The Democrat Party Hates America

[seeds]

What I wonder is this: why don’t more people have the courage to fully accept this scientific understanding once they acknowledge it? Why do we keep grasping for a sense of personal responsibility and free will when, deep down, the evidence tells us that our choices are shaped by the system we’re embedded in—the surroundings we’ve collectively created? If we truly want to improve the world, wouldn’t it make sense to shift our focus to changing these underlying systems? After all, they’re the real drivers of our behavior and the conditions we live under.

If “they” did arrive at the awareness of a need to “change these underlying systems”, would the choice to do so be a freely chosen?

No. Of course not. It would be caused by external influences.

Clearly, you (BigMike) are a hardcore materialist whose deterministic philosophy is deeply rooted in the realm of "weak emergence" which has you completely ignoring the arguments regarding "strong emergence."

So, as one who sees no problem in turning to our AI oracles for definitions of these terms, I asked your big brother (uncle? cousin? mom?) ChatGPT the following question (bolding by ChatGPT and me)...

Me:
In philosophy, what is the difference between weak emergence and strong emergence?

ChatGPT:
In philosophy, weak emergence and strong emergence are terms used to describe how complex systems and properties arise from simpler underlying processes, but they differ in how they view the relationship between these levels.

Weak Emergence

Weak emergence occurs when higher-level properties or behaviors of a system arise from lower-level interactions in ways that are often unexpected or novel but can, in principle, be reduced to or explained by those lower-level interactions. This means that while the emergent properties are surprising or unpredictable, they are still theoretically deducible from the system’s underlying rules....

Key points of weak emergence:

• Higher-level properties can be reduced to or explained by lower-level interactions.
  
  Emergent behaviors may be unpredictable in practice but are not fundamentally inexplicable.
  
  Often associated with computational or algorithmic models, where emergent properties are often surprising yet ultimately traceable to underlying rules.

Strong Emergence

Strong emergence posits that certain higher-level properties cannot be reduced to, explained by, or predicted from the lower-level base, even in principle. This implies that there are genuinely new properties or causal powers that come into existence at the higher level that are not present at the lower level. For example, proponents of strong emergence might argue that human consciousness cannot be fully explained by the interactions of neurons, asserting that consciousness has properties that are fundamentally different from those of the brain’s physical parts.

Key points of strong emergence:

• Higher-level properties are irreducible to lower-level processes and cannot be explained fully by them.
  
  These properties may possess novel causal powers that do not exist at the lower levels.
  
  Often linked to phenomena like consciousness or qualia, where emergent properties are seen as fundamentally new and not deducible from physical systems.

In summary,...
...weak emergence is generally seen as compatible with reductionism and naturalism, while strong emergence challenges these frameworks by suggesting that new properties or causal powers can arise in ways that defy explanation from lower levels alone.

The point is that no matter how much faith you have in your theory of determinism, there's just no way that determinism can explain (or account for) the (strong) emergence of the living, self-aware human "I Am-ness" from inanimate matter.

In other words, regardless of how much you will argue to the contrary, and will no doubt insist that it (the "I Am-ness") is just an "illusion" created by the firing of neurons in a glob of grey matter,...

...strong emergence nevertheless implies that the manifestation of phenomena...

(or should I say "noumena"?)

...as utterly unique and inexplicable as the human mind and, especially, its accompanying "agent," simply cannot be traced back (deduced) to something measurable in matter.

Although it is undeniable that the outside world strongly influences the choices we make, it is nonetheless the "I Am-ness"...

(the "dreamer" of dreams, the "thinker" of thoughts, the "interpreter" of qualia, etc.)

...that decides (via "free will") how it will respond to those outside influences.

(And that ^^^ my fellow PN asylum inmates, is precisely why "...The Democrat Party Hates America..." )
_______

[Gary Childress]

I see where you're coming from. It feels intuitive to believe that when we’re making deliberate, reasoned choices—especially those with moral, ethical, or value-based weight—we’re exercising true agency, rising above unconscious impulses. But the science complicates this intuition. Even in cases of careful deliberation, the brain is working with a network of influences rooted in prior experiences, environmental conditioning, and innate predispositions—all of which shape and guide our decisions, often without our conscious awareness.

