding of the word "God." We're not claiming a *caused* god -- anyone who does is misunderstanding his own Theism, and has lapsed into Gnosticism or some other such religion. Analytically, the word "God" refers to precisely the Uncaused Cause. Uncaused means "uncaused." So there's no question of "Who made God?" but rather only the question, "Can the idea of an Uncaused Cause be made coherent?"

And Atheism had better hope it can, because Naturalism and Materialism depend on there being some uncaused cause at the beginning of time. Science has no precept it holds dearer than the idea that *contingent events must have a cause.* But without the possibility of an infinite regress (i.e. an eternal universe), they cannot get such a thing without also positing an uncaused cause of some kind. They just insist that that "cause" is something other than God. What they think it is, I cannot say; for I do not find their view rational, and so I cannot defend it for them.

According to the theory there were no noble gases before the Big Bang? Unless you can come-up with a way to describe what you say that avoids any mention of 'causation' and 'before' with respect to something that is the basis for 'cause' and 'before' then I think you talking metaphysical nonsense.

Nope. You just misunderstood me again. I was saying this is a problem for Big Bang theorists. It's not a problem for Theists, since they just say "God," the ultimate Uncaused Cause. But Atheism cannot do that, so what is it to do? It both needs, and cannot allow, an uncaused cause.

It's an atheists problem, not a Theists one. The Theist has his complications begin with describing the nature of the Uncaused Cause. But in positing one, he has no problem, because he is not previously committed to avoiding the whole idea of uncaused causation -- at least in the unique case of God.

Describe this 'nothing' to me?

I can't, because it's an Atheist idea, not a Theistic one. A pure "nothing" would have to be something completely devoid of properties or materials of any kind. Then out of that total absence, and for absolutely no reason (or cause), the universe would have to suddenly spring, with all its physical laws in place, and produce intelligent life. That's the bizarre kind of description the Naturalist or Materialist is obliged to make in order to retain his Naturalism all the way back to the first cause. I can't defend it, because I don't believe it. Like you, I find it too weird and arbitrary to be plausible.

Which? Discussing sympathetically or dismissing.

Sorry. It appears I am also capable of ambiguity. I meant "discussing sympathetically," of course.

[Harry Baird]

OK, the temptation to join in this thread is just too much. Theological discussions get me every time. I hope I'm not intruding.

Mostly I'm interested in putting an idea to Immanuel Can (And I sure hope he can! I hope, too, that this little message might function as a Can Opener (oh dear!)), seeing as how he seems to both have a logical mind and to be a theist - a description that I would hope to be able to say fits me too - and also, to be well-read in the philosophy of religion - a description that I am sad to say decidedly does *not* fit me - and I'm curious to know what such a one makes of this idea. But first, I want to respond to a few things that have been said so far in this thread.

Re the "unliftable rock" problem, an atheist friend has an answer that I think is pretty good. "Can an omnipotent being create a rock that is too heavy for himself to lift? Sure, but if/when he did, he would no longer be omnipotent". It works for me.

Immanuel Can, you also wrote: 'Actually, a proper understanding of faith might be more nuanced as something like "faith means being able to project from the available evidence to things not yet fully confirmed."' I'd elaborate on that understanding: too, "faith" means, "trusting in the reality of described possibilities based on projection from the available evidence - possibilities such as that of God's existence, love, grace and redemption - and living and making decisions based in that trust".

I'd like to focus, though, if I may (not that anyone can stop me at this point!), on your helpful list of items of evidence in support of "faith", which, really, amounts to "faith in the existence of a creator God". First, though, let me say that my approach to "the big questions" is to evaluate and judge between answers based on plausibility. I have to admit that to some extent, judgements of plausibility are based on comparison to principles derived from experience, which aren't necessarily reliable in the broader scheme of things - "ultimate" logic/experience might be very different to "terrestrial" logic/experience - but I simply don't know of a better way.

So, you write: "For example, I've always been fascinated by the inability of naturalists to see order and design in the universe. It appears they find my recognition of it surprising, and yet it seems to perfectly obvious to me that I cannot believe they cannot see it on every side". Likewise. I put something similar to my (atheist) cousin at one point: that it would seem to be particularly strange that the incredible order of the universe stemmed from... nothing... and his response was that he saw the universe as chaotic, not ordered. I mean, what? I don't get how an intelligent fellow (and my cousin is demonstrably intelligent) could say something like that. I seem to remember that he justified it with something like this: whether the universe is more chaotic or more ordered is a relative issue, and without any absolute with which to compare the current state to, we might as equally say that it is chaotic as ordered. I suggested to him that the existence of intelligent life in our universe is as good of an "absolute" measure of order as we could hope for, but, as far as I can recall, this didn't sway him.

It certainly all *screams* "design" at me. On the other hand, I think Richard Dawkins (and whoever else advances this argument) has a point when he suggests that a designer is necessarily more complex than that which it designs, such that it would seem that to posit a designer of the universe to explain its order leads to the positing of an infinite regress of designers (and I think Craig - yes, I have read *some* theist philosophy - convincingly explains why infinite regresses are untenable). It really is a most peculiar and baffling question: not just the question of why anything exists in the first place, which is confusing enough, but why anything as *well-ordered* as this universe exists: it would seem that not only are we obliged, as you suggest several times in this thread, whether we are atheists or theists, to posit an uncaused cause, but also to posit order-for-no-reason; the order of an uncaused God is itself, so far as I know - and if you know of explanations, I'm all ears - inexplicable.

One thing, I think, though, to recommend God as an ultimate explanation, is that in the mystery of His being we can posit that there exists an answer to these conundrums which we simply - due to our limited perceptual and cognitive abilities in comparison to His reality - cannot imagine, nor, potentially, even comprehend, whereas to posit that the answer to these conundrums lies within our material, causal universe would seem... implausible; there really doesn't seem to be any likely way out of the insensibility of an "uncaused cause" if all we have to work with is (essentially) what we already know [with respect to the materiality of our universe]. It would seem to require another "category of being" to escape these conundrums. The concept of "God" offers hope of that other category of being.

You also write: "Or take consciousness...how does a purely material world suddenly "cough up" this completely non-material property, something the dead opposite of "material"?". Good question. Another atheist friend (they're everywhere, God help us!) affirms to me that consciousness *is*, in fact, material. He declares that, after all, we sense our thoughts, so, given that we can sense them, they must be "physical things". I think, though, that even if we allow him this (and I'm not sure that we ought to), we (he) cannot apply the same little "trick" to awareness itself, to that which senses (*experiences*) thought in the first place, the "perceptive and experiential space" within which thought occurs. This, it would seem to me, is a whole other category of existence than "matter", and, truly, it seems to me to be highly unlikely that one might ever convincingly explain how the one category of existence might spawn the other in the direction of matter=>consciousness.

This, it seems to me, does make the God hypothesis that much more plausible than the materialist hypothesis, since at least with God we *start* with consciousness, and it is far more plausible that (divine, "supernatural") consciousness might create matter than the other way around.

Finally, you suggest: "Or take the question of evil: atheists think it is a serious problem for theists...and yet it's surely far greater for atheists, who don't even have a way of legitimizing a category by which evil can be recognized. If "evil" actually exists, then that fact alone argues very powerfully for the existence of objective value, and objective value argues for God". It is here where I see things differently than you, and where I want to run my idea by you. To start with, I think a view that "objective morality" derives from (is inherent in) the very nature of conscious(ness / experience) itself, and does not require "backing" by God, in the same way that the concept of the number two is inherent in any pairing of two physical objects in reality, is perfectly plausible. In fact, it is the approach I take in constructing morality personally. I am not sure, though, how well this matches Rand's view, mentioned by Arising_uk, as I have not read any of her philosophy.

I *do* think, though, that real, undeniable, "unimaginable" evil as exemplified by those who abduct, imprison, and brutally torture others, is particularly difficult to explain on a materialist outlook. It doesn't seem (to me; no doubt there are materialists who would differ) that there is much in evolution that can explain *that* degree of the diabolical. I will come back to this in a moment.

First, though, I want to suggest that yes, evil *is* a serious problem for theists, but *only* those theists who hold to the particular definition of God that is popular in the Judeo-Christian tradition: that of a simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent ("tri-omni") Creator. Yes, I am aware (though I have not read it in detail) of Plantinga's purported nullification of the logical problem of evil through (as I understand it) essentially the suggestion that no matter how hard we find it to imagine, such a being *might* have some good reason for allowing evil, in particular one to do with simultaneously allowing for the existence of "genuine" free will. I don't find this argument particularly compelling: it might technically be correct, and technically "solve" the logical problem of evil, but in terms of solving the problem of evil entirely... well, let's just say that its implausibility is off the scale. That an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving Creator might not be able to find a way to support genuine free will without simultaneously allowing for (without His protection!) the many, many grotesque abuses that occur on this planet just beggars belief. It is not even remotely plausible.

This, then, is where I part ways with typical theists. On the one hand, I recognise the existence of "metaphysical" evil; on the other, I cannot ascribe it to a tri-omni God. Something's got to give, and, in my view, it is two things: firstly, we need to dispense with the notion that God is omnipotent, and secondly, we need to dispense with the notion that He is the source of evil. This, then, is why I would describe my theism as (philosophically/metaphysically rather than religiously - I know little about the actual religion) manichaean. It seems to me to be most plausible that evil originates in a metaphysical source opposite to, and not (not wholly, at least) under the direct control of God.

Not only does this view seem more plausible to me than that of typical theism, it also matches my experience of the world. So, basically, that's the idea that I wanted to put to you, Immanuel Can: the idea that typical theism is in need of revision, and the revision that makes most sense to me. I'd be interested in your take on it.

[Immanuel Can]

Harry:

Wow. What a thoughtful, reflective set of observations. Your remarks do a fair bit of work I have been at pains to do in the past, and no doubt will be obliged to review again in the future, and do it very, very well. Thank you for sharing.

I can't say I disagree with much of it. So I'll just say, "Yay, Harry," and turn to the question at the end, the one in which we seem to part company a bit...or so you suggest.

You write:

To start with, I think a view that "objective morality" derives from (is inherent in) the very nature of conscious(ness / experience) itself...

I guess my agreement with this depends on what you mean by "derives from." For consciousness itself is one of those spooky "supervenient properties" that, according to Naturalism, just "magically" appear when material arrives at some state. Materialists make a horrible mishmash of explaining how this would ever happen, so a good many of them doubt that "supervenient, emergent properties" even exist, despite the very widespread intuition we all have that they do. They have to resort to "explaining away" rather than "explaining" -- to saying why consciousness is not a "real" thing at all, simply an illusion of some sort. (Morality, by the way, would be another such "supervenient property.") So if consciousness is so difficult for Materialists to explain, I don't think we are giving them any comfort when we suggest moral values emerge from it. They can't explain either one in a non-reductional way.

So I'd have to ask, how is it you think consciousness "emerges," and then how does morality "emerge" from that? I know you're not a Materialist, so I'm not saying you have to confine your terms to material explanations -- but I'm not yet sure what you have in mind there.

In fact, it is the approach I take in constructing morality personally. I am not sure, though, how well this matches Rand's view, mentioned by Arising_uk, as I have not read any of her philosophy.

Well, I think that Rand isn't a very good moral philosopher. She may have some things to say about economics or political arrangements, and there are even parts of her arguments I rather like -- but her moral/ethical reflection is extremely shallow and intellectually unsatisfying. She didn't even understand Hume's Guillotine, so she just tried to deny there was a problem, and then she moved on to build her moral precepts on nothing. I do recommend you read her sometime; she's very, very easy to understand, and she's enjoying somewhat of a reborn popularity at present: but whatever else you find, you won't find much there to ground any account of morals.

