nihilism

[iambiguous]

Well, he will say that it's not objectivism because he doesn't insist that others believe what he does ("or else").

No, I will say that given my own rooted existentially in dasein frame of mind "here and now", objectivists are individuals who believe that they are in sync with their own truly Intrinsic Self. A sounder Self then able -- re God or No God -- to grasp The Right Thing To Do morally, politically and/or spiritually.

And, irony or ironies here, not only do I not insist others are obligated to think as I do regarding meaning, morality and metaphysics, but I am actually hoping that perhaps one day I will encounter a substantive argument able to convince me that I can perhaps manage to yank myself up out of this fucking hole I'm in.

In other words, that I am quite mistaken in believing that...

1] my own existence is essentially meaningless and purposeless
2] that human morality in a No God world revolves largely around a fractured and fragmented assessment of right and wrong rooted existentially in dasein.
3] that oblivion is not awaiting any of us when er die.

Go ahead, give it a try.

Although he often mocks, ridicules and responds with incredulity to anyone who does not believe what he believes.

Note to others:

To the extent he actually does believe this...? A "condition"?

The endless repetition of his views is also not 'insisting'.

Let's try to pin this down. What is, perhaps, more pathetic, someone inclined to iteration here or someone inclined to keep reading what he or she posts.

And for over a decade now!

[phyllo]

No, I will say that given my own rooted existentially in dasein frame of mind "here and now", objectivists are individuals who believe that they are in sync with their own truly Intrinsic Self. A sounder Self then able -- re God or No God -- to grasp The Right Thing To Do morally, politically and/or spiritually.

What do you think of that IWP?

I see him putting the 'objectivist label' on individuals who never claimed to "believe that they are in sync with their own truly Intrinsic Self. A sounder Self then able -- re God or No God -- to grasp The Right Thing To Do morally, politically and/or spiritually."

And even if Iambiguous is completely correct ... what's the problem with a person who believes that he is in synch with an intrinsic self? Why would such a person (or people) deserve to be repeatedly vilified and attacked?

[iambiguous]

No, I will say that given my own rooted existentially in dasein frame of mind "here and now", objectivists are individuals who believe that they are in sync with their own truly Intrinsic Self. A sounder Self then able -- re God or No God -- to grasp The Right Thing To Do morally, politically and/or spiritually.

And, irony of ironies here, not only do I not insist others are obligated to think as I do regarding meaning, morality and metaphysics, but I am actually hoping that perhaps one day I will encounter a substantive argument able to convince me that I can perhaps manage to yank myself up out of this fucking hole I'm in.

In other words, that I am quite mistaken in believing that...

1] my own existence is essentially meaningless and purposeless
2] that human morality in a No God world revolves largely around a fractured and fragmented assessment of right and wrong rooted existentially in dasein.
3] that oblivion is not awaiting any of us when er die

Go ahead, give it a try.

What do you think of that IWP?

I see him putting the 'objectivist label' on individuals who never claimed to "believe that they are in sync with their own truly Intrinsic Self. A sounder Self then able -- re God or No God -- to grasp The Right Thing To Do morally, politically and/or spiritually."

Okay, back to the part whereby, given particular sets of circumstances, he is able to explain to us how the three points I raise above are not applicable to him. And all I can do is to keep pointing out that if there is such a substantive argument, I wouldn't hesitate to go deeper in exploring it.

And even if Iambiguous is completely correct ... what's the problem with a person who believes that he is in synch with an intrinsic self? Why would such a person (or people) deserve to be repeatedly vilified and attacked?

Well, the problem as "I" construe it "here and now" is not that I believe those who have come to embody an Intrinsic Self ought to be vilified and attacked, but that, so far, I have not been able to come upon an argument that convinces me otherwise. That their own One True Path commands an "or else" frame of mind.

Also, the problem with objectivism as I now understand it revolves almost entirely around those who do append an "or else" in their Scripture or their political ideology or their assessment of nature.

[phyllo]

Back to the part where those 3 points have absolutely nothing to do with objectivism or the dangers of objectivism.

[iambiguous]

Back to the part where those 3 points have absolutely nothing to do with objectivism or the dangers of objectivism.

