Philosophy Now Forum

"Some of your actions are involuntary for instance breathing, spinal reflexes, and digesting food."

A great many of my functions are involuntary, and they all conspire to give rise to 'me' who uses the substance that is me, with all those autonomic functions, to do what 'I' choose.

#

"Are you aware that your consciously aware reasonings and choices occur after your brain has involuntarily 'decided' ?"

Really, you need to go and read what Libet himself said about his work and not rely on sci-popularizers with agendas.

Libet said his work in no way discounts free will, and he said this even before his time delay experiments were deeply questioned and found wanting.

Bottom line: anticipation is not synonomous with 'involuntary decision'. Anticipation is just anticipation.

Henry Quirk wrote:

Libet said his work in no way discounts free will, and he said this even before his time delay experiments were deeply questioned and found wanting.

But Libet was not a philosopher by profession.You yourself are honest and direct but you are nonetheless mistaken about the philosophical implications of Free Will.

I don't know the balance of the Libet argument. But I can say to you that Free Will must be the only human faculty that has no correlate in the human body. How can this be, Henry?
I'll tell you how it can be that Free Will can exist and yet have no anatomical correlate. It's because Free Will is supernatural not natural. Free Will is the special gift to humans from God which allows humans to supervene the causality to which all the rest of creation is subject.

In the olden days of Greece and Rome they believed in gods. These gods were powers to which human lives were subject, and the powers made humans fatalistic in their helplessness. The Abrahamic God took over from the old gods of polytheism. God now had all the powers that the old gods formerly shared among themselves, and Free Willism took the place of fatalism.

Now, we have understood nature to the extent that we need neither fatalism nor Free Willism.

I am sure, Henry, that with only a little intellectual nudging, that you a clear thinker and a practical man, would come to the understanding that Free Willo is not .

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 11:20 am Free Will must be the only human faculty that has no correlate in the human body. How can this be, Henry?

This is incorrect, of course. "Will" is a property of the thing we call "mind," which has a corresponding physiological structure known as the "brain."

Since we know that correlation is not causality, there is no indicator that brain causes mind, any more than we are assured thereby that mind causes brain: only that the two seem synchronized in some key ways. But we can certainly say there is a physiological correlate.

In the olden days of Greece and Rome they believed in gods. These gods were powers to which human lives were subject, and the powers made humans fatalistic in their helplessness.

You should read Plato, or even better, The Odyssey. That wasn't how ancient Greeks saw the situation. Instead of being fatalists, they looked for ways to "navigate" among the competing interests of the supposed "gods." In fact, that's why they had things like oracles, or in some places, witch doctors and priests; to help them map the uneven course among the supernatural entities to which they ascribed the various phenomena. They certainly did not simply resign themselves to whatever lot they had.

The Abrahamic God took over from the old gods of polytheism. God now had all the powers that the old gods formerly shared among themselves, and Free Willism took the place of fatalism.

This isn't how it happened either. The Abrahamic God supplanted the old gods, and completely changed the situation. For the first time, formerly polytheistic people could expect regularity and law-likeness from nature, since there was a single Supreme Being instead of the quarrelling nonsense of the former "gods." This meant that free will also gained the ability to predict regularities in nature, which it never would have had in a polytheistic universe -- for there, the gods disagree about all kinds of things, have moods, fight, get in a huff, fall in love with mortals, and so on.

Now, we have understood nature to the extent that we need neither fatalism nor Free Willism.

The only reason we have understood nature is that we came to expect these law-based regularities in it. And the reason we did that, according to A.N. Whitehead's thesis, is because we had one God instead of the quarrelling masses of gods. Theism made science possible, in other words. And science is predicated on the possibility of us making the universe intelligible, which presupposes free will.

If Determinism were true, the answer to every causal question would simply be, "Because that's the way it was predetermined to happen." Not a very complex science, that.

Immanuel Can wrote pretty well on the whole but erred as follows:

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 11:20 am
Free Will must be the only human faculty that has no correlate in the human body. How can this be, Henry?
(IC objected)This is incorrect, of course. "Will" is a property of the thing we call "mind," which has a corresponding physiological structure known as the "brain."

Since we know that correlation is not causality, there is no indicator that brain causes mind, any more than we are assured thereby that mind causes brain: only that the two seem synchronized in some key ways. But we can certainly say there is a physiological correlate.

True, correlation is not causation. We also agree that there is a physiological correlate. I also agree that there is no reason to believe that brain causes mind or indeed that mind causes brain. I believe that it's entirely reasonable that brain and mind are aspects of the same brain-mind. Or if you prefer, mind , and brain, are two ways in which we conceive of the same thing.

Where we disagree is that Immanuel Can, and presumably Henry Quirk, think that there is a component of mind i.e. will which is outwith the normal causes and effects that apply to brain/mind. But I disagree with this and I hold that Free Will is a theological invention which feeds upon our normal feeling that some of our choices are free from compulsion.