First, though, I want to suggest that yes, evil *is* a serious problem for theists, but *only* those theists who hold to the particular definition of God that is popular in the Judeo-Christian tradition: that of a simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent ("tri-omni") Creator.

Hold on a minute, though: what you've got there is an overly-simplistic description of one particular theological construct that is not the only one on offer. Be careful not to suggest it is the necessary "Christian" one, because it's not a very well-formed view: it's more like a populist shorthand characterization. "Omnipotent," as I've stated in my earlier comments on the subject, is an easily misread term, that some skeptics assume means "can-do-the-ridiculous," and is not even a term the Bible itself predicates of God. "Omni-benevolent" can easily be misread as "always-does-what-we-deem-beneficial" or something shallow like that which can get you into logical and practical difficulty later. I'd want to start with a better description before advancing further premises. Please don't take me to be agreeing with you on that starting point...it doesn't look adequate to me at all.

That an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving Creator might not be able to find a way to support genuine free will without simultaneously allowing for (without His protection!) the many, many grotesque abuses that occur on this planet just beggars belief. It is not even remotely plausible.

Here's another area where I couldn't pretend to defend the sort of view that your problem needs to be defended. I do not believe Divine Sovereign knowledge is necessarily exclusive of human free will. Ultra-Calvinists, one faction of Christendom, does that; I do not, and think their view unsupportable. Personally, I never use Sovereignty as a blanket excuse for human tragedy or evil, and I think it's appalling whenever anyone does.

This, then, is where I part ways with typical theists. On the one hand, I recognise the existence of "metaphysical" evil; on the other, I cannot ascribe it to a tri-omni God. Something's got to give, and, in my view, it is two things: firstly, we need to dispense with the notion that God is omnipotent, and secondly, we need to dispense with the notion that He is the source of evil.

Well, that's only true on the incautious misunderstanding of "omnipotence," I think. I also think that your idea of God "sourcing" evil is badly worded, and contains suppositions I would suggest may well be totally false. But in this second matter, the problem is probably more in a faulty conception of "evil". What I mean is that when you say "God is the source of evil," your terminology appears to imply that evil is a "thing," an entity-in-itself, like the various items in creation. I do not think that is a good description of evil. My present thought on the matter is that "evil" rather describes a derivative effect from the rejection, negation or pollution of a good. It is parasitic on the good for its existence.

Maybe an analogy will illustrate what I mean. You can go into a room and turn on the light; but you can't go into a room and turn on the dark. Dark is the *absence* of light, not a thing-in-itself. Likewise, death is the absence of life, not a thing-in-itself. Life and light are the "things"; dark and death are simply their negations. What if, then, evil is also not a thing-in-itself but rather the distortion produced in a normally good reality once it is distorted in its relationship or even cut off from the Source of all light and goodness?

I do not think, therefore, that the question "Who created evil?" is a coherent question. It's like the question, "Who turned on the dark?" And unless you take a strictly deterministic, Ultracalvinistic view of God's sovereignty, I don't think you need to worry about it. In fact, I think that trying to answer such an unreal question can only lead you to confused attributions of fault and implausible strategies of theodicy. That evil "exists" is surely true; but it exists derivatively of the negation of good, not as an essence in its own right...at least, that is my current thought on that matter.

This, then, is why I would describe my theism as (philosophically/metaphysically rather than religiously - I know little about the actual religion) manichaean. It seems to me to be most plausible that evil originates in a metaphysical source opposite to, and not (not wholly, at least) under the direct control of God.

Well, I do know the Manichees, and I don't think you want to be one. They're Gnostics, really, and so their view of God is not of an Uncaused Cause, but rather as a lower emanation created by an uber-god, or projected out of a higher "Mystery." Their creator "god" is fallible, created, clumsy and sometimes even malicious -- not at all the Christian conception of God.

Not only does this view seem more plausible to me than that of typical theism, it also matches my experience of the world. So, basically, that's the idea that I wanted to put to you, Immanuel Can: the idea that typical theism is in need of revision, and the revision that makes most sense to me. I'd be interested in your take on it.

Well, this has been an edifying discussion, and I thank you for raising the issue. I hope that perhaps I may have done some modest good in your ongoing work on the question, though it's a question of such seriousness and moment that I cannot be sure how precise my own explanation has been, or even how complete my current thought on the matter is. I too am growing, and my knowledge is at best partial.

At the very least, though, your probing questions certainly illustrate the philosophical complexity that actually underlies theology, when it is being seriously done.

[Harry Baird]

Hello, Immanuel Can, I'm glad you appreciated my remarks, and thank you for your own thoughtful comments, which were just as well-considered as I'd hoped for. I'll try to address your points inline.

To start with, I think a view that "objective morality" derives from (is inherent in) the very nature of conscious(ness / experience) itself...

I guess my agreement with this depends on what you mean by "derives from." For consciousness itself is one of those spooky "supervenient properties" that, according to Naturalism, just "magically" appear when material arrives at some state. Materialists make a horrible mishmash of explaining how this would ever happen, so a good many of them doubt that "supervenient, emergent properties" even exist, despite the very widespread intuition we all have that they do. They have to resort to "explaining away" rather than "explaining" -- to saying why consciousness is not a "real" thing at all, simply an illusion of some sort. (Morality, by the way, would be another such "supervenient property.") So if consciousness is so difficult for Materialists to explain, I don't think we are giving them any comfort when we suggest moral values emerge from it. They can't explain either one in a non-reductional way.

So I'd have to ask, how is it you think consciousness "emerges," and then how does morality "emerge" from that? I know you're not a Materialist, so I'm not saying you have to confine your terms to material explanations -- but I'm not yet sure what you have in mind there.

In answer to your first question as to how consciousness "emerges", I have to say that I don't have an adequate answer, and would not really like to speculate, except to say that I'm not even sure that consciousness *does* "emerge", so much as "inhabit" (by [a guided process of] "insertion") a material form (yes, most likely I'm a dualist).

As to your second question, the "emergence" (/derivation/inherency) of morality from (/in) consciousness, my view is (I think) exceedingly simple, so simple that I wonder whether I have missed something, because it can't be that there is so much debate in the field of ethical grounding if I am correct. Basically, it amounts to this: that consciousness is, as we all know, characterised by experience. Experience can be (*very* roughly speaking) either negative (painful), neutral or positive (pleasurable). By definition, negative experiences are those which we seek to avoid, and positive experiences those which we seek to attract. From this it follows very simply from the very nature/definition of experience that we "ought" to act so as to promote positive and obstruct negative experiences. Further, eschewing solipsism, and granting the reasonable assumption that the consciousnesses of others function similarly to our own, we recognise that from an objective perspective, we "ought" to do so for all conscious beings, not just ourselves. That, then, is the grounding of my morality; from there it is simply a matter of recognising that conflicts of interest exist, and working out a set of ethical principles that deal fairly with those conflicts of interest.

I did read up on Hume's Guillotine at your mention of it, and yes, I have heard before of the "is-ought problem". I would defend my view against it in this way: that my "ought" (that we "ought" to promote pleasurable experiences and obstruct negative experiences) is inherent in my "is" (that both pleasurable and negative experiences exist) in that, if one were to ask, "Why 'ought' we to promote pleasurable experiences?", surely a reasonable (and perfectly understandable to every conscious being) answer is "For the very fact that they're pleasurable, and all that that entails, you dolt!".

To clarify a couple of points: firstly, by "pleasurable" I do not mean to imply crude hedonism. I intend "pleasure" to cover the gamut of positive experiences, from the exhilarating and immediate thrill of sky-diving to the sober and cultivated joy of exercising enough discipline to complete a challenging and demanding lifelong project. Too, I recognise that often, pleasures are at odds: the pleasure of eating a block of chocolate is at odds with the pleasure of dental health and weight maintenance. I do not intend my outline above to suggest any particular hedonistic favouring of short-term pleasure over long-term pleasure. When I talk about "pleasurable experience", I mean in an overall rather than an immediate sense.

Secondly, whereas I suggested in my original post that the inherency of morality in the very nature of conscious(ness / experience) 'does not require "backing" by God', in the same way that I would suggest that the inherency of the concept of the number two in the existence of a pairing of two physical objects similarly does not require "backing" by God, I do want to clarify that nevertheless the "order" in this inherency, the fact that "one thing follows from another", the very *possibility* of such order, not to mention the vast consequences and further implications that can be derived from it (I mean, just think how incredible the field of mathematics is, from these humble underpinnings) might *very well* suggest the existence of (an ordered and ordering) God.

Harry: First, though, I want to suggest that yes, evil *is* a serious problem for theists, but *only* those theists who hold to the particular definition of God that is popular in the Judeo-Christian tradition: that of a simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent ("tri-omni") Creator.

Immanuel Can: Hold on a minute, though: what you've got there is an overly-simplistic description of one particular theological construct that is not the only one on offer. Be careful not to suggest it is the necessary "Christian" one, because it's not a very well-formed view: it's more like a populist shorthand characterization. "Omnipotent," as I've stated in my earlier comments on the subject, is an easily misread term, that some skeptics assume means "can-do-the-ridiculous," and is not even a term the Bible itself predicates of God. "Omni-benevolent" can easily be misread as "always-does-what-we-deem-beneficial" or something shallow like that which can get you into logical and practical difficulty later. I'd want to start with a better description before advancing further premises. Please don't take me to be agreeing with you on that starting point...it doesn't look adequate to me at all.

OK, except that I'd suggest that my point remains even if the tri-omni characterisations are not so much "absolute" as "guiding". Even if "omnipotence" does not mean "can do anything whatsoever, even the illogical", even if it just means "is a pretty darn powerful dude"; even if "omnibenevolent" does not mean "prioritises well-being over everything else", even if it just means "tries to be an especially good guy", *still* it is impossible to reconcile these characteristics, despite the "free will defence", with the intense suffering in the world.

Harry: That an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving Creator might not be able to find a way to support genuine free will without simultaneously allowing for (without His protection!) the many, many grotesque abuses that occur on this planet just beggars belief. It is not even remotely plausible.

Immanuel Can: Here's another area where I couldn't pretend to defend the sort of view that your problem needs to be defended. I do not believe Divine Sovereign knowledge is necessarily exclusive of human free will. Ultra-Calvinists, one faction of Christendom, does that; I do not, and think their view unsupportable. Personally, I never use Sovereignty as a blanket excuse for human tragedy or evil, and I think it's appalling whenever anyone does.

Initially I interpreted "I do not believe Divine Sovereign knowledge is necessarily exclusive of human free will" as "I do not believe Divine Sovereign knowledge necessarily excludes foreknowledge of human free will decisions", but, after contemplation, and in context, I see that you probably meant "I do not believe Divine Sovereign knowledge necessarily nullifies or contradicts human free will". Well, nor do I! (I used to). The problem I see doesn't rely on such a notion. In fact, we could forget about omniscience altogether and frame the problem I see simply as: a pretty darn powerful, supposedly loving being allows, permits, and does nothing to stop some of the most grotesque abuses, pain and suffering that can be imagined, not just as a result of human free will decisions, but in the course of natural disasters which, apparently, He is responsible for through His design of the universe and its laws. Let's see this as the implausibility that it is: that such a being would behave in such a way just doesn't make any sense.

That said, just a little commentary on omniscience versus free will: I think that when we add in a stipulation that the omniscient being is simultaneously the *creator* of the free will beings, it gets harder to reconcile that being's existence with their free will. For a being to know in advance everything we *would* do, albeit by our free will choices, and then to *choose* to bring us (and all of those free will choices) into existence, does, I think, confer at least *partial* responsibility for our choices onto that being, and, arguably, full responsibility (since he could have chosen for us not to exist, and thus not be "responsible" for our choices).

