Pure Consciousness?

[Ginkgo]

I am not looking for evidence of consciousness, that is what other people are doing. I am looking for an explanation of how it works.

I just read that bit.

My above post was an attempt at evidence of consciousness. That is why I ran with the philosophical zombie thing.

How consciousness works is a different issue.

Sorry about the confusion.

[chaz wyman]

This just adds to the confusion. You seem to demonstrate some assumption that I am not aware of.
Zombies are a fiction, I don't think this line of enquiry helps.

Well, I have to agree. I think the idea of zombies is kind of funny, but I learned about them in the SEP and they constitute a legitimate philosophical argument. I was actually trying to be less confusing using an accepted argument. My apologies.

The point is that if you study living things, you seem to get a more and complex consciousness with more complex brain matter.

Agreed. But as I noted with the examples of my dog and cat, it is not always the same kind of consciousness--there seems to be differences in instincts, emotions, awareness, thought and learning patterns that are not directly related to volume or even complexity. Honey bees actually have language, and they have navigational skills that we do not possess, even though they have little itty bitty brains.

So to use another metaphor, I have begun to think that it is not just "How much milk is in the glass?", but also, "What kind of milk--chocolate, skim, buttermilk?"

So I don't see what your problem is or why you want to ask "where does it come from", as we seem to be face to face with all the evidence we need.

I am not looking for evidence of consciousness, that is what other people are doing. I am looking for an explanation of how it works.

As there are no zombies, look at what you can. Single celled organisms are 'aware' of food sources, light and temperature changes. Leaves can move to orient themselves to sunlight, close up to avoid loosing water. As evolution has brought forth increasingly complex organisms we find that the response level to environmental stimuli becomes more complex, the complexity leads to higher animals such as Whales, Dolphins and humans with sophisticated communication.

Agreed.

Surely this is where you look to understand consciousness, as these living examples are the only evidence and the only examples we have.

People are forever telling me that the world works through cause and effect, but then they talk about "mental" issues as being just what they are. Does an issue, by virtue of being mental, remove itself to the realm of magic, religion, or superstition? Does it negate cause and effect, because it is mental? I don't think so. Consciousness may be more difficult to understand, but it still works like anything else with regard to cause and effect. We just have to learn the rules about what causes what.

This is what I have been trying to do, and I think that I have had some success. The first step is to separate the mental aspects, relate them to their physical counterparts, and examine how they work independently and how they influence each other. Doing this, I have made a few different hypothesis about how things may work using logic and reason, but as I said, I know nothing about science, so I need to share and get feedback on my ideas. I have not found anyone else, who views consciousness in this way, so I am looking for people, who may be open to a different interpretation.

In the case of zombies. Surely this thought experiment does nothing more that establish that life and consciousness requires healthy living brain matter. If there were an incorporeal soul, then you would have to ask why is it that such a thing cannot animate a dead body - why is it that animation is solely found in healthy matter.

Very good point, and more evidence that we do not have the answers.

Gee

The only problem with the evidence is that we use it wrongly. There is nothing we understand better than consciousness. In fact everything we think and do, all we see and interpret is second hand. Consciousness is primary to everything we do. It's matter we don't understand. We are what it is to be conscious.

[Ginkgo]

The only problem with the evidence is that we use it wrongly. There is nothing we understand better than consciousness. In fact everything we think and do, all we see and interpret is second hand. Consciousness is primary to everything we do. It's matter we don't understand. We are what it is to be conscious.

When it comes to the question of how mind and matter interact then we really only have two choices. Do we want a metaphysical explanation or a scientific explanation? It seems to me that Gee was looking for a metaphysical explanation. The problem with that from my point of view is we have so many competing metaphysics in this area.

A scientific analysis is the most promising when it comes to explaining how consciousness works. People such as Prinz, Koch and Crick as well as many other researches have come up with at least some type of explanation as to how consciousness might work

[Gee]

Hello again Gee.

The reason I mentioned dividing things into hard and easy problems was because I was hoping you could concede a few points to the physicalists. In this day and age we know that brains behave a bit like computers. They can have a memory, they are rational, have a sleep mode, as well as carrying out a logical process.

I would love to concede a few points to the physicalists, but have a problem with it, as they tend to get carried away with their ideas. Example: "brains behave a bit like computers." This is not true. The truth is that computers behave a bit like a very small part of the rational mind part of the brain. The problem that I have with physicalists is that they like to ignore points that I think are relevant.