Well, they would have everything to do with objectivism if I were to insist that all rational men and women were obligated to agree with me about them.

Or else.

Instead, I'm here in part hoping that others might be able to provide me with a frame of mind that actually makes them go away.

So, again, how are these assumptions...

1] that my own existence is essentially meaningless and purposeless
2] that human morality in a No God world revolves largely around a fractured and fragmented assessment of right and wrong rooted existentially in dasein
3] that oblivion is awaiting us when we die

...not applicable to you?

And that, in fact, is where, in my view, the danger of objectivism comes in. It might revolve around theocracy or fascism or communism or any other "my way or the highway" rendition of the One True Path.

[phyllo]

Can anyone explain to me where he got this conclusion from what he wrote ? ...

And that, in fact, is where, in my view, the danger of objectivism comes in. It might revolve around theocracy or fascism or communism or any other "my way or the highway" rendition of the One True Path.

[iambiguous]

Can anyone explain to me where he got this conclusion from what he wrote ? ...

And that, in fact, is where, in my view, the danger of objectivism comes in. It might revolve around theocracy or fascism or communism or any other "my way or the highway" rendition of the One True Path.

How about human history to date? And, ominously enough, some suggest the world we live in today is becoming increasingly less democratic. Though admittedly, in my view, it's not the moral and political objectivists that are bringing this about so much as the Vladimir Putins and the Xi Jinpings and the Donald Trumps.

And I have always been the first to acknowledge the threat that moral nihilism poses. The sociopath, for example. But it's the amoral "show me the money" folks who run the world that now pose the greater threat.

[iambiguous]

Epistemic Nihilism
Reflections on The Abyss That Divides Us…
John Timothy Manalaysay

Here’s how I would answer my teenage self-regarding this problem [above]: Knowledge and reality emerge through interrelated interactions between things and people.

One or another rendition of the Benjamin Button Syndrome? There's just the distinction I then make between these interactions in the either/or world and in the is/ought world.

Most things have emerged from and are dependent on lower processes. Reality is based on your relationship to different things out there in the world. Language is just another layer of reality which is dependent upon lower processes but still has its own sets of rules and can still influence the lower processes it is dependent on.

The lower processes? Biological imperatives, perhaps? And, in my view, reality is based on our own existential relationship to all of the different things out there in the world. Relationships we can pin down objectively and relationships we acquire and sustain existentially given either one or another One True Path or one or another rendition of moral nihilism.

In this sense, knowledge is constructed relationally, which is socially. Things such as propositions, justifications and rationalizations are the product of the social nature of language.

All of which are intertwined in ever evolving historical and cultural interactions.

[iambiguous]

Towards a response to epistemic nihilism
Jake Wright

Epistemic nihilism

I take epistemic nihilism to be the rejection of truth as an intrinsic or instrumental good. Often, discussions employing the term focus on at least the view that knowledge via universal epistemic principles is unobtainable...

On the other hand, as with all assessments pertaining to human knowledge, what is most crucial, in my view, is not what we claim to know "in our heads" about whatever reality may or may not be, but the gap between what we claim to know and all that there is to be known about existence itself. God or No God. That's why over and again I suggest that at the very least attempts must be made to demonstrate why all reasonable men and women are obligated to know this or that.

And this certainly does not exclude epistemology itself, right?

...sometimes accompanied by further claims—for example, Nietzsche’s claim that knowledge would not be useful if it were obtainable or Rorty’s claim that epistemology as an enterprise is fatally flawed and should be dismantled.

Of course, those like Nietzsche and Rorty are in the same boat all the rest of us are in. Unless, perhaps, someone here is able to demonstrate to us why their own assessments really are the exceptions? And not just theoretically but for all practical purposes.

When I use the term epistemic nihilism, however, I do not mean to suggest cases where a speaker believes that truth is unobtainable or cannot be adjudicated using universal principles, and I take epistemology generally to be a fruitful endeavor.

From my frame of mind, this would seem to be more in sync with such fantastic assumptions as sim worlds or dream worlds. "It's a radical form of skepticism that claims there's no reason to believe anything, including the view itself."