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 5:22 pm Where we disagree is that Immanuel Can, and presumably Henry Quirk, think that there is a component of mind i.e. will which is outwith the normal causes and effects that apply to brain/mind.

That's generally accurate, but not quite, I would say. We have not established that cause-and-effect is the complete reason for the human will.

That's how I'd put it.

We do know that the will has to work within some material conditions; for example, if I have no horse, I cannot choose to ride one. However, if I do have one, I can choose to ride or not. My legs may be sore, inducing me to ride, or I may want exercise, which argues for walking. However, neither the pain in my legs nor my desire for exercise can be said to "make" me choose one or the other. Rather, I consider my wishes and conditions, and make choices that my will desires. I may say, "My legs are sore, but I do need some exercise." I may weigh the alternatives, and make a free choice. So there are material criteria involved, but in no absolute sense do they "determine" the outcome of my deliberation. At the end of the day, I choose.

And that sort of choice, the second kind, is the kind that's open for debate. That is to say, if I have no material limits that prevent me from making a choice, am I free to choose, or will even my choice to ride be predetermined merely by my material preconditions? I say that I have freedom to choose. Determinism holds that I don't, and my impression that I do is merely an illusion.

But I disagree with this and I hold that Free Will is a theological invention which feeds upon our normal feeling that some of our choices are free from compulsion.

But question this "feeling." It's very existence is a Deterministic conundrum.

Why would evolution or material causality arrange things so that we have a "normal feeling that some of our choices are free from compulsion" (to use your words), when that "feeling" of which you speak merely acts to deprive us of reference to the objective material facts, and thus makes our effectiveness in the world less likely (i.e. produces less survival value) than if we all saw things as they really are, according to you (meaning "Determined") ?

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 5:43 pm We do know that the will has to work within some material conditions; for example, if I have no horse, I cannot choose to ride one. However, if I do have one, I can choose to ride or not. My legs may be sore, inducing me to ride, or I may want exercise, which argues for walking. However, neither the pain in my legs nor my desire for exercise can be said to "make" me choose one or the other. Rather, I consider my wishes and conditions, and make choices that my will desires. I may say, "My legs are sore, but I do need some exercise." I may weigh the alternatives, and make a free choice. So there are material criteria involved, but in no absolute sense do they "determine" the outcome of my deliberation. At the end of the day, I choose.

Right. This is called compatibilist free will, which requires determinism. It is different from the agent-causal libertarian free will that Henry raised.

davidm wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 6:14 pm Right. This is called compatibilist free will, which requires determinism. It is different from the agent-causal libertarian free will that Henry raised.

Compatibilism is actually a very poor coinage. Really, it is a bit of a misnomer, precisely because, as you say, it "requires Determinism." Thus Determinism, in Compatibilism, is not genuinely compatible with free will at all.

Compatibilism is not the mere observation that there are some material-caused conditions (like owning a horse) that limit the range of free will choices; everybody concedes that, on all sides. There's no such thing as choices that occur within no range limits. But to recognize that is not Compatibilism; rather, Compatibilism is the belief that Determinism is the only deep truth, and that the free will bit is just a "seeming" or "appearance of things," with no reality to it. It's a backhanded wave to free will, with Determinism being given the final word.

I'm with Henry, not with Compatibilism.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 8:40 pm

davidm wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 6:14 pm Right. This is called compatibilist free will, which requires determinism. It is different from the agent-causal libertarian free will that Henry raised.

Compatibilism is actually a very poor coinage. Really, it is a bit of a misnomer, precisely because, as you say, it "requires Determinism." Thus Determinism, in Compatibilism, is not genuinely compatible with free will at all.

Compatibilism is not the mere observation that there are some material-caused conditions (like owning a horse) that limit the range of free will choices; everybody concedes that, on all sides. There's no such thing as choices that occur within no range limits. But to recognize that is not Compatibilism; rather, Compatibilism is the belief that Determinism is the only deep truth, and that the free will bit is just a "seeming" or "appearance of things," with no reality to it. It's a backhanded wave to free will, with Determinism being given the final word.

I'm with Henry, not with Compatibilism.

Well, I'm kind of with Henry too, but the above is handwaving away the compatiblist thesis without giving it a fair hearing. A belief in what I would call quasi-libertarianism, which is what I subscribe to, does not require a renunciation of a materialist world view.

davidm wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 8:47 pm ...the above is handwaving away the compatiblist thesis without giving it a fair hearing.

It's not, actually. I've run into Compatibilism before, as a subcategory of a theology known as Calvinism, and have dismissed it for some of the reasons I've given, and for some other theological ones as well.

It's not plausible to me. I understand it, but I don't think it works.

...does not require a renunciation of a materialist world view.

I would say that the point of a worldview is for it to function as an accurate description the world; and really, there's no virtue in holding onto a particular worldview when it fails to give the best description of known reality. Better to renounce such a thing.