Libet’s experiments are just one piece of the puzzle. They demonstrated a kind of “lag” between brain activity and conscious awareness, suggesting that our sense of making a choice could be more of an after-the-fact experience. But beyond that, there’s also a growing body of research indicating that complex, reasoned decisions—even ones that feel free—are influenced by prior brain states and external factors that predate our awareness of them.

Now, I respect your view that self-consciousness and intellectual awareness provide a form of agency unique to humans. But here’s the question: if this sense of agency is shaped by countless pre-existing factors, is it really “free”? If we’re acting in alignment with our values, but those values are products of our experiences, conditioning, and perhaps even our neurobiology, then isn’t our “choice” still bound to those influences?

I understand that a metaphysical perspective might see this differently, but within a scientific framework, this agency remains part of a larger chain of cause and effect. Does that clarify where I’m coming from, or is there still a missing piece for you?

I suspect you are jumping the gun and that there are alternative interpretations of those experiments. It seems to me that if we humans believe we are determined then it provides a rationale that will allow us to legitimize doing pretty much as we please. Moral decision making seems like it would be a more complex process that could indeed involve things like compassion or altruistic factors vetoing one's first knee jerk tendencies. In moral decision making we do deliberate and perhaps that resets the readiness potential. If a person believes that nothing they do is their fault, then they might behave differently than if they felt responsible or accountable for their actions.

\_('_')_/

You said:
Do recent experiments in neuropsychology prove that human beings do not have free will?

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT
The question of free will in light of recent neuropsychological experiments is complex, and while studies have provided interesting insights, they do not definitively prove that humans lack free will. Here are a few key points:

The Libet Experiment: One of the most famous studies challenging free will is the 1980s work by Benjamin Libet, which showed that brain activity indicating a decision (a "readiness potential") occurs milliseconds before people become consciously aware of their decision. This finding suggests that the brain initiates actions before we are aware of "choosing" them, casting doubt on free will.

Replications and Criticisms: Later studies replicated similar findings, with some variations. However, many scientists argue that these experiments reveal only the timing of certain automatic responses, not the entirety of decision-making. Libet himself concluded that while the brain initiates impulses, consciousness can still "veto" actions before they're carried out.

Advanced Brain Imaging: More recent studies using functional MRI (fMRI) have shown that brain regions can predict decisions seconds before a person is consciously aware of them. But like the Libet experiment, these studies mostly focus on simple, immediate decisions rather than complex ones that involve reasoning, memory, or emotions.

Complex Decision-Making: The findings mentioned above mostly apply to quick, low-stakes choices, such as pressing a button. For more complicated decisions, involving reflection, memory, and complex reasoning, it’s unclear if the same pre-conscious "readiness potential" applies in the same way. Critics argue that real-world decisions may involve conscious deliberation in ways that simpler lab-based tasks don’t capture.

Philosophical Interpretations: Neuropsychology alone may not fully answer the question of free will, as it’s also a philosophical problem. Some philosophers argue that even if our decisions are influenced by unconscious processes, this doesn’t necessarily mean we lack free will—only that the mind works in ways we don’t fully understand.

In summary, recent neuropsychological experiments offer insights suggesting that some aspects of decision-making are influenced by unconscious processes, but they do not definitively disprove free will. Instead, they encourage us to think more deeply about what free will might mean and how conscious and unconscious processes contribute to human agency.

[Age]

... human beings, collectively, will 'grow up', 'mature', and, finally, become Truly responsible. But, again, there is NO rush.

Age, let’s talk about this idea of “True responsibility.” The concept is powerful, but if we understand it in the context of free will, we’re leaning into a myth.

Why do you believe, absolutely, that you and some others are leaning into a myth? And, why would you, and them, even want to lean into a myth from the outset?

Physically speaking, free will is impossible—it defies the principles of cause and effect, and everything we know about conservation laws.

Was anyone talking 'physically only' here?

If our actions are determined by a chain of causes, stretching back through factors we don’t control, how can we genuinely be “responsible” in the way we typically imagine?

