What could make morality objective?

[TimeSeeker]

This example is invalid as you cannot actually falsify first person subjective experience so give me a better one

Of course you can! Just like any scientific hypothesis new information can falsify past experience.

I experienced thirst. I go to the fridge. I grab the bottle, but on re-assessment this feeling of thirst is now gone.

Your thirst was falsified by re-assessing your feelings.

[surreptitious57]

Your thirst was falsified by re assessing your feelings

Falsification and feelings do not really go together do they
Science is not interested in how you feel but in what you can actually demonstrate
You can not tell science you are hungry or thirsty as there is no way for it to know

[TimeSeeker]

Falsification and feelings do not really go together do they
Science is not interested in how you feel but in what you can actually demonstrate
You can not tell science you are hungry or thirsty as there is no way for it to know

Tell "science"? Are we talking about the same thing?
I am talking about the scientific method. Hypothesis testing.
Who do I have to demonstrate my thirst to and why?

Falsification is any information that makes me change my mind.

I was thirsty -> was going to drink water -> On re-assessment -> no longer thirsty -> not going to drink water.

[Greta]

Your thirst was falsified by re assessing your feelings

Falsification and feelings do not really go together do they
Science is not interested in how you feel but in what you can actually demonstrate
You can not tell science you are hungry or thirsty as there is no way for it to know

In the old days "mind reading" was done via lie detectors, checking for a dry mouth, body language and so forth (before that they used to throw you in the water and, if you floated you were a witch and if you sank you were innocent). Today, brains scans can reliably reveal sensations and emotions. Hard science carefully tiptoeing into the domain of the subjective that once only the soft sciences and creeds dared to tread.

Given the mind/body connection, though, one would expect increasing attention paid to mental states and emotions in medicone, just as medicos are just starting to appreciate the importance of a healthy microbiome. In the latter case, though, they can do nothing about it aside from telling you to live healthily or suggest those horrid poo pills, which apparently are the most effective treatment for dodgy gut flora available to date.

If this sounds a bit off the beaten track, note that the links between the microbiome and emotions are not yet well understood but are suspected to be significant. Then again, everything impacts on emotions - weather and local environment, money, lurve, work, music, art etc.

[surreptitious57]

Who do I have to demonstrate my thirst to and why

Falsification is any information that makes me change my mind

In science any observation has to be inter subjective in order to eliminate bias
So you may be thirsty but less you can actually demonstrate it it is not scientific
The bar for falsification is higher than just single person subjective interpretation

[TimeSeeker]

In science any observation has to be inter subjective in order to eliminate bias

What bias am I trying to eliminate when I am addressing my thirst?

So you may be thirsty but less you can actually demonstrate it it is not scientific

It is perfectly scientific, evidence-based reasoning.

The fact that you can't read my mind/feelings (and therefore - you have no access to the evidence) is your problem, not mine.

The bar for falsification is higher than just single person subjective interpretation

So I need help to falsify myself now? Who should I ask if I have stopped being thirsty?

[Immanuel Did]

The contention is whether or not morality is objective, subjective, or an undefined third option.

Let's address subjective. If morality was just a construct or 'social convention' one could easily do something autrocious tonight and be without consequence only to be reprimanded the following day.

We all more or less believe certain things are performed without excuse.

Raping and torturing children is inexcusable.

If I am in a debate and my opponent claims that morality is a social convention then I can draw my gun, fire, and prove him correct.

However, if we realize that murder is overtly wrong and is not subjective than I can holster my weapon and win the debate.

The answer seems clear.

[Peter Holmes]

The contention is whether or not morality is objective, subjective, or an undefined third option.

Let's address subjective. If morality was just a construct or 'social convention' one could easily do something autrocious tonight and be without consequence only to be reprimanded the following day.

We all more or less believe certain things are performed without excuse.

Raping and torturing children is inexcusable.

If I am in a debate and my opponent claims that morality is a social convention then I can draw my gun, fire, and prove him correct.