Immanuel Can wrote:

We do know that the will has to work within some material conditions; for example, if I have no horse, I cannot choose to ride one. However, if I do have one, I can choose to ride or not. My legs may be sore, inducing me to ride, or I may want exercise, which argues for walking. However, neither the pain in my legs nor my desire for exercise can be said to "make" me choose one or the other. Rather, I consider my wishes and conditions, and make choices that my will desires. I may say, "My legs are sore, but I do need some exercise." I may weigh the alternatives, and make a free choice. So there are material criteria involved, but in no absolute sense do they "determine" the outcome of my deliberation. At the end of the day, I choose.

But there are some events that we are embroiled in which do pretty well determine how we choose to act. If your horse bolts with you on it you don't have a serious choice but to cling on to it for dear life as it's usually more dangerous to throw yourself off. However I accept that many if not most events are such that with all the knowledge and reasoning in the world we cannot entirely predict the outcome and at this juncture you say that Free Will kicks in. "At the end of the day I choose". Okay. You say that you choose of your Free Will: I say that your choice is a random choice and you may as well toss a coin.

And that sort of choice, the second kind, is the kind that's open for debate. That is to say, if I have no material limits that prevent me from making a choice, am I free to choose, or will even my choice to ride be predetermined merely by my material preconditions? I say that I have freedom to choose. Determinism holds that I don't, and my impression that I do is merely an illusion.

This is voluntarism(the basic argument for compatibilism) an attempt to reconcile Free Will with determinism. I agree with Immanuel that it is a feeble attempt at reconciliation.It won't work because what Immanuel desires with his body, mind, and well developed soul, he is caused by circumstances to so desire.

However, if Immanuel has a good horse at his disposal, he can ride it, he may ride it, there are no ideological grounds for not riding it, and he desires to ride it, and he is extremely knowledgeable and gifted with plenty of reasoning power, then Immanuel has more freedom of choices than some other man who cannot afford to keep an expensive animal, who cannot ride, who is prevented by his employer from sitting on a horse, who has been taught that riding is evil, and who lacks knowledge and reasoning power. Immanuel can and Immanuel can swap his horse for another he likes better, IC can decide for himself that horse riding is bad for the soul, IC can defer his ride until tomorrow, IC can and so on. Freedom is relative to who possesses it. Freedom is not a supernatural absolute which as a man you have or as a horse or an idiot you don't have.

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 9:41 pm But there are some events that we are embroiled in which do pretty well determine how we choose to act. If your horse bolts with you on it you don't have a serious choice but to cling on to it for dear life as it's even more dangerous to throw yourself off.

No, that isn't true. In that situation, the rider can take the more dangerous option if he/she wishes.

You say that you choose of your Free Will: I say that your choice is a random choice and you may as well toss a coin.

Not so. For it has implications. If you believe there IS no free will, you won't make a choice at all. You can't.

And by the way, in a Determined universe, the coin will always come down on the side it was always fated to. You may as well NOT toss a coin, then.

...what Immanuel desires with his body, mind, and well developed soul, he is caused by circumstances to so desire.

So you say.

But apparently, I'm not predetermined to believe it.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 9:52 pm

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 9:41 pm But there are some events that we are embroiled in which do pretty well determine how we choose to act. If your horse bolts with you on it you don't have a serious choice but to cling on to it for dear life as it's even more dangerous to throw yourself off.

No, that isn't true. In that situation, the rider can take the more dangerous option if he/she wishes.

You say that you choose of your Free Will: I say that your choice is a random choice and you may as well toss a coin.

Not so. For it has implications. If you believe there IS no free will, you won't make a choice at all. You can't.

And by the way, in a Determined universe, the coin will always come down on the side it was always fated to.

Determinism isn't fatalism.

You may as well NOT toss a coin, then.

Right and if you don't toss it, fatalism is false.

Immanuel can wrote:

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 9:41 pm
But there are some events that we are embroiled in which do pretty well determine how we choose to act. If your horse bolts with you on it you don't have a serious choice but to cling on to it for dear life as it's even more dangerous to throw yourself off.
IC replied:No, that isn't true. In that situation, the rider can take the more dangerous option if he/she wishes.

If the rider chose the more dangerous option he would have been deranged. IYO does Free Will operate for a madman?

By the way, when you , Immanuel, say "choice" you imply free choice. When I say "choice" I imply a behaviour which is so common that we hardly notice it. Let's imagine a man studying a breakfast menu. The man takes some time to decide what to order. The mental activity in which the man is engaged is choosing, or making a choice. The choice may be random if say the menu is in Chinese, or it may be be a caused choice. To say that the breakfaster's Free Will was involved would be to oppose the famous edict of William of Ockham.

davidm wrote: ↑Sun Nov 19, 2017 12:48 am

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 9:52 pm You may as well NOT toss a coin, then.

Right and if you don't toss it, fatalism is false.

So that form of fatalism is to toss the coin and allow the coin toss to determine the decision. Otherwise you can choose to make your own decision, which is not fatalism.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Nov 18, 2017 9:52 pm But apparently, I'm not predetermined to believe it.

I like that.