When, and if, you also come to understand the difference between 'actions' and 'behavior', then you will also better understand 'free will' and 'determinism' for those words are Truly referring to, and how those things both co-exist, and work together.

What I wonder is this: why don’t more people have the courage to fully accept this scientific understanding once they acknowledge it?

Are you aware that you just asked a clarifying question, and then proceeded to wonder why more people do not fully accept some thing?

I suggest you take another look at your own question asked, and then realize that what you so-call 'typically imagine' is not at all necessarily how others might 'typically imagine'.

And then realize that how you adult human beings can become 'genuinely' or Truly responsible is a very simple and very easy thing to do, that is; once one learns the know-how, and thus knows how to.

Why do we keep grasping for a sense of personal responsibility and free will when, deep down, the evidence tells us that our choices are shaped by the system we’re embedded in—the surroundings we’ve collectively created?

Again, all of this is just part of the evolutionary trajectory, which as you pointed out was pre-determined by past events.

In the days when this was being written, you human beings were, still, just in the process of learning how to become Truly responsible creatures, or beings. So, that when you, eventually do, and did, then what 'it' is that all want, and desire, can and will be-come created. And, obviously when this is happening and occuring what also becomes, and became, crystal clear is that 'what, eventually, is' was previously 'set to be' because of pre-determinism, itself.

So, when you also are Truly, or genuinely, responsible, then this, also, was pre determined, to be

If we truly want to improve the world, wouldn’t it make sense to shift our focus to changing these underlying systems?

What 'systems'?

Calling whatever 'it' are, 'systems' makes them sound like 'they' are things, which one it all have no or limited control over.

Also, once it becomes fully realised that everyone I those so-called 'systems' was caused and created by you adult human beings, then, and only then, when you want to become Truly responsible are you then able to CHANGE those 'systems', and thus able CHANGE the 'whole world' completely, as well.

After all, they’re the real drivers of our behavior and the conditions we live under.

So, what 'we' have here is another example of 'i', the adult human beings, do not have control over 'my mis/behavior' because it is 'the system's that has control OVER 'me' and OVER :the way' i behave, or misbehave.

Now, and as always, if absolutely any one would like to have a full in-depth discussion about any or all of this, then I am more than willing, and wanting to

[BigMike]

But here’s the question: if this sense of agency is shaped by countless pre-existing factors, is it really “free”?

That is why I say — an improvised resolution of an inharmonious chord — that yes, we definitely exist within determined circumstances and are in that sense unfree.

Our ruination is thus described. That into which we have fallen. (Metaphor and allusion).

But that we do have access to a cubic centimeter of free volition — if we can realize it.

Naturally, my sense of what is ‘divine’ (metaphysical and ‘supernatural’, i.e. unconstrained by our condition), is the hinge in my philosophy on which I lay stress. But that “conceptual pathway” is closed to you by the force of your atheistic commitments.

That is fine of course — your choice or simply a conceptual point that likely will not change.

But there is a larger conversation and it has to do with religiousness, or spirituality, in both a vulgar and an elevated sense, and its function and influence in our present. It is a sticky, difficult and nuance-requiring topic.

Alexis, I’m curious about how you see this “cubic centimeter” of free volition functioning without defying the conservation laws. Noether’s theorem firmly establishes that every conserved quantity—whether energy, momentum, or angular momentum—remains constant in a closed system. This principle is inextricably linked to the symmetry of physical laws and is one of the most ironclad results in physics.

For any “free volition” to act within this system, it would need to influence atoms or energy in a measurable way, pushing or pulling physical matter. But for a nonphysical “volition” to impact physical particles without any exchange of energy would be to say that we’re creating a force from nowhere—a literal violation of conservation laws, which Noether’s theorem proves simply cannot happen.

So, can you clarify how this “cubic centimeter” of free will might work? How would it engage with physical matter without contradicting this fundamental principle? And how would it bypass the rigorous constraints Noether’s theorem places on all physical interactions?