However, if we realize that murder is overtly wrong and is not subjective than I can holster my weapon and win the debate.

The answer seems clear.

Thanks, but I don't think your scenario shows that morality is objective. There's no connection between the source or foundation of morality and the things that people may do, for example whether you do or don't shoot your opponent.

How can 'it is morally wrong to shoot people' be a fact - a true factual assertion? It isn't a falsifiable factual claim at all. It's a value-judgement.

[Immanuel Did]

Re: Peter Holmes

I believe this conversation will always boil down to suppositions, worldviews, and unconscious cognitive biases.

If I follow you correctly you're arguing from a Humean/Positive perspective?

"We know we ought to not shoot (or cause life threatening damage) to others."

Does not translate to:

"It is wrong to shoot (or cause life threatening damage) to others."

Correct?

My contention would be that without what someone would call a standard or "absolute" we cannot know the basis of reality and knowledge.

There are different types or absolutes whether it's laws of thought, moral absolutes, or the uniformity of nature we have some form or idea of what these are (even if we don't personally find them tenable).

Immanuel Kant proposes that ought implies can through the Categorical Imperative.

"For if the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be better human beings."

Kant proposed a three pronged pitchfork in opposition to Hume's fork.

The fact value theory was imbedded in Hume's is - ought problem.

However, Hume extended this to include the logical validity of the natural sciences.

Using Hume's example of Billiard balls Kant puts forward new technical terms to represent new philosophical propositions.

Analytic & synthetic.

Analytic propositions only elucidate words - e.g. Billiard balls are spherical.

Synthetic propositions go beyond this - e.g. The white billiard ball struck so will cause the black ball to go on the direction indicated.

Kant also added two other terms:

A priori: Knowledge he defined as that coming purely from reasoning, independent from experience.

A posteriori: Knowledge as that coming from experience.

For Kant, knowledge came from a synthesis of experience and concepts: without the senses we should not become aware of any object, but without understanding we should form no conception of it.

Kant proposed space and time were given to everyone as a priori pure intuitions. They were absolute - independent of, and preceding impressions.

The issue with Hume's ought - is problem is that it can be exercised upon itself.

"Hume says we ought not to believe is can be defined from oughts."

"IS he saying that?"

The same can be said for the problem of induction. Positivists have great faith that the validity of natural science will produce common and familiar patterns so that the future ought to be like the past.

However, If we cannot agree on an Absolute or standard on which to judge that by there is no reason to infer or suspect uniformity in the natural order. What happens today may not be consistent with what happens tomorrow.

When it comes to whether or not there is an 'objective' or "absolute" morality. The validity of the premise can rest upon an ontological distinction.

That is not to say if we are providing a truth claim all we are trying to exercise is if we have a valid system or framework that may lead us to what we can define as "truth".

Truth being an abstract a priori analytic proposition (since it's not readily found in nature [Can't be frozen, burned, or put under a microscope]) can lead us to an understanding of reality if it coincides with actual experience (synthetic + a priori knowledge).

Kant advances an argument in his earlier work, "The Only Possible Basis For The Demonstration of The Existence of God". He attacks a fundamental understanding about the universe espoused by atomists such as Epicurus and Democritus.

See, atomists (largely what we would call the scientific naturalist perspective) claim that the only knowledge we can obtain is by observation.

Atomists claimed in 500 B.C. that all of reality is composed of atoms. However, there were no microscopes in existence at this time.

So, here we have a philosophy that refutes itself.

The atomist says knowledge can only be obtained by observation (synthetic) but then makes a claim to knowledge not based upon experience (analytic).

Atomists like to loudly boast there is no supernatural however this is a claim that cannot be processed or verified within their worldview.

Atomists will try to maintain that the uniformity of nature (although bewildering) is a property of matter and therefore it is the character of the natural world to be uniform.

When the materialist says,

"The material world is predictable."