So, right from the start proponents of epistemic nihilism would seem to be acknowledging there is no reason to believe even this. Instead, it would seem that one would need God or God's equivalent given an ontological/teleological explanation for the universe itself.

Further, though I will not argue for it here, I accept a correspondence view of truth that accepts claims as true insofar as they align with an actual state of affairs in the world.

Let's call this the...either/or world?

[Iwannaplato]

On the other hand, as with all assessments pertaining to human knowledge, what is most crucial, in my view, is not what we claim to know "in our heads" about whatever reality may or may not be, but the gap between what we claim to know and all that there is to be known about existence itself. God or No God. That's why over and again I suggest that at the very least attempts must be made to demonstrate why all reasonable men and women are obligated to know this or that.

Note the contradiction.

If one wants to be a skeptic, one doesn't get to pontificate without contradiction. But the temptation is very hard for most skeptics to resist. And here, must, even carries a moral certainty also, not just an epistemic one.

[iambiguous]

Towards a response to epistemic nihilism
Jake Wright

Perhaps the closest use of the term to my own is Arendt’s view of nihilism as ‘a way of thinking that can look rational but is really an attack on the purpose of rationality’.

Again, for those of my ilk, it all comes down to just how far out on the metaphysical limb it's taken. In other words, in the vicinity of sim worlds or dream worlds or solipsism? Sure, if someone is actually able to demonstrate that all knowledge is illusory, let them give it a try.

In the interim, I'm sticking with the rooted existentially in dasein assumption that knowledge embedded in the laws of nature, in mathematics, in the empirical world around us, in the rules of language, etc., while still profoundly mysterious given The Gap and Rummy's Rule, are clearly less illusory [to me] than knowledge that is claimed to be objective regarding conflicting value judgments.

There's what a doctor either knows or does not know about performing safe abortions. And then there's what ethicists claim to know about the nature of human morality itself here.

Click, of course.

As I discuss cases of epistemic nihilism, a common thread that emerges is the obscurance of truth because the truth is not valuable to the speaker who is attempting to influence their interlocutor’s rational deliberations.

Come on, how is this not far, far, far more pertinent to moral and political and religious conflagrations. Whose truth, after all?

This section examines such nihilism by considering the similarities between three exemplars of nihilistic speech—lying, bullshitting, and trolling—as well as the advantages of viewing activities like these as tokens of a larger type.

Right, that's really all that nihilists ever pursue given their interactions with others...lying, bullshitting and trolling. Now let the epistemic nihilists among us note how, what they think they know about this themselves, is...illusory>

Though, yes, I may simply be misunderstanding what this...

"Epistemic nihilism, as it is termed, is committed to the claim that there are no epistemic facts. It is argued that this type of view yields a radical type of scepticism, according to which there is no reason to believe the view itself or anything else, for that matter." Oxford Academic

...does mean for all practical purposes.

I also discuss how epistemic nihilism can transcend individual instances and become an identity or way of life, which has implications for how we ought to respond when combatting extreme cases of such nihilism.

How on Earth can someone go about the business of living life from day to day without being pretty damn certain that they know lots and lots of things. Things that have been a part of their lives for years, or even decades.

[iambiguous]

On the other hand, as with all assessments pertaining to human knowledge, what is most crucial, in my view, is not what we claim to know "in our heads" about whatever reality may or may not be, but the gap between what we claim to know and all that there is to be known about existence itself. God or No God.

If one wants to be a skeptic, one doesn't get to pontificate without contradiction.

I have no idea what this has to do with my own understanding of moral nihilism. And pontification, in my view, is far, far more indicative of those who do insist that their own understanding of meaning, morality and metaphysics is, in fact, the only One True Path that any serious philosopher ought to consider.

And trust me, when one becomes as fractured and fragmented as "I" am in regard even to my own assessment of nihilism, confusion, uncertainty and contradictory thinking are sometimes par for the course. After all, "here and now" I would never deny that my own conclusions here are rooted existentially in dasein. That is until someone is able to demonstrate to me how in regard to their own value judgments that is not the case at all.

But the temptation is very hard for most skeptics to resist. And here, must, even carries a moral certainty also, not just an epistemic one.

My own must here revolves only around the assumption that given the hole "I" have dug myself down into philosophically...