[BigMike]

Gary, I appreciate you bringing up these points, especially the debate surrounding the Libet experiments. But let me clarify: while Libet’s findings are fascinating, they’re not the primary basis for my argument against free will. My main concern isn’t simply about the timing of brain activity or even whether unconscious processes precede conscious ones. It’s about something deeper—an implied violation of physical laws, particularly the conservation laws, if free will were real.

Think about it: for free will to truly exist as a force that initiates action, it would need to be something nonphysical that can somehow influence physical matter—specifically, our neurons. But for this to happen, this “free will” would have to interact with matter through one of the four fundamental forces: gravity, electromagnetism, the strong force, or the weak force. Yet, there’s no evidence of a nonphysical entity affecting matter through any of these interactions. To suggest that free will could override this physical framework would be to imply a force from nowhere, a direct violation of conservation laws, and this simply doesn’t hold up under the principles that govern our reality.

So while the Libet experiments provide interesting insights into the unconscious processes that shape decision-making, they’re only one small part of the picture. My argument goes beyond these findings to something foundational: in a universe governed by physical laws, where energy and matter are conserved and only interact through well-defined forces, free will as an external, independent force simply can’t fit in. If our actions are caused, they are caused by physical, not metaphysical, influences. Does this address some of the concerns you’ve raised?

[Gary Childress]

Gary, I appreciate you bringing up these points, especially the debate surrounding the Libet experiments. But let me clarify: while Libet’s findings are fascinating, they’re not the primary basis for my argument against free will. My main concern isn’t simply about the timing of brain activity or even whether unconscious processes precede conscious ones. It’s about something deeper—an implied violation of physical laws, particularly the conservation laws, if free will were real.

Think about it: for free will to truly exist as a force that initiates action, it would need to be something nonphysical that can somehow influence physical matter—specifically, our neurons. But for this to happen, this “free will” would have to interact with matter through one of the four fundamental forces: gravity, electromagnetism, the strong force, or the weak force. Yet, there’s no evidence of a nonphysical entity affecting matter through any of these interactions. To suggest that free will could override this physical framework would be to imply a force from nowhere, a direct violation of conservation laws, and this simply doesn’t hold up under the principles that govern our reality.

So while the Libet experiments provide interesting insights into the unconscious processes that shape decision-making, they’re only one small part of the picture. My argument goes beyond these findings to something foundational: in a universe governed by physical laws, where energy and matter are conserved and only interact through well-defined forces, free will as an external, independent force simply can’t fit in. If our actions are caused, they are caused by physical, not metaphysical, influences. Does this address some of the concerns you’ve raised?

So are you suggesting that if you do something wrong that you are not responsible for the wrong you did? Or what are the implications of these "laws of conservation"? Are you suggesting that you are not conscious and able to tell your body to do one thing instead of another? Are you suggesting that if you see a truck coming down the road, that you are unable to make the choice to avoid the oncoming truck. I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at.

To be honest, your "conservation law" sounds a bit like Zeno's Paradoxes. Zeno's Paradoxes are meant to prove that movement is impossible. And yet we do seem to move from one place to the next. So which is incorrect? Is it incorrect that we move from one place to another or are Zeno's Paradoxes somehow flawed?

[Alexis Jacobi]

So, can you clarify how this “cubic centimeter” of free will might work? How would it engage with physical matter without contradicting this fundamental principle? And how would it bypass the rigorous constraints Noether’s theorem places on all physical interactions?

I do not have — in the days when this was being written — an explanation.

[BigMike]

So are you suggesting that if you do something wrong that you are not responsible for the wrong you did? Or what are the implications of these "laws of conservation"? Are you suggesting that you are not conscious and able to tell your body to do one thing instead of another? Are you suggesting that if you see a truck coming down the road, that you are unable to make the choice to avoid the oncoming truck. I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at.

To be honest, your "conservation law" sounds a bit like Zeno's Paradoxes. Zeno's Paradoxes are meant to prove that movement is impossible. And yet we do seem to move from one place to the next. So which is incorrect? Is it incorrect that we move from one place to another or are Zeno's Paradoxes somehow flawed?

