Philosophy Now Forum

bahman wrote:I can accept C as what we intended to do. The problem then is why what we intended to do matches to what happen?

Why shouldn't it? I've explained where your explanation went wrong, but you don't provide anything new in this post.

bahman wrote:Well, I think that chemical cause anaesthesia in this case. I don't think that there is any correlation in here but cause.

Well, what we "think" won't be determinative. Only what is true will matter. You need to be certain you are not making a causal fallacy.

I think that psychological being is caused by biological activity.

And that's why you think everything has consciousness? Even rocks? Even simple elements and basic compounds? Or would you stop at living things only?

Go to drug store to see how our psychological being could be affected by chemicals.

I know. That's not controversial. But also our physical being can be affected by our psychology: consider medical phenomena like "the placebo effect," or how morale can speed healing. There's no question there's a connection between the biological and psychological: but to think of it as one-way causality is to ignore half the evidence, I think.

Trinitarian? what it has to do with you and duality?

A dualist thinks of things in two parts. A trinitarian sees them in three.

That is different from Pantheism: Pantheism is the belief that all of reality is identical with divinity, or that everything composes an all-encompassing, immanent god. Here I just argue that everything is conscious.

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How can we imagine all of the physical world -- rocks, trees, chemical compounds, humans, one-celled organisms, and so forth -- are all conscious if they are not part of some mind-based phenomenon? That's got to take us in the direction of some kind of Pantheism. For if "mind" or "consciousness" is the deep reality of things, there must be some "mind-based" origination point of all things.

Maybe you'd better clear this up for me: are you really saying that everything is conscious? Even what most people regard as inert objects? Or just living things?

Noax wrote:

bahman wrote: I can accept C as what we intended to do. The problem then is why what we intended to do matches to what happen?

Why shouldn't it? I've explained where your explanation went wrong, but you don't provide anything new in this post.

Because C' and S' are two different modes of matter so there is no reason to accept that C' is correlated to S'.

Immanuel Can wrote: Well, what we "think" won't be determinative. Only what is true will matter. You need to be certain you are not making a causal fallacy.

Where is my fallacy in my reasoning?

Immanuel Can wrote: And that's why you think everything has consciousness? Even rocks? Even simple elements and basic compounds? Or would you stop at living things only?

Well, even a simple electron experience the existence of another electron and react. So to me it is reasonable to say that everything is conscious.

Immanuel Can wrote: I know. That's not controversial. But also our physical being can be affected by our psychology: consider medical phenomena like "the placebo effect," or how morale can speed healing. There's no question there's a connection between the biological and psychological: but to think of it as one-way causality is to ignore half the evidence, I think.

I agree that relation between biological and psychological is two way.

Immanuel Can wrote: A dualist thinks of things in two parts. A trinitarian sees them in three.

What are the three components?

Immanuel Can wrote: How can we imagine all of the physical world -- rocks, trees, chemical compounds, humans, one-celled organisms, and so forth -- are all conscious if they are not part of some mind-based phenomenon? That's got to take us in the direction of some kind of Pantheism. For if "mind" or "consciousness" is the deep reality of things, there must be some "mind-based" origination point of all things.

Pantheism in this case is correct if only one mind is involved in all changes.

Immanuel Can wrote: Maybe you'd better clear this up for me: are you really saying that everything is conscious? Even what most people regard as inert objects? Or just living things?

This is a little long and confusion for me when it comes to consciousness. Let start with monism where matter is inert. We are either dealing with an emergent phenomena or we have to accept that the whole is more than sum of parts when it comes to consciousness. Either way, we just have two claims and cannot show which one is right yet. Lets start with dualism then. I have problem with dualism sine under dualism, soul/mind are spiritual and have no location. It is simply hard for me to related something which has no location to body which has a location. This is a problem because we know that we have different minds and bodies so it is difficult to relate minds to bodies. We have interaction problem in our hands too. Moreover, I have problem with birth and life after death too. How and when mind gets involve in a growing embryo? So to me I have problems with dualism hence the only alternative for me is monism in which I have difficulty to explain consciousness.

bahman wrote:

Immanuel Can wrote: Well, what we "think" won't be determinative. Only what is true will matter. You need to be certain you are not making a causal fallacy.

Where is my fallacy in my reasoning?

It's the "causal fallacy," the assumption that if two things happen together, one must cause the other. It's not always true.

Well, even a simple electron experience the existence of another electron and react. So to me it is reasonable to say that everything is conscious.

Wow. Well, you're using the word "conscious" in a much looser way than most people do. Most people think it has to imply some sort of cognition, not just having had something happen TO one. But okay....

Immanuel Can wrote: I agree that relation between biological and psychological is two way.

Then it argues against the biological being the unique causal force.

What are the three components?