Harry: This, then, is where I part ways with typical theists. On the one hand, I recognise the existence of "metaphysical" evil; on the other, I cannot ascribe it to a tri-omni God. Something's got to give, and, in my view, it is two things: firstly, we need to dispense with the notion that God is omnipotent, and secondly, we need to dispense with the notion that He is the source of evil.

Immanuel Can: Well, that's only true on the incautious misunderstanding of "omnipotence," I think.

Oh? Please elaborate.

I also think that your idea of God "sourcing" evil is badly worded, and contains suppositions I would suggest may well be totally false.

Well, if God alone is creator of everything, and knew in advance all that would occur when He created, I'm not sure how we are to escape such an idea.

But in this second matter, the problem is probably more in a faulty conception of "evil". What I mean is that when you say "God is the source of evil," your terminology appears to imply that evil is a "thing," an entity-in-itself, like the various items in creation. I do not think that is a good description of evil. My present thought on the matter is that "evil" rather describes a derivative effect from the rejection, negation or pollution of a good. It is parasitic on the good for its existence.

Maybe an analogy will illustrate what I mean. You can go into a room and turn on the light; but you can't go into a room and turn on the dark. Dark is the *absence* of light, not a thing-in-itself. Likewise, death is the absence of life, not a thing-in-itself. Life and light are the "things"; dark and death are simply their negations. What if, then, evil is also not a thing-in-itself but rather the distortion produced in a normally good reality once it is distorted in its relationship or even cut off from the Source of all light and goodness?

Oh, no! I don't see it like that at all! I have heard this view before, and it strikes me as wholly misguided. An absence of good is not "evil", it is... neutral! Evil is an *active* thing *beyond* neutrality. I think a far better analogy is electrical charge: we can have a positively charged proton (good), an uncharged neutron (neutral) or a negatively charged electron (evil).

To provide a more concrete example: imagine a man who goes out of his way to help his neighbours, raises money for charity, rescues people from burning buildings, etc etc. This man is good. Now, let us strip all of these things from him. Rather than going out of his way to help his neighbours, he keeps himself to himself. Rather than raising money for charity, he stays at home and reads. Rather than rescuing people from burning buildings, he leaves that to the firefighters. Is he, then, evil? I think not; he is simply "not good"; he is "neutral". If we want to convert him into an *evil* man, we have to add to him *active* malevolent intent backed by malevolent action: rather than helping his neighbours, he trips them up and spits in their faces. Rather than raising money for charity, he steals from charity. Rather than rescuing people from burning buildings, he sets buildings on fire, knowing that there are people inside who will burn to death.

Does this make sense?

I do not think, therefore, that the question "Who created evil?" is a coherent question. It's like the question, "Who turned on the dark?" And unless you take a strictly deterministic, Ultracalvinistic view of God's sovereignty, I don't think you need to worry about it. In fact, I think that trying to answer such an unreal question can only lead you to confused attributions of fault and implausible strategies of theodicy. That evil "exists" is surely true; but it exists derivatively of the negation of good, not as an essence in its own right...at least, that is my current thought on that matter.

Perhaps from the above you will understand why I disagree that the question "Who created evil?" is incoherent. Indeed, I think it is a critical question to ask in theology. Evil is *active*, not passive, and demands explanation.

Harry: This, then, is why I would describe my theism as (philosophically/metaphysically rather than religiously - I know little about the actual religion) manichaean. It seems to me to be most plausible that evil originates in a metaphysical source opposite to, and not (not wholly, at least) under the direct control of God.

Immanuel Can: Well, I do know the Manichees, and I don't think you want to be one. They're Gnostics, really, and so their view of God is not of an Uncaused Cause, but rather as a lower emanation created by an uber-god, or projected out of a higher "Mystery." Their creator "god" is fallible, created, clumsy and sometimes even malicious -- not at all the Christian conception of God.

Hmm. I'm not so sure I don't want to be a Manichee. That view sounds plausible enough to me... a lot more plausible than the Christian God, at any rate. To be honest, though, I don't have a very clear view of God, and wouldn't be willing to "lay bets" on any particular understanding, except for what I've suggested here: that the Christian view needs revision due to implausibility.

At the very least, though, your probing questions certainly illustrate the philosophical complexity that actually underlies theology, when it is being seriously done.

Thank you.

[Immanuel Can]

I wonder whether I have missed something, because it can't be that there is so much debate in the field of ethical grounding if I am correct. Basically, it amounts to this: that consciousness is, as we all know, characterised by experience. Experience can be (*very* roughly speaking) either negative (painful), neutral or positive (pleasurable).

Yes, actually, you've passed over something by accident. Material events are, by virtue of being only material events, not "about" anything. That is, they are not (in a Materialist view, anyway) part of some integrated universal perspective on things; they are accidental happenings. So we have to ask ourselves, how do these random, material events issue in our organized concepts of them? How do they end up being "about" something, or how do they end up in a taxonomy of similar entities as soon as they get inside the human brain? How do we recognize them, predict them, project them, create from them, imagine based on them, and philosophize about them? If the human brain is itself just a collocation of random atoms, how is rationality even trustworthy? And how can we, in a non-circular way, rationally prove that we should trust our reasoning?

These are huge issues, and they point to a total discontinuity between the physical world and the mental world we make as a result of our interaction with it. Nothing in the gradual accretion of time or evolutionary steps goes even an inch in the direction of showing how something so qualitatively, experientially different from materiality appears. That's why philosophers call them "emergent" properties; not because they are thought to "emerge" gradually, but rather because they seem to spring into existence totally beyond the available list of physical factors.

In short, you jump all the deep problems, assume the existence of some kind of consciousness-potential, and then move on to describing how consciousness could develop through experience once it already exists. The real problem is, how does it exist in the first place? However, if I tried to spell all of the problem out here I would have to write pages and pages. Fortunately both Thomas Nagel ("Mind and Cosmos") and David Bentley Hart ("The Experience of God") have done a nice job of the "supervieniece" problem recently, so I can point you to the literature if you care to pursue it further. For now, I'll stop.

we "ought" to promote pleasurable experiences and obstruct negative experiences) is inherent in my "is" (that both pleasurable and negative experiences exist) in that, if one were to ask, "Why 'ought' we to promote pleasurable experiences?", surely a reasonable (and perfectly understandable to every conscious being) answer is "For the very fact that they're pleasurable, and all that that entails, you dolt!".

This would be of some help, perhaps, if the issue of morality were something like, "What do I want to do?" Naturally, we would be likely to pursue our pleasure and avoid pain. Fine. But unfortunately, morality involves more than that: it involves the relations *between* individuals, each perhaps pursuing his/her own concept of pain and pleasure, or whatever. The real question is not "What do I want to do?" which I can resolve just by consulting my own feelings, but rather, "What do I owe to others to do/not do?"

How great it would be if we lived in a world of infinite resources, opportunities and pleasures. Then this aspect of morality would never be a problem. But in a situation of limited resources, opportunities and relationships, my "pleasures" unfortunately impinge on the pleasures, potentialities, opportunities and aspirations of the other people with whom I live. To give a simple example, by virtue of the fact that I married my wife, no one else is allowed to; and she cannot be married to someone else while married to me; and if she tried, that would impinge on my pleasure, and so we'd have the same problem in reverse.

You get the idea. There are many, many such examples. Almost anytime I enjoy something, someone else can't. Do I owe them a chance? Can I just take everything I wish with no regard for them? Or would that be a moral issue? Think for a bit, and you'll quickly be able to come of with long lists of how your pleasures present difficulties for others. Again, if while living in the "First World" I use 80% of the world's power and resources in order to create my lifestyle, what does that say about the situation of people in the "Developing World" as they try to develop the kind of opportunities I already enjoy? You see it, I'm sure.

even if it just means "tries to be an especially good guy", *still* it is impossible to reconcile these characteristics, despite the "free will defence", with the intense suffering in the world.

Well, admitting that Biblically speaking, evil is said to be a "mystery," (i.e. a thing that, while not devoid of explanation exceeds present human capacities) I will venture a few tentative thoughts.

According to Susan Neiman, there are two aspects to the concept "evil" 1) natural evils, such as earthquakes, and 2) human evils, such as genocide. Both need explanation if we are to deal with evil as a concept, she says. I think this is helpful. 2) could be relevantly explicated, at least in part, by the free will of human beings. If "being free" means "never disobeying God," then it's hard to see what "freedom" consists in at all. Surely "free will" must entail both the ability to do good and the ability to refuse the good, no? If so, human evils can (at least partly) be placed at the feet of the human beings who do them. If God were to prevent all such evils, he would conceptually be preventing freedom thereby as well. Perhaps God sees greater value in human freedom than in forcing the right outcome to happen every time. We can toy with that idea, if you like; but there's a start.

As for evil type 1) this is more interesting. I do think there's a possible explanation for it as well, but it depends on us having adequately worked through the concept of human freedom first. We need to see what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for human freedom, and then we can move on to the natural world, and the state in which the Creator has allowed it to continue. But I shouldn't get ahead of myself here, so I'll wait and see if you're with me on 2) first.

I see that you probably meant "I do not believe Divine Sovereign knowledge necessarily nullifies or contradicts human free will". Well, nor do I! (I used to). The problem I see doesn't rely on such a notion. In fact, we could forget about omniscience altogether and frame the problem I see simply as: a pretty darn powerful, supposedly loving being allows, permits, and does nothing to stop some of the most grotesque abuses, pain and suffering that can be imagined, not just as a result of human free will decisions, but in the course of natural disasters which, apparently, He is responsible for through His design of the universe and its laws. Let's see this as the implausibility that it is: that such a being would behave in such a way just doesn't make any sense.

Can I accept this for the moment, but can we come back to it when we've solved the 2) issue? I promise not to duck it later, okay?

Well, if God alone is creator of everything, and knew in advance all that would occur when He created, I'm not sure how we are to escape such an idea.

Theologians traditionally (and I think rightly) distinguish between "foreknowledge" and "predestination." To "predestine" something is to "make" it happen, as the only allowed alternative. If that were true, then all human evil as well as all natural evils would have to be ultimately traced to the Creator. But "foreknowledge" is different. I can invite you over to my house "foreknowing" that you won't accept, but genuinely willing to let you choose to come or not. I haven't "predestined" you to refuse, thereby, but I have also correctly foreknown what you would freely choose. Something like that captures the distinction.

Referring to evil and its ontological status, you ask:

Does this make sense?

The "active" nature of evil, as you call it, could only be attributed where there is an active agent, correct?

Pure concepts are inert, not active; but coupled with an agent that believes/practices them, they can have active potential. To illustrate, 2+2 is a pure concept: it never made anything happen; yet when coupled with my active intention to double my apples, it becomes a good description of a real-world event. So concepts are inert; but agents are active.

Well, is evil a description of a concept, or an agent, or both? How do you see it? Certainly in the case of human agents, it's very straightforward: we could say, "Evil people are doing evil things." But does it go beyond that for you?

But now, I've gone on far too long. I'm going to stop, pause, and let you talk. If I've forgotten or overlooked anything you really care about, please point it out to me and I'll go back to it.

A very interesting exchange, Harry.

[Harry Baird]

In short, [in describing a moral grounding --HB] you jump all the deep problems, assume the existence of some kind of consciousness-potential, and then move on to describing how consciousness could develop through experience once it already exists. The real problem is, how does it exist in the first place?

Hmm. Well, with respect, I really see this as a separate problem. I think that morality can be derived simply from what we observe about ourselves and our fellows; *why* what we observe about ourselves and our fellows holds is, I think, a whole other ball game.

However, if I tried to spell all of the problem out here I would have to write pages and pages. Fortunately both Thomas Nagel ("Mind and Cosmos") and David Bentley Hart ("The Experience of God") have done a nice job of the "supervieniece" problem recently, so I can point you to the literature if you care to pursue it further. For now, I'll stop.