I get why this might seem like Zeno’s paradoxes at first glance—it feels counterintuitive to suggest that actions we seem to choose are actually determined by physical processes. But unlike Zeno’s paradoxes, which rely on a play with infinite divisibility, conservation laws are foundational, empirically verified principles of physics that describe how matter and energy behave in our universe. They’re not abstract thought experiments; they’re observable realities governing everything from the tiniest particles to massive astronomical bodies.

Now, on the question of responsibility: I’m not suggesting that we’re unaware of our actions or incapable of avoiding harm. Our consciousness allows us to process information, weigh options, and respond to stimuli—like avoiding an oncoming truck. But the point is that these responses are products of our brain’s physical processes, which are in turn shaped by prior influences and environmental conditioning. In other words, while we feel we’re making free choices, every thought and decision is the result of complex interactions within the brain, bound by physical laws.

So, when it comes to moral responsibility, the implications are complex. Responsibility isn’t about denying awareness or consciousness; it’s about understanding that these are all part of a larger, deterministic system. Instead of holding individuals accountable as if they acted in isolation, without causes, a deterministic view suggests focusing on the systems and conditions that shape behavior—our laws, environment, and social structures.

[BigMike]

So, can you clarify how this “cubic centimeter” of free will might work? How would it engage with physical matter without contradicting this fundamental principle? And how would it bypass the rigorous constraints Noether’s theorem places on all physical interactions?

I do not have — in the days when this was being written — an explanation.

Thank you for the honesty, Alexis. I appreciate the openness in acknowledging that, at least as things stand, there’s no clear explanation for how this “cubic centimeter” of free will might interact with physical matter without violating core scientific principles like conservation laws and Noether’s theorem. It’s a complex issue, and the scientific framework places some pretty tight constraints on what’s physically possible.

These kinds of questions can be challenging to reconcile with deeply held beliefs about agency and free will. But it’s exactly these gaps in understanding that make for fascinating conversations. If you’re ever interested in exploring more, I’d be glad to continue digging into these topics together.

[Gary Childress]

So are you suggesting that if you do something wrong that you are not responsible for the wrong you did? Or what are the implications of these "laws of conservation"? Are you suggesting that you are not conscious and able to tell your body to do one thing instead of another? Are you suggesting that if you see a truck coming down the road, that you are unable to make the choice to avoid the oncoming truck. I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at.

To be honest, your "conservation law" sounds a bit like Zeno's Paradoxes. Zeno's Paradoxes are meant to prove that movement is impossible. And yet we do seem to move from one place to the next. So which is incorrect? Is it incorrect that we move from one place to another or are Zeno's Paradoxes somehow flawed?

I get why this might seem like Zeno’s paradoxes at first glance—it feels counterintuitive to suggest that actions we seem to choose are actually determined by physical processes. But unlike Zeno’s paradoxes, which rely on a play with infinite divisibility, conservation laws are foundational, empirically verified principles of physics that describe how matter and energy behave in our universe. They’re not abstract thought experiments; they’re observable realities governing everything from the tiniest particles to massive astronomical bodies.

Now, on the question of responsibility: I’m not suggesting that we’re unaware of our actions or incapable of avoiding harm. Our consciousness allows us to process information, weigh options, and respond to stimuli—like avoiding an oncoming truck. But the point is that these responses are products of our brain’s physical processes, which are in turn shaped by prior influences and environmental conditioning. In other words, while we feel we’re making free choices, every thought and decision is the result of complex interactions within the brain, bound by physical laws.

So, when it comes to moral responsibility, the implications are complex. Responsibility isn’t about denying awareness or consciousness; it’s about understanding that these are all part of a larger, deterministic system. Instead of holding individuals accountable as if they acted in isolation, without causes, a deterministic view suggests focusing on the systems and conditions that shape behavior—our laws, environment, and social structures.

I think you're shooting yourself in the foot. How are you going to change the system or anyone's conditions if you are unable to change the system or their conditions? Can you change the laws of conservation if they determine that things are as they are?

[seeds]

So, can you clarify how this “cubic centimeter” of free will might work? How would it engage with physical matter without contradicting this fundamental principle? And how would it bypass the rigorous constraints Noether’s theorem places on all physical interactions?

I do not have — in the days when this was being written — an explanation.

Oh, come on now, guys.