Physicality, consciousness, spirituality.

Immanuel Can wrote: Maybe you'd better clear this up for me: are you really saying that everything is conscious? Even what most people regard as inert objects? Or just living things?

This is a little long and confusion for me when it comes to consciousness. Let start with monism where matter is inert.

Do you mean Materialist Monism? I presume you don't mean Idealist Monism...

We are either dealing with an emergent phenomena or we have to accept that the whole is more than sum of parts when it comes to consciousness.

Well, "emergent consciousness" is just a way of saying, "we don't know how consciousness comes about, so we say it just pops into existence." It's not really an explanation of anything...

It is simply hard for me to related something which has no location to body which has a location. This is a problem because we know that we have different minds and bodies so it is difficult to relate minds to bodies.

Yes, this is a major problem. Suppose someone anaesthetizes me so deeply I cease to breathe. Every cell that made up my body is still intact...but something is missing...and we can't figure out how that thing was located. And we don't say I am really "me" anymore, even though my physiology is completely intact. So how is it that we can have the entire physiology, but not the "person" there anymore?

It's strange indeed.

We have interaction problem in our hands too. Moreover, I have problem with birth and life after death too. How and when mind gets involve in a growing embryo? So to me I have problems with dualism hence the only alternative for me is monism in which I have difficulty to explain consciousness.

Yes, it's a classic difficulty. I'm pretty sure monism isn't the right solution, though; because monism has to say that either mind or matter does not exist, and only the other one does. Intuitively, that seems wrong. It seems like avoiding the whole problem simply by denying it exists at all. It doesn't look like a solution.

bahman wrote:Because C' and S' are two different modes of matter so there is no reason to accept that C' is correlated to S'.

No, C and S are not two different modes of matter. Under physicalism, matter doesn't come in modes. Everything is particles and their interactions and all particles have causal effect on subsequent states, not just some of them.

bahman wrote:

Conde Lucanor wrote: I never said there are no relations between the different systems in nature and that it lacks unity, but the same laws of nature will give you the ice landscape in the North Pole and the tropical rainforest in the Equator, different habitats, different conditions that produce their own processes. For austerity of explanations, it all can be reduced to a "bunch of electrons, protons, etc.", but that won't explain what actually happens in detail.

Well, we can today explain the behaviour matter based on its constitutes, electrons, protons, neutrons.

Nope, you can't.

Immanuel Can wrote: It's the "causal fallacy," the assumption that if two things happen together, one must cause the other. It's not always true.

Well, we know that anesthesia is caused with certain medicine so I am not sure why this could be a causal fallacy.

Immanuel Can wrote: Wow. Well, you're using the word "conscious" in a much looser way than most people do. Most people think it has to imply some sort of cognition, not just having had something happen TO one. But okay....

This view is not anomaly free too since there is only one identity for each person yet we are assuming that all particles are conscious.

Immanuel Can wrote: Then it argues against the biological being the unique causal force.

I agree.

Immanuel Can wrote: Physicality, consciousness, spirituality.

I haven't yet figure out my world view as it was discussed in previous post. Each framework is simply anomalous.

Immanuel Can wrote: Do you mean Materialist Monism? I presume you don't mean Idealist Monism...

I meant materialist monism.

Immanuel Can wrote: Well, "emergent consciousness" is just a way of saying, "we don't know how consciousness comes about, so we say it just pops into existence." It's not really an explanation of anything...

That is true that we still have no explanation for consciousness but other framework are anomalous so it seems that this framework is the only feasible one.

Immanuel Can wrote: Yes, this is a major problem. Suppose someone anaesthetizes me so deeply I cease to breathe. Every cell that made up my body is still intact...but something is missing...and we can't figure out how that thing was located. And we don't say I am really "me" anymore, even though my physiology is completely intact. So how is it that we can have the entire physiology, but not the "person" there anymore?

It's strange indeed.

That is a serious problem of dualism. The problem is so serious that I discard dualism as a good framework.

Immanuel Can wrote: Yes, it's a classic difficulty. I'm pretty sure monism isn't the right solution, though; because monism has to say that either mind or matter does not exist, and only the other one does. Intuitively, that seems wrong. It seems like avoiding the whole problem simply by denying it exists at all. It doesn't look like a solution.

Well, we either put consciousness in a black box and strive to dualism or we accept the challenge to find out how consciousness is derived from matter by striving to monism. We hide all our ignorance about consciousness under dualism and we are in trap what consciousness is in monism.

Noax wrote:

bahman wrote: Because C' and S' are two different modes of matter so there is no reason to accept that C' is correlated to S'.

No, C and S are not two different modes of matter. Under physicalism, matter doesn't come in modes. Everything is particles and their interactions and all particles have causal effect on subsequent states, not just some of them.