I did a little reading of reviews of those two books, and that reading only confirmed what I wrote above: whilst this is an interesting issue, it is a separate one from the grounding of morality (at least as I see that grounding).

This would be of some help, perhaps, if the issue of morality were something like, "What do I want to do?" Naturally, we would be likely to pursue our pleasure and avoid pain. Fine. But unfortunately, morality involves more than that: it involves the relations *between* individuals, each perhaps pursuing his/her own concept of pain and pleasure, or whatever. The real question is not "What do I want to do?" which I can resolve just by consulting my own feelings, but rather, "What do I owe to others to do/not do?"

I thought I'd covered all of that already with this: "Further, eschewing solipsism, and granting the reasonable assumption that the consciousnesses of others function similarly to our own, we recognise that from an objective perspective, we "ought" to do so for all conscious beings, not just ourselves. That, then, is the grounding of my morality; from there it is simply a matter of recognising that conflicts of interest exist, and working out a set of ethical principles that deal fairly with those conflicts of interest."

According to Susan Neiman, there are two aspects to the concept "evil" 1) natural evils, such as earthquakes, and 2) human evils, such as genocide. Both need explanation if we are to deal with evil as a concept, she says. I think this is helpful. 2) could be relevantly explicated, at least in part, by the free will of human beings. If "being free" means "never disobeying God," then it's hard to see what "freedom" consists in at all. Surely "free will" must entail both the ability to do good and the ability to refuse the good, no? If so, human evils can (at least partly) be placed at the feet of the human beings who do them. If God were to prevent all such evils, he would conceptually be preventing freedom thereby as well. Perhaps God sees greater value in human freedom than in forcing the right outcome to happen every time. We can toy with that idea, if you like; but there's a start.

We can toy with it, but I have to say that I think that that's all that it is: a toy. Even animals, supposedly (I do not believe that they are myself) low down on the scale of sentience will attempt to save one another from harm. How unbelievable then that the ultimate sentient force for good in the universe would *not* do likewise *assuming it could*, which assumption would seem to hold in typical Christian theology. What possible value could there be in allowing His creatures to harm one another as bitterly as they currently do for some abstract notion of "freedom"? Why on Earth would freedom *to* harm trump freedom *from* harm?

Freedom is a relative notion. We already are not free in significant ways. We are not free to fly up into the sky unaided. We are not free to live indefinitely. We are not free to turn other people into hedgehogs. Etc etc. However the cookie is sliced, we will lack freedom in *some* sense. Surely a sensible tri-omni God would design a universe where either we lacked the freedom to harm one another, or, when we had the thought, He intervened to show us the error of our ways. I mean, I assume you believe otherwise, so perhaps you can give me a good reason why this would not be the case. What motive could a good, powerful God possibly have to allow suffering in His Creation?

On the other hand, if God is *not* all-powerful, and is opposed by a force that *wants* suffering, then it all makes a lot more sense, doesn't it?

As for evil type 1) this is more interesting. I do think there's a possible explanation for it as well, but it depends on us having adequately worked through the concept of human freedom first. We need to see what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for human freedom, and then we can move on to the natural world, and the state in which the Creator has allowed it to continue. But I shouldn't get ahead of myself here, so I'll wait and see if you're with me on 2) first.

It seems that we will have to thrash out #2 a little.

I see that you probably meant "I do not believe Divine Sovereign knowledge necessarily nullifies or contradicts human free will". Well, nor do I! (I used to). The problem I see doesn't rely on such a notion. In fact, we could forget about omniscience altogether and frame the problem I see simply as: a pretty darn powerful, supposedly loving being allows, permits, and does nothing to stop some of the most grotesque abuses, pain and suffering that can be imagined, not just as a result of human free will decisions, but in the course of natural disasters which, apparently, He is responsible for through His design of the universe and its laws. Let's see this as the implausibility that it is: that such a being would behave in such a way just doesn't make any sense.

Can I accept this for the moment, but can we come back to it when we've solved the 2) issue? I promise not to duck it later, okay?

OK.

Well, if God alone is creator of everything, and knew in advance all that would occur when He created, I'm not sure how we are to escape such an idea.

Theologians traditionally (and I think rightly) distinguish between "foreknowledge" and "predestination." To "predestine" something is to "make" it happen, as the only allowed alternative. If that were true, then all human evil as well as all natural evils would have to be ultimately traced to the Creator. But "foreknowledge" is different. I can invite you over to my house "foreknowing" that you won't accept, but genuinely willing to let you choose to come or not. I haven't "predestined" you to refuse, thereby, but I have also correctly foreknown what you would freely choose. Something like that captures the distinction.

Sure, but your analogy is flawed: a better analogy would be if you had the power to decide in the first place whether or not I existed, way before we even got to the point of you inviting me to your house. If you knew what I would answer, and chose to create me anyway, isn't it reasonable to suggest that you bear at least *partial* responsibility for my "decision" not to accept your invitation?

In this sense, if God knew that, were he to Create, evil would come into existence, yet chose to Create anyway, surely he could fairly be described as the "source" of evil?

Referring to evil and its ontological status, you ask:

Does this make sense?

The "active" nature of evil, as you call it, could only be attributed where there is an active agent, correct?

[...]

Well, is evil a description of a concept, or an agent, or both? How do you see it? Certainly in the case of human agents, it's very straightforward: we could say, "Evil people are doing evil things." But does it go beyond that for you?

Yes, it goes beyond that for me. In the same way that we might say that a particular drug causes people to become violent, we might say that some "substance of evil" causes people to be(come) evil. I do not know that this is true, of course, it just seems very possible to me.

[Immanuel Can]

I did a little reading of reviews of those two books, and that reading only confirmed what I wrote above: whilst this is an interesting issue, it is a separate one from the grounding of morality (at least as I see that grounding).

I'm sorry, Harry -- did I misunderstand? I thought we were talking about the existence of a thing called "evil," for which I thought you were wondering if the Supreme Being was responsible; I did not see in that the moral grounding question, which is quite a different one (though tangentially related in some ways, of course). Perhaps you'd better clear that up for me. I don't want to wander from your point.

I thought I'd covered all of that already with this: "Further, eschewing solipsism, and granting the reasonable assumption that the consciousnesses of others function similarly to our own, we recognise that from an objective perspective, we "ought" to do so for all conscious beings, not just ourselves. That, then, is the grounding of my morality; from there it is simply a matter of recognising that conflicts of interest exist, and working out a set of ethical principles that deal fairly with those conflicts of interest."

I was also not under the impression that this covers the territory. Are we assuming (without proving) that we should all eschew solipsism? Are we also assuming that a similarity of conscious functions automatically issues in value-equality? -- that doesn't seem rationally apparent, if we are, so I would think we'd owe people a proof at the least.

I suppose we can just gloss over these two big gaps, and move on, but it doesn't seem likely to me that a rational skeptic would fail to notice we're only assuming gratuitously, not offering proof for our assumption there. I don't think he'll take such an explanation to be "covering".

However, I do see in your response your recognition that ethics is about interpersonal relationships, not about individual preference: so that much seems "covered," perhaps.

We can toy with it, but I have to say that I think that that's all that it is: a toy.

Oh, I have to disagree with that: for one thing, the stakes are far too high for it to be a "toy." For another, it seems very clear to me analytically that whatever we take "freedom" to mean, it must include some ability for personal volition, or for personal choice of some kind. I don't think that's too much to suggest.

Short of allowing there to be any personal choice, surely the Supreme Being would simply be creating a world of robots, no? But what sort of "choice" could it be? For example, could we say it could be genuine "choice" to have only the power to obey your Master but not to disobey? Could any relationship be established between two beings -- say a husband and a wife, for example -- where the wife is granted no freedom to do anything contrary to the specific will of her husband? Or would we rightly suspect that no genuine relationship was possible in a marriage pact constituted on such a basis?

Well, assuming for a moment the positive picture of God as the source of all life, light, health, wisdom, truth, purity and so forth, what would "choosing NOT-THAT" look like? To be free to choose or refuse relationship with the source of all goodness would mean...what? What would such an alternate choice look like? What would its likely corollaries be? How would a creature look if it chose denial of truth and goodness, and disassociation from the source of life?

Freedom, we might say, is not "free of consequences." Nor are the terms on which it (conceptually) be had painless. But that is not a fault perhaps of "freedom" itself, but rather of the exercises we make of our potentiality for freedom.

Freedom is a relative notion.

In the sort of ways you mention, yes I suppose you could say that. On the other hand, no one thinks that "freedom" has to mean "free to do anything." We seem quite convinced that we, as creatures, can have freedom, though the term is not available in all domains. We don't have to be "free to fly" in order to be "free to choose."

I what way can we be free, then? Let me suggest, along with John Locke, that the primary way is "freedom of conscience." We have a right to choose, and then to live with whatever consequences or conditions we have chosen. And Biblically speaking, we are also accountable for such choices. Were there no freedom, there could be no accountability either, of course. Once doesn't blame a creature for doing what it could not have helped doing, what it could not have chosen to the contrary. That would be simply arbitrary, not just. The Bible insists that God judges, and that he does so on the basis that people are responsible for their choices; this would be an irrational claim for a Calvinist to try to explicate. How could God judge people for things He made them incapable of doing, or on the other hand, things He made them certain to do?

Sure, but your analogy is flawed: a better analogy would be if you had the power to decide in the first place whether or not I existed, way before we even got to the point of you inviting me to your house.

All analogies are flawed: that's what makes them "analogies," and not the thing-in-itself, naturally. But you're astute in observing that difference. I guess the question is, then, can the Supreme Being make something that has genuine autonomy (free will), or does the fact of His having "made" it entail that it cannot have free will? I will suggest that in the case of a genuinely Supreme Being, the former might be right, not the latter.

If you knew what I would answer, and chose to create me anyway, isn't it reasonable to suggest that you bear at least *partial* responsibility for my "decision" not to accept your invitation?

No, I don't think it does, especially if I'm right to say that foreknowledge does not entail predestination.

Let's try a further example: perhaps I know that you are a Manchester United fan. I say to you, "Isn't Liverpool a great team?" But you reply, "I can't stand Liverpool." Have I, in such an exchange, done anything at all to *cause* your distaste for Liverpool? Do I bear even *partial* responsibility for causing your hatred because I asked the question? Did I make you choose Manchester United?

Now let's suppose I were the Creator, in addition to my other talents. Suppose I made you in such a way that you were genuinely free to choose any football team you wished. How would I become responsible, then, for your hatred of Liverpool, even if I, because of my exceeding cleverness, knew beforehand what you would choose? If you were genuinely free, I made you genuinely free. You did what you did. I did not do it for you.

The only question, then, is "Is human freedom genuine, or only some sort of elaborate illusion?"

In this sense, if God knew that, were he to Create, evil would come into existence, yet chose to Create anyway, surely he could fairly be described as the "source" of evil?

Well, we don't agree on what sort of "thing" evil is, though you and I probably would agree on many of its manifestations. You see it as a sort of separate creation in its own right, so far as I can see at the moment, and I see it as a contrary to the good, a byproduct of goodness + genuine-freedom-wrongly-used. We might be stuck on that point, Harry.

Yes, it goes beyond that for me. In the same way that we might say that a particular drug causes people to become violent, we might say that some "substance of evil" causes people to be(come) evil. I do not know that this is true, of course, it just seems very possible to me.

Does it go so far as to attribute to evil itself some sort of agency? In other words, is there something out there that is not a human-doing-evil, or even an angel-doing-evil, but some sort of universal malevolence that can undertake action in the real world? Because if it's not, then what *makes* it evil must be the potentiality it has when in contact with a free agent. But if the agent is free, then God is not culpable: that's implicit in the concept of our personal "freedom." We are responsible for what we do.