But how much can we concede to the physicalist explanation? In this day and age computers are not emotional. Dennet would say yes, but that is only true at the moment but it wont be true in the future. The workings of a machine will, in the future, account for all of the feelings and emotions humans have.

Is that so? The interesting thing about the way that I study consciousness, is that I learn how things work. So I am aware that emotion is external; it, like the sub/unconscious mind, is communal, shared, outside of the body. So if a computer had this quality of emotion, then it would also have a "personal space", it could be read by a person who reads auras, it's best friend could take one look at it and know that it needed cheering up.

So you are telling me that Dennett thinks that a computer can do this?

Now this is where it gets interesting from Chalmers' point of view. Chalmers would agree that it may well be the case that now and into the future all of the things we call consciousness can, and perhaps, be accounted for in terms of matter in motion. The whole business is just physical processes at work. But all of these things Dennett would call the easy problem suffer from a major problem. That is the problem of experience. Chalmers would probably say that no matter how sophisticated the machine, a mechanical explanation will never explain experience

Experience is a very small part of the problem. As I mentioned above emotion does not work internally, neither does awareness, neither does feeling, and if by some miracle we could make a computer that was emotional, aware, and had feelings, then it would be alive, and we would have to deal with the greatest problem. All life wants, and at the least it wants to survive and continue. What kind of a nightmare would that be?

For Chalmers the hard problem is the easy problem as well. Perhaps we could say that consciousness is like a coat that fits around the mechanical explanations. Keeping in mind that it is possible that a mechanical explanation covers all types of consciousness.

There might be a metaphysical explanation for consciousness, but I seriously doubt that there can be a mechanical explanation.

This is why Chalmers introduced the idea of a philosophical zombie. The zombie is the machine, is the human. The zombie is exactly like a human with a computer brain, just like every human might be explained in these terms. The only difference being that the zombie lacks experience. It doesn't have ,"What it is like experiences" So when I abuse a philosophical zombie by calling him names, he will like any human be offended and sad. The difference being that the zombie is not really offended or sad. It is just the appropriate mechanical mechanism taking place in the brain. So the zombie ACTS hurt and offended where as a real person IS hurt and offended.

Agreed. There can be an imitation of the brain, and an imitation of consciousness, but it is not real.

Would this be how you understand the hard and easy problems? Because this is where I was trying to lead you.

Pretty much. I would like to read Dennett's "Consciousness Explained", just to see how he justifies his assumptions. But I would also like to read, Chalmer's "Hard Problem" to see how close he is. I have not yet tried to read them, because I am not sure that I can. Do either of them write with plain speaking, or do they feel the need to put 16 different "isms" and "ologys" in each paragraph? I ask because I now have problems learning new terminology; one of my many gifts from multiple sclerosis.

In your next post, you apologized for misreading my intentions. No apology is necessary, as if there is fault, it is mine. I find your writing interesting and appreciate your responses.

Gee

[Felasco]

While reading a thread in another forum, I saw the words "pure consciousness". Is there such a thing as "pure" consciousness? If there is such a thing, then what is impure consciousness? What does consciousness mix with that makes it impure?

I haven't read the whole thread yet, and don't know what others might mean by "pure consciousness".

I think of the term as meaning being aware without thinking. Observing reality, without analyzing it, categorizing it, comparing it, ranking it etc.

[Gee]

The only problem with the evidence is that we use it wrongly.

How do we use it "wrongly"?

There is nothing we understand better than consciousness.

You keep saying this, but I don't understand your meaning. Could you elaborate?

In fact everything we think and do, all we see and interpret is second hand.

With the rational mind, I can see where this could be true. But I do not think that it is true with the sub/unconscious mind.

Consciousness is primary to everything we do. It's matter we don't understand. We are what it is to be conscious.

Do you have a solipsist view?

Gee

[Gee]

When it comes to the question of how mind and matter interact then we really only have two choices. Do we want a metaphysical explanation or a scientific explanation? It seems to me that Gee was looking for a metaphysical explanation. The problem with that from my point of view is we have so many competing metaphysics in this area.

I have this idea in my head that I should consider any and all explanations. Consciousness is a subject that can be viewed from so many different perspectives, that it would be foolhardy to try to understand it without at least perusing the differing explanations. So I look to philosophy, science, religion, psychic phenomenon, and anything else that I can think of.

A scientific analysis is the most promising when it comes to explaining how consciousness works. People such as Prinz, Koch and Crick as well as many other researches have come up with at least some type of explanation as to how consciousness might work

I tried to look these guys up in Wiki, but couldn't find them. I do not want to get into a technical explanation of consciousness, because I could never absorb it. I was serious when I said that I know as much about science as a dolphin knows about climbing trees.

