That's a failed analogy, for at least three reasons:Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Feb 27, 2023 3:27 pmThat's like saying, "It can't be the case that a husband can be a father, because the fact that he's a husband makes it possible for him to be a father, and the fact that he's a father makes it possible for him to be a husband."Harry Baird wrote: ↑Sun Feb 26, 2023 11:08 am It can't be both the case that the former (the morality of the acts/laws/principles/etc which are decreed/commanded/embodied/etc by God as moral) explains the latter (God's decreeing/commanding/embodying them as moral) as well as the case that the latter explains the former, because they're opposite explanations, so common sense dictates that it can't be the case that both are true.
- On the Dilemma, only one thing is predicated of God (that He embodies morality), not two things as in your supposed analogy (that a certain man is both a husband and a father).
- The Dilemma thus has nothing to do with how one thing predicated of God makes another "possible" - as in your analogy where being a husband makes being a father possible (and/or vice versa) - because we are only predicating one thing of God.
- The Dilemma is not based on God's being merely an instance of a moral agent, as in your analogy where this man is an instance of a husband and an instance of a father: it is based on his being the embodiment of morality itself. Thus, a successful analogy would be if this man was not merely a father, but the embodiment of paternity itself.
The analogous question then would be:
Does (the assumed fact of) this man's embodying paternity explain the paternity of his embodiment, or does the paternity of his embodiment explain (the assumed fact of) this man embodying paternity?
That might sound a little convoluted, but it's just the framing in terms of "explanatory priority" of the simpler and more understandable question:
Does whatever this man's nature happens to be determine the standard of paternity, or does this man's nature embody paternity because it conforms to the standard of paternity?
If it's the former, then paternity is arbitrary: it is whatever this man's nature happens to be. Necessarily, arbitrariness is ungroundedness.
If it's the latter, then this man's nature doesn't ground paternity: that external standard (whatever it is) does.
Even granting that this man embodies paternity, then, does not ground paternity in him.
In other words, it does not explain the essence of paternity; it does not tell us how we (can/could) know what paternity is.
Likewise for the supposed grounding of morality by God's embodying it, even if we grant that God does embody morality.
In context, all of those are simply different ways of saying that "God embodies morality", which I've shown above is insufficient to ground morality in Him.Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Feb 27, 2023 3:27 pm The nature of God is the location of what we human beings understand, in our naive way, as "moral."
[...]
"The moral" and "God's character" are synonyms for precisely the same property.
[...]
"Good" and "what God is" are the same thing.
From your perspective, this is obviously A Very Big Deal, because one of your favourite apologetic arguments is the argument from objective morality: that without God, there is no objective morality. That argument fails, of course, if objective morality is not grounded in God - and the Euthyphro Dilemma shows exactly that.