"Why?"

"Because it's character is to be predictable."

That's unargued philosophical bias.

Kant has a solution to this problem put forth in his work.

Kant's idealism argues that matter itself contains the principles which give rise to an ordered universe, and this leads us to the concept of God as an Absolute Neccesary Being, which "embraces within itself everything which can be thought by man." "God includes all that is possible or real."

An Absolute Neccesary Being would account for human reasoning, laws of thought, classes of ideas, the uniformity of nature, and absolute morality because "God includes all this possible or real".

Monotheism implies that "man is made in God's image". If that's true it would entail why our minds appeal to laws of thought, laws of logic, and absolute morality (moral law) if they are not our own convention but are in the image of a law-giver. Uniformity has a reason to be uniform if that's the character and mind of God.

So, to put it simply without appealing to the truth of the matter if God is an actual variable to be put into the equation it could account for much of our human experience, understanding, and whether or not there is such a thing as "objective morality".

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Did

If I understand you aright, you're promoting Kantian idealism and monotheism.

I don't think that Kant, any more than Aristotle, showed a way to overcome or dissolve the is-ought barrier.

Whatever facts we deploy to justify moral judgements, they remain judgements - and others can deploy different facts, or re-interpret the same facts, to justify different moral judgements.

And I don't think our longing for foundations for either knowledge or morality means that there are or must be such foundations that can underpin or guarantee either knowledge or morality. (The problem of induction is a metaphysical confection.) An invented god certainly doesn't fit the bill, because a real one couldn't do so anyway. The good wouldn't be good, any more than a fact would be a fact, just because a god says so, or because they emanate from its nature.

We build and repair objective knowledge and moral value on foundations and with materials of our own making. And that doesn't mean that what we build must be shaky.

Our linguistic practices constitute everything we say about everything, including our linguistic practices. There, if anywhere, is our foundation.

[Logik]

Immanuel Did

If I understand you aright, you're promoting Kantian idealism and monotheism.

I don't think that Kant, any more than Aristotle, showed a way to overcome or dissolve the is-ought barrier.

Whatever facts we deploy to justify moral judgements, they remain judgements - and others can deploy different facts, or re-interpret the same facts, to justify different moral judgements.

And I don't think our longing for foundations for either knowledge or morality means that there are or must be such foundations that can underpin or guarantee either knowledge or morality. (The problem of induction is a metaphysical confection.) An invented god certainly doesn't fit the bill, because a real one couldn't do so anyway. The good wouldn't be good, any more than a fact would be a fact, just because a god says so, or because they emanate from its nature.

We build and repair objective knowledge and moral value on foundations and with materials of our own making. And that doesn't mean that what we build must be shaky.

Our linguistic practices constitute everything we say about everything, including our linguistic practices. There, if anywhere, is our foundation.

Your position is incoherent.

The sentence "The Earth revolves around the Sun" is true by correspondence.

What is the truth-value of 'The Earth revolves around the Sun is a fact' ? How would you falsify it?

'Factuality' is a value judgment too.

[Immanuel Did]

Re: Peter Holmes

In Robert Hanna's Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study of Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge.

Robert details that the Analytic-Synthetic distinction is merely an updated version of Hume’s Fork (Most of Kant's work is in reaction to Hume) which in turn is the two-pronged epistemic and cognitive-semantic distinction between:

(i) trivial, merely stipulative, necessary, and a priori “relations of ideas,” and

(ii) substantive, empirical, contingent, and a posteriori “matters of fact.”

But in fact Kant’s original Analytic-Synthetic distinction was a three-pronged pitchfork designed for philosophical digging in the real earth, that is, a threefold epistemic and cognitive-semantic distinction between

(i) logically, conceptually, or weakly metaphysically necessary analytic a priori truths,

(ii) non-logically, essentially non-conceptually, or strongly metaphysically necessary synthetic a priori truths, and

(iii) contingent synthetic a posteriori truths,

Such that the original Kantian Analytic-Synthetic distinction just is the distinction between

(1) truth in virtue of conceptual content, always taken together with some things in the manifestly real
world beyond conceptual content, although never in virtue of those worldly things, and

(2) truth in virtue of things in the manifestly real world beyond conceptual content, via autonomous essentially non-conceptual content, always taken together with some conceptual content, although never in virtue of that content.