The idea of Evil as a thing-in-itself seems like it's where something like Mancheaism would take one: to a personalized Evil. But once it got there, would it not have a Dualist universe, with two 'gods', one good and one evil? And if so, in what sense would it make sense to ask of the *good* god, "Why did you create Evil?" since Evil would be a coequal agency, and thus alone responsible for evil. And why would it make sense then to denigrate the good god because of what the evil one did?

I'm not sure this is where you want to go, but if not there, then where, Harry? It looks very confused to me at the moment.

[Harry Baird]

Hello there, Immanuel Can. I am sorry for the delay, I have been struggling with motivation, plus my father is visiting for a few days, so it's slow going...

I'm sorry, Harry -- did I misunderstand? I thought we were talking about the existence of a thing called "evil," for which I thought you were wondering if the Supreme Being was responsible; I did not see in that the moral grounding question, which is quite a different one (though tangentially related in some ways, of course). Perhaps you'd better clear that up for me. I don't want to wander from your point.

Well, it was an admittedly tangential point, started when you wrote that the existence of evil "argues very powerfully for the existence of objective value, and objective value argues for God". I responded (riffing off the idea of objective "value", and converting that for the purposes of discussion into objective "morality"): 'I think a view that "objective morality" derives from (is inherent in) the very nature of conscious(ness / experience) itself, and does not require "backing" by God [...] is perfectly plausible'. At that point, I had been under the impression that we were (or would be, should you have chosen to respond) embarking on a "side issue": the issue of "objective morality" and its grounding, as separated from the original issue of the existence of evil and God's responsibility for it. I raised this side issue simply because it is one that interests me personally. Sorry if I didn't make that clear enough.

Are we assuming (without proving) that we should all eschew solipsism? Are we also assuming that a similarity of conscious functions automatically issues in value-equality? -- that doesn't seem rationally apparent, if we are, so I would think we'd owe people a proof at the least.

Well, I'd be happy to discuss my reasons for suggesting that we eschew solipsism, and that similarity of conscious function entails value-equality, but, as you have said in a prior post, space is limited. To cover both of those very briefly: solipsism seems incoherent to me, in that, if "everything" is "me", then why am I not in control of everything as it would seem I ought to be if everything really were "me" in a meaningful sense? As far as similarity of conscious functions goes, it's not so much that as *the possession of consciousness itself* that interests me from a value perspective. I think that the capacity to experience at all on an individual basis qualifies a being for equal treatment. I would suggest that it is not so much up to me to prove it as to one who denies such a thing to disprove it, but if you want to press me, I will devote more space to this issue.

For another, it seems very clear to me analytically that whatever we take "freedom" to mean, it must include some ability for personal volition, or for personal choice of some kind. I don't think that's too much to suggest.

Totally agreed! I don't think I quite explained what I meant with my explanations of "relative" freedom (inability to fly etc). I think more relevant examples would stem from the fact that we have *predispositions*. One man's predisposition is to paint with watercolours; another's is to pick fights in bars. In *some* sense (not an absolute sense, for sure) some of these predispositions are not of our own choosing, but, are, one might suggest, of God's choosing. Surely our predisposition to do good as opposed to evil is one which God might easily have a powerful hand in? And surely this would not negate our personal volition, for there are many choices (and other predispositions) which it would not affect!

But even if this is not enough for you, I would simply ask again (you didn't answer me the first time): why should freedom *to* [harm] be held in higher regard than freedom *from* [harm]? Why would God say, "OK, freedom means you get to hurt other people as much as you like" and not, "OK, freedom means you are free from being hurt by other people in any way"?

Short of allowing there to be any personal choice, surely the Supreme Being would simply be creating a world of robots, no? But what sort of "choice" could it be? For example, could we say it could be genuine "choice" to have only the power to obey your Master but not to disobey? Could any relationship be established between two beings -- say a husband and a wife, for example -- where the wife is granted no freedom to do anything contrary to the specific will of her husband? Or would we rightly suspect that no genuine relationship was possible in a marriage pact constituted on such a basis?

Well, assuming for a moment the positive picture of God as the source of all life, light, health, wisdom, truth, purity and so forth, what would "choosing NOT-THAT" look like? To be free to choose or refuse relationship with the source of all goodness would mean...what? What would such an alternate choice look like? What would its likely corollaries be? How would a creature look if it chose denial of truth and goodness, and disassociation from the source of life?

Freedom, we might say, is not "free of consequences." Nor are the terms on which it (conceptually) be had painless. But that is not a fault perhaps of "freedom" itself, but rather of the exercises we make of our potentiality for freedom.

But I'm not suggesting roboticism, merely predisposition to not harm. This leaves plenty of choice wide open. The problem for the Christian advancing such points as you are is the (purported) existence of heaven: a realm where nobody harms anybody or does any wrong, and all is blissful. If such a realm is possible at all, then why would a good, powerful God allow for anything *other* than that? A critic of Christianity might very well advance against the concept of heaven the very *same* arguments you advance against my critique of the Christian God's worldly realm: surely those in heaven are not truly "free", since they are (apparently) not free to harm one another, etc. Bear in mind, *I* don't accept these arguments as sound (obviously), but *you* seem to, and I'm simply pointing out how they might be used against you.

I what way can we be free, then? Let me suggest, along with John Locke, that the primary way is "freedom of conscience." We have a right to choose, and then to live with whatever consequences or conditions we have chosen. And Biblically speaking, we are also accountable for such choices. Were there no freedom, there could be no accountability either, of course. Once doesn't blame a creature for doing what it could not have helped doing, what it could not have chosen to the contrary. That would be simply arbitrary, not just. The Bible insists that God judges, and that he does so on the basis that people are responsible for their choices; this would be an irrational claim for a Calvinist to try to explicate. How could God judge people for things He made them incapable of doing, or on the other hand, things He made them certain to do?

Where's the fairness in judging something whose choices you knew from before you even created it, and which you chose to create anyway? I still think you're not seeing my point here about at least partial responsibility of creating with foreknowledge.

Sure, but your analogy is flawed: a better analogy would be if you had the power to decide in the first place whether or not I existed, way before we even got to the point of you inviting me to your house.

All analogies are flawed: that's what makes them "analogies," and not the thing-in-itself, naturally. But you're astute in observing that difference. I guess the question is, then, can the Supreme Being make something that has genuine autonomy (free will), or does the fact of His having "made" it entail that it cannot have free will? I will suggest that in the case of a genuinely Supreme Being, the former might be right, not the latter.

I would question the qualifier you add to autonomy (free will): "genuine". Do I have "genuine" free will if God knew all the choices I would made, and then, by *His* choice, made me ... to make those choices? It might be free will of *some* description, sure, but "genuine"? I'm not so sure about that.

If you knew what I would answer, and chose to create me anyway, isn't it reasonable to suggest that you bear at least *partial* responsibility for my "decision" not to accept your invitation?

No, I don't think it does, especially if I'm right to say that foreknowledge does not entail predestination.

Let's try a further example: perhaps I know that you are a Manchester United fan. I say to you, "Isn't Liverpool a great team?" But you reply, "I can't stand Liverpool." Have I, in such an exchange, done anything at all to *cause* your distaste for Liverpool? Do I bear even *partial* responsibility for causing your hatred because I asked the question? Did I make you choose Manchester United?

Now let's suppose I were the Creator, in addition to my other talents. Suppose I made you in such a way that you were genuinely free to choose any football team you wished. How would I become responsible, then, for your hatred of Liverpool, even if I, because of my exceeding cleverness, knew beforehand what you would choose? If you were genuinely free, I made you genuinely free. You did what you did. I did not do it for you.

Oh, but I wasn't "genuinely" free to decide to be created in the first place, and thus incur upon myself the very burden of free will choices at all! *That* might be the best way of framing my point. Not only does (would, if the Christian version of God were true) God hold that "ultimate" card, but He holds the card of *knowing* what I will decide, and thus can choose (based on whether He likes my future choices or not) whether or not to "instantiate" me. To put it another way: if God in his foreknowledge knew that I would make terrible ("genuine" free will) choices were He to create me, then why would He go ahead and create me anyway? Surely it would be better for Him to instead create Fred Jenkins, who, He knows, will instead make wonderfully amazing ("genuine" free will) choices? And, once we start seeing things like this, then we see that God holds in His hand the ultimate matter of which good and which bad (human) choices are made, regardless that it might *seem* that they are "genuinely" in "our" hands.

The only question, then, is "Is human freedom genuine, or only some sort of elaborate illusion?"

Oh, I think it's real, just within some very tough parameters.

Well, we don't agree on what sort of "thing" evil is, though you and I probably would agree on many of its manifestations. You see it as a sort of separate creation in its own right, so far as I can see at the moment, and I see it as a contrary to the good, a byproduct of goodness + genuine-freedom-wrongly-used. We might be stuck on that point, Harry.

Stuck, schmuck, you just need to start seeing things the righ... uh, my... way.

Does it go so far as to attribute to evil itself some sort of agency? In other words, is there something out there that is not a human-doing-evil, or even an angel-doing-evil, but some sort of universal malevolence that can undertake action in the real world?

Very much so. I believe in the existence of a metaphysical counterpart to God. I thought I had made that clear.

Because if it's not, then what *makes* it evil must be the potentiality it has when in contact with a free agent. But if the agent is free, then God is not culpable: that's implicit in the concept of our personal "freedom." We are responsible for what we do.

Except for the point I've been trying to make to you over this and my previous post.

The idea of Evil as a thing-in-itself seems like it's where something like Mancheaism would take one: to a personalized Evil.

Right!

But once it got there, would it not have a Dualist universe, with two 'gods', one good and one evil?

Yes!

And if so, in what sense would it make sense to ask of the *good* god, "Why did you create Evil?" since Evil would be a coequal agency, and thus alone responsible for evil.

Only in the sense of answering the question with "There is no good reason, something's amiss with our assumptions" i.e. the typical Christian assumptions of God.

And why would it make sense then to denigrate the good god because of what the evil one did?

It wouldn't! I'm not denigrating God, I'm denigrating the nonsensical Christian *conception* of Him!

I'm not sure this is where you want to go, but if not there, then where, Harry? It looks very confused to me at the moment.

It very much *is* where I want to go, and not only where I *want* to go, but where I went in my very first post in this thread. I'm not sure why you're confused. I thought I made it clear from the start that the point of my critique was to suggest that the Christian conception of God is flawed, and needs to be replaced with one in which not only is God not omnipotent (and not necessarily the source of all), but is opposed in a dualism by a force for evil.

Phew, I composed that post over a couple of days, it was a struggle to write at first, but the second half almost wrote itself (hooray for legal stimulants!). I hope it all makes sense. I might not be able to reply until my father leaves for work (on Wednesday). Thanks for the stimulating discussion.

[Immanuel Can]

Hello there, Immanuel Can. I am sorry for the delay, I have been struggling with motivation, plus my father is visiting for a few days, so it's slow going...

Don't mention it: your responses so far have been very fruitful for me, in terms of provoking me to deeper reflection. I don't mind waiting at all, since it has been worth it.

'I think a view that "objective morality" derives from (is inherent in) the very nature of conscious(ness / experience) itself, and does not require "backing" by God [...] is perfectly plausible'. At that point, I had been under the impression that we were (or would be, should you have chosen to respond) embarking on a "side issue": the issue of "objective morality" and its grounding, as separated from the original issue of the existence of evil and God's responsibility for it. I raised this side issue simply because it is one that interests me personally. Sorry if I didn't make that clear enough

.
No, that's fine. Shall we move to the "objective morality" idea? Or shall we continue to work on the "God's responsibility" issue -- or both? If it's both, should we use separate messages for each topic?

similarity of conscious function entails value-equality

I can't say that I think this is true; and if it were, then would not mentally-handicapped or even just less-intelligent people than yourself have to be thought to have less value? That would seem to me to follow from that view.

