Some epistemological musings, all provisional, and all open to finessing...
Truth(fulness) is a property of (a) meaning(ful statement), where the meaning(ful statement) is usually embodied in symbols with defined syntax and grammar, i.e., a language.
Three basic categories of truth are (these are my own terms which might or might not reflect standard usage):
- Representational, in which the degree of truth of the meaning(ful statement) is proportional to the accuracy with which it corresponds to that which it represents (something beyond itself).
- Semantic, in which the meaning(ful statement) does not represent anything beyond itself but rather is (ultimately) a tautology given its meaning. Mathematical proofs and logical arguments are examples, but, more prosaically, so are statements like "A bachelor is an unmarried man".
- Normative, being that embodied in (especially ethical) principles, prescriptions, and proscriptions. Example: "It is wrong to intentionally cause harm to another where that harm could reasonably have been avoided." (Arguably, this category could be subsumed as a sub-category of representational truth, in which the correspondence is with an abstract/Platonic normative realm).
Two types of representational truth are (same caveat):
- Direct: those based in personal experience. Example: I currently see the image of a computer screen in front of me.
- Empirical: those based on inferences from observation. Example: a scientific theory.
Semantic and direct truths are known infallibly and incontrovertibly. Empirical truths are not. We can only be more or less confident in the actual truth of a potential empirical truth based on how reliably we observe its consequences and predictions in reality - and, strictly speaking, our confidence could always be totally misplaced.
Normative truths are in between: they can be known more or less infallibly. They are known by inference, given an objective, impersonal perspective, from the relevant direct and empirical truths.
Where, then, does this leave Truth-with-a-capital-T?
Simply as those most profound of empirical and normative truths that most broadly describe and explain reality and how we ought to behave in it.
Experimental science can probably only get us so far towards it.
Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Sat Mar 11, 2023 2:36 pm
the object of science (as we know it) is not *truth* but rather *accurate description*
Given my musings above, the two (*truth* and *accurate description*) are, in the context of science, synonymous (as that which I've referred to as "empirical truth", being a type of "representational truth"). For reference and clarity, I'm endorsing here a correspondence theory of truth.
Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Sat Mar 11, 2023 2:36 pm
The 'scientific description' of the world, as we all know, has supplanted metaphysical views
Extending my musings: in this context, "metaphysical" truths are a sub-type of "empirical" truths; they are those truths regarding the empirical reality that lies beyond "physical" reality. To some extent, they are scientifically accessible, but the current naturalistic assumptions of current science mean that currently this is not taking place to any great extent. This is consistent with the assertion that (currently):
Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Sat Mar 11, 2023 2:36 pm
these latter [i.e., metaphysical views --Harry] are often described now as vast hallucinations and the work of the imagination run wild.
So, I think that this (reordered for relevance and flow)...
Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Sat Mar 11, 2023 2:36 pm
But back to the question of the truth and
what is true. If we take the science-view to its ultimate point every human truth is shown to be sentimental clap-trap, a series of lies which lead to self-deception.
...is only true with respect to the (naturalistic aka materialistic) assumptions and prejudices behind the way science is currently practised (in general; there are exceptions), and not with respect to the ideal practice of science.
Now, re this:
Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Sat Mar 11, 2023 2:36 pm
The 'science view' however, even though it explains phenomena, really does not explain much of anything. In fact it does away with explanation. It reduces Explanation to mere explanation.
I think I understand what you're getting at. It is perhaps another way of getting at that which this quote (from Bernardo Kastrup's Why Materialism Is Baloney) also gets at:
Bernardo Kastrup wrote:
[S]cience can explain a body in terms of tissues; tissues in terms of cells; cells in terms of molecules; molecules in terms of atoms; and atoms in terms of subatomic particles. But then it can only explain one subatomic particle in terms of another, by highlighting their relative differences. Science cannot explain the fundamental nature of what a subatomic particle is in itself, since all scientific explanations need a frame of reference to provide contrasts.
Capturing the observable patterns and regularities of the elements of reality, relative to each other, is an empirical and scientific question. But pondering about the fundamental nature of these elements is not; it is a philosophical question
Moving on:
Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Sat Mar 11, 2023 2:36 pm
Gary Childress wrote: ↑Sat Mar 11, 2023 3:13 am
Philosophy is a little different from the sciences in that it puts wisdom at the top of the order of priority.
The term 'wisdom' is one closely linked with religious truth. And if there is 'philosophical wisdom' it is, it seems to me, the jibber-jabber of those who talk philosophically about essentially religious categories of value.
I guess that this depends on what you mean in context by "religious". Given that, to me, religion (and its truths) and philosophy (and its wisdom) are distinct categories, I disagree with you here on my own terms, but you might well be right on your own.
Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Sat Mar 11, 2023 2:36 pm
I am not sure about your definition of *philosophy*.
Although this was not directed at me, here's my definition anyway: clear thinking about reality and how to behave in it. In context, "clear thinking about" is similar to - and compatible with, but less loaded than - "wisdom regarding".
Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Sat Mar 11, 2023 2:36 pm
I think in my next
wondrous essay I am going to have to tell the Story of the Jacobi family. The three siblings Ephraim, Elisabeth and Alexis and how Alexis won-out and got hold of the family wealth! I pushed Ephraim out of the metaphorical nest! He had all the spiritual talent and a great deal of the charisma, but
I had the Machiavellian will.
I survived, he collapsed.
I believe I am correct in predicting that Elisabeth, then, in deep horror at the depths of the depravity of (human) Nature, was forever lost to the world, but please straighten me out if I have erred here.