When I studied how consciousness works, I did it through mostly observation, along with studying the various religions, psychic phenomenon, the paranormal, and science. At this point, I am looking mostly to science to confirm or disprove many of my ideas. And also to sort out what I think I understand--and learn.

I have divided consciousness in three ways; the external and the internal effects; and the mental, emotional, instinctive, and awareness aspects. And, of course, I am very aware of the divisions of mind as explained by Freud, as that is also relevant.

Generally speaking, the external consciousness is emotion, awareness, and feeling, with instincts working through both internal and external. The internal consciousness is thought and memory.

Mental works through the brain, is private and internal.

Emotion works through chemical, is shared and external.

Awareness and feeling are external, but I don't know a system that they work through.

Instinct keeps us alive, works internally regarding external things, works through hormones and pheromones.

Emotion seems to have the ability to move and carry knowledge.

All aspects, the mental, emotional, and physical, have the ability to influence each other.

These are the general separations that I have found help me to understand how consciousness works. Is anybody studying it in this way?

Gee

[Ginkgo]

Hello again Gee.

The reason I mentioned dividing things into hard and easy problems was because I was hoping you could concede a few points to the physicalists. In this day and age we know that brains behave a bit like computers. They can have a memory, they are rational, have a sleep mode, as well as carrying out a logical process.

I would love to concede a few points to the physicalists, but have a problem with it, as they tend to get carried away with their ideas. Example: "brains behave a bit like computers." This is not true. The truth is that computers behave a bit like a very small part of the rational mind part of the brain. The problem that I have with physicalists is that they like to ignore points that I think are relevant.

But how much can we concede to the physicalist explanation? In this day and age computers are not emotional. Dennet would say yes, but that is only true at the moment but it wont be true in the future. The workings of a machine will, in the future, account for all of the feelings and emotions humans have.

Is that so? The interesting thing about the way that I study consciousness, is that I learn how things work. So I am aware that emotion is external; it, like the sub/unconscious mind, is communal, shared, outside of the body. So if a computer had this quality of emotion, then it would also have a "personal space", it could be read by a person who reads auras, it's best friend could take one look at it and know that it needed cheering up.

So you are telling me that Dennett thinks that a computer can do this?

Now this is where it gets interesting from Chalmers' point of view. Chalmers would agree that it may well be the case that now and into the future all of the things we call consciousness can, and perhaps, be accounted for in terms of matter in motion. The whole business is just physical processes at work. But all of these things Dennett would call the easy problem suffer from a major problem. That is the problem of experience. Chalmers would probably say that no matter how sophisticated the machine, a mechanical explanation will never explain experience

Experience is a very small part of the problem. As I mentioned above emotion does not work internally, neither does awareness, neither does feeling, and if by some miracle we could make a computer that was emotional, aware, and had feelings, then it would be alive, and we would have to deal with the greatest problem. All life wants, and at the least it wants to survive and continue. What kind of a nightmare would that be?

For Chalmers the hard problem is the easy problem as well. Perhaps we could say that consciousness is like a coat that fits around the mechanical explanations. Keeping in mind that it is possible that a mechanical explanation covers all types of consciousness.

There might be a metaphysical explanation for consciousness, but I seriously doubt that there can be a mechanical explanation.

This is why Chalmers introduced the idea of a philosophical zombie. The zombie is the machine, is the human. The zombie is exactly like a human with a computer brain, just like every human might be explained in these terms. The only difference being that the zombie lacks experience. It doesn't have ,"What it is like experiences" So when I abuse a philosophical zombie by calling him names, he will like any human be offended and sad. The difference being that the zombie is not really offended or sad. It is just the appropriate mechanical mechanism taking place in the brain. So the zombie ACTS hurt and offended where as a real person IS hurt and offended.

Agreed. There can be an imitation of the brain, and an imitation of consciousness, but it is not real.

Would this be how you understand the hard and easy problems? Because this is where I was trying to lead you.

Pretty much. I would like to read Dennett's "Consciousness Explained", just to see how he justifies his assumptions. But I would also like to read, Chalmer's "Hard Problem" to see how close he is. I have not yet tried to read them, because I am not sure that I can. Do either of them write with plain speaking, or do they feel the need to put 16 different "isms" and "ologys" in each paragraph? I ask because I now have problems learning new terminology; one of my many gifts from multiple sclerosis.