I think that the capacity to experience at all on an individual basis qualifies a being for equal treatment.

This, now, is a different criterion. "Capacity to experience" what? Do animals have it, or just human beings? More basically, what quality of "experiencing" do you suppose produces the justification of "equal treatment"? I can't see it yet.

I'm going to stop this message here, as it deals with all the responses concerning objective morality, and do another message on the subject of "freedom" and "Divine responsibility." If you decide you want to keep the two subjects together, I'll blend them again next time. For the moment, what I'd like to know on this topic is simply this:

"Can you explain precisely what property of "consciousness" or "experience" it is that you find justifies objective morality?"

I'd really like to understand the mechanics of your conviction about this.

[Immanuel Can]

Now to the other topic of our discussion.

why should freedom *to* [harm] be held in higher regard than freedom *from* [harm]? Why would God say, "OK, freedom means you get to hurt other people as much as you like" and not, "OK, freedom means you are free from being hurt by other people in any way"?

It' shouldn't be held in higher regard, of course. And I'm not proposing it is. It seems to me unduly cheerful to say, "This world is a vale of happiness," but unduly cynical to say, "It's a place of nothing but misery and pain." It seems more realistic to me to say that it is a place of mixed beauty and pain, health and harm; which is what one might expect out of a good Creation turned fallen Creation.

My point would rather be that "freedom" as a concept includes both the freedom to do the right thing, and the freedom to do the wrong; the option to help, and the option to harm. More on that shortly.

The problem for the Christian advancing such points as you are is the (purported) existence of heaven: a realm where nobody harms anybody or does any wrong, and all is blissful. If such a realm is possible at all, then why would a good, powerful God allow for anything *other* than that?

Well, if "freedom" includes the option to do either kindness or harm, then that question answers itself, at least partly. For "freedom" to exist, people must have an ability to choose both for *and* contrary to the will of God. God may not wish harm on anyone; but it's quite conceivable that "freedom of choice" is such an overwhelming good that God would see reason to allow the possibility of some harm in order that genuine freedom could be offered to humanity.

I think we instinctively see the sense of that. If we were offered the choice of a life rigidly limited to "goodness" but devoid of freedom and its associated goods (such as personhood, relationships, choice, identity, thankfulness, love...), or a life of freedom with pains and harms also entailed, many of us might think freedom was worth more. In fact, I think that's what we see in things like human rights activists who provoke governments to the point of going to jail, or soldiers who die in the name of freedom: we humans think freedom's pretty important -- so much so, that sometimes it even relativizes the value of life itself, it seems.

Where's the fairness in judging something whose choices you knew from before you even created it, and which you chose to create anyway? I still think you're not seeing my point here about at least partial responsibility of creating with foreknowledge.

Well, I think that perhaps I do see it. If I set it out as a formula, I think this might be your belief:

foreknowledge + creatorial "making" = predestination

However, I think our departure from each other is on a very subtle (but I think important) point here: is that formula correct? I say it's not.

Why do I say so? Because I think it conceivable to imagine a created creature, foreknown to his Creator, who is still genuinely free.

Another analogy, if I might. A person gives birth to a child. Every molecule of that child is knitted together in its mother's womb. However, as anyone who has children knows, that fact will not impinge even a bit on that child's free will --he or she will be a genuine individual, capable of turning into a saint or an axe-murderer. The mere fact of your having created every molecule of him tells nothing about the genuineness of the child's freedom.

Now, you will say, yes -- but I don't "foreknow" what my child will do: sure, I create him, but in a radically free way, he is his own person. I agree. But theologians in general recognize that "foreknowledge" is not "predestination." The latter is fully deterministic; the former is consistent with personal freedom.

In short, you've made a fallacy of composition here. You've thought that two possible causes of determinism togther make the case for determinism conclusive. But they don't. I've argued that neither, considered individually, contributes an answer to the question of whether or not we're free, and there is nothing in both-together that adds to that insufficiency. So I think I'm seeing your case: I wonder if you grasp mine yet.

Oh, but I wasn't "genuinely" free to decide to be created in the first place, and thus incur upon myself the very burden of free will choices at all!

Neither, presumably, was your child consulted in his creation. But as we've seen, that doesn't impinge on the question.

*That* might be the best way of framing my point. Not only does (would, if the Christian version of God were true) God hold that "ultimate" card, but He holds the card of *knowing* what I will decide, and thus can choose (based on whether He likes my future choices or not) whether or not to "instantiate" me.

Well, to describe the creation even this way is surely to say more than we know. Biblically, for sure, the description does not go that way. You may suspect it, but what are you reasons for thinking it's necessarily true?

To put it another way: if God in his foreknowledge knew that I would make terrible ("genuine" free will) choices were He to create me, then why would He go ahead and create me anyway?

I'm suggesting it's because he wanted you to be a genuinely free being, and thus a being capable of genuine relationship with Him.

God holds in His hand the ultimate matter of which good and which bad (human) choices are made, regardless that it might *seem* that they are "genuinely" in "our" hands.

That's the Determinist and Calvinist view, to be sure. I just think it's wrong.

Stuck, schmuck, you just need to start seeing things the righ... uh, my... way.

That's very funny.
Hey, who knew philosophers could do self-deprecating humour?

Only in the sense of answering the question with "There is no good reason, something's amiss with our assumptions" i.e. the typical Christian assumptions of God.

No, I think you missed my question. I'm saying, if we have two coequal creator "gods" (let's call one "Mr. Goodgod" and one "Mr. Evildemon"), then you can no longer blame Mr. Goodgod for any evil that exists. It's all Mr. Evildemon's fault.

But then you're stuck with the even more perplexing question, "Why is reality inherently dualistic in this way? Why is it necessary for Mr. Evildemon to exist at all?" In which case, your situation isn't explanatorily any better than you are presently assuming that mine is. In fact, it looks considerably worse; for now you've moved "evil" from being a contingent state to being a necessary one. Instead of offering some kind of hope that evil could "mean something" or could eventually "have a point," you've now made it a fatalistic fixture of the universe, and inherently turned all pain, all travail, all injustice, and all suffering into something meaningless. For who can prevent Mr. Evildemon, and who can blame him for doing what is in his nature to do?

Thus you not only take away the hope of there being a meaning for pain, but you also deprive the suffering of the voice to cry out against injustice. In a dualistic universe, no "justice" could ever be expected or asked.

Or so it seems. But I'm sure you'll have something interesting to say about my objection.

Whenever you have time is soon enough.

[Harry Baird]

Hello there, Immanuel Can. I am sorry for the delay, I have been struggling with motivation, plus my father is visiting for a few days, so it's slow going...

Don't mention it: your responses so far have been very fruitful for me, in terms of provoking me to deeper reflection. I don't mind waiting at all, since it has been worth it.

You know how to make a guy feel appreciated...

Shall we move to the "objective morality" idea? Or shall we continue to work on the "God's responsibility" issue -- or both? If it's both, should we use separate messages for each topic?

Let's go with both, if you're up for it. I'll stick with a single post, only because I prefer it that way, but you're of course most welcome to split your own replies in two.

similarity of conscious function entails value-equality

I can't say that I think this is true; and if it were, then would not mentally-handicapped or even just less-intelligent people than yourself have to be thought to have less value? That would seem to me to follow from that view.

Well, I tried to clarify in the following few sentences, one of which you quote below, that by "conscious function" I meant at the broadest possible level, that by which consciousness "functions" in providing us with experiences according to which we (broadly speaking) suffer or feel pleasure. *That* is the level at which I think all conscious beings are equally valuable, at least from a moral perspective.

I think that the capacity to experience at all on an individual basis qualifies a being for equal treatment.

This, now, is a different criterion. "Capacity to experience" what?

Anything that can be broadly characterised as either pleasurable or painful.

Do animals have it, or just human beings?

Certainly animals, including insects, have it, and my best guess is that so do plants.

More basically, what quality of "experiencing" do you suppose produces the justification of "equal treatment"? I can't see it yet.
[...]
"Can you explain precisely what property of "consciousness" or "experience" it is that you find justifies objective morality?"

I'd really like to understand the mechanics of your conviction about this.

I'm not sure what more I can do than repeat myself, perhaps in different words. :-/ The capacity for conscious beings to experience either pleasure or suffering is what (in my view) objective morality arises as a consequence of, for what could be more self-evident to conscious beings such as ourselves, who *do* experience such things, that we *ought* to promote the one, and *ought* to diminish the other? Is this not what morality, at root, reduces to? One main difference, it seems to me, between different moralities, is that they are based in different ideas of *what* leads to pleasurable and/or painful conscious experiences - e.g. in Christianity, unredeemed sin leads one to the painful experience of hell, which is one reason why tempting a man into sin, and thus promoting rather than diminishing his potential future suffering, is an immoral act. Of course, there is a lot more that could be said about Christian morality and how I would frame it in terms of what I see as an objective moral grounding, but I won't bend your ear too much.

why should freedom *to* [harm] be held in higher regard than freedom *from* [harm]? Why would God say, "OK, freedom means you get to hurt other people as much as you like" and not, "OK, freedom means you are free from being hurt by other people in any way"?

It' shouldn't be held in higher regard, of course. And I'm not proposing it is.

Oh, but it manifestly is! Do you have any expectation that you are or will be free from harm in this life? Of course not! Yet you *are* free to harm as much as you like - assuming you can either get away with it, or accept the consequences in terms of human punishment.

It seems to me unduly cheerful to say, "This world is a vale of happiness," but unduly cynical to say, "It's a place of nothing but misery and pain." It seems more realistic to me to say that it is a place of mixed beauty and pain, health and harm; which is what one might expect out of a good Creation turned fallen Creation.

Sure, but even in a fallen Creation, one would not expect a wholly good, immensely powerful and *unopposed* Creator to simply permit people to do harm to one, would one? The Christian belief is that God is one's best friend, right? What kind of a best friend sits by idly whilst His best friends are harmed, without stepping in to prevent that harm, even though He has more power than could ever be imagined to be enough to do exactly that?

My point would rather be that "freedom" as a concept includes both the freedom to do the right thing, and the freedom to do the wrong; the option to help, and the option to harm.

But why should *others* have to suffer for *your* bad choices? I could totally understand a concept of freedom like that which you propose if, when you did the wrong thing, *you*, and you alone, suffered for it, and if, when you did the right thing, *you*, and you alone, benefited from it, but why should we accept the notion of collateral damage given an all powerful Creator who can step in to prevent it?

The problem for the Christian advancing such points as you are is the (purported) existence of heaven: a realm where nobody harms anybody or does any wrong, and all is blissful. If such a realm is possible at all, then why would a good, powerful God allow for anything *other* than that?

Well, if "freedom" includes the option to do either kindness or harm, then that question answers itself, at least partly. For "freedom" to exist, people must have an ability to choose both for *and* contrary to the will of God. God may not wish harm on anyone; but it's quite conceivable that "freedom of choice" is such an overwhelming good that God would see reason to allow the possibility of some harm in order that genuine freedom could be offered to humanity.

Weird, that seems to me to be totally oblivious to my point. No offence, but it really does. For, if, as you write in your first sentence, freedom includes the option to do either kindness or harm, then how can those in heaven be considered to be "free", since heaven is a place where there *is* no option of harm? And if those in heaven are not free, yet you (presumably, as a Christian) aspire to heaven, then of what ultimate value is this supposed freedom anyway?

I think we instinctively see the sense of that. If we were offered the choice of a life rigidly limited to "goodness" but devoid of freedom and its associated goods (such as personhood, relationships, choice, identity, thankfulness, love...), or a life of freedom with pains and harms also entailed, many of us might think freedom was worth more. In fact, I think that's what we see in things like human rights activists who provoke governments to the point of going to jail, or soldiers who die in the name of freedom: we humans think freedom's pretty important -- so much so, that sometimes it even relativizes the value of life itself, it seems.