Now of course it's silly to think of quantifying (assigning a parameter of measurement) to free will, however, to go with Alexis' playful terminology, here...



...is how a "cubic centimeter" of something non-material (free will) interacts with physical matter without violating any laws of physics.
_______

[Gary Childress]

So, can you clarify how this “cubic centimeter” of free will might work? How would it engage with physical matter without contradicting this fundamental principle? And how would it bypass the rigorous constraints Noether’s theorem places on all physical interactions?

I do not have — in the days when this was being written — an explanation.

Oh, come on now, guys.

Now of course it's silly to think of quantifying (assigning a parameter of measurement) to free will, however, to go with Alexis' playful terminology, here...



...is how a "cubic centimeter" of something non-material (free will) interacts with physical matter without violating any laws of physics.
_______

I don't interact with matter. My body does. I just watch while it does it.

[seeds]

I do not have — in the days when this was being written — an explanation.

Oh, come on now, guys.

Now of course it's silly to think of quantifying (assigning a parameter of measurement) to free will, however, to go with Alexis' playful terminology, here...



...is how a "cubic centimeter" of something non-material (free will) interacts with physical matter without violating any laws of physics.
_______

I don't interact with matter. My body does. I just watch while it does it.

Seriously, Gary?

Do I have to explain to you that your body is made of "matter," and that every time you move your arm down to scratch your material butt, your inner "I Am-ness"...

(that non-material, qualia sensing [in this case, an itch] aspect of your inner being - the thing you call your "I")

...most definitely "interacts" with the matter of your body via the free will decision to move your material arm for the express purpose of dealing with the qualia of an itch?
_______

[BigMike]

I think you're shooting yourself in the foot. How are you going to change the system or anyone's conditions if you are unable to change the system or their conditions? Can you change the laws of conservation if they determine that things are as they are?

I understand why this might seem paradoxical at first glance, but let’s dig a little deeper. The laws of conservation don’t stop change—they explain *how* change happens. When I say that every action, thought, and memory is shaped by physical processes, I’m not denying that change is possible. In fact, change is always happening—our brains are constantly adapting to our environment and experiences. What we learn, remember, and respond to are all shaped by external forces, which cause real, lasting changes in our neuronal networks. That’s what memory is: the physical rewiring of our brain, where new axon terminals grow, synapses strengthen, and neural pathways adjust based on our experiences.

The idea isn’t that we’re “stuck” without the possibility of altering the world or our surroundings. It’s that these changes are caused by interactions in a complex, deterministic system. So, even if individuals don’t have free will in the traditional sense, we can still change systems by creating conditions that shape people’s behavior in beneficial ways. We influence laws, environments, and social systems that, in turn, reshape individuals and society—through education, for instance, or social reform.

It’s not about changing the fundamental laws of conservation but rather understanding them to create meaningful, impactful shifts in the world we live in.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Now, on the question of responsibility: I’m not suggesting that we’re unaware of our actions or incapable of avoiding harm. Our consciousness allows us to process information, weigh options, and respond to stimuli—like avoiding an oncoming truck. But the point is that these responses are products of our brain’s physical processes, which are in turn shaped by prior influences and environmental conditioning. In other words, while we feel we’re making free choices, every thought and decision is the result of complex interactions within the brain, bound by physical laws.

Factually, even in our ultra-modern 2024, the “mechanism” through which or by which humankind act, think, reason and discern, is debated and undecided.

But curiously, you have re-roped in the fact of the realness of consequential choices that each of us can and do make, within our cultural and temporal matrixes, and within our biological matrix, except you cannot refer to any evidence of a metaphysical agent.

However, you are not the only one to have concerned himself with the •psychic• factor (the psyche is what I mean) and the issue and question of human consciousness.

I think that ultimately I resist your spiel in some way similar to my resistance of a dreary poem. I do not mean this personally though. I do not disagree that material science (scientism more properly) presents strong arguments (for determinism), but the way it is handled or wielded is to me far too constraining.

As Basil Willey has suggested a “master metaphysician” is needed to explore even the most convincing, and devastating, materialist argument.

I myself do not desire to tie myself up in those knots …