In your next post, you apologized for misreading my intentions. No apology is necessary, as if there is fault, it is mine. I find your writing interesting and appreciate your responses.

Gee

Once you get over the jargon these people use the arguments are not really that complicated.

Basically Dennis saying the same thing you said. "There can be an imitation of the brain and an imitation of consciousness, and it isn't real" The difference is that Dennett would say it is real. This is why it is important to concede to the physicalist argument in order to take it too it's logical conclusion. Chalmers does this to show that it isn't real, as opposed to the possibility that it could be real or is real at the moment.

Perhaps we could say that the easy problem of consciousness is the imitation of consciousness, by the zombie or the machine. Now or in the future we can get a computer to display emotions and demand its own personal space, but it would only ever be an ACT on the part of the computer or the zombie. For the moment we can look at this as the easy problem of consciousness.

Perhaps, on the other hand, we could say that the hard problem is when we examine the claim that people are NOT ACTING when it comes to these types of emotions. These experiences are very much a subject thing that machine can never obtain. Why can machines never obtain this level? Because they cannot have experiences. Why we have experiences is the hard problem.


Ginkgo

[Gee]

While reading a thread in another forum, I saw the words "pure consciousness". Is there such a thing as "pure" consciousness? If there is such a thing, then what is impure consciousness? What does consciousness mix with that makes it impure?

I haven't read the whole thread yet, and don't know what others might mean by "pure consciousness".

I think of the term as meaning being aware without thinking. Observing reality, without analyzing it, categorizing it, comparing it, ranking it etc.

Hi Felasco;

It appears that you are talking about the sub/unconscious mind. That would be very pure consciousness, and much more honest than what comes out of the conscious rational mind.

But I think that the various aspects of consciousness are dispersed in different species in various combinations and degrees, so that is what I am looking into.

Gee

[MGL]

As there are no zombies, look at what you can. Single celled organisms are 'aware' of food sources, light and temperature changes. Leaves can move to orient themselves to sunlight, close up to avoid loosing water. As evolution has brought forth increasingly complex organisms we find that the response level to environmental stimuli becomes more complex, the complexity leads to higher animals such as Whales, Dolphins and humans with sophisticated communication.
Surely this is where you look to understand consciousness, as these living examples are the only evidence and the only examples we have.

The argument seems to be: because consciousness has only been "observed" in things with brains, we must infer that only brains are conscious.

But consider:

We have a bag of matchboxes, half of them red and half of them white. We notice that we can only open the red boxes and inside we find a beetle, but we are unable to see inside the white boxes. We cannot conclude from this that only the red boxes contain beetles.

[Ginkgo]

When it comes to the question of how mind and matter interact then we really only have two choices. Do we want a metaphysical explanation or a scientific explanation? It seems to me that Gee was looking for a metaphysical explanation. The problem with that from my point of view is we have so many competing metaphysics in this area.

I have this idea in my head that I should consider any and all explanations. Consciousness is a subject that can be viewed from so many different perspectives, that it would be foolhardy to try to understand it without at least perusing the differing explanations. So I look to philosophy, science, religion, psychic phenomenon, and anything else that I can think of.

A scientific analysis is the most promising when it comes to explaining how consciousness works. People such as Prinz, Koch and Crick as well as many other researches have come up with at least some type of explanation as to how consciousness might work

I tried to look these guys up in Wiki, but couldn't find them. I do not want to get into a technical explanation of consciousness, because I could never absorb it. I was serious when I said that I know as much about science as a dolphin knows about climbing trees.

When I studied how consciousness works, I did it through mostly observation, along with studying the various religions, psychic phenomenon, the paranormal, and science. At this point, I am looking mostly to science to confirm or disprove many of my ideas. And also to sort out what I think I understand--and learn.

I have divided consciousness in three ways; the external and the internal effects; and the mental, emotional, instinctive, and awareness aspects. And, of course, I am very aware of the divisions of mind as explained by Freud, as that is also relevant.

Generally speaking, the external consciousness is emotion, awareness, and feeling, with instincts working through both internal and external. The internal consciousness is thought and memory.

Mental works through the brain, is private and internal.

Emotion works through chemical, is shared and external.

Awareness and feeling are external, but I don't know a system that they work through.

Instinct keeps us alive, works internally regarding external things, works through hormones and pheromones.

Emotion seems to have the ability to move and carry knowledge.

All aspects, the mental, emotional, and physical, have the ability to influence each other.

These are the general separations that I have found help me to understand how consciousness works. Is anybody studying it in this way?

