Philosophy Now Forum

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 1:15 pm

anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 1:07 pm
This is just another example in which the 2 things (wind and tornadoes) are both in the same ontological category.

What about a video game? Is a video game the same ontological category as the metal it runs on?

How is a video game an example of emergence?

anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 1:26 pm

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 1:15 pm

anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 1:07 pm
This is just another example in which the 2 things (wind and tornadoes) are both in the same ontological category.

What about a video game? Is a video game the same ontological category as the metal it runs on?

How is a video game an example of emergence?

Literally every possible reason. It's a simulation of another world - none of the individual physical components of a computer on their own can stimulate a world.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:57 pm

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:40 pm

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:38 pm

That's the sort of shit people say when emergence isn't taken seriously.

I'm not sure that's the kind of argument I am thinking of. I am thinking more along the lines of Ghosts aren't physical, therefore they don't exist.

Can you give me an example of when people don't take emergence seriously, an example that fits what you were thinking of?

People who are illusionists about the mind, or illustionists about anything non-fundamental, which is not incredibly common but you see it from time to time among physicalists.

OK, I've run into that. There isn't any actual experience, it's an illusion. Maybe their right about themselves.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 2:26 pm

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:57 pm

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:40 pm I'm not sure that's the kind of argument I am thinking of. I am thinking more along the lines of Ghosts aren't physical, therefore they don't exist.

Can you give me an example of when people don't take emergence seriously, an example that fits what you were thinking of?

People who are illusionists about the mind, or illustionists about anything non-fundamental, which is not incredibly common but you see it from time to time among physicalists.

OK, I've run into that. There isn't any actual experience, it's an illusion. Maybe their right about themselves.

Weird to me to call experience an illustion. Isn't illusion itself an experience? So they're having the illusory experience of experiencing experiences... When in fact in reality they don't have experiences... Yeah, there's something about that that seems silly to me.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 1:28 pm

anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 1:26 pm

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 1:15 pm

What about a video game? Is a video game the same ontological category as the metal it runs on?

How is a video game an example of emergence?

Literally every possible reason. It's a simulation of another world - none of the individual physical components of a computer on their own can stimulate a world.

We've been talking about emergence. In an earlier post I brought this up -

Another problem of emergence is this - how exactly is it that, if emergence is the case, presumably non-experiencing matter is transformed into experiencing matter as a human embryo develops? And to complicate matters, when comparing the development of human embryos and octopus embryos, what is the common element? It's a problem because the human nervous system and the nervous system of an octopus are decidedly different. Assuming that both embryos start out as non-experiencing matter and at some point transform into experiencing matter - what is the common element that both share?

And you suggested that maybe consciousness emerges from unconscious matter like tornadoes emerge from something else less complex. And I can see the point you're making... When considering this definition

"here is a description from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges."

Because tornadoes form when weather systems and other physical stuff becomes more complex. When there is a certain level of complexity - we say "there is a tornado" - and in an earlier stage, there was no tornado - just dust and wind... Again - like an embryo, where presumably, if emergence is the case, before enough complexity was reached, there was nothing that had 1st person experiences, and after a certain amount of complexity was reached, there was. If emergence, we'd look at an earlier stage of the embryo, and we'd say, "those embryonic tissues are not conscious", and then after a certain amount of complexity was reached, we'd say "that is now conscious".

But exactly how is a computer program an example of emergence? What is the earlier, less complex stage, and what is it that has presumably emerged?

anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 10:59 pm
But exactly how is a computer program an example of emergence? What is the earlier, less complex stage, and what is it that has presumably emerged?

The computer program emerges from a hunk of metal with electricity running through it. Less complex stage would be a hunk of metal that isn't a whole computer, just a handful of circuits. One circuit with electricity can't really do anything. A handful of circuits, you actually start to get some emergent thing, logic, you can even start to make simple calculators (that can only add) with some relatively small number of circuits. More and more circuits and you can do more and more complex logic, more and more calculations. Multiply these circuits many times until eventually you get a computer capable of running complex physics stimulations.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sat Oct 05, 2024 5:30 am

anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 10:59 pm
But exactly how is a computer program an example of emergence? What is the earlier, less complex stage, and what is it that has presumably emerged?

