Londoner wrote: ↑Sun Jul 09, 2017 11:50 am
Incorrect in that you think the Ontological Argument (Anselm etc.) works? Or incorrect in that other proofs of God do not often amount to the same thing, i.e. proving the existence of God from a predicate of God?
Oh, about both, actually...but much more easily verifiably about the second than the first.
I don't know that I can offer anything new. I had the impression that philosophy has already has given adequate reasons why the Ontological Argument does not work; I am happy with them, and have not attempted to think up any new ones of my own.
Well, here's what I have found in regard to the Ontological Argument, just so far as the skeptics are concerned. In general, what they tend to do is to misrepresent the argument
immediately -- usually by arguing as if what the OA is implying is that things which are imagined must therefore become necessarily real, which it is decidedly NOT arguing -- and then by shooting down that misrepresentation, and concluding with some triumphalist note like, "Aha! Now we see how foolish the Theists are!...unicorns...pixies...ta-da!"
If you're under the impression that "philosophy" (unspecified collective? Some unknown group of "philosophers"?) has "already given adequate reasons why the Ontological Argument does not work," then in my experience, you must be referring to some strategy like that, or else to an unexamined belief that
someone somewhere has done such work, even though perhaps you don't know what and where such would actually be. Certainly, I've been unable to locate arguments against the OA that are not flawed in one of these two sorts of ways.
Of course, that sort of strategy doesn't amount to much except a warm blanket for the Atheists to wrap themselves in. They find that sort of demonstration reassuring; but this is because they were only interested in thinking to the point at which they could unilaterally declare a "win" in the first place, and not in engaging a substantial version of the OA at all. But actually, they've conceptually misrepresented both the nature of the concept of "Supreme Being" and the implications of the argument itself. Naturally, those Theists who are more aware of the argument tend to be unimpressed.
I'd just like to see if you've got anything interesting by way of an objection, something more than what I suggest above. Should I understand your implication to be that this is not the case? That would be disappointing, if not entirely impossible to anticipate.