AlexW wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 5:54 am
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 3:53 am
What do you mean "feel" something? Do you mean tactilely, or emotionally "feel" it?
I referred to the sense of touch, not to emotions.
I see.
Well, I think I do understand. You're a sort of what would be called a Common Sense Realist, a sort of Materialism. It doesn't seem you detect a difference between the senses (see, touch, taste, and so on) and the "observer," the entity "behind the eyes," so to speak, who is making sense out of the external stimuli.
I do see a problem there. A rudimentary sensor, a mechanical device, can be created to indicate a difference in things like colour or texture. So in the senses sense, the sensor can "detect" the difference. But it is utterly devoid of potential to interpret, categorize, relate or process the difference it detects. It is not an observer.
So if experience is no more than the externals of taste, touch, feel, and so on, then experience is what a rudimentary sensor is having. But I don't think anybody reasonable wants to say that's what the sensor is having.
And I think you intuit the problem in such a view already. For you say...
None of the senses actually tell us "this is something material that I am experiencing now" - sure, thought will tell us this when our hand touches a solid surface, but the sense of touch itself does not.
Right. So the five senses cannot be equal to "experiencing." There must be an observer to do the thinking, a "ghost in the machine," to parrot Gilbert Ryle.
There is nothing wrong with this interpretation,
Well, I see a problem. It's the one above. If the five senses are all that are necessary to constitute an "experience," then there is no need for an observer. But if an observer exists, then something different from Materialism is true. And something more than the five senses is required for an "experience" to happen.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 3:53 am
Take the term "observer." An "observer" isn't an eye, per se. He HAS an eye, but an eye without the "observer" behind it would not be capable of "observing" anything, no matter how much light it channelled through its pupil, its iris, its rods and cones, or the optic nerve. A "seeing" observation is not a function of light. Instead, it's an interpretation of light patterns detected through the neural matrix by an entity we call the "observer."
This may all be true (or not)... I am not really talking about all these possible interpretations, but I am attempting to point you to what comes before all these thoughts take hold of the experience and turn something very simple into something complex.
It's not merely a difference of
quantity, though, but a difference of
quality. No matter how "complex" the stimuli picked up by the five senses are, they don't even constitute an "experience" without an observer processing them and making them into something. An experience is
qualitatively different from sensors being stimulated. It's actually a different thing.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 3:53 am
f Materialism is true, then there can be no "observer," no consciousness behind cognition.
As I see it, the only "thing" thats true is the basic experience of "taste of apple" (or whatever else is being experienced...) - all the rest is interpretation and will never be true.
I would have to say this isn't so. After all, the same apple may taste bitter to one person and sweet to another -- say if one has just been eating a sugary dessert, and the other just had a steak. So it's not the "taste" itself that is being "true." It's variable. Rather, the difference is being marked by two different observers of exactly the same object.
No matter how "accurate" the conceptual interpretation, it is still infinitely far away from the truth of "taste of apple" - it "exists" actually, in a completely different dimension --> basic reality and conceptual reality never meet (just like left and right will never meet - they can only both vanish and leave you with... no separation and no opposite at all).
This almost sounds Platonic. Plato thought there was a "realm of ideal forms" where the "truth" about things like the taste of apple sort of floated about eternally. I'm sure you don't believe that, but what you just said sounds a lot like Plato.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 3:53 am
If Materialism is true, then conceptual thought itself doesn't exist in reality either.
Sure, conceptual thought exists... [/quote]
Yes, I agree it does. But Materialism holds that that is impossible. "Thought," according to Materialism, is nothing other than the snapping and crackling of neurons in a thing called a "brain." And in this brain, there is no "observer." There is no real-world entity capable of processing and interpreting these things. What there really is, is only the inevitable playing out of the long chain of material causes that exist in the universe. Well, so say the Materialists.
You can think of an apple, but you cannot experience "apple" directly.
This is true.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 3:53 am
It's what philosophers of mind call an "epiphenomenon," which is essentially a word meaning, "weird side effect we Materialists cannot find any adequate way to explain."
Did what I said above, explain it?
If not, I'll try again (if you like)

You have explained what you mean, I agree. I think there are still problems with that view, though, as I have suggested. I wonder what you'll make of those objections.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 3:53 am
I don't find it obvious at all, I must confess. I'm surprised at the confidence of your expression, actually, Alex
Well... look at at an apple and tell me what you actually see.
What you wrote earlier, which I repeat here to refresh out minds was:
The observer and the observation are made/thought up - they actually do not exist anywhere but in conceptual thought.
I guess I could sort of agree with this, if I was sure I understood what you mean by "made up." But I also would say that we all start out assuming Common Sense Realism...that what we see is what we are getting from our senses. We only later discover that's not how it's working.
Kant said there were two real things in play: one was the external world, of which we have no
absolutely correct experience, and the experience that is occasioned by the external world, but is really the observer's processed version of the impressions from the senses. So we have a sort of
relatively correct experience that we get from reality. But even Kant did not separate the external world entirely from the internal observer; after all, with no external world, there would be no internal experience. And the internal experience is largely stimulated by the actual activities of the outside world.
What I'm saying is that the truth is a bit of a tightrope walk between two incorrect beliefs. On one side is the falsehood that we observers see the world as it actually is, in all cases; on the other is the error that nothing we see is real, and reality itself is entirely a matter of interpretation. Both are false. Our experience is
stimulated by, and
dependent on external realities, but is
processed by an internal observer in order to
become an "experience" in the proper sense of that word.
Does that seem in any way close to what you also think?
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 3:53 am
It doesn't seem apparent to me that I can find a way to dismiss things like consciousness, rationality, selfhood, identity, personhood, morality, and so on...all of which are immaterial realities that seem very compelling to me
They are only compelling to you because you have acquired certain knowledge - conceptual knowledge - that gives value to these concepts.
No, I think that's wrong. As I say, we all start out assuming some sort of Common Sense Realism. And these things are all part of the common sense of things. A person who walked around doubting all rationality, his own identity, the personhood of others, or all morality would be the odd fish in the school. Surely that's apparent. So nobody taught us about these things: they were intuitive experiences long before we could articulate them all, and they formed our baseline assumptions about the world.
In fact, I never recall anyone ever sitting down with me and explaining consciousness or selfhood to me, let alone rationality. Yet I was using all these things long before I went to school. And long before I could explain why, I had a sense of morality being in the world...if only because I knew darn well when I was being deceptive or selfish, even as a tiny child. Everybody's got a conscience.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 3:53 am
It's not clear to me that that OP wording makes any sense...
Yes, maybe it could have been said differently, but hey... this is true for all statements.[/quote]
In philosophy, though, we try to fix this after-the-fact. If we misspeak, we try to correct. If we explain badly, we try to refine.
And part of that process has to be to accept justified critique from other people who detect better than we do, sometimes, when we have misspoken or miscommunicated. I think this OP does that, and I'd like to see the poster explain what he really meant, using better words, so I can understand it properly and give a fairer response.
As worded, it's actually insufficiently clear.
I welcome any further thoughts you have on any of the above, Alex.