1] that my own existence is essentially meaningless and purposeless
2] that human morality in a No God world revolves largely around a fractured and fragmented assessment of right and wrong rooted existentially in dasein
3] that oblivion is awaiting all of us when we die

...I'll need more than just someone's assurance that what they claim to believe or to know or to think about these things "in their heads" "here and now" really need be as far as they go

[Iwannaplato]

On the other hand, as with all assessments pertaining to human knowledge, what is most crucial, in my view, is not what we claim to know "in our heads" about whatever reality may or may not be, but the gap between what we claim to know and all that there is to be known about existence itself. God or No God.

If one wants to be a skeptic, one doesn't get to pontificate without contradiction.[/quote]

I have no idea what this has to do with my own understanding of moral nihilism. And pontification, in my view, is far, far more indicative of those who do insist that their own understanding of meaning, morality and metaphysics is, in fact, the only One True Path that any serious philosopher ought to consider.

I highlighted the word MUST. It indicates no swing room for something else being the case. I don't know how I could have made this more clear.

[iambiguous]

Towards a response to epistemic nihilism
Jake Wright

It takes no great imagination to see how lying constitutes epistemic nihilism. The goal of a lie is to convince one’s interlocutor to believe a falsehood spoken by the liar because their belief in that falsehood would advantage the speaker in some way.

On the other hand, epistemologically or otherwise, how exactly would someone go about knowing this for sure? And where does this..

"Epistemic nihilism, as it is termed, is committed to the claim that there are no epistemic facts. It is argued that this type of view yields a radical type of scepticism, according to which there is no reason to believe the view itself or anything else, for that matter."

...fit in here? in other words, forall practical purposes. Any epistemic nihilists here care to go there regarding their own behaviors?

Then the part where, in the is/ought world, "lies" can become little more than personal opinions: "Abortion is immoral".

Is that a lie?

And how would we go about knowing this for sure?

Then the part where lies embedded in the either/or world, i.e. the Sun revolves around the Earth, are known to be lies by those who know such things because they are...astronomers? On the other hand, someone may well just be ignorant of this. They can be set straight. They can, well, know the truth here.

For example, one may lie and deny an extramarital affair, but such a lie would only be successful if the interlocutor (e.g., the speaker’s spouse) believed the lie and presumably would be uttered only if the speaker viewed it as to their advantage.

I'm clearly missing the point here. From my frame of mind, given how I understand epistemic nihilism myself, it's not whether we lie about an extramarital affair, but whether or not we can in fact know this. Let alone know that such behavior is...immoral?

Even white lies—for example, the claim that dinner was delicious when it was not or that one’s dress is attractive when it is not—advantage the speaker at some level, for example by allowing the speaker to seem supportive or to grease the wheels of social cohesion. Thus, the lie requires the recognition that the value of truth is outstripped by the value obtained by others’ belief in one’s falsehood.

Same thing? If one is an epistemic nihilist, he or she claims there are no epistemic facts. They may lie or tell the truth, but what's the difference if ultimately "there is no reason to believe the view itself or anything else, for that matter."

Whereas for moral nihilists of my ilk, the either/or world is bursting at the seams with things we seemingly can in fact know to be applicable to all of us. Morality, on the other hand...

[Iwannaplato]

Towards a response to epistemic nihilism
Jake Wright

It takes no great imagination to see how lying constitutes epistemic nihilism. The goal of a lie is to convince one’s interlocutor to believe a falsehood spoken by the liar because their belief in that falsehood would advantage the speaker in some way.

On the other hand, epistemologically or otherwise, how exactly would someone go about knowing this for sure? And where does this..

"Epistemic nihilism, as it is termed, is committed to the claim that there are no epistemic facts. It is argued that this type of view yields a radical type of scepticism, according to which there is no reason to believe the view itself or anything else, for that matter."

I think the guy is wrong also, though perhaps not for the same reason. I mean, a liar CLEARLY believes there are epistemic facts. To lie means to tell what you think is not true. So, there are assertions that are true and assertions that are false. A liar must believe that. So, a liar cannot possibly be an epistemic nihilist, since for one of those they can't know what a lie would be.