Again, my two points remain in relation to all of that:

1. Why should *others* suffer for *our* bad choices? Where's the fairness in that (and surely, if God is to be a good God, He must be a fair God)?
2. If this is what freedom truly is, then surely those in heaven are not truly free, and yet you (presumably, as a Christian) aspire to heaven. Do you then aspire to lack of freedom?

Where's the fairness in judging something whose choices you knew from before you even created it, and which you chose to create anyway? I still think you're not seeing my point here about at least partial responsibility of creating with foreknowledge.

Well, I think that perhaps I do see it. If I set it out as a formula, I think this might be your belief:

foreknowledge + creatorial "making" = predestination

No, that's not it. It's more like this:

foreknowledge + creatorial "making" = creatorial responsibility for "created-permitted" decisions

Another analogy, if I might. A person gives birth to a child. Every molecule of that child is knitted together in its mother's womb. However, as anyone who has children knows, that fact will not impinge even a bit on that child's free will --he or she will be a genuine individual, capable of turning into a saint or an axe-murderer. The mere fact of your having created every molecule of him tells nothing about the genuineness of the child's freedom.

Now, you will say, yes -- but I don't "foreknow" what my child will do: sure, I create him, but in a radically free way, he is his own person. I agree. But theologians in general recognize that "foreknowledge" is not "predestination." The latter is fully deterministic; the former is consistent with personal freedom.

Yes, I will say that (that the fact that you don't, versus God, "foreknow" what your child will do, is the failing of your analogy). As I pointed out, you *do* misunderstand me, because I am not arguing for "predestination", but "[Creatorial] responsibility". The difference is, indeed, subtle, but, I think, significant.

In short, you've made a fallacy of composition here. You've thought that two possible causes of determinism togther make the case for determinism conclusive. But they don't. I've argued that neither, considered individually, contributes an answer to the question of whether or not we're free, and there is nothing in both-together that adds to that insufficiency. So I think I'm seeing your case: I wonder if you grasp mine yet.

I think I grasp yours. You're saying, "God might have created us knowing what we would do, but because He created us with free will, even though He knows what we will do, He did not predestine our choices - our choices are, in fact, free willing". I agree. I just don't think that this is sufficient to absolve a Creator of responsibility for *instantiating us and all of our future decisions in the first place, knowing what they would be* when He could have chosen not to. I think the fact that *He chose* to bring us into existence, including all of our (admittedly, free will) decisions, knowing from before He brought us into existence what they would be, when He could have alternatively chosen *not* to instantiate us, confers at least *some* moral responsibility onto Him for those decisions.

Oh, but I wasn't "genuinely" free to decide to be created in the first place, and thus incur upon myself the very burden of free will choices at all!

Neither, presumably, was your child consulted in his creation. But as we've seen, that doesn't impinge on the question.

Sure, but as I've agreed / pointed out, your analogy fails in that I cannot foreknow my child's decisions. Here's a better analogy:

I am a gifted precognitive psychic and inventor. I have, in certain realms, particularly those relating to my own creations, the gift of perfect foreknowledge. If I create something, I am gifted to know exactly what it will "do" and what will become of it in the future. This ability has been scientifically tested and proven. The whole world knows it. Now, with my gift of invention, I invent a "free will android". This is a being created out of mechanical parts, but in a way that somehow avoids (perhaps through some sort of exploitation of quantum effects) determinism, and which imbues my creation with "genuine" (in the same sense that we humans have it) free will. So, my free will android creation has genuine free will, yet at the same time, I knew everything that it would do before I decided to create it.

Now, a few days after I create my free will android, and set it loose in the world, it brutally rapes and murders your daughter.

I wonder what your attitude towards me would be. Do you think it might be, "Oh, it's OK, Harry, I absolve you of responsibility - after all, you didn't predestine your android, and it had genuine free will"? Or do you think it might be a little more like, "Harry, how could you, you perverse man!? You *knew* what you were unleashing, and you unleashed it anyway, and now I have lost my daughter because of it, even as you knew that that was exactly what was going to happen!"?

*That* might be the best way of framing my point. Not only does (would, if the Christian version of God were true) God hold that "ultimate" card, but He holds the card of *knowing* what I will decide, and thus can choose (based on whether He likes my future choices or not) whether or not to "instantiate" me.

Well, to describe the creation even this way is surely to say more than we know. Biblically, for sure, the description does not go that way. You may suspect it, but what are you reasons for thinking it's necessarily true?

I'm only going on my best knowledge of modern Christian theology. If I am wrong, I am happy to be corrected. As far as I recall (I have read the Bible all the way through, but only once), Biblically, there are several verses where God is said to have knowledge of the future, and, indeed, predicts it accurately. On the other hand, there are occasions where He appears to feel emotion over the choices that people make, suggesting that He did not know what those choices were to be in advance. So, I guess the Biblical evidence for foreknowledge of human free will decisions is mixed.

To put it another way: if God in his foreknowledge knew that I would make terrible ("genuine" free will) choices were He to create me, then why would He go ahead and create me anyway?

I'm suggesting it's because he wanted you to be a genuinely free being, and thus a being capable of genuine relationship with Him.

Why need "genuine" freedom include the ability to harm others? I can perfectly well imagine a very satisfying freedom in which neither I nor anyone else had any inclination to harm anyone else. Indeed, isn't this the Christian ideal?

God holds in His hand the ultimate matter of which good and which bad (human) choices are made, regardless that it might *seem* that they are "genuinely" in "our" hands.

That's the Determinist and Calvinist view, to be sure. I just think it's wrong.

Well, again, I'm not arguing for predestination a la Calvinism, I'm arguing for Creatorial responsibility.

No, I think you missed my question. I'm saying, if we have two coequal creator "gods" (let's call one "Mr. Goodgod" and one "Mr. Evildemon"), then you can no longer blame Mr. Goodgod for any evil that exists. It's all Mr. Evildemon's fault.

Sure, agreed so far, I'm not sure yet what I've missed. But let me keep on reading your response...

But then you're stuck with the even more perplexing question, "Why is reality inherently dualistic in this way? Why is it necessary for Mr. Evildemon to exist at all?" In which case, your situation isn't explanatorily any better than you are presently assuming that mine is. In fact, it looks considerably worse; for now you've moved "evil" from being a contingent state to being a necessary one.

I'm not sure how "necessity" crept in. I am saying that this is the way things *appear* to be, not that they *have to be* this way. Nevertheless, I understand that you're enquiring into the reason for an opposite to God to exist, and why such a dualism between God and His opposite would exist, and that you are suggesting that this is harder to explain than a solely monotheistic God. I really don't think that it is though, especially given the critique based on suffering/evil that I've been attempting to level at this purported monotheistic God.

I don't know the ultimate explanation for duality, but here's just one possibility: conscious Reality (all that existed in the first place) split itself in two in an intuitive move for reasons we cannot know, but potentially to do with fostering the evolution of Itself. After all, we are all familiar with the concept of an "arms race" and the incredible technology that results from such a thing, not to mention the superhuman feats that people accomplish in the "necessity" of defending themselves in war. Is it not possible that this duality is Reality's attempt to generate an internal "arms race" and thus facilitate Its own evolution?

Instead of offering some kind of hope that evil could "mean something" or could eventually "have a point," you've now made it a fatalistic fixture of the universe, and inherently turned all pain, all travail, all injustice, and all suffering into something meaningless. For who can prevent Mr. Evildemon, and who can blame him for doing what is in his nature to do?

Thus you not only take away the hope of there being a meaning for pain, but you also deprive the suffering of the voice to cry out against injustice. In a dualistic universe, no "justice" could ever be expected or asked.

Well, I don't think that duality necessarily means that pain is meaningless. If the possibility I suggested above were true, pain would serve the purpose of inspiring us to evolve in the face of necessity - the necessity of defeating a *merciless* evil oppositional force.

Or so it seems. But I'm sure you'll have something interesting to say about my objection.

I can only hope it's interesting! Let me know what you think.

[Immanuel Can]

Thanks for your thoughtful reply, Harry. I hope I can do it justice.

Well, I tried to clarify in the following few sentences, one of which you quote below, that by "conscious function" I meant at the broadest possible level, that by which consciousness "functions" in providing us with experiences according to which we (broadly speaking) suffer or feel pleasure. *That* is the level at which I think all conscious beings are equally valuable, at least from a moral perspective.

I don't see anything self-evidently compelling in this suggestion, Harry. We are "conscious" -- so what? We "feel pain and pleasure" -- so what? The mere *fact* that we experience these things does not get us the *value conclusion* that this is right or wrong, merely that it *is so.* To refer to one of this month's PN articles, how do we get an "ought" from your mere "is" statement?

There's nothing the compels us to "a moral perspective" here. And I think there should be. I think you think there should be too. But what is it?

"Capacity to experience" has precisely the same problem.

...what could be more self-evident to conscious beings such as ourselves, who *do* experience such things, that we *ought* to promote the one, and *ought* to diminish the other? Is this not what morality, at root, reduces to? One main difference, it seems to me, between different moralities, is that they are based in different ideas of *what* leads to pleasurable and/or painful conscious experiences...

That's the point, Harry --it's not "self-evident" at all. Your description of morality turns out to be purely Utilitarian. And the critiques of Utilitarianism are many and well-known, so there's no reason for me to relist them here -- unless you decide you want me to, of course. As for that being some sort of "universal" morality, that's completely, obviously not true. Some systems think that causing or accepting pain is acceptable in certain cases, and in others positively morally meritorious. Pleasures, in a similar way, can be both good and evil, and are characterized differently by different systems. So it's by no means "self-evident" to anyone.

"Self-evidence" is what people allude to when they have absolutely *no* evidence. Personally, you can trust that I will not refer to "self-evidence" in order to back a questionable view of my own; but because I will not, I feel quite free to call "foul" whenever others try it. There is no such thing as "self-evidence."

e.g. in Christianity, unredeemed sin leads one to the painful experience of hell, which is one reason why tempting a man into sin, and thus promoting rather than diminishing his potential future suffering, is an immoral act. Of course, there is a lot more that could be said about Christian morality and how I would frame it in terms of what I see as an objective moral grounding, but I won't bend your ear too much.

Bend on, Harry...I'm interested.

Actually, Christianity is no example of pain-pleasure calculus. You forget that it's centered on a Man who was brutally crucified and who never morally deserved it at all, and then was resurrected in defiance of this brutal human judgment by a righteous God. There has never been a more powerful statement that the moral values of God are not those of mankind. Pain, in this case, is the price of love, and is what a God of righteousness and kindness puts upon Himself in order to obtain redemption for human beings who have, of their own free will, gone astray from right relationship with their Creator.

But here we switch subjects...

Next message: Freedom, God and Heaven.

[QMan]

Arising_Uk wrote:
You are assuming it's a non-material property, so you show me a disembodied consciousness and I'll agree with you.

Qman:
That's of course a hyperbolic statement.
If you saw a disembodied consciousness you'd assume you were loosing your mind and would not believe it. If I someone else experiences a disembodied consciousness and tells you about it you would say that person is loosing their mind, is hallucinating, or is dishonest (see below for the experience of a disembodied consciousness). You are therefore presenting a no win scenario as though it is a legitimate way for you to become convinced of something. This is a very common method used in these Fora to dodge issues while trying to sound convincing.

Here it is:
Spinal orthopedic surgeon Dr. Mary Neal dies in a kayak pinned under water for close to 30 minutes. Comforted by Jesus as she dies (disembodied consciousness) taken to the entrance to heaven and then told she must go back. One of the reasons, besides witnessing with her story, she is told is to be with her son when he is going to die at age 18. He was 5 years at this time. He died at 18 when he was hit by a car.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0xjYdm55k5U

Clearly, from what I have seen so far, the crowd over here cannot trust in someone else's competence when it goes against their ingrained biases.

