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As in, not the direct consequence of other stuff doing what other stuff does? No, I don't think strong emergence is likely to exist in this universe.Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 10:08 am
But would you consider the difference between unexperiencing matter to experiencing matter to be a strong emergence?
Where do you think the consciousness is?Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 10:16 amAs in, not the direct consequence of other stuff doing what other stuff does? No, I don't think strong emergence is likely to exist in this universe.Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 10:08 am
But would you consider the difference between unexperiencing matter to experiencing matter to be a strong emergence?
I would cut that sentence a little bit shorter than you have.Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 10:42 am It seems to me that at this point we have no explanation for consciousness being caused by anything we understand about matter
Any analysis of just how consciousness came to be is difficult. I don't see any clear winners among the choices I presented.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 5:53 amEmergence of mind is very difficult to explain, you're right. There's no way around it, it's difficult.
Humanity has solved a lot of difficult problems.
I don't know exactly how mind emerges, but I think it's more likely that it does than that it doesn't.
I don't know what you mean by that but it doesn't seem true to me. Is chat gpt in the same category as the matter that's used to store the data and code of chat gpt and run it?But the thing is... whenever you describe an example of emergence, both the first thing, and the thing that emerges are in the same category
You said "both the first thing, and the thing that emerges are in the same category" - as in, "the thing that emerges is in the same category as the thing it emerges from", that's what I understand you to be saying here.anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 11:47 amI guess I don't get it. Is chat cpt doing something different from any other program that is doing what it was programmed to do?
Just to be clear - we're talking about emergence - here is a description from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges."Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 11:50 amYou said "both the first thing, and the thing that emerges are in the same category" - as in, "the thing that emerges is in the same category as the thing it emerges from", that's what I understand you to be saying here.anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 11:47 amI guess I don't get it. Is chat cpt doing something different from any other program that is doing what it was programmed to do?
I do think chat gpt is doing something different from most programs, yes, but even if it weren't, are "computer programs" in the same category as "electrical circuits"? I don't think so.
(for an example of why I think chat gpt is doing something different from most other software, check this out: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yzGDwpR ... esentation )
How do computer programs "fit the bill"? What exactly is the composition of the thing before emergence, and what emerges?You said "both the first thing, and the thing that emerges are in the same category" - as in, "the thing that emerges is in the same category as the thing it emerges from", that's what I understand you to be saying here.
Well computer programs are made of arrangements of matter and operate by running electricity through circuits and stuff, right?anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:22 pm How do computer programs "fit the bill"? What exactly is the composition of the thing before emergence, and what emerges?
What do you think of this?anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:22 pmhere is a description from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/Consider, for example, a tornado. At any moment, a tornado depends for its existence on dust and debris, and ultimately on whatever micro-entities compose it; and its properties and behaviors likewise depend, one way or another, on the properties and interacting behaviors of its fundamental components. Yet the tornado’s identity does not depend on any specific composing micro-entity or configuration, and its features and behaviors appear to differ in kind from those of its most basic constituents, as is reflected in the fact that one can have a rather good understanding of how tornadoes work while being entirely ignorant of particle physics. The point generalizes to more complex and longer-lived entities, including plants and animals, economies and ecologies, and myriad other individuals and systems studied in the special sciences: such entities appear to depend in various important respects on their components, while nonetheless belonging to distinctive taxonomies
Fair enough.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 10:58 amI would cut that sentence a little bit shorter than you have.Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 10:42 am It seems to me that at this point we have no explanation for consciousness being caused by anything we understand about matter
It seems to me that at this point we have no explanation for consciousness
I'm not sure what group I'm picking on in the analogous consciousness situation. Who are the Philipinoes on that issue? [ah, I get my answer below]If we had some satisfying non material explanation of consciousness, then singling out material hypotheses would make sense. But because we don't have that, singling out the material hypothesis feels similar to saying "No Philippino has figured out the cure for cancer." Like... yeah that's strictly true, but why single out those people? Nobody else has either.
Ah, no. I am not picking on materialists. I don't think anyone has an explanation for consciousness. I suppose idealists and some other positions are more parsimonious with substance. But my mentioning my questions about matter was more or less a tangent. I kind presumed materialist and felt like I was betraying myself a bit by consistantly using that language. But, I do not think they bear any extra burden, nor would I call myself an idealist or dualist. I'm not arguing for those positions or attacking materialists. For the sake of focus, I am actually pressing toward, if anything, considering consciousness a facet of matter, not unlike those facets I mentioned earlier of matter.Unless of course you have a higher expectation on those people than other people. If you expected Philippinos to be especially capable of curing cancer, then it kinda makes sense. Do you expect materialists to be especially capable of figuring out consciousness?
That's the sort of shit people say when emergence isn't taken seriously.
I'm not sure that's the kind of argument I am thinking of. I am thinking more along the lines of Ghosts aren't physical, therefore they don't exist.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:38 pmThat's the sort of shit people say when emergence isn't taken seriously.
Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:27 pmWhat do you think of this?anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:22 pmhere is a description from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/Consider, for example, a tornado. At any moment, a tornado depends for its existence on dust and debris, and ultimately on whatever micro-entities compose it; and its properties and behaviors likewise depend, one way or another, on the properties and interacting behaviors of its fundamental components. Yet the tornado’s identity does not depend on any specific composing micro-entity or configuration, and its features and behaviors appear to differ in kind from those of its most basic constituents, as is reflected in the fact that one can have a rather good understanding of how tornadoes work while being entirely ignorant of particle physics. The point generalizes to more complex and longer-lived entities, including plants and animals, economies and ecologies, and myriad other individuals and systems studied in the special sciences: such entities appear to depend in various important respects on their components, while nonetheless belonging to distinctive taxonomies
People who are illusionists about the mind, or illustionists about anything non-fundamental, which is not incredibly common but you see it from time to time among physicalists.Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:40 pmI'm not sure that's the kind of argument I am thinking of. I am thinking more along the lines of Ghosts aren't physical, therefore they don't exist.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:38 pmThat's the sort of shit people say when emergence isn't taken seriously.
Can you give me an example of when people don't take emergence seriously, an example that fits what you were thinking of?
Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:27 pmWhat do you think of this?anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 12:22 pmhere is a description from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/Consider, for example, a tornado. At any moment, a tornado depends for its existence on dust and debris, and ultimately on whatever micro-entities compose it; and its properties and behaviors likewise depend, one way or another, on the properties and interacting behaviors of its fundamental components. Yet the tornado’s identity does not depend on any specific composing micro-entity or configuration, and its features and behaviors appear to differ in kind from those of its most basic constituents, as is reflected in the fact that one can have a rather good understanding of how tornadoes work while being entirely ignorant of particle physics. The point generalizes to more complex and longer-lived entities, including plants and animals, economies and ecologies, and myriad other individuals and systems studied in the special sciences: such entities appear to depend in various important respects on their components, while nonetheless belonging to distinctive taxonomies
This is just another example in which the 2 things (wind and tornadoes) are both in the same ontological category.The basic problem is this: emergence seems, at first glance, to be a reasonable enough idea, but when pressed for details it comes up sorely lacking. In fact, emergence of mind is very difficult to sensibly explain. Mind is not like five-fingered-ness, or warm-bloodedness. These things, which clearly did emerge, are ontologically unlike mind. They are simply reconfigurations of existing physical matter, whereas mind is of a different ontological order. It is too fundamental an aspect of existence to be comparable to ordinary biological structural features.
What about a video game? Is a video game the same ontological category as the metal it runs on?anonymous66 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 04, 2024 1:07 pm
This is just another example in which the 2 things (wind and tornadoes) are both in the same ontological category.