Re: Christianity
Posted: Thu Jan 19, 2023 2:22 pm
This seems to be the position that most of us take. Since as it happens (again most of us) cannot, even if we wished to, fit ourselves back into a genuine and a fully operative religious position (i.e. the way of seeing and understanding reality as the Scholastics saw it.Harbal wrote: ↑Thu Jan 19, 2023 11:08 am I think that morality should be practiced for its own sake, and that it is its own reward. You seem to have the view that pleasing God is the reason for practicing it. You also seem to think it matters which one of those reasons we choose for behaving morally, whereas I don’t. I think my reason is more credit worthy, but as long as we do behave morally, I don’t think our reason for doing it is too important.
Let us be clear and honest here: Immanuel Can, the primary protagonist in this thread, is working like the Devil to re-establish a view that mirrors the internal content of Scholasticism. But he cannot come out and just say it perhaps because he cannot actually see it. Strangely, he must veil his core propaganda assertions in false-intellectualism.
Be that as it may we have another issue to confront: the origin of our own 'moral systems'. What I have often said about Monsieur Harbal is that he seems to be unaware of his own *formation*. What made him him. He is cut off from all of this except insofar as he is an *outcome* of long and complex processes. Now, someone like Uwot is far more *prepared* in this sense because he has studied the evolution of ideas in depth. But Harbal is interesting because he is an outcome without, necessarily, having become a participant or co-creator in his outcomedom. That is why the avatar of Alfred Newman is so illustrative.
But the thing is that we do all of us exist within a 'system of morals' that has been worked out over, literally, centuries. I am embarrassed to resort to Spark Notes of the second chapter of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals to encapsulate what I mean:
We have been so 'punished' over such long periods of time that finally the way we behave -- and our morals -- is installed in us at a level below actual thought.Nietzsche opens the second essay by examining the significance of our ability to make promises. To hold to a promise requires both a powerful memory--the will that a certain event should not be forgotten--and a confidence about the future and one's ability to hold to the promise in the future. This confidence demands that, on some level, we must make ourselves calculable or predictable, and for a people to be predictable, they must share a common set of laws or customs that govern their behavior.
Society and morality thus serve the purpose of making us predictable, which in turn serves the purpose of allowing us to make promises. This complicated process has as its end the "sovereign individual" who is able to make promises, not because he is bound by social mores but because he is master of his own free will. The sovereign individual is then faced with the tremendous responsibility of being free to make claims regarding his own future: we call this sense of responsibility a "conscience.
"Guilt," in its present incarnation, is associated with accountability and responsibility: you are guilty because you could have and should have done otherwise. Accountability and responsibility, which are connected with the concept of free will, are in no way connected with "guilt" as it was originally conceived. "Guilt," according to Nietzsche, originally meant simply that a debt needed to be paid. As Nietzsche remarks in section 13 of the first essay, "free will" is a recent invention that accompanies slave morality.
Punishment, according to slave morality, is then meted out because, and only because the offender could have acted otherwise. If someone is for whatever reason deemed not to have acted freely (insanity, duress, accident, etc.) they are not punished.
Nietzsche's conception of the ancient world is far crueler, but, he suggests, far more "cheerful." People were punished simply because it was fun to punish people. If you fail to keep your promise to me, at least I get the pleasure of beating you up. Here we see the original association of "guilt" with "debt." Guilt was seen as a debt to be paid: if you make a promise, you are in debt to me. If you fail to keep your promise, you must pay off the debt in some other way. If that "other way" is my gouging your eye out, there are no hard feelings afterward, and there is no sense of a corrective measure being taken. There is simply an agreement that now our debts are settled and we can go our different ways.
For this reason what Harbal says:
Is interesting because in order for someone to behave morally there had to have occurred a long long process of instilling that sense of rightness, or of simple compliance, with a standard. In the Occident that occurred over centuries.but as long as we do behave morally, I don’t think our reason for doing it is too important.
It is fair to say that when the former education systems break down (as indeed they are) and we are no longer educated in the classic Great Books tradition, that we fall away from all the material that instructs us in morals.