Mind, C, is sort of matter but it is not particle under materialism. So we have a configuration of particles, S, and mind, C.

Conde Lucanor wrote:

bahman wrote:

Conde Lucanor wrote: I never said there are no relations between the different systems in nature and that it lacks unity, but the same laws of nature will give you the ice landscape in the North Pole and the tropical rainforest in the Equator, different habitats, different conditions that produce their own processes. For austerity of explanations, it all can be reduced to a "bunch of electrons, protons, etc.", but that won't explain what actually happens in detail.

Well, we can today explain the behaviour matter based on its constitutes, electrons, protons, neutrons.

Nope, you can't.

Yes, we can. That is what physicist call it condensed matter physics.

bahman wrote:Mind, C, is sort of matter but it is not particle under materialism. So we have a configuration of particles, S, and mind, C.

You need to complete your posts to prevent these hundreds of replies.

So why is what you now seem to be calling 'configuration of particles C' any less able to effect S' than anything else? This is your claim, but your statement above doesn't convey the 'logical impossibility'.

bahman wrote:

Immanuel Can wrote: Yes, this is a major problem. Suppose someone anaesthetizes me so deeply I cease to breathe. Every cell that made up my body is still intact...but something is missing...and we can't figure out how that thing was located. And we don't say I am really "me" anymore, even though my physiology is completely intact. So how is it that we can have the entire physiology, but not the "person" there anymore?

It's strange indeed.

That is a serious problem of dualism. The problem is so serious that I discard dualism as a good framework.

I don't think that follows logically. Now, as I say, I'm not a strict dualist: but if a body, with all its chemical, physical and so forth components is not sufficient to have a total "person" present (i.e.. what we have is a corpse instead), then that would argue for the existence of a non-physical essential component to "personhood." It would support dualism of some kind, not disprove it.

Didn't see this post until now:

Immanuel Can wrote:This is the point I doubt.

Some things are capable of being described gradualistically, and some are simply not . . .

You don't seem to doubt this, you seem to be sure that it's an on/off affair.

It could be an on/off affair, but I don't think there's a good reason to believe that it is. I'm not saying that anyone is sure that it's a gradation, by the way.

Either you're not quite understanding the problem, or you've somehow vaulted ahead of brain experts. Everyone else seems to see a major mystery here.

First off, it hardly matters whether everyone thinks something. That certainly doesn't make them correct. But I'm not at all the only philosopher who thinks there's nothing mysterious about it.

In Philosophy, it's called the "emergent properties problem."

You just can not help but regularly be patronizing, as if you know more about philosophy than everyone else, and you're educating everyone else. If you really knew more about philosophy you'd know that (a) I'm not the only philosopher who thinks that there's nothing mysterious about consciousness (and certainly many neuroscientists think that there's nothing mysterious about it on a broad ontological level), and (b) that it's actually called "the hard problem," not "the emergent properties problem," because "emergent properties" has connotations that many do not accept, whether they're physicalists or not.

Again, you've jumped ahead of the story. You've started with "brain materials, structures and processes." You haven't touched the question of why these mere materials have come to have what we call "consciousness" in the first place.

The materials that have consciousness are brain materials, structures and processes near the complexity of the human brain. They don't have consciousness because of something prior to that. It's a property of those materials, structures and processes, and not a property of other materials, or other structures, or other processes.

Not so fast. How did these materials first come to have any iota of "consciousness" at all?

Forget about cosnciousness for a minute. As a universal generality, all materials, in particular structures, and undergoing particular processes, have particular properties, right? All materials have properties that are only present with each physical change in those three factors (the materials, structures--that is relations of the materials, and processes--that is, the changing relations of those materials). So the way that any x "comes to have" the properties it has is by being comprised of the materials, in the structures, and undergoing the processes that it is at that moment. Those same exact properties do not obtain when the materials, structures and processes are different. Properties supervene on those three things. So consciousness is simply a property of materials in the structures and undergoing the processes that are typical of human brains.

For Evolutionism needs a story about that, or it's got a huge gap in its story regarding the appearance of consciousness from non-conscious materials.

There's no gap. There are different properties with all different materials, structures and processes. At every step in that there are different properties.

Immanuel Can wrote:Yes, this is a major problem. Suppose someone anaesthetizes me so deeply I cease to breathe. Every cell that made up my body is still intact...but something is missing...and we can't figure out how that thing was located. And we don't say I am really "me" anymore, even though my physiology is completely intact. So how is it that we can have the entire physiology, but not the "person" there anymore?

It's strange indeed.

You'd be ignoring processes. You can't ignore processes. Different properties obtain with (different) changing relations ("different" because relations are always changing).

For those to whom consciousness seems "mysterious," why wouldn't any arbitrary property of any arbitrary material be "mysterious"?