To be sure, there were anticipations of the original
Kantian Analytic-Synthentic distinction in the writings of
Locke, Hume, and Leibniz.

But since Kant is the official originator of the original Analytic-Synthetic distinction—in the sense that he was the first to use that terminology, and the first to make it an absolutely central feature of his logic, semantics, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics.

Kant showed that Hume's fork couldn't account for certain epistemological/metaphysical concepts.

The problem of induction although Hume's work grants total understanding of the shortcoming of his own philosophy.

Hume lays down fact-value distinction in his ought-is problem however Hume is manifesting his own metaphysic to explain away causality is at bottom: A metaphysic.

A metaphysic refuting metaphysics, I understand it's mind boggling.

So, Hume takes inductive reasoning and shows why it relies on causality that cannot be 'rationally' justified. However, Hume has just taken something conceptual and applied it to something empirical.

That's a violation of his own metaphysic.

Hilary Putnam among others has pointed out how Hume applies a personal value or 'opinion' to state something empirical or factual.

The very notion of truth is enough to destroy Hume's fork.

Since a truth is an abstract a priori truth that ceases to be conceptual the moment is applies to contingent reality (a priori + synthesized knowledge).

Hume's model although doubting causality also doubts the distinction between facts and values. In asserting his point he has achieved a phyrric victory.

The same could be said of linguistic relativism/determinism (our knowledge is insufficient because of the construct of language) advanced in the sapir-whorf thesis this ideology was advanced by Ludwig Wittgenstein who freely admitted in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that linguistic relativism is self-refuting.

I believe your original question is if objective morality is "possible".

The answer is yes, it is.

However, not within your metaphysic. Your metaphysic denies causality, uniformity, similarity, and immaterial laws (or at least the validity of them).

Within a different metaphysic or "framework" it IS possible to have 'objective' morality.

And this is without evaluating the "truth" of the Analytic-Synthetic system. This is just an exercise in whether there is ANY rationality that could grant us such a thing let alone truth.

The most you could say is you don't adhere or believe in the Idea of God but that says nothing about the truth, value, or worth of such a proposition.

Asserting that God is invented begs the question,

"Is God invented?"

Once again coming from a Humean perspective on this subject will leave you without a rational foundation and an outcome of infinite regress.

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Did

If I understand you aright, you're promoting Kantian idealism and monotheism.

I don't think that Kant, any more than Aristotle, showed a way to overcome or dissolve the is-ought barrier.

Whatever facts we deploy to justify moral judgements, they remain judgements - and others can deploy different facts, or re-interpret the same facts, to justify different moral judgements.

And I don't think our longing for foundations for either knowledge or morality means that there are or must be such foundations that can underpin or guarantee either knowledge or morality. (The problem of induction is a metaphysical confection.) An invented god certainly doesn't fit the bill, because a real one couldn't do so anyway. The good wouldn't be good, any more than a fact would be a fact, just because a god says so, or because they emanate from its nature.

We build and repair objective knowledge and moral value on foundations and with materials of our own making. And that doesn't mean that what we build must be shaky.

Our linguistic practices constitute everything we say about everything, including our linguistic practices. There, if anywhere, is our foundation.

Your position is incoherent.

The sentence "The Earth revolves around the Sun" is true by correspondence.

What is the truth-value of 'The Earth revolves around the Sun is a fact' ? How would you falsify it?

'Factuality' is a value judgment too.

I don't see why my position is incoherent.