[Immanuel Can]

Harry, cont'd...

Let me start by saying that perhaps some of what is sponsoring your objections is a somewhat stereotypical and crabbed view of what you might call "Heaven." The Bible generally says very little about it, beyond "Eye has not seen, ear has not heard, nor has it entered the heart of man what God has prepared for those who love Him." It says nothing about harps, wings and togas, and it has much more to say about the reconstituted Earth by comparison. If you try to shed those somewhat cliched preconceptions we have been handed by weak theology and the media, then some of what is perplexing you about the Heaven idea will alter, I think.

Later I will talk more about Heaven if you like, but I think we need to start at the other end right now, and that is the question of whether or not human beings have any kind of freedom at all. For if they do not, then Heaven and Hell and everything in between make no sense at all. After all, why discuss a state you haven't yet found the reasons to believe in?

Sure, but even in a fallen Creation, one would not expect a wholly good, immensely powerful and *unopposed* Creator to simply permit people to do harm to one, would one? The Christian belief is that God is one's best friend, right? What kind of a best friend sits by idly whilst His best friends are harmed, without stepping in to prevent that harm, even though He has more power than could ever be imagined to be enough to do exactly that?

Have you ever taught a child to ride a bike? Heck, did you ever have a child at all? If you did, you let him be harmed in order to achieve something you considered more important. You sent him/her out on a date, knowing all the while that he/she was going to be hurt emotionally because very few teen relationships endure. You let him/her go to a school where they would take away his/her freedoms and subject him/her to humiliating tests; where scores of his/her peers would be assembled and might easily pick on him/her. You let him/her wear painful braces on his/her teeth. You let him/her play sports and sustain injuries. In a thousand ways, you opened him/her up to harm, knowing full well what the risks were. And yet you did it, and you called it "love."

Pain is not an unconditional evil; its evilness depends on whether or not what is potentially gained is capable of relativizing the price that must be paid. Likewise, "harm prevention" is not always an expression of love -- especially in cases where cutting off someone from the potential of harm leaves him or her stunted, controlled and dominated. You can become a very bad parent by thinking of nothing but harm-prevention.

"Harm" is also perceivable in two dimensions. There is "harm" in this life, and "harm" in eternity. I don't think I'll have to make the case that eternal "harm," if such exists, is by far the worse of the two. One might excuse a great many "harms" now in order to avoid eternal "harm."

But why should *others* have to suffer for *your* bad choices? I could totally understand a concept of freedom like that which you propose if, when you did the wrong thing, *you*, and you alone, suffered for it, and if, when you did the right thing, *you*, and you alone, benefited from it, but why should we accept the notion of collateral damage given an all powerful Creator who can step in to prevent it?

I want to answer this question. But before I do, we have a problem: you don't even believe in the concept of human freedom, apparently. Until I can make the case to you that individual freedom requires that one be free to do both good or evil it would be premature to move on to explanations of how that illuminates the suffering of others. So I must first establish whether or not you recognize that basic to human freedom is the ability to choose *both* good and evil.

For, if, as you write in your first sentence, freedom includes the option to do either kindness or harm, then how can those in heaven be considered to be "free", since heaven is a place where there *is* no option of harm? And if those in heaven are not free, yet you (presumably, as a Christian) aspire to heaven, then of what ultimate value is this supposed freedom anyway?

Well firstly, Heaven is not what you think it is. But secondly, and more importantly, the freedom to choose does not have to be perpetual in order to be genuine. For example, if your wife *chose* to give her life to being married to you, that was a free act. She does not afterward have to go and be with other men to *prove* that her choice to continue with you is still a free one. It is enough that she had the option to choose other men, or none at all, and chose you instead. She did it once, and it was done. She made a free decision, and this free choice of hers is the basis of your permanent relationship. Yet there is no loss of genuineness in the choice, though it is now permanent. In fact, I might dare to hope she's found the relationship itself is a new and deeper grounds for freedom, not a mere limitation on her ability to choose other partners. Yet that initial free choice is crucial: without that, she would not truly be your wife in the full, free sense that relationship should imply.

If we choose relationship with God, that choice can be permanent, and yet we do not need to revisit that choice on an ongoing basis in order to know it was the right one. There is no loss of freedom in that; there is rather an embracing of right relationship, grounded in free choice.

foreknowledge + creatorial "making" = creatorial responsibility for "created-permitted" decisions

I think perhaps I'm finally seeing your distinction: correct me if I'm not yet getting it. You are suggesting that even if we *were* free, then God would still be responsible for the evil that happened in the world simply by dint of having the power to prevent it and not doing it. Is that what you meant?

If so, then I see why you're saying you're not a Calvinist Predestinarian about this. But then I also don't understand the second part of this...

I agree. I just don't think that this is sufficient to absolve a Creator of responsibility for *instantiating us and all of our future decisions in the first place, knowing what they would be* when He could have chosen not to. I think the fact that *He chose* to bring us into existence, including all of our (admittedly, free will) decisions, knowing from before He brought us into existence what they would be, when He could have alternatively chosen *not* to instantiate us, confers at least *some* moral responsibility onto Him for those decisions.

I get what you're saying about God creating *us*, but if you include *our decisions,* then it falsifies your claim not to be a Calvinist. I'm arguing that the very idea that God micromanages our decisions is Hypercalvinism and erroneous, and if you believed it would make you a Strict Determinist at the very least, a position I would never wish to defend. I think it's simply wrong. I suggest that God does not "make our decisions for us." I would agree, however, to His having made *us.*

In contrast, I'm positing a world in which God *does* create us, but *does not* force us to behave in a particular way, and in that world I think we can make progress on the question of evil.

All I'm asking at the moment is, "If human freedom were a real thing (and you needn't concede that it is, if you like) then what would be rationally required in order for it to exist?" I'm suggesting that a minimal definition would include the ability to choose *both* for *and* against God. Can we agree at least to that -- even hypothetically?

Now to the next topic, related but different...blame.

Here's a better analogy:

I think this shows me a little better what you're trying to say to me, Harry. You're trying to say, "If God foreknows, why does He not prevent; and if he does not prevent, then is He not being unconscionable?" Is that right?

What if the price of prevention were the loss of genuine freedom -- not just for one person, but for everyone? What if the only way to keep evils from ever happening were the total deprivation of all choice, the destruction of the self, the elimination of the very grounds of personhood, and the reduction of the world itself to a petty exercise in robotics? Is there no way you could conceive of that as being a greater evil than the allowance of possibility of "harm"? Because I would think it is worse, and I think most people who thought it through might well agree.

I'm only going on my best knowledge of modern Christian theology. If I am wrong, I am happy to be corrected. As far as I recall (I have read the Bible all the way through, but only once), Biblically, there are several verses where God is said to have knowledge of the future, and, indeed, predicts it accurately.

Correct.

On the other hand, there are occasions where He appears to feel emotion over the choices that people make, suggesting that He did not know what those choices were to be in advance. So, I guess the Biblical evidence for foreknowledge of human free will decisions is mixed.

Well, Biblically speaking, God is a "Person," which would mean He can "feel," of course. But he's the prototype, and we are the copy, so our ability to "feel" is but a pallid analogical reflection of His greater ability. So it would not be a surprise if He could. At the same time, since our abilities are only a pallid copy, He might choose sometimes to use anthropomorphic language concerning Himself, merely to make himself analogically comprehensible to us in our limited state. Yet we should not push analogical statements too far: for example, the Bible talks of "the right hand of God," and that is clearly an analogy. How God "feels," then should not be taken to be too directly comparable to how we "feel."

In a similar way, statements about God being "sorry" or "repenting" or "changing His mind" about something should clearly not be taken as literal statements but rather analogical ones, I would suggest. Consequently, how far we could take them remains an open question, not a certainty on either side. I take them to anthropomorphize an action to a level we can understand, rather than to be an exhaustive description of the cognitions and of the actions of God. Thus I would not personally choose to take refuge in such statements to build my case for free will. I will make it on other grounds, so you may feel free if you wish to ignore those analogical statements.

However, I would grant you that foreknowledge is a very strong doctrine, Biblically speaking, and it doesn't suffer from analogical uncertainties in the way that statements of "feeling" on God's part do.

Why need "genuine" freedom include the ability to harm others? I can perfectly well imagine a very satisfying freedom in which neither I nor anyone else had any inclination to harm anyone else. Indeed, isn't this the Christian ideal?

Indeed it is. But I'm going to later suggest there are reasons why, if "freedom" is to be real at all, that there has to be some period of time in which another state of affairs is possible. That period of time need not be forever (and indeed, it cannot be) but it has to have obtained at some point. If you think of the marriage example I used earlier, you'll catch the drift --if your wife never had a choice about marrying someone else or staying single, then she never had a choice to marry you; and she isn't your wife, she's your prisoner.

I'm not sure how "necessity" crept in. I am saying that this is the way things *appear* to be, not that they *have to be* this way. Nevertheless, I understand that you're enquiring into the reason for an opposite to God to exist, and why such a dualism between God and His opposite would exist, and that you are suggesting that this is harder to explain than a solely monotheistic God. I really don't think that it is though, especially given the critique based on suffering/evil that I've been attempting to level at this purported monotheistic God.

So you're really not a Gnostic, then? Nor an evil/good Dualist? Are you opting instead for a sort of Darwinian account? (your subsequent statement at least suggests that possibility) But if so, then evil has no cure at all...in a Darwinian view, evil and the so-called "good" are both merely byproducts of an impersonal, contingent process called "evolution." Just as with the Dualism problem, there is no such thing as "evil" except to mean "what I don't happen to like," and there's no such thing as injustice, only "I don't like what chance gave me." There is absolutely no remedy for evil in such a world either. Yet perhaps you have a different option in mind...

I

don't know the ultimate explanation for duality, but here's just one possibility: conscious Reality (all that existed in the first place) split itself in two in an intuitive move for reasons we cannot know, but potentially to do with fostering the evolution of Itself. After all, we are all familiar with the concept of an "arms race" and the incredible technology that results from such a thing, not to mention the superhuman feats that people accomplish in the "necessity" of defending themselves in war. Is it not possible that this duality is Reality's attempt to generate an internal "arms race" and thus facilitate Its own evolution?

Indeed, this is "a different option"! This is a new one: I've never seen it before. Interesting, and yet quite savage. You mean that "evolution" "wants" something? (Surely that is an analogical problem even greater than anthopomorphisms of the Supreme Being.) How odd would that be: that an impersonal, deterministic process "wants" something? Why should we think it should "get" what it "wants" anyway? Should we embrace it, along with the evils it entails, or should we fight it? And how the heck would we ever know? In fact, why should we even *care* where "the race" is going, and not just take care of our own skinny selves? So many questions!

Well, I don't think that duality necessarily means that pain is meaningless. If the possibility I suggested above were true, pain would serve the purpose of inspiring us to evolve in the face of necessity - the necessity of defeating a *merciless* evil oppositional force.

But if, as Dualism implies, this "merciless oppositional force" is one of the two basic constituents of reality, Harry, then there's zero chance we'll ever "defeat" it, since that would mean "defeating" the nature of reality itself. And how could that possibly be "meaningful"? If its contrary to the fabric of reality itself, then from whence this strange quality you call "meaning"?

I can only hope it's interesting! Let me know what you think.

Yes, Harry, very: I'm finding this conversation very fresh, interesting and engaging. Please continue as long as you feel likewise.

IC


P.S. I know you're still wondering "Why should others suffer for our bad choices?" and I want to honour that question, because I think it's fair and important: but I need to see where we are on the issue of personal freedom first, okay? Then I will move on to that answer. Feel free to remind me if, for any reason, I forget. As soon as we get a mutually agreed upon definition for "freedom," then let's go there.