Moral Objectivism
by Michael Huemer
Several relativist theories
Here are a few different things one could believe in order to be a moral relativist:
1. Moral judgements are simply universally in error, i.e., contrary to appearances, nothing is good, right, evil, just, etc. These are concepts without any application.
Contrary to appearances? Tell that to the objectivists. From their frame of mind, what appears to be true
to them in regard to value judgments is true for all of us. So, you either become "one of us" or you are
necessarily wrong. Of course, some here will flat out exclude those of color or homosexuals or feminists or Jews or liberals. They can never be "one of us". And then those who are rather blunt regarding the "or else" part.
2. Moral 'judgements' are not genuine assertions. They don't actually claim anything about the world. Instead, they are mere expressions of emotion, as "Hurray" is an expression of emotion.
Uh, theoretically? Because for all practical purposes the only assertions that are not genuine for the objectivists are those from men and women who are
not "one of us".
3. "X is good" means "I like X."
And, of course, we live in a world bursting at the seams with those who insist instead that they do not like X because it's bad.
4. "x is good" means "x is ordained by my society."
"Ordained" given might makes right, right makes might, or democracy and the rule of law? And that can make all the difference in the world.
5. What people do when they make a moral judgement is to project their subjective mental state out into the world. They confuse their emotions with some object in the world and mistakenly take the feeling in them to be some property of the object. This is the most psychologically sophisticated version of relativism.
Of course, that's where deontology might be broached. In other words, using the tools of philosophy -- of science? -- rational men and women can pin down our actual moral
obligations. Though, again, after thousands of years where's that gotten us?
6. Morals (in the objective sense) are established by convention; i.e., in the same sense in which a society may establish a convention such that certain kinds of pieces of paper are money, or establish conventions such that certain activities constitute marriage, and so on, just so, a society may establish conventions such that certain things are good. Things become good or bad in virtue of conventions.
Same thing. Our conventions or theirs?
With money, however, the pieces of paper themselves are not in dispute. On the other hand, capitalists and socialists have been going at it now for decades regarding, among other things, money and political economy.