A correspondence theory of truth is obviously mistaken: the factual assertion 'snow is white' is true because ... snow is white. That's just the myth of propositions at work - the delusion behind the idea of propositional knowledge: mistaking what we say for the way things are.

And your example is exemplary: 'What is the truth-value of 'The Earth revolves around the Sun is a fact' ? How would you falsify it?' Notice that you don't indicate the propositional (linguistic) nature of the embedded proposition.

What the question means is: Is the factual assertion ' 'the earth orbits the sun' is a true factual assertion' a true or false factual assertion?

Answer: it's true given the way we use those signs. (There's no foundation beneath our linguistic practices.) But we could falsify it by showing that the embedded factual assertion, 'the earth orbits the sun' is false, from which it would follow that the factual assertion 'the factual assertion 'the earth orbits the sun' is true' is false.

Perhaps we can cut to the chase: do you deny the existence or possibility of facts, and so factual truth?

Is your claim - ''Factuality' is a value judgment too. - factually true or false?

[Logik]

A correspondence theory of truth is obviously mistaken the factual assertion 'snow is white' is true because ... snow is white.

Huh? You reject correspondence and then appeal to it in order to justify the truth-value of your assertion?

It seems to me that you are arguing from a position of linguistic prescriptivism, which would be ironic since all prescriptivism is value imposition and therefore - guilty of crossing the is-ought gap.

I don't like the word 'white'. I am going to call it 'chalky' instead.
'Snow is chalky' is true because ... snow is chalky.

This is perfectly coherent from a descriptivist standpoint.

That's just the myth of propositions at work - the delusion behind the idea of propositional knowledge: mistaking what we say for the way things are.

The way things are exists outside of language, and without language.

What the question means is: Is the factual assertion ' 'the earth orbits the sun' is a true factual assertion' a true or false factual assertion?

Answer: it's true given the way we use those signs. (There's no foundation beneath our linguistic practices.) But we could falsify it by showing that the embedded factual assertion, 'the earth orbits the sun' is false, from which it would follow that the factual assertion 'the factual assertion 'the earth orbits the sun' is true' is false.

Similarly - you reject foundationalism yet you appeal to language as foundational?

If there is no foundation beneath our linguistic practices then there is no "way things are". There is only what we say for the way we experience things.

You are a very confused person. Also, you aren't a mind-reader, please refrain yourself from putting words in my mouth.

What the question means is "Given our agreed-upon use of the symbols 'snow' and 'white' then "The snow is white" is a true proposition" when we talk about correspondence because we have agreed on that correspondence.

'The snow is orange' is a false proposition because the word 'orange' does not correspond to the color which we've agreed to call 'white'.

What I don't understand is how you use the sign 'facts'.

Perhaps we can cut to the chase: do you deny the existence or possibility of facts, and so factual truth?

I do not know how to answer metaphysical questions.

I do not deny the existence of truth. As a logical construct within an agreed-upon system for the use of signs for correspondence.

What I do not understand is how you use the sign 'facts' and what it corresponds to. Here is how I propose that we cut to the chase.

Can you give me one example of a "factual truth" and one example of a "non-factual truth". This way I can learn by juxtaposition.

[Peter Holmes]

A correspondence theory of truth is obviously mistaken the factual assertion 'snow is white' is true because ... snow is white.

Huh? You reject correspondence and then appeal to it in order to justify the truth-value of your assertion?

There was supposed to be a colon after 'mistaken', so that what follows shows the mistake of correspondence. I apologise.

It seems to me that you are arguing from a position of linguistic prescriptivism, which would be ironic since all prescriptivism is value imposition and therefore - guilty of crossing the is-ought gap.

I reject linguistic prescriptivism, so I'm not sure why what I'm arguing demonstrates it. I'd be grateful if you can show where I'm going wrong.

I don't like the word 'white'. I am going to call it 'chalky' instead.
'Snow is chalky' is true because ... snow is chalky.

This is perfectly coherent from a descriptivist standpoint.