The computer program emerges from a hunk of metal with electricity running through it. Less complex stage would be a hunk of metal that isn't a whole computer, just a handful of circuits. One circuit with electricity can't really do anything. A handful of circuits, you actually start to get some emergent thing, logic, you can even start to make simple calculators (that can only add) with some relatively small number of circuits. More and more circuits and you can do more and more complex logic, more and more calculations. Multiply these circuits many times until eventually you get a computer capable of running complex physics stimulations.

This has perhaps been said already in some form, but I was thinking that it might help to also think of submergence. When something that has certain (often more complicated) qualities/abiliites/features degenerates - through damage, aging, entropy, separation/scattering of parts etc.- and the same matter is this new organization (generally, I would guess less organized) no longer has those features/abilities etc. it had before the damage.

A dam made out of bricks falls apart and now we still have bricks with the same qualities, but they no longer constitute something that creates a small resovoir behind it. A book that got soaked and no longer contains information, even if the one has the water it got soaked in and all the ink that ran out - plus pages binding cover, etx. And yes, a computer that got smashed to the point that memory got lost, the parts don't interact except as lumps of metal and plastic - they have crude Newtonian interactions or could - and all those functions that emerged in its making are not longer present.

Anyway that helps me think of the idea.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Sat Oct 05, 2024 9:49 am

true true, good point

Any Western philosophy argument about consciousness is useless. Fact is: human consciousness is a soft emergence and phenomenal consciousness has nothing to do with emergence.

Consciousness is not even a theory. It's a phenomena that does away with all theory.

You are not conscious. Consciousness is you.

Fairy wrote: ↑Tue Oct 08, 2024 6:21 pm Consciousness is not even a theory. It's a phenomena that does away with all theory.

You are not conscious. Consciousness is you.

But, didn't you say you are nothing?

Walker wrote: ↑Tue Oct 08, 2024 8:48 pm

Fairy wrote: ↑Tue Oct 08, 2024 6:21 pm Consciousness is not even a theory. It's a phenomena that does away with all theory.

You are not conscious. Consciousness is you.

But, didn't you say you are nothing?

The you didn’t say anything. The you was said.

Fairy wrote: ↑Wed Oct 09, 2024 9:47 am

Walker wrote: ↑Tue Oct 08, 2024 8:48 pm

Fairy wrote: ↑Tue Oct 08, 2024 6:21 pm Consciousness is not even a theory. It's a phenomena that does away with all theory.

You are not conscious. Consciousness is you.

But, didn't you say you are nothing?

The you didn’t say anything. The you was said.

No way.

Unfortunately, all of the common explanations for consciousness fall short.

Property dualism - if consciousness itself (or some kind of proto-consicousness or some kind of simple experience-like Qualia) is fundamental to every material thing... then how is it that we feel like a single conscious subject? This is known as the combination problem.

From a Google search - "Stated generally, the combination problem is the problem of how precisely the fundamental conscious minds come to compose, constitute, or give rise to some further, additional conscious mind (especially our own)."

Just "spit-balling here" but I wonder if property dualism could be combined with Daniel Dennett's ideas about consciousness as presented in his book From Bacteria to Bach and Back Again to form a coherent theory of consciousness. To do so, one would have to assume that Qualia are real, something that Dennett is loath to do.

My understanding of Dennett's view is that humans are alone in their experience of consciousness because they have developed the consciousness they have because of human culture. So human culture and human consciousness developed hand in hand - you can't have one without the other. But all property dualism is saying is that some kind of proto-consciousness or qualia-like experience is basic to all matter.

Dennett's ideas do present a problem for Chalmer's zombie thought experiment. When we conceive of other minds, we tend to think of human minds (or minds a lot like human minds). What could a mind that didn't evolve in human culture be like? If Dennett is right, then even if property dualism is also true (again I tend to think of property dualism and panpsychism as synonyms) then there would be no other human-like minds. There might be some kind of consciousness - but it wouldn't be able to communicate - because communication requires human culture (or presumably some kind of culture?).