Gee

Hi Gee,

I don't think I am being of much help to you, so I won't bother you after this.

You seem to have a combination of metaphysics and science. By metaphysics I mean a type of substance dualism. This type of dualism means that the mind and the brain are separated (in two different places) because they are different substances. One is mental stuff and the other is physical stuff. How two two manage to work together has a long history in philosophy. Spinoza, Liebnitz, Malebrache and Descartes all give a dualist account and each of them comes up with a different explanation of how the two interact. The problem for and these philosophers wikll be to give a satisfactory explanation as to how they interact.

When science came on the scene there was a tendency to reject dualist explanations in favour of some type of reductionism. In other words, we can reduce the mental to the physical a.k.a Dennett. Now this is pretty much the path science has taken in order to give an account of how consciousness works. The problem will always be marrying together science and metaphysics.


Anyway I hope things are going well for you.

Ginkgo

[Gee]

Perhaps we could say that the easy problem of consciousness is the imitation of consciousness, by the zombie or the machine. Now or in the future we can get a computer to display emotions and demand its own personal space, but it would only ever be an ACT on the part of the computer or the zombie. For the moment we can look at this as the easy problem of consciousness.

Perhaps, on the other hand, we could say that the hard problem is when we examine the claim that people are NOT ACTING when it comes to these types of emotions. These experiences are very much a subject thing that machine can never obtain. Why can machines never obtain this level? Because they cannot have experiences. Why we have experiences is the hard problem.

Ginkgo

I concede your point, "Why we have experiences is the hard problem."

But I have a question. If we are exposed to knowledge, information, or even emotion, but we are not aware of it; if it is absorbed into the sub/unconscious mind, did we "experience" it?

Gee

[Felasco]

It appears that you are talking about the sub/unconscious mind.

No, the conscious mind. Just without thought.

[Ginkgo]

Perhaps we could say that the easy problem of consciousness is the imitation of consciousness, by the zombie or the machine. Now or in the future we can get a computer to display emotions and demand its own personal space, but it would only ever be an ACT on the part of the computer or the zombie. For the moment we can look at this as the easy problem of consciousness.

Perhaps, on the other hand, we could say that the hard problem is when we examine the claim that people are NOT ACTING when it comes to these types of emotions. These experiences are very much a subject thing that machine can never obtain. Why can machines never obtain this level? Because they cannot have experiences. Why we have experiences is the hard problem.

Ginkgo

I concede your point, "Why we have experiences is the hard problem."

But I have a question. If we are exposed to knowledge, information, or even emotion, but we are not aware of it; if it is absorbed into the sub/unconscious mind, did we "experience" it?

Gee

From my point of view I would say that it depends on the type of information, but generally speaking the answer would be, yes.

We experience many things but most of the things we experience we don't attend to, but we still experience them. Tomorrow, I will try and find you a link to studies in attentional blindness.

[Gee]

I don't think I am being of much help to you, so I won't bother you after this.

You seem to have a combination of metaphysics and science. By metaphysics I mean a type of substance dualism. This type of dualism means that the mind and the brain are separated (in two different places) because they are different substances. One is mental stuff and the other is physical stuff. How two two manage to work together has a long history in philosophy. Spinoza, Liebnitz, Malebrache and Descartes all give a dualist account and each of them comes up with a different explanation of how the two interact. The problem for and these philosophers wikll be to give a satisfactory explanation as to how they interact.

Thank you. I read some on Liebnitz and his Monads, which reminded me of Higg's Bosuns, but I have no idea if he has an answer. Descartes seemed to be into the God thing, so I dismissed his theories, although he made some contributions with logic and math. I did not know about Spinoza or Malebrache, so will look them up, but am not sure how much they will help.

When science came on the scene there was a tendency to reject dualist explanations in favour of some type of reductionism. In other words, we can reduce the mental to the physical a.k.a Dennett. Now this is pretty much the path science has taken in order to give an account of how consciousness works. The problem will always be marrying together science and metaphysics.

Ginkgo

Dualist theories usually mean God theories, so I am not interested in those. Reductionist theories usually mean, let's ignore some of the facts because this is getting too complicated, so I am not interested in those.

We can call consciousness, God, or we can decide to ignore some aspects of consciousness because they don't fit our theories, but can we call ourselves philosophers while we do either of these things? I don't think so.

I think of consciousness as a communication, much like a cell phone. I think that it is real and has properties that can be defined, whether that means that it is physical, or metaphysical is irrelevant to me. It is what it is, and I study it.

Gee