It may be that what you mean by 'coherence' and what I mean by 'correspondence' are pulling in different directions. My point is that your claim tells us nothing about snow except that we can truly say 'snow is chalky' - as long as it's white chalk we're referring to. Features of reality don't correspond to our ways of describing them. So they can't confirm the truth of what we say about them.

That's just the myth of propositions at work - the delusion behind the idea of propositional knowledge: mistaking what we say for the way things are.

The way things are exists outside of language, and without language.

Agreed. I think there are three things: features of reality; what we believe and know about them, such as that they are the case; and what we say about them, which (classically) can be true or false. Muddling those things up - as a correspondence theory does - is a mistake.

What the question means is: Is the factual assertion ' 'the earth orbits the sun' is a true factual assertion' a true or false factual assertion?

Answer: it's true given the way we use those signs. (There's no foundation beneath our linguistic practices.) But we could falsify it by showing that the embedded factual assertion, 'the earth orbits the sun' is false, from which it would follow that the factual assertion 'the factual assertion 'the earth orbits the sun' is true' is false.

Similarly - you reject foundationalism yet you appeal to language as foundational?

I'm saying that the only foundation to what we say about things is in our linguistic practices. Other kinds of foundationalism, such as empiricism and rationalism, presume to by-pass language and identify the things themselves - which they can't do.

If there is no foundation beneath our linguistic practices then there is no "way things are". There is only what we say for the way we experience things.

Not so. There are features of reality.

You are a very confused person. Also, you aren't a mind-reader, please refrain yourself from putting words in my mouth.

If I did, I apologise, and I'll try to be more careful. I re-phrased your question in order to bring out what I think it means. You can, of course, reject my re-phrasing and show why it's incorrect.

What the question means is "Given our agreed-upon use of the symbols 'snow' and 'white' then "The snow is white" is a true proposition" when we talk about correspondence because we have agreed on that correspondence.

This seems to answer your own question. We can falsify the claim that the assertion 'the snow is white' is true (is a fact) by seeing if it correctly describes snow, given the way we use those signs. So I'm not sure why you asked the question.

As for correspondence, in what ways do the things we call 'snow' and 'white' correspond with the words 'snow' and 'white'. Is this a one-to-one relationship we can examine objectively? Do those things exist independently so that we, as it were, merely have to name them? If there are different ways of categorising things, which there obviously are, because they don't categorise themselves, the notion of correspondence is surely compromised.

'The snow is orange' is a false proposition because the word 'orange' does not correspond to the color which we've agreed to call 'white'.

What I don't understand is how you use the sign 'facts'.

I define a fact as a true factual assertion - merely a linguistic expression. A factual assertion is falsifiable because it claims something about a feature of reality that may not be the case. It's true (a fact) if it correctly describes that feature of reality, given the way we use those words or other signs. Do you have a different definition?

Perhaps we can cut to the chase: do you deny the existence or possibility of facts, and so factual truth?

I do not know how to answer metaphysical questions.

It isn't a metaphysical question. Linguistic expressions are real (physical) things: sounds, marks on paper or screen, gestures, and so on.

I do not deny the existence of truth. As a logical construct within an agreed-upon system for the use of signs for correspondence.

Leaving aside the nature of 'correspondence', and what you mean by 'logical construct' (do you think that's something non-linguistic?), and what you mean by 'the existence of truth', we seem to agree. So I've lost track of why you think I'm a very confused person.

What I do not understand is how you use the sign 'facts' and what it corresponds to. Here is how I propose that we cut to the chase.

Can you give me one example of a "factual truth" and one example of a "non-factual truth". This way I can learn by juxtaposition.

I apologise for the expression 'factual truth', which is too compressed and, arguably, a tautology. Since we agree there are facts - factual assertions that are true given the way we play our conventional games with signs - my OP asked if there are any moral facts - so that morality is objective. Again, I'm afraid I've lost track of your position on this question.